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Abstract 
This thesis is a social history of Bombay city in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. It explores material changes in urban life consequent upon the impact of 
modernity and the varied range of contestations of the colonial order which they 
provoke. 
The first chapter outlines the specific nature of colonial modernism and shows its 
impact on the city's spatial forms and on its social relations. Representing a highly 
selective, power-driven, and essentially technological manipulation of modernity, it 
ensures distorted and differential outcomes within urban society. These conditions are 
considerably aggravated by the sudden impact of the First World War, the subject of 
the second chapter. The War increases material scarcities, worsens conditions of urban 
life, widens disparities between rich and poor, and intensifies colonial repression. 
At the same time, the crisis of war brings to the city the full potential of the 
revolution in communications which carries a modem discourse of civic rights. In the 
city, Homiman and sections of the bilingual urban intelligentsia rapidly vernacularize 
this discourse and diffuse it into new social contexts. This is perceived by the local 
colonial state as seriously threatening and subversive. The third chapter shows how 
Gandhi's anti-modernist rejection of the city leads to his attempts to control, and in 
some aspects reverse, this gathering urban momentum for an expansion in citizenship 
rights. 
The final chapter considers the new visions of urban citizenship expressed in the 
agitation for an expansion of civil and democratic rights, and in labour protest 
movements. This critical modernism looks to the future, rather than to the past, and acts 
as a force to humanise the city, presenting an alternative and potentially more radical 
challenge to the colonial state than the Gandhian movement. 
Number of thesis words, exclusive of footnotes: 76,000. 
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Introduction: Modernity and modernisms. 
This thesis is the story of a city, Bombay, set in the modem historical era of the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. It explores material changes in urban life and the varied 
range of contestations of the colonial order which these provoke. 
The concept of `modernity' tends to be accompanied by a confusing conflict of 
definitions which often elicit strong reactions. However, I do believe that it is a useful 
concept to convey the broad range of issues with which this thesis is concerned. 
Consistent with much of the historical literatures on the subject, I view modernity 
essentially as urban experience. 2 It can be defined as a periodised experience of urban 
industrial life, materially structured in the early twentieth century by the technologies 
and artifacts of the `second industrial revolution' of the late nineteenth century, and 
receptive to a variety of related social ideas. 
This emphasis on the experience of city life at a particular historical conjuncture also 
places modernity as a local, periodised phase within the larger global process of 
`modernisation' which has been occuring over a longue duree of centuries and affecting 
entire social formations (rather than just cities) in a variety of reciprocal ways. 3 Indeed, 
Bombay's reception of modernity was shaped not only by its pivotal role in the colonial 
market-place, but more particularly by the contradictions unleashed by imperial urban 
processes resulting in very different constructions of the new forces by contending 
social classes. 
Between 1905 and 1925, Bombay witnessed the arrival of the cinema and the 
motor car, as well as of an unprecedented range of consumer goods, its streets were 
built with new methods of construction, and its buildings with new materials such as 
'As distinct from the "sociological" interpretation of modernity. For a recent critique of 
the flawed sociology of modernity, see David Washbrook, From Comparative 
Sociology to Global History: Britain and India in the Pre-History of Modernity, in 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40,4 (1997), pp. 410-443. 
2For instance, Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air. The Experience of 
Modernity. (London 1983); Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism (London 
1989); Mica Nava and Alan O'Shea (eds), Modern Times (London 1996). 
3See Washbrook, From Comparative Sociology.., pp. 417-424. 
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reinforced cement concrete. The city became increasingly electrified, daily newspapers 
expanded, and rush hours emerged. At the same time, ideas of citizenship, town 
planning, trade unions, and socialism erupted into the intellectual life of the city, causing 
a new effervescence. The event of war, now industrialised to unparalleled levels of 
destructiveness, also impacted on the city, bringing evidence of a darker side of 
modernity. But the First World War also dramatically intensified the contradictions of 
colonial rule: while reinforcing official dispositions towards a coercive use of modem 
`technics', it also exacerbated social inequalities; both these movements now provoked 
intensified forms of protest and contestation. 
The first part of the thesis shows how the new forces of modernity impacted on the 
city's spatial forms and on its social relations. They inscribed themselves on a city that 
had already been shaped by a distinctive colonial conceptualization of urban space, 
marked by an extreme degree of social differentiation. This "colonial urbanism" 
originally derived from the city's projected vocation, in the eyes of its imperial rulers, 
as a commercial centre for the concentration and, on the one hand, export of 
commodities extracted from a rural hinterland, and on the other, import of consumer 
goods from Britain. It required the creation of capitalist social relationships through a 
legal framework which emphasized private property and trading rights within a 
politically authoritarian regime. 
The resulting accumulation of wealth gave the city its dominant class factions of 
merchants, landlords, and industrialists, exploiting a large labouring class servicing 
their needs. Colonial spatial organisation thus shaped the hegemony of some groups 
over the mass of citizens; it produced a series of formally differentiated social spaces 
inhabited by communities characterized by extreme class inequalities both in material 
well-being and in access to various kinds of urban resources. Contemporaries observed 
the stark contrast between the few localities rich in civic amenities, and the majority of 
neighbourhoods lacking adequate housing, transport, and water-supply, and prone to 
the scourge of disease. Yet, it was precisely the severity of this social inequality that 
made Bombay particularly receptive to some of the new visions of modernity. 
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Thus, however much Bombay owed its origins to colonial enterprises and 
continued, during this period, to serve imperial needs, the city's ability to attract and 
integrate some of the new ideas and artifacts into its life, does in my view give it a 
significant measure of agency. Between 1905 and 1925, the city ordered new rotary 
printing presses, film cameras, as well as contemporary radical political books, 
journals, and pamphlets. It debated ideas of citizenship and town planning, the rise of 
socialism, women's right to the franchise, the role of trade unions, and the importance 
of architecture. And it produced protest movements that provided a novel challenge to 
the existing colonial order, movements, moreover that had an all-India impact. If this 
seems an arbitrary selection from the range of the city's engagements with modernity, 
it nonetheless serves to illustrate a point. 
That is that, while there clearly is a relationship between colonial hegemony and the 
experience of modernity, in no sense are they identical processes. From the vast array 
of raw materials that make it up, modernity offers a range of possible world-views or 
"modernisms" which contending social groups in the city construct differently. 
Colonial modernism represented a highly selective, power-driven manipulation of 
modernity. It placed a premium on a largely mechanical and superficial technological 
interpretation, the `social filters' of domination and privilege ensuring limited 
applications to, and distorted and differential outcomes within, urban society. 4 
Architecturally imposing buildings, new wide roads and electric lighting simply served 
to consolidate particular localities of south Bombay as elite social spaces, distinguished 
from the rest of a city starved of civic amenities. The reinforced concrete tenement 
chawl intensified the bleakness of working-class housing. The electrified tramway 
4Richard W. Bulliet uses the concept of `social filters' to define hegemonic processes 
such as class, race, colonialism, gender which, he argues, determines which 
technologies are disseminated between societies and how rapidly they impact. Richard 
W. Bulliet, Determinism and Pre-Industrial Technology, in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo 
Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? (Cambridge Mass. 1994), p. 205. 
banned halalkores (sweepers) from using the service, while taxis were forbidden by the 
police from carrying cleaners and other menials belonging to the `Depressed Classes'. 5 
New wireless stations were set up primarily `with a view to suppress civil 
disorder', 6 while the cinema was perceived as a potential vehicle for government 
propaganda. Similarly, the perspectives opened up by ideas of urban planning were 
nullified by the local colonial state's involvement in the competition, amongst the 
dominant class factions, for the scarce market resource of urban land. Visually 
reinforcing spatial inequality and social stratification, and inseparable from the exercise 
of hegemony, colonial modernism could thus only provoke challenge and contestation. 
In the early post-war era in Bombay city, colonial modernism was confronted by 
the Gandhian movement. Along with the colonial model, Gandhi rejected all potential 
varieties of modernism as alien to the genius of "Indian civilization". However, his 
distinctive "invention of tradition" necessarily occured within the actual framework of 
the present, the past serving essentially as an ideological instrument to confront the 
unsettling `maelstrom of modern life, .7 In particular, his rejection of the city as the 
principal artifact of modernity led to unsustainable attempts to deny urban materialities 
and to reverse citizens' evolving modes of consumption. This restricted his appeal to a 
well-to-do but unsettled urban merchant class whose tax grievances against the colonial 
regime now drew them into nationalist politics. Gandhian contradictions were 
encapsulated by the Municipal Nationalist Party's ambivalent opposition to the colonial 
status quo in the city in the mid-1920s. 
In contrast to Gandhi's anti-modernism, this thesis has sought to identify a "critical 
modernism" which came to prominence virtually simultaneously in the early post-war 
era. It attempts to show how, in reaction to colonial urbanization and political 
5The Bombay Chronicle received a letter of complaint from a tram passenger who had 
witnessed the ejection of a halalkore by the conductor. The author wondered how the 
Tramway Company `conducted ostensibly by men of most advanced views' were able 
to prohibit a certain class of people from travelling in its cars, a policy which was 
wholly `incompatible with the spirit of modem times'. BC, 7 Aug. 1922. 
6GOI Home Political Proceedings, Jan. 1922. 
7Berman, All That Is Solid.., p. 16. 
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repression, Bombay citizens developed increasing civic aspirations which culminated in 
a series of campaigns and protest movements in the city. This expanded consciousness 
of rights was not an automatic by-product of industrial modernity or of "nationalism", 
but the outcome of an impressive creativity in understanding the relevance of, and 
seizing upon, a contestatory vocabulary of civic democracy derived from a Western 
world itself in the throes of unprecedented social change. 8 This enabled a novel 
linguistic ordering, and new definitions, of urban experience. 9 
It is significant that this movement emerged from the simultaneous realms of 
journalistic practice and labour/political activism during the crisis years of war. In an era 
of global transformations marked by a revolutionary circulation of new ideas, the 
newspaper provided an expanding public space for the production, dissemination, and 
public discussion of ideas: here, the material grievances of the poorer sections of urban 
society could for the first time be linked to the more general colonial denial of civic 
rights, particularly the rights of expression and of political participation, the hallmarks 
of contemporary nationalist agitation. In this building up of connections, the leadership 
roles of the Bombay Chronicle and of its activist editor, Benjamin Guy Horniman, 
were crucial. The paper constructed a daily narrative of the city which identified the 
undesirable hegemonies of the urban colonial order and kept them constantly in the 
public eye. 
The Bombay Chronicle revealed an autocratic and unaccountable local colonial state 
both presiding over and sharing in, the unfettered domination of private interests over 
the city. In the daily scenario drawn in its pages, "public" institutions--government 
81 therefore understand critical modernism as a dynamic and dialectical urban process, 
entirely differently to Bhikhu Parekh's use of the term. Parekh defines `critical 
modernism' purely in terms of nineteenth century attempts by Raja Ram Mohun Roy, 
K. C Sen, and Gokhale to achieve a `syncretism' or `creative synthesis' between the 
`spiritual principles' of Hindu civilization and the modern European `spirit of science'. 
Bhikhu Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform (Delhi 1989), pp. 59-63. 
90n the political importance of the appropriate linguistic `ordering' of material 
experience, see Gareth Stedman Jones's essay Rethinking Chartism, in his Languages 
of Class: Studies in English working class history (Cambridge 1983), pp. 90-178; and 
also, Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge 1981). 
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departments, the Improvement Trust, the Municipal Corporation--were essentially 
engaged in activities detrimental to both the city and to the vast majority of its citizens. 
Their operations facilitated the exploitation of citizens by unregulated private enterprise, 
ensuring high levels of social deprivation: tenants by landlords, workers by millowners 
and their middlemen, consumers by merchants and monopolies, passengers by the 
railway companies. The Chronicle provided an increasingly influential reading of the 
various civic contestations that were now challenging these hegemonies, thus cohering 
and amplifying them. 
This narrative was, of course, in English, the original language of modernity. 
However, its dissonant and contestatory use as a means of assaulting mainstream 
colonial culture revealed English in a new light: no longer the one-dimensional 
repository of a timeless `great tradition' emphasized and promoted by Macauley, and 
used, in the city's higher education institutions, to transmit a politically conservative 
`cultural ideal'; 10 but a changeable and flexible medium that could be shaped and 
reshaped for new purposes. Originally disseminated as the language of power, the 
thrust of critical modernism was now remaking and revitalising English, and taking it 
into new domains of use; in spite of Gandhi's view that `the highest development of the 
Indian mind" did not require "a knowledge of English', 1I mastery of this dissident 
English was the perfect symmetrical response to the original colonial conquest of 
Indian `epistemological space' through the appropriation and objectification of Indian 
languages. 12 This could now mean that a translated article from the Chronicle would 
lead groups amongst the urban poor such as postmen to strike, while government 
10English education was formally organised through the setting up of the Elphinstone 
College (1827) and the University of Bombay (1857); it was not only designed to 
create a class of `interpreters', to be employed mainly in the various government 
departments, but to inculcate a code of moral values which emphasized `self- 
improvement' and strength of character, the quintessential virtues of Victorian 
capitalism. Ellen E. McDonald, English Education and Social Reform in Late 
Nineteenth Century Bombay. A Case Study in the Transmission of a Cultural Ideal, in 
Journal ofAsian Studies, 25,3 (May 1966), pp. 453-470. 
11 YI, 2 Feb. 1921. This view also denied the very basis of his own cultural creativity. 
12Bernard S. Cohn, The Command of Language and the Language of Command, in R. 
Guha (ed. ) Subaltern Studies IV (Delhi 1986), pp. 276-329. 
pamphlets in the vernacular designed to explain the Rowlatt Act would have no effect 
whatsoever. 
This divergent English was received by a bilingual intelligentsia13 long 
accustomed, in the city, to mediating between English and the main Marathi and 
Gujarati vernaculars-14 Given the bilingual character of a substantial section of the 
urban press, these mediations largely shaped the evolution of public opinion. The 
English of critical modernism now provided opportunities for its vernacularization into 
expanded civic contexts. A Bombay characterized by an unprecedented circulation of 
print-newspapers, magazines, Home Rule pamphlets, Satyagraha leaflets, cinema and 
theatre posters, advertisements, notices for public meetings, Khilafat handbills, trade 
union bulletins, municipal petitions, banners carried by striking workers and nationalist 
demonstrators-offered a vast array of possibilities for vernacularization. Indeed, much 
of this writing was itself bilingual. 15 Moreover, the circulation and discussion of the 
new civic articulations were boosted by the fact that they operated within an expanding 
and increasingly assertive meta-nationalist public discourse. 
Besides the press, political activism provided a more direct oral dissemination 
route. The very social structure of the city, characterized by extreme class and literacy 
inequalities, ensured that sections of the bilingual intelligentsia played a crucial role in 
attempting to organise the working classes during this era. Labour activists and early 
trade union organisers were predominantly drawn from groups whose professions 
13This concept is borrowed from Benedict Anderson though I perceive this 
intelligentsia's role in somewhat more creative terms at this particular historical 
conjuncture. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London 1991), pp. 116,134,140. 
The Bombay intelligentsia's general exclusion from the municipal franchise until 1923 
meant that it tended to adopt a critical perspective vis-a-vis the colonial urban order. 
Journalists, moreover, tended to be its most vociferous anti-establishment faction. 
During this period, these bilinguals were in the process of emerging as a nationalist 
intelligentsia, but more interestingly perhaps, with a variety of nuanced positions along 
the modernist-anti-modernist continuum. 
14 Christine Dobbin, Urban Leadership in Western India (Oxford 1972), pp. 54-55. 
15And sometimes indeed trilingual. The monthly Movie magazine, for instance, 
launched in 1924, was published in English, Marathi, and Gujarati. Annual Report on 
Indian and Anglo-Vernacular Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1924; Bombay Confidential Proceedings 1925, pp. 108-9. 
demanded the constant handling and switching of language: social workers, journalists, 
barristers and advocates. For these strategically-placed readers, bilinguality offered the 
ability to access the modernist world of changing visions and practices and to select and 
diffuse the most relevant concepts and ideas in the context of an evolving urban labour 
arena. 
Throughout this era, literacy in English was rising faster than the general rate of 
literacy in the city. Between the early years of the century and the late 1920s, the 
percentage of the literate population rose from 19 to 24 percent; 16 over the same 
period, literacy in English increased from 5 to 11.6 percent. 17 Thus, in twenty-five 
years the percentage of citizens literate in English had risen from a quarter to almost 
half the total literate population. Indeed, this was probably the era that accelerated the 
journey of English towards becoming an `Indian' language. The 1931 census classified 
9.2 percent of citizens as `bilingual', quickly adding however that this was a `plainly 
much underestimated' figure. 18 
Significantly, the colonial state brought its institutional apparatus of repression to 
bear on the material artifacts of print production and circulation, seen as fundamental to 
the emergence of various forms of critical modernism. The Press and Defense of India 
Acts were used to coerce the Chronicle and other nationalist papers and, ultimately, to 
expel Horniman from India; customs authorities were instructed to be on the lookout 
for `hand printing machines fitted with Persian and Indian type face for communist 
propaganda purposes'; these could easily be `fitted into a small portmanteau' and 
`carried as travelling luggage'; 19 indeed a postal cordon sanitaire attempted to keep 
16s was probably the highest literacy rate of any contemporary colonial city, and it 
was a figure which the national all-India aggregate would only reach in 1961. D. P 
Pattanayak, Multilingualism and Mother-Tongue Education (Delhi 1981), p. 44. 
17C1,1901, vol. x: Bombay (Town & Island), part v, p. 34-36; and 1931, vol. ix: The 
cities of the Bombay Presidency, p. 35. 
18ibid., p. 38. 
19GOB Revenue Department Resolution, 9 Aug. 1923; GOB Confidential 
Proceedings 1923. 
out not only "communist" publications, but any literature potentially critical of the 
colonial status quo. 20 
In the city, journalists' and activists' homes were periodically raided in the search 
for non-registered, "illegal" printers while schools, libraries and reading-rooms were 
provided with only government-approved material. State repression was however 
unable to prevent the production, circulation, and exchange of new ideas within the city; 
conducted through an expanding, bilingual urban press, and through a variety of oral 
platforms, this process contributed massively to the radicalisation of public opinion. 
This diffusion of new ideas on an urban world characterized by extreme material 
inequalities also led to unprecedented social agitation. Workers now found in strikes 
and in trade union activity promising class combinations to attempt to reverse the 
steady deterioration of their living conditions. The spate of strikes and the growth of 
trade unions in the early post-war era thus represented another dimension of critical 
modernism. It is true that until the mid-1920s, these unions were not "radical" and 
were primarily concerned with improving the welfare of workers within unchanged 
colonial/capitalist relations of production. As a result, from very early on, they faced 
attempts at cooption (rather than outright repression) by the colonial state. 
I argue, however, that this very focusing on welfare issues was part of a new 
demand for social rights which included housing and other material deprivations of 
urban labour. This should also be seen in relation to simultaneous demands for the 
expansion of civil and political rights. Overall, this global urban pressure on the colonial 
state amounted to a radical challenge aimed at a substantial extension of citizenship 
rights while offering, at the same time, an implicit programme for national renewal. 
Critical modernism in Bombay during this period can thus be defined as the 
articulation of citizenship aspirations conducive to urban renewal, and inherent in the 
dynamism of the new age. Its social base was constituted by the mass of 
20No distinction was made between communist and social democratic publications, 
while correspondence between Bombay activists and left-wing figures in Britain was 
routinely intercepted. 
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disenfranchised citizens, led by sections of the middle class intelligentsia increasingly 
active in the world of labour. It thus spoke in a polyphony of voices: journalists, 
political activists, social reformers, labour organisers, women's groups, workers, 
tenants, students; its arenas, too, were multi-locational: the press, the public platform, 
the street, the neighbourhood, the workplace, the municipal chamber. It confronted a 
range of particular vested interests responsible for the iniquitous material conditions of 
urban life, butressed by a local colonial state intent on preserving its own sacrosanct 
political traditions. This thesis tells the story of some of these confrontations. 
It has relied on newspapers, reports, pamphlets, official records and private papers, 
which are simultaneously artifactual remains as well as representations of Bombay life 
during this period. The artifactual nature of these sources mean that they were deeply 
embedded in the material world of their time, providing direct access to real processes 
of social change even before we consider what they actually say. The new mode of 
production of the daily newspaper, for instance, was part of the wider process of 
modernist transformations of the urban world. 21 This awareness that the sources 
themselves represent an indissoluble unity of material process and consciousness, has 
shaped the philosophy of this work which has sought to locate "discourses" firmly 
within the changing material world of this era. 22 
Finally, this thesis also attempts, implicitly, to suggest the fruitfulness of a 
comparative approach. This is founded as much on the belief that urban industrial 
formations in the modern era are eminently comparable, as on the view that it is 
through the delineation of contrasts that the singularity of colonial urbanism can best be 
established. Indeed, the urban framework invites the consideration of possibilities that 
21 The introduction of the `double octuple' rotary machine now enabled a dramatic 
increase in both the speed and volume of newspaper production which led to 
appreciable price reductions. The Times of India's drop from four annas to one anna in 
1915 is credited with providing the paper, for the first time, with a substantial Indian 
readership. Times of India Sesquicentennial Books: Feedback Letters to the Editor of 
the Times of India (Times of India Books, Bombay 1989), p. 10. 
22For a recent eloquent plea for a return to the `material world' in historical research, 
see Raj Chandavarkar's introduction to his Imperial Power and Popular Politics 
(Cambridge 1998), pp. 21-22,28-29. 
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something may yet be learnt from a synchronic juxtaposition of Indian and Western 
societies. Moreover, connections and comparisons between Bombay and other cities, 
both in India and abroad, were very much in the minds of contemporaries. 
During this period, the celebratory motto of Urbs Prima in Indis, coined by the 
city's elites to mark the first phase of colonial urbanism in the nineteenth century, was 
giving way to a new awareness of Bombay as a world city, one of a select club of about 
twenty world-wide conurbations with a population of over a million inhabitants. 23 
More people now lived in this Indian city than in any British city with the exception of 
London, and Bombay's competitors for the "status" of "second city of the Empire" 
were limited to Calcutta; Glasgow, and Birmingham. 
The 1921 Census listed Bombay demographically alongside the other identified 
major cities of the world. Bombay's 1,175,914 inhabitants placed the city behind only 
New York, London, Paris, Chicago, Petrograd (St. Petersburg), Tokyo, Berlin, 
Philadelphia, Vienna, and Buenos Aires. It ranked alongside Moscow, Rio de Janeiro, 
Budapest, Glasgow, and Calcutta, and ahead of Peking (Beijing), Shanghai, Hamburg, 
Istanbul, Birmingham, and Liverpool. 24 
A reading of the press and of municipal debates reveals a creative quest to 
understand and make greater sense of the city's problems by drawing on the experience 
of other world cities. Comparisons were now being made across the entire range of 
institutional and social processes which affected the city's well-being: State policies and 
obligations, the range of civic rights, the performance of municipalities and of public 
transport systems; urban prices and wages, landlordism, and the concentration of the 
city's poor in overcrowded, high-rent areas; approaches to town-planning and to the 
eradication of disease. 
23C1,1921, vol. ix, p. I. 
24ibid. 
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In highlighting the possibilities of comparative method, this thesis thus also pays 
tribute to one of the ways in which the citizens of Bombay were themselves attempting 
to move towards the definition of a more humane city during this period. 
13 
Chapter one: Colonial modernism and the flawed paradigms of 
urban renewal. 
1. Contrasting urban landscapes: uneven spatial development and social 
stratification. 
Bombay was not an indigeneous Indian city. It did not evolve from an original 
sacred centre or a place of pilgrimage, but represents the outcome of a colonial capitalist 
process which created its own stratified urban forms. This process of production of an 
uneven social space was distinctive in its colonial realisation, while also related to the 
more general problematic of social inequality characteristic of modem industrial cities., 
The production of Bombay as a social space subsumes the processes of 
urbanization and industrialization. The city, of course, predated its industrialization. By 
the mid-nineteenth century, a built environment potentially supportive of capitalist 
industrialization was already in existence. It provided a concentration of assets in the 
form of entrepreneurs, capital, and technologies, as well as of financial institutions, 
necessary for industrial enterprise. In this sense, industrialization was merely a phase in 
the constant production and renewal of colonial urban space: 2 while underlining and 
accentuating social inequalities, industrial development did not in itself significantly 
alter the fundamental colonial patterning of the city into a series of uneven spatial 
templates. 
Under the controlling hand of the East India Company, Bombay was originally 
created as a built environment to facilitate the extraction and concentration of vast 
1See particularly Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford 1991); Le droit 'a 
la ville (Paris 1968/72); David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Oxford 1988); The 
Urban Experience (Oxford 1989). 
2Significantly, the rate of the city's population increase during the initial phase of 
industrialization between 1864 and 1891 remained lower than during the commercial 
boom years of 1846-64. The already dense population of `B' and `C' wards, for 
instance, was attributed to `the commercial delirium of the early sixties'. The population 
increase over the last decades of the century should, moreover, be attributed to the vast 
array of activities involved in the overall transformation of urban space--reclamations, 
construction of homes, public buildings, railway stations, road and water works, 
dockyards, tramway extensions, markets, temples, and mosques--rather than just to the 
growth of cotton spinning and weaving factories. CI, 1901, vol. x part iv, p. 141-42; 
part v, p. 17. 
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quantities of cotton and opium from its rural hinterland, and to enable their shipment 
abroad; these commodities provided the basis for a flourishing colonial trade with 
China, 3 while cotton exports to England contributed significantly to new domestic 
consumption patterns which paved the way for Britain's industrial take off. 4 Spatially, 
Bombay was thus conceived as a regional centre of capital accumulation, at the heart of 
an export-oriented network of communications centred on its port. This was expressed, 
in terms of human geography, by a settlement area gradually expanding west-north- 
westwards from the fortified harbour area along the south-eastern shore of the original 
island. 
Social labour created much of the surface land that gradually expanded and joined 
together the original seven small islands, enabling their progressive urban 
metamorphosis into "Bombay. " A virtually continuous process of land reclamation 
from the sea, and of construction of vellards, bunders, and causeways, enabled the 
development of built structures and the gradual expansion of human settlement. The 
construction of Hornby Vellard in the late 18th century connected north and south 
Bombay and made habitable the centre of the island, otherwise inundated during high 
tide; while the completion of the Sion, Worli, Colaba, and Mahim causeways during 
the first half of the 19th century finally linked the islands into one landmass .5 
The development of built structures between the early eighteenth and mid- 
nineteenth centuries produced the Fort as the city's dominant social space. In the 
vicinity of Bombay Castle, the East India Company's seat of government (one of the 
few pre-existing built structures inherited from the Portuguese), bastions, batteries, and 
fortified gates created a walled area which controlled access to and from the settlement 
and the steadily expanding port and harbour. To the west, a semi-circular swathe of 
ground was cleared to provide an open space, the Esplanade, within direct firing range 
3Amar Farooqui, Urban Development in a Colonial Situation: Early Nineteenth 
Century Bombay, in EPW, (October 5 1996), pp. 2748-49. 
4Washbrook, From Comparative Sociology.., pp. 417-19. 
5Sharada Dwivedi & Rahul Mehrotra, Bombay: The Cities Within (Bombay 1995), pp. 
20,45,78. 
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from the fortified area. Such military security reinforced the Fort's desirability as the 
prime location for both commerce and residence. 6 
Military force was thus inscribed in the newly produced social space which became 
the nucleus of early British Bombay, extending southwards to Colaba. From very early 
on, however, the Company's enforced reliance upon native brokers to secure profitable 
commercial transactions with the Bombay hinterland, ensured the granting of property 
rights7 to elite merchant communities who thus participated in the creation of urban 
space within the Fort. Banias, Bohras, and particularly, Parsis, settled in the northern 
quarter of the walled town where the construction of indigeneous houses, shops, and 
warehouses, the emergence of street markets, and the activities of shroffs, traders, and 
hawkers, effectively created the locality which became known as Bazaargate. 8 
Nonetheless, an informal racial division did emerge within the boundaries of the 
Fort. Churchgate Street came to function as an intangible line of demarcation separating 
the British settlement to the south `crowded with whitewashed English homes with 
covered piazzas' from the `brightly painted and carved ethnic Indian houses' to the 
north. Moreover, while the British strove to ensure that, south of Churchgate Street, 
building sites were controlled and that architectural and design considerations were 
applied to the organisation of social space, no strict building regulations were enforced 
either in north Fort or in the rapidly growing "Indian town" just beyond the 
fortifications. 9 
It was here that enabling colonial property rights led to the emergence of 
predominantly `Indian' social space: Girgaum, Bhuleshwar, Kalbadevi, Dhobi Talao, 
Pydhuni, Chakla, Umarkhadi, Mandvi, Dongri While the various mohallas and wadis 
(neighbourhoods) of these localities derived their distinctive identities from the jail 
6ibid., pp. 19-22. 
7For a full discussion of their implications, see chapter four. 
8Dwivedi & Mehrotra, pp. 29-31. 
9ibid., pp. 28,38. In 1839, legislation was passed limiting the height of buildings in the 
Fort to 50 feet, but little attempt seems to have been made to enforce it in the northern 
sector. Farooqui, p. 2753. 
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(caste), religion, language, or occupation of the majority of their residents, 10 this was 
an urban landscape nonetheless primarily structured by the needs of commerce: landuse 
here was mixed commercial-residential, with the same building serving merchants and 
traders both as residence (on the upper floors) and as the pedhi (shop) from which they 
conducted their wholesale or retail businesses. 1I This landscape also came to 
accomodate the major cloth, bullion, and jewellery markets established by wealthy 
merchants, as well as the numerous godowns (warehouses) that served them. 12 
The overwhelming concentration of commercial activities and employment 
opportunities in the Fort led to a diverse population influx which very quickly caused 
urban congestion. By the early 19th century, this core urban area easily had the highest 
density of persons per house while the rate of increase in such settlements as Mandvi, 
Market, and Dongri, just to the north, was even higher. 13 The demand for housing also 
led to a sharp rise in the value of land which was becoming an increasingly scarce 
resource. Investment in urban real estate provided lucrative new opportunities for 
indigeneous merchants who had prospered through the opium and cotton trade with 
China. There soon emerged a new "class faction" of landlords whose determination to 
secure `all possible advantage of the area in their possession by building to its full 
depth', 14 led to the production of a uniquely degraded form of social space: the high- 
density, overcrowded tenement chawl. 15 
Into these chawls poured successive waves of migrant workers from the Konkan 
and Deccan. This was primarily an unskilled, casual labour force in search of seasonal 
employment offered by the construction trades, the expansion in dockyards, and the 
I OJim Masselos, Appropriating Urban Space: Social Constructs Of Bombay In The 
Time of the Raj, in South Asia vol. xiv no. 1 (June 1991), p. 37. 
11 Mariam Dossal, Imperial Designs and Indian Realities: The Planning of Bombay 
City 1845-1875 (Delhi 1991), p. 17. 
12Masselos, Appropriating Urban Space.., pp. 36-37; Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 22. 
13Farooqui, p. 2749; 
14ibid., p. 2753. 
151t was `a form of tenement designed to accomodate the largest number of people in 
the smallest possible area. ' Meera Kosambi, Bombay in Transition. The growth and 
social ecology of a colonial city 1880-1980 (Stockholm 1986), p. 46. 
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increase in port and maritime activities. Some were able to combine this work with 
self-employed retailing of the daily necessities of urban life, particularly as itinerant 
hawkers and street vendors. As in all cities before the advent of public transport, there 
was no option but to live within walking distance of the workplace: for the newly 
arrived labourers, this meant seeking chawl accomodation in those areas of the `native 
town' closest to the Fort and the port area. Here, bad housing-dark, poorly ventilated, 
and overcrowded--combined with their katcha (ie unpaved) surroundings and the 
absence of drains and sewers to produce "foul air" and a disease-prone environment. In 
these circumstances, fevers and diseases such as tuberculosis were routine while 
epidemics like cholera and malaria frequently visited upon the poor during the first half 
of the 19th century. 16 
Thus, well before the impact of industrialization, the colonial desire to create a 
homely landscape out of an "alien" physical environment combined with the spatial 
impact of an unregulated commercial capitalism, had produced a qualitative hierarchy 
of social spaces. While functioning as the nerve-centre of the colonial military- 
commercial complex, South Fort was also created as a British "home from home", 
drawing to itself the maximum social and civic amenities. Here, built forms were 
essentially organised to convey an aesthetic sense of spaciousness: the archetypal house 
in the European settlement, the low-built one-storey bungalow, was an original colonial 
creation. Situated in an open space enclosed by a fence, the bungalow, with its shaded 
verandah and rooms oriented to admit every breeze, was not only a privileged response 
to climatic conditions; it also served as a marker of its inhabitants' superior social 
status. 17 
Moreover, with the exception of the water-supply which remained problematic 
until the second half of the century, South Fort was well lit, well paved, and provided 
with covered drains. It was also, of course, the space of political power. New buildings 
16Farooqui, pp. 2750,2754; Dossal, p. 126. 
17Anthony King, The Bungalow. The production of a global culture (London 1984), 
pp. 46-47. 
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like the massive Town Hall, with its distinctive Corinthian interiors, and the Mint, with 
its conspicuous Ionic portico, were built in the dominant European neo-classical style 
whose `ordered beauty' expressed the British conception of how power and prestige 
ought to be represented in built form. 18 The Mint also symbolized the increasing 
penetration of capitalist institutions while the Town Hall signified a new colonial 
consciousness of the city's importance in the imperial network of trade. 
In contrast, North Fort, with its high rise houses closely crowded together, and its 
rows of shops, busy market, and street bazaar, was already by mid-century a highly 
congested settlement. 9 It was unpaved and poorly lit, while unregulated building had 
rendered its streets uneven and dangerous. These conditions were even more prominent 
in the `Native Town', with its generally less affluent Indian residents, just beyond the 
fort walls. Here, haphazard built structures, crowded into narrow, winding lanes 
provided the social space for a large variety of small-scale commercial activities. Richer 
merchants tended to occupy residences along street fronts, leaving the urban poor to 
congregate in chawis and tenements in the rear, interior spaces 20 
The original character of the Fort as the growing settlement's prime social space, 
combining military, governmental, commercial, and residential functions, entailed a 
number of cumulative consequences: as economic functions, in particular, grew, they 
produced built structures that very quickly exerted severe pressure on the available land 
surface area within the fortified walls. By the early 19th century, the Fort's `substantial 
buildings' had spilt over to almost three miles into the Indian town. 21 Over the course 
of the century, `warehouse room' continued to expand at the expense of residential 
space in both north and south Fort. 22 As a result, European settlement gradually 
migrated to Malabar Hill, Cumballa Hill, and Breach Candy--prime residential land 
18Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj. The New Cambridge History of India, 
III. 4 (Cambridge 1994), p. 51. 
19Kosambi, p. 45. 
20Dossal, p. 23. 
21 Farooqui, p. 2753. 
22C1,1901, vol. x part iv, p. 128. 
19 
fronting the sea in the south-west and west of the island; even here, however, the 
British were never able to exclude elite Indians from acquiring land and building 
houses. 23 
The transfer of authority from the East India Company to the British Crown 
following the Rebellion of 1857 led to a drive to reconstruct social space in the Fort. 
Additional land was created through the demolition of the ramparts and reclamation 
from the sea as the colonial authorities now strove to erase built signs of their military 
origins and highlight instead the city as a prosperous centre of commercial enterprise 
illustrative of colonial power and prestige. Facing the Town Hall, a circular garden park 
enclosed by a complex of architecturally unified commercial buildings was created as 
Elphinstone Circle. Similarly, the Esplanade was reorganised from a single open space 
into four separate maidans, while the removal of the fortifications also enabled the 
emergence of major new roads providing south Bombay, for the first time, with north- 
south as well as east-west axes. 24 
The renewal of social space in the Fort now had an explicitly imperial objective. The 
opened up sites were occupied by planned public buildings designed to display the 
architectural arts of a "superior" civilization. During the late 19th century, there thus 
emerged a range of public edifices in the `neo-Gothic' style originally devised by John 
Ruskin and William Morris as, ironically, a rebellion against the tastelessness of 
mainstream British Victorian architecture. The Bombay High Court, the Secretariat, the 
University Library and Convocation Hall, and the Municipal Corporation were some of 
the Gothic buildings that conferred a new landscape upon the Fort. At the same time, 
the siting of the rä Tway terminal:, at Victoria Terminus and the 
architecturally grand station- that enclosed 
it 
_, clinched the 
Fort's function as the 
spatial embodiment of a new colonial modernism. 
23Farooqui, p. 2753. Parsi-owned houses were generally occupied by Europeans. 
While Farooqui attributes this solely to `cultural preference'--Parsis being unwilling to 
live in a predominantly European quarter, it is more likely that these houses were seen 
by their owners as shrewd investments bringing in high rental returns. 
24Dossal, pp. 192-93; Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 90. 
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With its deliberate, unsubtle symbolism--it featured mounted figures representing 
`Progress' as well as `Commerce' and `Engineering', 25 the Victoria Terminus 
building encapsulated the colonial conception of modernity. In the colonial context of 
late 19th century Bombay, "progress" meant an unquestioned adherence to the 
competitive norms of commercial capitalism now facilitated by the new technologies of 
speed-the railway, the tramway, the telegraph. No doubt, the Bombay government 
generally favoured manufacturing interests in Britain and local 'Anglo-Indian' 
commercial lobbies now organised in the Bombay Chamber of Commerce; however, 
the strength of Indian merchant enterprise, particularly through the trade in opium, 
enabled a growing process of indigeneous capital accumulation which was channeled 
both into urban real estate and the built environment, and subsequently into industrial 
development. 
A multi-caste urban bourgeoisie, these shetias benefitted both from the British 
government's abrogation of the East India Company's trading monopolies and from 
the gradual consolidation of capitalist property rights during the course of the 19th 
century. A proportion of their considerable profits from trade was reinvested in urban 
real estate; already by the 1850s, it was estimated that half of the island of Bombay was 
owned by shetia-landlords. 26 Investment in land and buildings not only brought 
lucrative returns but also enabled a more flexible strategy of capital accumulation. 
Meanwhile, as competition from British expatriate capital in the export trade grew 
ever more intense, a new demand for Indian raw cotton emerged as a result of the 
American Civil War. This created a boom period of capital accumulation for 
indigeneous merchants27 and new possibilities of diversification as a result of the city's 
25ibid., p. 105. 
26Christine Dobbin, Urban Leadership-, p. 12. 
270f this new wealth, `some 6 million pounds sterling' was spent on land reclamation 
so that by 1872 `the area of the whole island had risen from 18.62 square miles to over 
22 square miles. ' Once again, however, it was the south and its commercial ventures 
that primarily benefitted, the new space being entirely devoted to roads, railways, 
docks, and warehouses. CI, 1901, vol. x part iv, p. 128; Dossal, p. 219. 
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easy access to sources of both raw cotton and cheap labour by the 1860s, capital began 
to be increasingly invested in the building of cotton mills. 28 
By the latter stages of the nineteenth century, the production of the urban 
environment thus reflected the increasingly intense competition for profitable 
investments between European and Indian elites, a conflict within dominant class 
factions. The new hegemony of laissez faire economic doctrines meant that space was 
conceived primarily as a commodity, and that its transformation into urban forms was 
entrusted to competitive market forces. As in European cities, this precluded any 
overall approach to urban planning and the development of a concomitant civic sense of 
the public good. It promoted an essentially fragmentary view of the city, leaving Indian 
and colonial elites free to develop social spaces as they wished, within their respective 
bits of territory. Thus, while the Fort was re-created as the colonial image centre, built 
spaces in the Indian town were primarily generated by the drive for the most rewarding 
exchange values. 
Employment prospects generated by the new public buildings, the development in 
communications, and the extension of dockyards led to a dramatic increase in the urban 
population, `.. all attracted into a comparatively small portion of the island'. Landlords 
and speculative builders attempted to make the most of the consequent housing demand 
and rising rents by building tenements and erecting additional storeys to old buildings 
`totally unfit to bear their weight'. 29 As a result, Chakla grew to an average of eighteen 
houses per acre, `huge four-storeyed dwelling places, with scarcely room for a sweeper 
to pass between them' 30 Mandvi was described as `pre-eminently in a position to 
become the plague-centre of the island' by the 1880s. It was `choked with population 
and notorious for its insanitary condition'. Houses had sprung up `storey upon storey' 
and now `stretched towards the docks, climbed tier by tier up the old portion of the 
Dongri Kolis.. spread away to Dhobi Talao, Bhuleshwar, Khara Talao, and northward, 
28Raj Chandavarkar, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India. Business 
strategies and the working classes in Bombay, 1900-1940 (Cambridge 1994), p. 65. 29C1,1901, vol. x part iv, p. 135. 
30ibid., vol. x part v, p. 15. 
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till they faced the new buildings which a growing mill-industry-was bringing during 
this period into existence.. ' 31 
Indeed, by the end of the century, a new industrial landscape, created out of the 
filling in of previously empty lowlands, had emerged virtually adjoining the northern 
portion of the congested Indian town. The local colonial state's desire that industrial 
space be located as far as possible from the imperial centre of the Fort and the elite 
residential settlements of Malabar Hill and Cumballa Hill, 32 coupled with the 
enticement of cheaper land values, ensured that shetias-turned-industrialists built their 
cotton mills and workshops in the sparsely populated urban villages of Tardeo, Lalbag, 
and West Parel. I 
With little interest shown in providing accommodation for the mill workers by 
either the colonial state, millowners, or the newly established Bombay Municipal 
Corporation, the housing issue was, like everything else, left to seek a market solution. 
As a result, entrepreneurial landlords built the most basic tenement chawls on the 
premise that the chronically low-waged workers would only be able to pay a cursory 
rent. In the absence of regulations specifying minimum adequate living space, home 
amenities, and open space between buildings, one-room tenements were erected on 
`every inch of available land' without connections to drains or sewer pipes. 
`Innumerable chawls' sprang up north of Bellasis Road, and `all the open land in 
Tardeo' was gradually built over and `as fast as the houses were built there appeared a 
population to inhabit them'; while Byculla was said to contain `some of the worst one- 
31 ibid., vol. x part iv, p. 150. 
32Since the early 19th century, `noxious' industries were continually being removed 
from south Bombay and relocated in the north. In 1872 the Municipal Health Officer 
warned that the health of the predominantly European residents of Cumballa Hill was at 
risk due to the sudden mushrooming of mill workers' huts in nearby Tardeo; while the 
government-appointed Bombay Extension Committee recommended, in 1887, that 
particular northern districts only be designated for further industrial development. 
Masselos, Appropriating Urban Space.., p. 36; Frank Conlon, Industrialization and 
the Housing Problem in Bombay, 1850-1940, in K. Ballhatchet & D. Taylor (eds), 
Changing South Asia: Economy and Society (London 1984), pp. 158-59. 
23 
room tenements in Bombay'. The bulk of this population was described as living in 
`incredible poverty' on a `starvation diet' 33 
Industrial social space thus represented an exacerbation of the overcrowded and 
insanitary conditions already prevailing in the Indian town. By the end of the century, a 
new city had indeed come into being, but one that was marked by environmental 
degradation, human poverty, and health pandemics. Unhealthy and overcrowded 
buildings threatened the lives of their occupants, facilitating the spread of tuberculosis 
and respiratory diseases; the coal-powered cotton mills, railway locomotives, 
engineering workshops, and government Mint churned out thick black smoke which 
caused a deterioration in air quality, and further increased susceptibility to respiratory 
illnesses. Lingering dark clouds brought about `a marked change.. over localities such as 
Byculla, Parel, Tardeo, Tarwadi and even remote Sewri. '34 The very topography of the 
city, built on flatlands between the sea and the coastal hills, worked against the rapid 
dispersal of industrial emissions. During the day, the prevailing sea-breeze funneled the 
smoke-filled air towards the hills; however, the direction of the night-time breeze 
ensured, for much of the year, that the polluted air drifted back over the city again. 35 
The Municipal Corporation expanded the city's water-supply, but in a manner 
which favoured the growth of commercial and industrial activities rather than the needs 
of ordinary citizens36, and much of it remained unfiltered; moreover, this increase was 
not matched by the construction of a comprehensive drainage system, leaving the vast 
majority of districts north of the Fort without adequate drains or sewers. As a result, the 
environmental impact of five million extra gallons per day of undrained surface water 
tilted a fragile urban balance further towards disease-prone conditions. Much of the soil 
in the low-lying central localities of the city remained water-logged and liable to be 
33ibid., pp. 151,144. 
34C1,1901. vol. x, part iv, p. 151. 
35Nigel Crook, Principles of Population and Development (Oxford 1998), p. 81. 
36It was estimated that out of a total urban supply of 36 million gallons in the early 
1920s, 17 million were supplied to commercial and industrial enterprises. BC, 6 May 
1921. 
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permeated by disease microbes, creating a favourable ecology for the spread of malaria 
and plague. 37 
The severity of the end-of-century plague pandemic revealed the environmental 
degeneration caused by half a century of laissez-faire urban development in which land 
and buildings were primarily resources for capital accumulation by urban elites. This 
had allowed private owners and users of land virtually absolute freedom to produce 
localized built structures and social spaces which came to exercise a progressively 
degenerative impact on the global urban fabric. Disease showed little respect for class- 
driven spatial boundaries, demonstrating to panic-stricken colonial authorities the 
fallacy of their fragmented approach to the urban environment. 
371ra Klein, Urban Development and Death: Bombay City, 1870-1914, in MAS 20,4 
(1986), pp. 735-45. 
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2. Competing colonialisms: urban 'improvement', development agencies, and the 
local colonial state. 
Bombay followed the tradition of pre-industrial urban Europe where plague and 
congestion had often spurred the renewal of city centres. 38 The "old plague" of 
medieval European knowledge had now, however, arrived in a city simultaneously 
experiencing the impact both of an indigeneously-driven initial phase of 
industrialization, and--as a result of Bombay's position in the imperial market-place--of 
the technological innovations and artifacts associated with the second industrial 
revolution of the late 19th century in the West. 
Plague initially induced severe restrictions against ships from India, disrupting 
Bombay's export trade and virtually paralysing the city's commercial life 39 The 
pandemic thus posed a real threat both to the colonial nurturing of the city as the urban 
jewel in the imperial crown, and to the interests' of indigeneous merchants, 
industrialists, and Anglo-Indian businessmen. Beyond the urgency-and severity-of 
immediate measures, there was thus widespread elite consensus that a new, bold 
initiative was required to "clean up" the city. However, in the absence of any real local 
medical knowledge about plague40, and of even less colonial interest in the political 
dimensions of the major improvements in public health secured by contemporary 
British cities41, the official mind seized upon slum clearance and reinforced social 
segregation as the crucial elements of urban renewal. 
38Helen Meller, Urban renewal and citizenship: the quality of life in British cities, 
1890-1990, in Urban History vol. 22, pt. I (May 1995), p. 63. 
39Mark Harrison, Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventive Medecine 
1859-1914 (Cambridge 1994), p. 134. 
40ibid., p. 140. 
41In particular, the municipalisation of local government in the late 19th century, with 
councillors now elected on an enlarged franchise, led to improved and expanded urban 
services (housing, water, transport, street cleansing, parks, gas, electricity, sewage 
purification, maternity welfare) often directly operated by municipalities. These were 
largely paid for by taxes on the rental value of property. See Tom Hart, Urban Growth 
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Thus one element, and scarcely the most successful, was abstracted from the range 
of enabling social, political, and ideological forces that were achieving incremental 
public health gains in Glasgow, and made to serve as the model for urban 
`improvement' in Bombay. The example of the Glasgow Improvement Trust42 led to 
the formation, in 1898, of the Bombay City Improvement Trust. Dominated by local 
elites43, the Trust hardly seemed a likely purveyor of new ideas on urban regeneration. 
With its initial focus on slum clearance as the primary instrument of sanitary reform, 
the new body passed over a unique opportunity to draw on the lessons of decades of 
British "improvement" schemes whose neglect of housing provision had generally 
resulted in the exacerbation, rather than the abolition, of overcrowding-44 
Armed with compulsory powers of property acquisition under the terms of the City 
of Bombay Improvement Act of 1898,45 the Trust, therefore, accorded its urgent 
attention to the removal of insanitary slums. It was to act on the basis of priority areas 
designated or `represented' by the Municipal Commissioner. 46 Apart from direct 
clearance, slums were also to be attacked through the `indirect' method of opening up 
congested neighbourhoods through road building. The provision of sanitary homes for 
workers received, in contrast, much lower priority. 47 
and Municipal Government: Glasgow in Comparative Context 1846-1914, in A. 
Slaven/D. H Aldcroft (eds), Business, Banking, and Urban History (Edinburgh 1982). 
42The Trust's essential strategy of recouping the costs of slum demolition and new 
housing through the sale of high value land around the city centre failed; this led to the 
abandonment of the major part of its housing schemes for workers. Hart, Urban 
Growth.., p. 207. 
43The Board comprised the Military Commander of Bombay District, the Collector of 
Land Revenue, the Municipal Commissioner, leading members of the Bombay 
Chamber of Commerce and the Millowners Association, and two elected 
representatives of the Municipal Corporation, the prominent shetias Dinsha Wacha and 
Ibrahim Rahimtoola. BITR 1907, p. iv. 
44Conlon, Industrialization.., p. 162. 
45This embodied all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 with the 
significant exception of section 23 (2) which provided for the payment to the property 
owner of a sum equivalent to 15 percent of the market value of the land acquired. BC, 
15 April 1925. 
46BITR 1920, p. 116. 
47The Trust later admitted that the provision of working-class housing was never one 
of its fundamental aims. GOB Local Self Government Proceedings 1919, p. 1648. 
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An important component of the Trust's work involved the development into 
suitable building sites of vacant lands handed over by the Bombay government and the 
Municipal Corporation: yet house building on these lands was never conceived in 
relation to the needs of those made homeless as a result of the slum clearance 
operations. Land acquisition was funded by the raising of low-interest loans; 48 in 
addition, the Trust also received yearly grants from both government and municipality, 
though it was hoped that eventually, the proceeds of leasing the developed plots of land 
would make up the larger part of the Trust's revenue. 49 
The inhabitants of the initial slum target areas, in Nagpada, Mandvi, Market, and 
Chandanvadi, found themselves compulsorily evicted without being offered alternative 
accomodation. Alongside the Trust's operations, the Municipality's enforcement of the 
new Epidemic Diseases Act compounded the problem of dishousing. The Act required 
the excision of a tier of living rooms in the middle of deep, insanitary houses so as to 
create a `chowk' to allow light and air into the buildings. The majority of those evicted, 
belonging to the poorest class of tenants, attempted to find accomodation in surviving 
tenements in the same neighbourhoods. The result was a renewed `.. overcrowding of 
houses in the very slums the Municipal Commissioner was seeking to improve and 
just outside the areas the Trust was clearing of slums' 50 
The Trust's construction of working-class tenements for the poorest of those 
dishoused remained, during the first decade of its existence, grossly inadequate. By 
1909,11,301 families, numbering well over 50,000 people, had been evicted from 
demolished one-room tenements, while the new sanitary Trust chawls at Nagpada, 
48Loans were raised at 4 percent per annum over a period of 60 years. During the first 
decade of its existence, the Trust raised Rs. 324 lakhs in capital, of which Rs. 235 lakhs 
was spent on buying properties. S. M Edwardes, The Gazetteer of Bombay City and 
Island (Bombay 1909), vol. III, p. 86. 
49The Municipal Corporation provided the bulk of this financial assistance, originally 
Rs. 4.75 lakhs in 1900-01; by 1919-20 its contribution had risen to Rs. 15.1 lakhs. This 
compared with the annual subsidy of Rs. 2 lakhs provided by the Bombay government. 
BMCR 1919-20, p. 137. 
50J. P Orr, Social Reform and Slum Reform (Bombay 1917), part II, p. 23. 
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Mandvi, Chandanvadi, and Byculla, only contained 2,844 rooms. 51 Slum eradication 
thus led to an increased demand for housing which immediately resulted in a sharp rise 
in rents. This demand was largely met by private landlords adding new storeys to their 
old insanitary tenements. Indeed, as fast as `many houses had chowks cut in them' they 
`also had storeys added'. Not only did this result in the reproduction of congestion52 
but also in an increase in the costs of acquiring slum property by the Improvement 
Trust 53 The Trust found, for instance, that between 1901 and 1913, of the 41 houses 
included in its Undria Street scheme, 14 had had lofts removed and storeys added 
resulting in the virtual doubling of the average assessment per house from Rs. 441 to 
Rs. 867.54 
The one-dimensional attack on congestion through slum eradication thus floundered 
on the housing issue. Repeating the British experience, the Trust's rapid clearing of 
targetted slums was not matched by the construction of adequate and affordable homes, 
thus enabling landlords to step in and simply continue their practice of erecting the most 
hazardous and unhealthy built structures to accomodate the urban poor. 55 Their control 
over the Municipal Corporation, strengthened by the colonial state's refusal to 
democratize the municipal franchise, ensured the Corporation's continued ability to 
resist the adoption of a uniform, sanitary building code. 56 Minor amendments in 1910 
failed to bring the building by-laws in line with those of Calcutta which there were now 
51 ibid. 
52Ultimately perhaps the most self-critical of the colonial agencies, the Trust 
subsequently readily admitted this. Its initial operations had `.. tended only to make bad 
worse, to intensify congestion where it already existed and to extend it to comparatively 
open areas just beyond the original congested zone'. BITR 1919, p. 121. 
53These costs were already high as the Trust had no power to acquire only parts of 
buildings. GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1916, p. 930. 
540rr, Social Reform.., pp. 23-24. 
55The dominant shetia class argument against sanitary housing for workers was put 
with lapidary precision by Ibrahim Rahimtoola: it would necessarily mean higher rents 
and therefore an increase in the costs of labour which would adversely affect `the city's 
prosperity'. Combining the perspectives of merchant, industrialist, and landlord, 
Rahimtoola could see the housing issue from the points of view of all three class 
factions. Report of the Bombay Development Committee 1914, p. xxvii. 
56The revocation, in 1912, of the powers of `Plague Commissioner' invested in the 
Municipal Commissioner represented another victory for landlords. Ibid., p. ix. 
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strict regulations governing rear open spaces and the proportion of a house site that 
might be built upon. 57 Thus, while sanitary building was introduced on Improvement 
Trust estates, unregulated development continued to be the norm outside Trust land, 
providing substantial profits for building speculators 58 
Indeed, the Trust's presence on the urban scene at first signified little apparent 
change in the ability of a host of other authorities, both private and public, to pursue 
their own individual developmental interests. The Municipal Corporation continued to 
be responsible for a range of public works which included road construction, 
improvements of streets and buildings, water works and drainage schemes; the 
Railways and Tramways pursued the extension of their operations to new parts of the 
city, laying tracks and building assembly and repair workshops as well as station yards. 
The Bombay government itself was a prime developmental agency, commissioning a 
series of grandiose, architecturally innovative public buildings in south Bombay 
between 1901 and 1914. Meanwhile, industrialists were adding new factories to an 
expanding industrial landscape in the north-west, while new business premises were 
springing up both in the Indian town and in the Fort. 
Very quickly, however, the Improvement Trust's operations on the land market and 
its emergence as a substantial landowner in its own right brought the new body into 
open conflict with the influential landlord faction which dominated the Municipal 
Corporation. By 1915, Trust estates comprised ten percent of urban land, 59 though less 
than one-third of these holdings had been developed for building purposes. 60 
Moreover, it was not only landlords who experienced the Trust's operations as a threat 
to their continuing opportunities for profitable investments both in landed property and 
the built environment. Its interventions necessarily led to intensified competition for 
57J. P Orr, Social Reform.., pp. 18-19. The Corporation was even unwilling to pass 
legislation empowering it to declare individual rooms unfit for human habitation even 
though such a measure was strongly recommended by a Municipal Sub-Committee in 
1912. BITR 1915, p. 26. 
58BITR 1919, p. 121. 
59BC, 6 Feb. 1917. 
60Edwardes, The Gazeteer.., vol. III, p. 88. 
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scarce urban land, with each of the dominant class factions finding their options, in an 
era of escalating prices, drastically curtailed. It was becoming increasingly costly to 
produce social spaces favourable to capital accumulation: the "anarchy" of laissez-faire 
urban development was set to enter a new, more ferociously competitive, stage. 
The issue of communications development became a particularly acute arena of 
conflict during these years. Apparent elite consensus over the idea of road 
improvements in the city was purely theoretical since virtually any communication 
scheme, whether the construction of a new avenue or the extension of an old street, 
meant the disruption of social spaces which incorporated a range of stored capital 
assets; the mixed commercial-residential landuse in the inner city meant that the 
requisitioning of buildings adversely affected the interests of both landlords and 
merchants. Both at Municipal Corporation meetings and on the many official advisory 
committees they sat on, Ibrahim Rahimtoola and other prominent landlords 
consistently questioned the `necessity and financial desirability' of projected 
communication schemes. 61 Similarly, the widening of Abdul Rahman Street, at the 
heart of the Indian commercial district, was opposed by the Millowners' Association, 
the Indian Merchants' Chamber, and the Piecegoods Merchants' Association. 62 
Major road projects, moreover, also risked encroaching upon the developmental 
ambitions of the railway companies, of pitting tramway against railway, and even--the 
government of Bombay against the government of India. In 1904, the government of 
India acquired, on behalf of the GIP Railway, a very substantial area of land at Matunga 
without informing the Bombay government, the Improvement Trust, or the Municipal 
Corporation. 63 Railway development in this area would clearly affect the Improvement 
Trust's and the Municipality's road construction plans in relation to the new Dadar- 
Matunga housing development scheme. The Municipal Commissioner slammed the 
Railway Companies' `land hunger', accusing them of seeking `to turn the city into a 
61Report of the Bombay Development Committee 1914, p. xxvii. 
62GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1909, p. 383. 
63Report of the Bombay Development Committee, p. xxiv. 
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station yard with a few houses dotted about here and there'. Desirable sanitary 
measures, he added, could not be enforced upon `these independent bodies', and he 
appealed to the Bombay government to intervene, as it alone could `define the limits up 
to which commercial interests are to be supreme'. 64 
But the Municipal Corporation was itself no stranger to the pursuit of `commercial 
interests'. The extension of Churchgate Street in the Fort involved the acquisition of 
properties, the removal of buildings, the rearrangement of the land into small plots and, 
with the early post-war boom in land prices, the sale of surplus land by public auction 
at two thousand rupees per acre. 65 Brushing aside representations from local residents 
and shopkeepers requesting a slowing down of the project to enable them to be 
rehoused within reasonable distance, the Corporation completed the extension within a 
year. In the process, it made a profit of `more than Rs. 40 lakhs'. 66 Street extensions 
became another arena of competition between the Municipality and the Improvement 
Trust, each seeking to secure the most projects by claiming credit for pioneering new 
methods of road construction to meet `modem traffic conditions'. 67 
Meanwhile, the Bombay government broadly seemed to accept the view that the 
Railways had been allowed to appropriate far too much urban space. They now 
occupied substantial portions of both the eastern and western flanks of the city, when 
concentration in just one area might have been desirable `both in terms of trade and for 
the benefit of residential areas'. Moreover, the railways cut across the main lines of 
64GOB Medical Proceedings 1905, p. 128. 
65BMCR 1919-20, p. 12; BC, 19 Jan. 1924. 
66BC, 10 Sept. 1919 and 10 May 1921. 
671n September 1914, Municipal Commissioner Cadell wrote to the Bombay 
government alleging that the Trust was keen to `stick to old methods of construction' 
which were now `inadequate'. The Chairman of the Trust quickly despatched a 
countering memo asserting that it was in fact the Trust, through its Princess Street and 
New Queen's Road schemes, that had pioneered `improved methods of road 
construction in Bombay'. GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1915, pp. 899- 
900. 
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road communication leading out of the city, `causing serious inconvenience to traffic in 
these thoroughfares' 68 
The local colonial state, however, drew back from imposing one obvious remedy, 
the construction of overbridges, as these were `very costly'. 69 However, in the same 
1907 consultative letter inviting responses from the elite commercial organisations on 
the `future development of the City', the Bombay government appeared to be 
advocating restrictions on the development of the railways in favour of the construction 
of `broad northern and southern thoroughfares' 70 Given the shape of the island, it was 
clear that north-south movement had greater potential to open up larger areas for 
eventual settlement than east-west movement. 
Yet, the two major road projects completed during these years, Princess Street and 
Sandhurst Road, were both east-west thoroughfares. Princess Street extended from 
Carnac Bridge, just north of the Fort, to Queen's Road on the south-western sea front. 
The Trust justified the location of this development both on communication and 
"improvement" grounds: it would ease movement from the southern part of the Indian 
town to the west of the city while at the same time open up congested neighbourhoods, 
allowing in sea breezes to ventilate the dense inner city. 71 Once again, however, the 
large-scale housing demolition the scheme occasioned was not made good by the offer 
of immediate alternative accomodation. The predictable result was an increase in 
overcrowding in nearby Cavel, just north-west of the new development where `large 
numbers of insanitary houses' had `new storeys added to them', making light and 
ventilation in neighbouring houses even worse than before. 72 
68Letter from Bombay Government, General Department, to the Municipal 
Corporation, Improvement Trust, Chamber of Commerce, Millowners' Association, 
Port Trust, Indian Merchants' Chamber, Bombay Presidency Association, GIP and 
BB&CI Railway Companies, 9 December 1907. GOB Local Self-Government 
Proceedings 1909, p. 71. 
69ibid. 
70ibid., p. 381. It put forward the proposition that Victoria Terminus be made the sole 
terminal for both GIP and BB & CI lines, thus allowing the latter's stations and depots 
south of Grant Road to be phased out. 
71 Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 161 
72j. p Orr, Density of Population in Bombay (Bombay 1914), p. 9; BITR 1913, p. 127. 
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While some areas adjacent to Princess Street, notably Dhobi Talao and 
Chandanvadi on its west side, had their share of slums, 73 this was not, by far, the most 
congested part of the city; it just happened to be close to the prime social space of the 
Fort. The new thoroughfare proved to be primarily beneficial to colonial and Indian 
elites, providing them with a quicker route to work on their daily journey from Malabar 
Hill and Cumballa Hill to the Fort area. Wide enough for the new motor-cars, Princess 
Street also amplified elite residential movement away from the old city centre towards 
the west of the island. 74 It served as an extension and modernization of colonial social 
space, visually incorporating modem housing estates75 and new commercial buildings 
purposely designed to be architecturally consistent with the built structures of the 
Fort. 76 This would not be the last time that an Improvement Trust "development" 
would benefit the upper classes directly at the expense of the urban poor, while simply 
shifting congestion from one neighbourhood to the next. 
A decade of Trust operations signally failed to have any impact on overall levels of 
urban overcrowding and slum conditions. The most congested part of the city, a central 
area of about a thousand acres comprising the bulk of the municipal `B' and `C' wards, 
showed an actual rise in population density from 467 to 483 persons per acre between 
1901 and 1911.77 Plague remained a constant menace, periodic outbreaks exacting a 
73BC, 17 Feb. 1915. 
74A similar logic dictated the construction of Sandhurst Road, opened in 1909: it 
provided an opening further north in the inner city for movement towards the west of 
the island. Interestingly, by 1914, there were claims that Europeans were being virtually 
driven out of Cumballa Hill and Malabar Hill by Parsi and Hindu merchants. Report of 
the Bombay Development Committee, 1914, p. 233. 
75These and other innovative residential estates on Lamington Road and the new 
Hughes Road primarily attracted well-to-do Parsis from North Fort. This largely 
accounted for the 23 percent decrease in the population of North Fort between 1891 and 
1911. Orr, Density of Population.., p. 7. 
76Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 161. 
77Calculated on the basis of statistics provided by the 1931 CI, 1931, vol. ix, p. 10. 
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high death toll, 78 while there was no abatement in the familiar diseases of malaria and 
smallpox. 79 
The Improvement Trust blamed the Municipal Corporation's failure to amend its 
building by-laws in favour of a uniform sanitary code, 80 and with its costs rising, 
complained increasingly of the inadequate basis of its subsidy from the Bombay 
government; 81 the Corporation in turn accused the Trust of overspending on roads to 
the detriment of direct slum improvement; 82 it also claimed that it had no sanitary 
jurisdiction over the vast tracts of government and railway land; not to be outdone, the 
Bombay government was scathing about the Corporation's apathy, nor was it even 
averse to blaming the Trust for displacing `considerable numbers of the poorer classes' 
and not providing them with alternative sanitary dwellings! 
Such bitter mutual recriminations on the part of the colonial agencies reveals the 
consistently high level of institutional frustration at the failure to reverse the process of 
urban environmental degeneration. However, this never extended to a questioning of 
the dominant culture of laissez-faire whose individualistic norms precluded a 
coordinated, consensual approach to urban development as well as the prioritizing of 
collective, civic needs in renewal schemes. This meant that the processes of production 
78'Since it broke out in 1896 it has always been with us', stated the 1911 Census, 
observing that plague accounted for 114,506 deaths in the decade 1900-1910. C1,1911, 
vol. viii, part 1, p. 9. 
79BG, 24 Feb. 1905 and 18 March1909. 
80BITR 1913, pp. 123-24; and 1915, p. 109. 
81 ibid., (1913), p. 147; also 1916, p. 102. The Trust's repeated representations led the 
Bombay government, in turn, to attempt to solicit an extra annual grant of around Rs. 
4.5 lakhs from the Government of India in 1913. The GOI refused, arguing that any 
additional funds should be sought from the considerable `untapped local resources' at 
the disposal of the Municipal Corporation. The Bombay government responded by 
pointing out that urban development schemes currently envisaged rendered imperative 
the municipality's holding back of `an adequate reserve of taxation' and suggested 
instead that the additional funds be drawn from a surtax on transfers of land and house 
property in Bombay city. The GOI finally gave its assent and the Bombay government, 
to the great dismay of the Municipal Corporation, went as far as preparing a Bill for 
legislation. New war-time colonial priorities, however, led to the Bill being withdrawn 
in 1916. GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1913, pp. 551-53; and 1916, pp. 
963-64. BITR 1916, p. 102. 
82Letter from President, Bombay Municipal Corporation, to Secretary, GOB General 
Department, 29 July 1915; BITR 1916, p. 98. 
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and renewal of social space would remain driven by the profit and prestige motives of 
the dominant classes. Moreover, the fixed and finite nature of urban land as a wealth- 
generating resource ensured that these processes would also continue to be destructively 
competitive. 
Thus the one and only Bombay government pre-war urban policy initiative, its 
1909 Resolution on the `Development of Bombay City', was primarily concerned with 
increasing the social space `available for occupation by the wealthy classes'. 83 Since 
the environmental blight caused by the municipal sewage pumping station at Love 
Grove, just north of Mahaluxshmi, precluded the northerly expansion of upper class 
settlements along the western shore, it advocated another reclamation scheme in Back 
Bay, purely for elite residential purposes. Moreover, in its desire to maintain the 
traditional pattern of landuse in which residence and workplace were in close spatial 
proximity, and which would ensure the continuing residential separation of social 
classes, the local colonial state appeared to have forgotten all about the fundamental 
problem of congestion. 
The `well-to-do' residents of Bombay, the Resolution declared, should continue to 
be housed in the west and south-west of the city, `as near the Fort as houses at suitable 
rents are available'. Similarly, mill workers and labourers would need to reside close to 
factories and docks, in the centre and east, as long as hours of work and wages did not 
`permit their travelling any distance' from their workplace. Although the document 
advocated the immediate `erection of a large number of chawis for the e-accomodation of 
the poorer classes', no specific, practical measures were suggested. Only the `middle 
class worker', who could afford the cost of public transit, could be persuaded to move 
to the suburban north-west and eventually, to the still largely undevelopped island of 
Salsette beyond the existing city boundaries. Such spatial segregation had to be 
83The following paragraphs are based on Bombay Government/General Department 
Resolution no. 3022,14 June 1909: Development of Bombay City and the 
improvement of communications in the Island. GOB Local Self-Government 
Proceedings, 1909, pp. 381-386. 
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maintained `otherwise the interests of one class will suffer by the intrusion, into areas 
unsuitable for them, of residents of another' 84 
With the constant increase in the working-class population during this period, this 
was a recipe for exacerbating congestion in the already densely populated central 
districts: it necessarily implied the multiplication of built structures over a finite land 
surface area. Indeed, such conditions were at the heart of the unsustainable urban 
environment which had spawned disease and death, and threatened Bombay with 
economic catastrophe. Nor were the colonial authorities unaware of the new 
technological factor of the electrified railway or of social initiatives such as cheap 
workers' trains which, between them, were widely perceived as the potential answer to 
the limited availability of land in European inner cities 85 Prior to the 1909 Resolution, 
the Bombay government's own consultation document, circulated in 1907 to the city's 
`important representative bodies', had referred to the possibilities of `free and rapid 
communication by rail and tramway' as well as of `cheap workmen's trains or 
workmen's tramways' which would enable working-class accomodation `in the less 
frequented portions of the Island where land is available on easy terms'. 
The Resolution of 1909, however, decisively rejected these ideas, describing as 
`premature' any `scheme for an electric railway for the conveyance of suburban 
passenger traffic'. Only with the establishment of the projected upper class residential 
area in Colaba would railway electrification become, `in course of time', a realistic 
option. Currently, an electric railway line could only be justified `within Port Trust 
limits' so as to provide rapid `access to the trade centres' now emerging along the 
north-east foreshore. Other possibilities of rapid transit such as overhead trackless 
trolleys and underground railways were similarly dismissed as `beyond the scope of 
the immediate requirements of the Island'. The prospect of subsidised transport for 
84GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings, 1909, p. 72. 
85Paolo Capuzzo, Between Politics and Technology: transportation as a factor of 
mass suburbanization in Europe 1890-1939, p. 1. Paper presented at a conference on 
"Suburbanising the masses: Public transport and urban development in historical 
perspective", National Railway Museum, York, UK, November 1997. 
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workers, an increasingly important aspect of industrial policy in several European 
cities, also fell by the wayside since there was `practically a consensus of opinion on the 
part of all the bodies consulted' that no such special measures were necessary. 
However, while electrification was rejected and only anticipated as a distant 
prospect, the threat to the development of station and terminal accomodation for the 
BB&CI Railway in the south of the city was now lifted. With the Railway Board itself 
averse to immediate electrification, the Bombay government's policy directive 
represented a victory for the railways over the tramways as the previously suggested 
removal of stations south of Grant Road would have meant an expanded service of 
electric trams. On Grant Road itself, sixty-three plots of land were compulsorily 
acquired by the government of India on behalf of the BB&CI Railway for the building 
of a long-distance terminal station. In the absence of any process of public consultation, 
at least one thousand five hundred families were reportedly evicted from their 
homes. 86 
At the same time, the local colonial state, again oblivious of spatial impact, also 
advocated the expansion of road communications to be provided by the building of `an 
eastern, a central and a western trunk line of roadway'. The implications for the narrow, 
already congested central and southern portions of the city appeared ominous. 
Finally, the Resolution mentioned the impending introduction of `a Town Planning 
Act' for the entire Bombay Presidency which would, as `in England and Germany', 
regulate the sanitary development of future building operations. This would include 
the alignment of streets to be constructed at some f u' ture date.. the necessity of building 
in conformity with the alignment, the bringing of sites to a certain level, the erection of 
houses of a suitable type and harmonious architectural design, and the limitation of the 
area actually occupied by buildings to a certain proportion of the whole site area. 
These regulations were essentially to be applicable to the island of Salsette beyond 
the existing northern city limits, the subject of a separate `development report'. The 
86BC, 3 Aug. 1920; Praja Mitra & Parsi, 4 Aug. 1920; BNNR no. 32,1920. 
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Bombay government appeared to detect the beginnings of a `middle-class' migratory 
pattern away from the congested inner city towards Salsette, which it attributed to `.. the 
amenities of the climate and the comparative cheapness of living'. It declared itself 
anxious to use town planning methods to develop Salsette lands for building purposes 
so as to ensure that settlement would proceed according to `a well ordered plan'. 
Somewhat contradicting its views on transport in the Bombay City Resolution, the local 
colonial state declared itself, finally, in favour of the provision of `easy means of 
communication' between the city and the new suburbs 87 
The Bombay government's failure to conceive of "suburbanisation" in terms of the 
urgent decentralisation of congested inner city settlements, possible only through the 
development of rapid transit, revealed the incoherence of its approach to planning. 
There was no conception of the city as an integrated social space requiring forms of 
public intervention in the interests of all citizens. Surburbanisation was viewed in terms, 
not of the spatial and residential needs of an ever growing majority of urban wage- 
earners, but purely in relation to the select numbers who, it was thought, could afford to 
move under existing market conditions. In its inability to see beyond a Bombay socially 
and spatially fragmented by different and unequal class interests, the local colonial state 
continued to advocate a hierarchical pattern of development focused around the needs 
and aspirations of the affluent south. In this perspective, the poorer classes would 
continue to be confined to their existing neighbourhoods, a recipe for escalating urban 
congestion and aggravating environmental blight. 
There was indeed a glaring contradiction between the Resolution's professed 
objective of formulating `a policy which shall govern the development of the Island for 
the next twenty years' and its rejection of the possibilities of cheap and rapid public 
transport as being `beyond the scope' of immediate necessity. This negated a core 
principle of planning: the forecasting of various processes of urban growth upon which 
the formulation of town extension plans and the development of new suburbs 
87GOB Public Works Proceedings, 1909, pp. 661,735,789. 
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necessarily rested. The local colonial state could not think in any such visionary terms 
as it still perceived Bombay fundamentally as a "transactional space"--as the exit-point 
and facilitator of commercial ventures dedicated to taking resources out of India. This 
precluded any substantial public expenditure on the development and maintenance of an 
evolving urban living environment; it also ensured that the Bombay government 
remained bound to a host of particularistic and competing economic actors, each of 
whom was equally committed to the immediacy of its perceived interests. 
As a result, the local colonial state's directives represented little more than an 
attempted balancing act between various competing capitalist forces. This ensured that 
urban policy remained caught up in the time-warp of the early industrial era rather than 
offering new perspectives on urban renewal in the light of contemporary movements 
towards `city planning' guided by the new visions of the modern era. It was a blueprint 
that seemed to offer Bombay and its citizens a future remarkably similar to their past. 
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3. The politics of built forms: high design, sick buildings, and the elusiveness of 
town planning. 
The substantial expansion in built forms is a significant and revealing aspect of the 
city's history during the first quarter of the twentieth century. In spite of the 
considerable demolition of built structures as a result of slum clearance and road 
building operations, the number of buildings in Bombay rose from 38,454 in 1901 to 
52,334 in 1921.88 Building, construction, and reclamation sites characterized a 
changing and expanding urban landscape which, by the late 1920s, was barely 
recognizable from the nineteenth century "town and island". 
Buildings classified as `residential' easily comprised the most important category, 
numbering 34,808. However, they showed only a very modest eleven percent increase 
since the turn of the century, a probable indication of the effects of "improvement" 
schemes on this category of buildings. Significantly too, the density of buildings 
closely corresponded with the density of population. The most overcrowded parts of 
the city, comprising the central sections of `B', `C', and `E' municipal wards--Chakla, 
Bhuleshwar, Kumbharwada, Kamatipura, and Second Nagpada-also experienced the 
most intense pressure of buildings on the land: over fifteen buildings per acre. This 
pressure was, moreover, heightened by the `modern tendency' to construct large 
residential blocks in preference to small buildings. 89 Indeed, congestion and its 
attendant environmental problems were due less to population density per se than to the 
ever growing spatial extension of insanitary buildings. 
In contrast to the relative stagnation of residential space, the increased rate of 
production of industrial and commercial space was certainly impressive. Mills, 
factories, and industrial workshops increased by 328 percent, from 467 in 1901 to 1, 
530 in 1921; there was an even higher rate of growth of over 400 percent in the case of 
godowns (warehouses) used by commercial enterprises, railways, tramways, and 
88C1,1921, vol. ix, part B, p. ii. 
89ibid., pp. iv-vi. 
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docks. Indeed, the increase in this category of buildings was the single most important 
factor in the overall expansion of built structures during this period. 90 
Moreover, while industrial premises tended to converge towards the north-east of 
the city outside the old Indian town, godowns remained tied to the traditional 
commercial districts in the centre of the city, contributing their share of growing 
building pressure on the land. New factories represented investments in the built 
environment for the purposes of increased industrial production and profit, while the 
multiplication of godowns reflected the continuing and growing accumulation of 
commercial wealth by shetias and Anglo-Indian companies. Between them, these built 
structures represented the most important repository of the dominant class's stored 
assets. 
In addition to this growth in commercial premises, this was also the era that 
witnessed a considerable development in `official' colonial public building. The General 
Post Office, the new Custom House, the JJ School of Art, the Prince of Wales 
Museum, the Royal Institute of Science, and the Gateway of India, were all built 
between 1905 and 1925.91 Between them, they represented a mix of functions which 
reveal the expanding ambitions of the local colonial state in this new era. For here were 
buildings designed to centralize and speed up communications, to reinforce economic 
control, to socialize citizens in the established canons of Western culture, and to provide 
an authoritative interpretation of the Indian past. This process significantly reached its 
apotheosis in a monument glorifying British conquest of Western India and mastery 
over its cultural past 92 
But these buildings were also much more than their intended functions. They 
represented the most forceful attempt yet to harness the possibilities of new 
technological developments in order to produce massive architectural forms 
90ibid., pp. vi-vii. 
91 Christopher W. London, Edwardian Architects of Bombay: George TVittet and John 
Begg, in MARG vol. XLVI no. I (Bombay 1994), pp. 37-52. 
92The Gateway of India was modelled on, and thus represented a mastery of, 16th 
century vernacular Gujarati architecture. London, p. 49. 
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consciously symbolizing modern colonial power and prestige. With the exception of 
the JJ School, the sheer size and elevation of the new edifices achieved a dwarfing of 
human scale and a domination of the immediate spatial environment, providing the city 
with new monumental landmarks. The `unprecedented plasticity'93 of reinforced 
concrete was used to cast the imposing domes of the General Post Office, the Prince of 
Wales Museum, and the Gateway of India while also providing the latter with its 
foundations. As the dome, together with the arch, was central to the evolving "Indo- 
Saracenic" style of colonial architecture, the engineering versatility of the new material 
seemed to offer Indo-Saracenic a rich future in Bombay. 94 
That this never quite happened was largely the result of the Bombay government's, 
and its Consulting Architect, George Wittet's, marked preference for European 
classical forms. These were used in the vast majority of the ninety-five public building 
projects which Wittet undertook until his death in 1926. However much Indo-Saracenic 
may be (correctly) open to colonial hegemonic readings, 95 its cultural eclecticism and 
visual reclaiming of Mughal styles was attracting the interest of a first generation of 
nationalistically-oriented architectural critics seeking to revitalize indigeneous forms. 
The Prince of Wales Museum, in particular, with its `protruding balconies, mini- 
domes, Jain-style interior columns, marble inlaid floors reminiscent of Mughal palaces, 
and a dome highlighted with red sandstone squinches'96 was widely perceived as 
93Colin Chant, Materials: Steel and Concrete, in Colin Chant (ed. ), Science, 
Technology and Everyday Life (London 1989), p. 155. 
94A late 19th century movement in colonial architecture, Indo-Saracenic represented a 
self-conscious attempt to design official buildings -which reflected their Indian 
environment. Working under the patronage of the Maharaja of Jaipur, its leading 
theoretical exponent, Swinton Jacob, produced the "Jeypore Portfolio of Architectural 
Details" in 1890. The Portfolio presented a flexibly arranged framework of vernacular 
architectural forms, particularly Islamic motifs, that could, in any particular 
combination, be chosen to shape modern buildings. Dwivedi & Mehrotra, pp. 198-99. 
See also Giles H. R Tillotson, Orientalizing The Raj: Indo-Saracenic Fantasies, in 
MARC, vol. XLVI (Bombay 1994), pp. 15-34. 
95See Metcalf, Ideologies.., p. 158. 
96London, p. 44. 
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evidence of the possibilities of a vernacular architectural revival 97 In this context, the 
colonial state's hasty retreat back to the classical may be seen as an attempt to halt the 
development of a style whose ultimate destination it now felt was beyond its control. 
Whatever the style of architecture used, the new public buildings were expressions 
of colonial high design which contributed to the modernist renewal of the Fort. 
Alongside the Bombay government, it was significant that the Improvement Trust too 
came to play a crucial part in this process. On the Fort's main artery, Hornby Road, the 
Trust developed the first unified arcaded commercial premises, adding a novel 
component to the redesigning of the city's dominant social space. 98 These premises, 
and the rooms constructed above the arcade, brought the Trust substantial rental 
returns. 99 Arcades also provided citizens with a new spatial experience, as the 
following advertisement by "Whiteaways", one of the main Department Stores to 
emerge from the Hornby Road development, suggests: `During this week see The 
Arcade windows. Every one of our immense windows reflects the season's 
styles.. There is a huge window devoted to the clothing needs of men in khaki... The 
Arcade is a cool promenade by day and a blaze of light and life till 8 p. m at night'. 100 
At the same time, the new medium of cinema was emerging from early exhibitions 
in tents and in the open air and acquiring its own specially designed buildings. 
Predictably, cinema edifices in the city were pioneered in the Fort where initially, spatial 
constraints made it easier to renovate and reconvert old theatres. The Empire, which 
opened in 1916, was rebuilt `out of all recognition' to its previous incarnation, in a 
`cream and gold colour scheme' and now equipped `with a balcony and a lounge with 
97From around 1920, emerging bodies such as the Bombay Architectural Students' 
Association were making representations to the Development Department, the 
Municipal Corporation, the Improvement Trust, and the Port Trust, using this and other 
few examples to urge the adoption of Indian styles for new buildings `especially in new 
areas still to be developed or old ones to be rebuilt'. Only the Improvement Trust 
responded, somewhat belatedly organising, in 1923, a design competition for `facades 
of buildings in Indian style'. However, in spite of the excellent response, the designs 
were never used. BC, 7 Nov. 1921; BITR 1923, p. 33. 
98Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 172. 
99GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings, 1922, p. 207. 
1 00BC, 2 Oct. 1915. 
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tea rooms on the first floor'. Its main entrance was on Bori Bunder, with another access 
on Homby Road convenient for tram stops `from every part of the city'. 101 
Cinema initially attracted a number of predominantly Parsi entrepreneurs who were 
already active in a range of modem commercial enterprises. The most eminent, J. F 
Madan, 102 chose to locate two of his most prestigious cinemas, the Imperial and the 
Empress, in `new Girgaum', on land leased from the Improvement Trust on 
Lamington Road. Just off the new Sandhurst Road, Lamington Road was at the heart 
of one of the Trust's most valuable inner city real estate development zones and 
included new elite residential plots. The high rental returns of this location, Madan's 
expanding cinema empire, 103 and the growing commercial potential of moving 
pictures, made this a highly remunerative business venture for the Trust. 04 
The design of the Imperial reflected the early European predilection for `baroque' in 
cinema architecture, with the auditorium as the centrepiece. The Times of India 
described the opening of this cinema as `.. one of the big events in the moving picture 
history of Bombay.. anybody passing down this splendid broad thoroughfare will be 
able to see a long new building standing back in a spacious garden, with a covered way 
leading from the front gate to the entrance. 'l05 
101BC, 2 Dec. 1916. 
1021n addition to his cinema interests, Madan was also an importer of foods, 
pharmaceutical products and liquors, and also dealt in real estate and insurance. Erik 
Barnouw & S. Krishnaswamy, Indian Film (Delhi 1980), p. 8. Rustomji Dorabji, 
proprietor of the Wellington, West End and Venus cinemas, was also a motor-car 
dealer, owning the Wellington Motor & Cycle Works in the Fort. Indian 
Cinematograph Committee 1927-28. Evidence, vol. I, p. 348. 
10313y 1927, Madan Theatres owned 8 out of the 18 cinemas in the city. ibid., p. 13. 
104After 1909, the need to maximize revenue led to the Trust letting out its vacant 
lands `at the best rent obtainable' to temporary users for periods ranging from a month 
to 8 years. The longer periods, the Chairman stated, were for commercial enterprises 
which had invested considerable capital on buildings such as godowns and cinemas. 
These, he added, yielded `very good rents in particular localities, especially where the 
Trust have constructed new or improved old roads'. Indeed, `in many plots, the 
temporary revenue yields an even better return on the Trust's capital outlay than the 
permanent revenue. ' J. P Orr, Social Reform.., pp. 24-25. 
105T01,5 April 1917. 
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The correspondent of the Bombay Chronicle was equally if not more impressed by 
the Empress, which opened its doors in 1919: 
Externally, one has visions of white colonnades and tasteful palm gardens in the 
making, and internally the decorations in gold and white give a sense of coolness and 
comfort which is accentuated by the breeze created by 50 fans.. The Empress will be 
one of the few theatres in Bombay which will have a fired screen and this will ensure 
absolute steadiness in the pictures. The very latest Pathe cinema apparatus has been 
introduced, enclosed in a chamber which is guaranteed to be fireproof. Great 
consideration has been given to fire precautions and there are no fewer than 12 
exits. 106 
Cinemas in the Fort and Girgaum catered predominantly, though not exclusively, to 
upper class Europeans and Indians. At the select Excelsior and Empire cinemas in the 
Fort which only showed `high class European society dramas', the composition of 
audiences was described as `Illiterate 10 percent, Semi-literate 30 percent, Educated 60 
percent. Males 60 percent, Females 25 percent, Boys 15 percent. Europeans 30 percent, 
Parsis 40 percent, Hindus 20 percent, Others 10 percent'. 107 These audiences 
experienced not only the new medium of the moving image in its early silent mode, but 
the charms of conceptually original buildings, well-lit, lively, and providing 
unprecedented amenities and comforts. 108 
In contrast, the cheaper cinemas in the centre and north of the city catered for the 
rapidly growing working-class movie audiences. By the mid-1920s, workers had 
indeed overtaken `educated Indians' as the predominant urban cinema audience. 109 
106BC, 10 Sept. 1919. 
107lndian Cinematograph Committee, p. 548. Indeed, both cinemas offered a wide- 
ranging variety of admission prices. In 1925, these were: Box for 4 (Rs. 12-10 annas); 
Sofa for 3 (Rs. 10); Orchestra stalls (Rs. 2-8 annas); Dress Circle (Rs. 2-8 annas); 
Stalls (Rs. 1-4 annas); Family Circle (Rs. 1-4 annas); Pit Stalls (12 annas); Gallery (4 
annas). ibid., pp. 46-47. 
108The Royal Opera House, which began showing films in 1917, was refurbished so 
as to provide each floor with its own refreshment room and a promenade space during 
intervals. Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 211. 
109Two-thirds of all cinema-goers were now described as belonging to `the illiterate 
classes'. Indian Cinematograph Committee 1927-28: Evidence, vol. 1, p. 1. 
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Unlike the Imperial and the Empress, however, entrepreneurs built cinemas such as the 
Venus and the Lakshmi, close to Parel's mill district, as `unpretentious constructions' 
devoid of the architectural qualities and social amenities of the picture palaces of south 
Bombay. I I OThere were frequent complaints about the cinemas on Falkland Road and 
Grant Road in particular: a combination of overcrowding, cigarette-smoking, low 
ceilings and narrow and insufficient emergency exits, made them liable to `spontaneous 
combustion'; while their inadequate latrines and location in the immediate vicinity of 
milch cattle and horse stables, rendered them 'indistinguishable from their wider 
insanitary environment. I>> 
Modernity in building also led to the emergence of a new style of upper class 
housing in south Bombay. The traditional low-built bungalow was increasingly giving 
way to tall appartment blocks which, facilitated by the new technology of reinforced 
concrete, were now springing up in Cuffe Parade, Apollo Bunder, Malabar and 
Cumballa Hills. 112 This new mode of living in `flats' represented a modern 
compromise between the lavish spatial arrangements of the bungalow and the sparse, 
multi-purpose 1-2 room residential accomodation of the vast majority of citizens. It 
introduced an innovatively compact living space, delineated for the first time into the 
standardised functions of `living room', `bedroom', `bathroom', and `kitchen. ' The 
new apartments were fitted with electric lights, fans, and the modern water-carriage 
system of sanitation. 113 
The Times of India, consistent guardian of traditional colonial high culture, 
bemoaned the gradual disappearance of the `cool, comfortable, and roomy' bungalow 
and the city's increasing subjection to `the tyranny of the flat'; 1 14 while the 1921 
Census observed that `the Flat is now such an important institution that at the next 
110ibid., Report, p. 19. 
111Newspapers received constant letters of complaint calling for municipal intervention 
to enforce sanitary conveniences and safety measures on cinema proprietors. TOl, 6 
June 1919; BC, 4 Nov. 1924. 
112Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 225. 
113Report of the Bombay Development Committee, p. 78; BMCR 19 16-17, p. xiv. 
114The Times of India Illustrated Weekly, 23 June 1920. 
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Census it may be well to make the distinction (from other residential buildings) from 
the outset.. '1 15 Indeed, by this time, `real homes' in the shape of whole houses were 
described as having become `very rare' in the old city. 116 
More elaborate, old-style dwellings now tended to be built in the would-be northern 
suburbs by (or more accurately for) those owning the new motor cars. The industrialist 
Jamsetji Tata single-handedly attempted to kick-start the suburban development of 
Salsette where he had acquired considerable land by commissioning George Wittet to 
construct a hundred one-storey bungalows in the traditional "Queen Anne" style in 
Bandra. 1 17 On Matunga Road, near Wadala village, Shri Ranchodlalji Maharaj, head 
priest of the Vaishnav Hindu community, had a large two-storey bungalow built 
including servants' quarters, outhouses, and stables. The substantial compound was 
laid out as a garden adorned with fruit-bearing trees. The front porch was designed in 
Hindu-style temple architecture which was alone estimated to have cost ten thousand 
rupees to build. Shri Ranchodlalji only resided here two or three months during the 
year, living the rest of the time in his Bhuleshwar residence. 118 
In stark contrast, this was an era of acute crisis in the provision of working-class 
accomodation. As we have seen, in the years preceding the First World War, the 
housing needs of the labouring classes, and more generally, the urban poor, were not 
high on the colonial urban development agenda. Moreover, although other options were 
now possible, official thinking remained dominated by the shibboleth of maintaining 
workers' residential proximity to their workplace. Many of these residential areas were 
within the already highly congested central inner city localities and the target of the 
Improvement Trust's renewal schemes. The net effect of these schemes was to reduce 
115C1,1921, part B, p. v. 
116 Orr, Social Reform.., p. 17. 
117King, The Bungalow.., p. 57; Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 206. By 1919, Bandra was 
described as having become `.. a permanent residential suburb for the better classes of 
Europeans, Parsis, and Muslims' due to its closeness to Bombay as well as to its 
`salubrious climate and detached bungalows'. Even here, however, increasing demand 
for houses was now tempting landlords to `build indiscriminately'. TOI, 2 July 1919. 
118BITR 1918, p. 90. 
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both the actual and potential housing space within the inner city for an ever increasing 
population, while at the same time raising the value of central urban land and 
consequently, rents. 119 
After a decade of ineffective and costly slum clearance operations, the Trust 
modified its policy, slowing down the process of building demolition and dishousing 
while attempting to rehouse displaced tenants in new chawls. Between 1909 and 1918, 
the Trust demolished 7,823 and constructed 9,311 one-room tenements on its 
estates. 120 These were never meant to satisfy the quantitative needs of the labouring 
population but merely to provide qualitative housing models `.. by way of 
encouragement to private enterprise.. to take on the work' after the Trust had made a 
start. 121 Incorporating some of the principles of modem sanitary housing, the new 
tenements rapidly came to be seen as the "cream" of one-room housing accomodation 
in Bombay. The new concrete buildings at Nagpada, for instance, were spatially 
arranged so as to include paved and drained interior courtyards both as open spaces and 
crucial sources of internal ventilation for the residential blocks. 122 
However, very few mill hands, construction labourers, or dockers were able to 
afford the `self-supporting' average monthly rent of between Rs. 3.50-5.00 per room in 
Trust chawls. 123 By 1914, the average monthly wage of the labouring population was 
between Rs. 15-20, with over seventy-five percent of industrial workers owing average 
debts of Rs. 104 to money-lenders. 124 The Chairman of the Trust himself admitted that 
`so far as mere housing is concerned, there will be more of the middle class 
accomodated on the Trust estates at present than of the poorer classes'. He conceded 
119In the two decades between 1898, the year of the Trust's creation, and 1918, 
properties and rents in south and central Bombay were estimated to have gone up by 
100-200 percent. TOl, 18 April 1919. 
120 Orr, Social Reform.., p. 27. 
121 ibid., p. 6. 
122Dwivedi & Mehrotra, p. 159. 
123BITR 1920, p. 28. 
124BC, 12 May 1916. Workers' difficulties in meeting daily living expenses were 
compounded by the standard practice, amongst millowners, of keeping wages in 
arrears for 6-8 weeks. BC, 15 May 1917. 
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that the Nagpada estates had `become inhabited by the lower middle and middle 
classes', while the Sandhurst Road chawls, like the ones on Princess Street earlier, 
provided accomodation for those `who could afford to pay high rents for shops.. ' 
Similarly, there were `no poorer classes' on the Lamington Road estates. 125 Even the 
new chawls at Soparibaug, at the heart of the cotton mill district, found few takers 
amongst local mill hands at the monthly rent of Rs. 3.75 per room. 126 
The 1931 Census confirmed that `.. lower middle class people (ie clerks employed 
in government, municipal, or commercial service) are in many instances occupying 
accomodation meant to provide better one-room accomodation for the working- 
classes. '127 This was indeed a telling expression of both housing scarcity, and of the 
low-wage structure of the city's economy: on the eve of the war, the vast majority of 
clerks earned between Rs. 20-30, only slightly above the average working-class wage. 
It provides further evidence of the extreme nature of urban class inequality, offering a 
glimpse of the extent to which the high income privileges of the ruling colonial 
bureaucracy were maintained at the expense of a mass of poorly paid employees. 
Meanwhile, private enterprise showed little interest in taking up the Trust's 
invitation. A chronically low-waged labouring population simply did not provide the 
basis for profitable investments in new house building, especially in view of the higher 
capital costs of sanitary design and construction. Indeed, the few private owners of 
large stretches of building land now tended to hold on to their properties in anticipation 
of a continuing rise in land values, thus keeping the most amenable building sites off 
the market. 128 Instead, the virtually universal response to the rising popular demand 
for accomodation was for landlords to extend their old chawls upwards and outwards, 
1250ra1 evidence by J. P Orr, Chairman, Bombay Improvement Trust, to the Bombay 
Development Committee. Report of the Bombay Development Committee, pp. 287-88. 
126Conlon, Industrialization.., p. 163. 
127CI, 1931. Vol. ix, p. 102. 
128BITR 1919, p. 123. 
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thus aggravating the insanitary phenomenon of `sweating building sites'. 129 This also 
enabled them to continue to operate outside the regulations of the new municipal 
building code of 1919 which only applied to `new buildings to be constructed on land 
previously unbuilt upon'. 130 
In localities such as Kamatipura, Second Nagpada, Byculla, and Parel, 131 it was 
now common to find a continuous area of chawl buildings `each occupying practically 
the whole area' of its site and backing on to one another, with only a dark, narrow 3-4' 
gully in between. In the absence of a proper drainage system, these gullies were 
effectively open drains, filled with domestic waste water and refuse. The small size and 
low ceiling of the dwelling rooms forestalled any proper supply of light and air, a 
situation made worse by many landlords' increasing tendency to sub-divide rooms. 
The tenements' small windows, the only source of cross ventilation, could not be 
opened because of the foul smell emanating from the gullies. At the same time, the 
addition of fourth and fifth storeys to many buildings further worsened light and 
ventilation conditions both internally, especially on ground floors, and in neighbouring 
tenements. 132 
Extensions to insanitary buildings simply brought in more people on to the same 
residential site, worsening the state of the gullies and aggravating the poor circulation of 
air. With more tenants-overwhelmingly poor and ill-fed--having to breathe a reduced 
supply of air as a result of the buildings' occupation of a larger proportion of cubic air 
space, an increased susceptibility to air-borne diseases became an inevitable 
consequence of living in sick buildings. Byculla had an `unduly high death-rate' caused 
by `diseases of the respiratory system', while Tarwadi was described as having a `high 
1291ndeed, this was especially marked in "represented" areas, ie the most congested 
central urban localities. BITR 1913, p. 123; J. P Orr, The need for co-operation 
between neighbours in the development of building estates (Bombay 1915), p. 1. 
130GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1919, p. 785. 
131These were among the 13 of the 32 sections of the city in which 80 percent or more 
of the population lived in 1-room tenements. CI, 1931, vol. ix, p. 89. 
132 Orr, The need for co-operation.., p. 2; Density of Population.., p. 13. 
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tuberculosis death-rate'. 133 Even in the epidemic year 1919, with cholera and influenza 
exacting a heavy death-toll amongst the labouring population, respiratory diseases still 
easily accounted for the highest proportion of fatalities, contributing over one-third of 
the total number of deaths in the city. 134 
In addition, such buildings often had a devastating impact on the local physical 
environment. Overcrowding and poor drainage increased the volume of sullage water 
spilling directly into the soil from buildings. In Kamatipura, where there was virtually 
no paved and drained open spaces around buildings, 135 the sub-soil was now said to 
be so `irreclaimably contaminated', that the entire section, it was suggested, be left free 
of human habitation for a number of years and converted into a park. 136 Such an 
environment was indeed hardly conducive to sustaining human life. While the infant 
mortality rate in the city during the decade 1913-23 averaged 475 per 1000 births, this 
figure rose to over 800 in Kamatipura. 137 
On the eve of the First World War, the City of Bombay Improvement Act was 
amended so as to enable the Trust to build chawls for and at the expense of millowners. 
These would involve no `loss to the public purse' and would be erected in the industrial 
zone just north of the congested central inner city. 138 Once again, however, the 
response from industrialists was far from enthusiastic. Only one firm, the Spring Mills 
Co., successfully negotiated a housing scheme for its workers with the Trust, and 
133ibid., p. 14. 
1340f the 68,610 deaths recorded in 1919,24,055 were due to respiratory diseases, 8, 
455 to cholera, 7,566 to fevers and influenza, 4,457 to diarrhoea and dysentry, 2,955 
to diseases of the nervous system, and 2,780 to tuberculosis. BMCR 1919-20, pp. xii- 
xiii. 
135BITR 1913, p. 126. 
1360rr, Density of Population.., pp. 13-14. 
137Report of the Executive Health Officer for the year 1923 in BMCR 1923-24, part B, 
p. 1. The Gujarati lamented the impossibility of mothers' providing `.. pure milk and 
healthy surroundings to their offsprings when they themselves breathe the atmosphere 
tainted by stenches from sewers'. Gujarati, 15 Feb. 1920; BNNR no. 8,1920. The 
average infant mortality figure in the city was still four times higher than Glasgow's 
123, which was the worst of any metropolitan British city during this period and 
regarded as unacceptable. See R. A Cage, Infant Mortality Rates and Housing: 
Twentieth Century Glasgow, in Scottish Economic & Social History 14 (1994), p. 80. 
138BITR 1918, p. 118. 
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chawls containing five hundred and four rooms were completed during the war 
years. 139 
The Trust, however, decided to continue to use the imported construction materials 
of cement and steel which were now both in shorter supply and more expensive as a 
result of war conditions. 140 As a result, it found that the new housing could only be 
made `self-supporting' at a monthly rent of Rs. 5.35 per room and admitted for the first 
time that `chawls cannot be built to pay except at rents which the poor cannot 
afford'. 141 Higher building costs also easily disuaded the few millowners who had 
expressed interest, from pursuing housing schemes with the Trust. 142 
Such a situation was the logical outcome of the misguided and self-defeating 
attempts to force workers to bear the brunt of the economic costs of their housing. The 
net result was simply to price them out of virtually all new "working class" housing 
development schemes and to throw them back on to the mercy of rack-renting 
landlords and to even worse living conditions than those that had led to the creation of 
the Improvement Trust in the first place. Over the next decade, the Trust, in spite of its 
declared intentions, effectively ceased to build any accomodation that had a realistic 
chance of being occupied by mill-hands or labourers. Its house-building efforts were 
now largely spent on addressing the colonial priority of securing self-contained 
accomodation for the city's police force. 143 Industrial projects such as the "Kohinoor 
Mill Chawls" and the "Dadar Workmen's Cottages" in the early 1920s consisted of 2- 
139BITR 1919, p. 28. 
140Bombay Presidency Administrative Reports 1917-18, pp. 57-58; and 1918-19, pp. 
37-38. 
141BITR 1919, p. 28. 
142BITR 1917, p. 11. 
143Annual Reports of the Bombay City Police 1917, p. 13; and 1918, p. 13; BITR 
1917, p. 11; and 1922, p. 18. In September 1919, the Bombay government made 
urgent representations to the Indian Munitions Board for the supply of cement from the 
UK required for the construction of police accomodation schemes. The Board, 
however, replied that owing to the `prevailing cement position in Britain', it could only 
arrange for the supply of 1000 of the 2550 tons requested. GOB Judicial Proceedings, 
September-December 1919, p. 1903. 
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3 room tenements designed to house `superior grade clerks and upper subordinates' 
employed by the mills. 144 
By the end of the war years, `house famine', affecting particularly the working 
classes, was seen as Bombay's most acute social problem. 145 `The greatest and most 
urgent task to which Bombay must devote itself now and for years to come', stated the 
Bombay Chronicle, `is to build houses--to build, to build, and to build well and with 
foresight. ' The paper went on to suggest that local authorities should attempt to emulate 
the London County Council's ambitious post-war popular housing programme. 146 In 
Britain, the end of the war had brought the first national subsidised housing scheme 
under the Housing Act of 1919. As a result, London and other metropolitan local 
authorities embarked upon the building of suburban council houses which were let, at 
low rents, to wage-earners with dependant families. All the new homes were provided 
with indoor toilets, electric lighting, and running water. 147 
With little response from private enterprise, and with the Improvement Trust now 
given specific responsibilities for northern suburban development, the Bombay 
government set up a new "Development Department" to take charge of the 
construction of `at least 50,000 1-room tenements' which would finally solve the 
problem of working-class accomodation. 148 Like the Trust, the new government 
department was endowed with powers of compulsory land acquisition; 149 this was yet 
another authoritarian "quango" characterized by secretive deliberations and the 
complete absence of any public consultation procedures. 150 Moreover, in an era of 
144B1TR 1921, p. 12; and 1922, p. 33. 
145The Bombay Central Labour Federation estimated in 1922 that at least 50,000 
workers in the city were homeless and slept on pavements. GOB Judicial Proceedings, 
January-May 1922, p. 334. 
146BC, 30 June 1919. Interestingly, J. P Orr, chairman of the Improvement Trust 
during the war years, now moved on to the post of Director of Housing with the 
London County Council. TOI, 7 Nov. 1919. 
147Gordon Phillips, The Social Impact, in Stephen Constantine, Maurice W Kirby and 
Mary B Rose (eds), The First World War in British History (London 1995), p. 130. 
148GOB Development Proceedings 1921, p. 49. 
149ibid., 1920, p. 46. 
150BC, 29 June 1920. 
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unprecedented boom in land values, and with the continuing rise in the price of 
construction materials, building costs were higher than ever. Funds for the scheme 
were to be provided by a new town cess of one rupee on every bale of raw cotton 
imported into the city from other parts of India. 151 Once again, the Development 
Department was to operate on a strictly commercial basis: this meant the obligation to 
realise `full market values' on land transactions and to impose `self-supporting' chawl 
rents on workers. There were to be no subsidies. 152 
Such dogged determination not to learn from the experience of the Improvement 
Trust in over two decades of housing schemes, meant that the Development 
Department's failure was even more ignominous, and at greater financial cost. When 
the first completed "DD Chawls" in Worli and Naigaum went on offer at the beginning 
of 1923 at monthly rents varying from Rs. 13-17 per room, there were few takers. 
Significantly, the `very small' numbers who took up tenancies consisted of `clerks, 
superior artisans, and small shop-keepers', but no industrial workers. 153 Two years 
later, due to the increasingly heavy financial loss incurred by the government's 
disastrous Back Bay Reclamation Scheme, 154 the house-building programme was 
suspended indefinitely: only 207 chawls comprising 16,544 1-room tenements had 
been constructed. In May 1925, rents were reduced to Rs. 7-10 per room, and a few 
months later, rooms were offered free of charge to postmen, telegraph messengers, and 
government peons. 155 Nonetheless, at the start of 1926, only 65 of these blocks were 
partially occupied, with 80 percent of the tenements still vacant., 56 
This high vacancy rate suggests other than purely economic causes. While mill 
hands and labourers on a monthly post-war wage of Rs. 24-38 could clearly not afford 
the rents, the well-established process of lower middle class tenancy substitution did 
151 ibid., p. 44. 
152ibid., 1925, p. 105. 
153ibid., 1923, p. 67. 
154See the Report of the Committee appointed by the GOI to enquire into the Back 
Bay Reclamation Scheme, 1926. 
155GOB Development Proceedings 1925, pp. 67,121. 
156ibid., 1926, p. 23. 
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not on this occasion materialise. The press had warned Lloyd that if the housing 
scheme was intended to be `for the benefit of the people', provision for potential users' 
input into the planning process was indispensable. 157 As it turned out, bad design and 
poor amenities meant that once again, sick buildings had been produced, this time by a 
colonial agency `out of touch with the life of the people for whom the buildings were 
intended'. 158 On the Worli estate, where the largest number of chawls had been 
constructed, rooms had no water connections, nahanis (washing places), or lighting, 
and only very inadequate chulha (fireplace for cooking purposes) provision; the 
number of latrines per floor was also insufficient. The chawls had also been designed 
without the customary verandah, which poor tenants had come to regard as their 
essential `breathing space'. Rooms had thus no view of the sky and no perspective on 
the outside world. 159 
Moreover, only one chimney flue per four rooms had been designed to cope with 
the smoke from several chulhas. As a result, tenants on third and fourth floors found 
their rooms filling up with smoke from the lower floor rooms. The Development 
Department's chief engineer admitted that this `was a serious difficulty which had not 
been foreseen when the chawls were designed'. However, the provision of a separate 
flue for each room would be `very costly' as it would entail a significant `alteration in 
the design of the chawl'. The only alternative, he suggested, would be to allow the 
smoke to escape through the windows; yet even this was not possible: instead of proper 
open-and-shut glass windows, fixed metal nets already providing very inadequate 
ventilation covered the openings. 160 
From the moment they appeared on the northern Bombay skyline, the new chawls 
were greeted with unanimous condemnation. The monotonous desolation of block after 
block of dark ferro-concrete tenements shocked even government officials. Professor 
157Hindusthan, 21 Aug. 1920; BNNR no. 35,1920. 
158BC, 2 June 1925. 
159BC, 25 Oct. 1924. 
160GOB Development Proceedings 1923, pp. 209-10; BC, 10 May 1924. 
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Stanley Jevons, himself a government housing expert, condemned the `unhealthy 
mechanical buildings' as a `travesty of housing reform' which reflected `the greatest 
discredit' on the Bombay government. 161 The Archbishop of Bombay told the 
eminent architect Claude Batley that he feared the DD chawls would turn into `centres 
of vice and crime' because `there was no evidence of the milk of human kindness in 
their design'. The designer, who could hardly call himself an `architect', had utterly 
failed to visualize the needs and aspirations of prospective residents. 162 
The DD chawls, in fact, expressed in built form the continuing elite fear of the 
labouring and "dangerous" classes who were to be `caged' or `warehoused' 163 in the 
distant north-west, away from the city's central districts where the plague had arisen. 
They also testified to the destructive effects of a process of "development" which 
entirely neglected the material needs and aspirations of the majority of the population. 
In a scenario that was to be repeated countless times over the course of the twentieth 
century, "development" meant the displacement and dishousing of the poorest sections 
of society and a resettlement programme a full two decades after the original schemes 
that had caused the homelessness. Deprived of water, lighting, sanitation facilities, and 
civic amenities, the resettlement sites in turn proved to be little more than concrete 
jungles, designed merely to reproduce disease and high mortality rates. 164 
A radically alternative urban development scenario was sketched out by the 
foremost prophet of early modern planning, Patrick Geddes, who arrived in Bombay in 
March 1915.165 Geddes observed that in Bombay, as elsewhere in India, disease- 
obsessed local authorities and their engineers seemed to be engaged in `destroying 
161. ' __ BC110 Pay 11.24. 
162Claude Batley, The Importance of City Planning, in Clifford Manshardt (ed. ), 
Bombay Looks Ahead (Bombay 1934), p. 36. 
163These were the terms used by contemporaries. BC, 12 June 1924. 
164 In the House of Commons, Communist MP with Bombay antecedents, Shipurji 
Saklatvala, accused the Bombay government of intensifying the rate of infant mortality 
in the city by its persistence in building these one-room tenements. Voice of India, 25 
June 1923. BNNR no. 30,1923. 
165The Bombay Chronicle described Geddes as a pioneer in `perhaps the most vital 
and significant of all contemporary social movements in the West, .. the reconstruction of cities and the redemption of town life'. BC, 25 Aug. 1914. 
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much and constructing little,. 166 But urban planning was more than simply about new 
buildings and places: to be successful, it had to be concerned with creating social spaces 
where people could flourish. 167 The home, he pointed out, was both the essential 
determinant of the well-being of its inhabitants and the primary spatial unit of the city. 
Planning in Bombay thus needed to be designed to facilitate the supply of habitable 
homes, achievable through a judicious balance between constructing new houses and 
carefully renovating old ones. 168 
This approach would, moreover, entail massive savings in the lavish sums spent on 
`destroying the whole neighbourhood and rebuilding it with less room than before'. 169 
He criticized elitist renewal schemes which prioritized roads over homes and seemed 
primarily concerned with `immediate effect': 
.. Here a street as fine as may be, there a monument as impressive as 
funds will allow, 
there again an avenue as extensive or a garden as magnificent as space permits... the 
result has been that in too many cities imposing new streets have been laid out without 
survey of their surrounding quarter and constructed without reference to local needs 
or potentialities. 170 
This was indeed a global urban problem. In the central districts of European and 
Indian cities alike, rents were rising, to the benefit of landlords. This was not due to `a 
general economic process beyond explanation', but primarily `the result of demolitions 
which made houses scarcer and dearer than before.. '171 
166BC, 25 March 1915. Geddes criticized the essential anti-plague strategy of selective 
slum demolition as `counter-productive'. This merely resulted in people and rats alike 
crowding into other densely populated areas, with starving rats becoming increasingly 
susceptible to disease `while the congested heaped-up human population becomes even 
less able than before to keep down the rats'. Cited in Jaqueline Tyrwhitt (ed. ), Patrick 
Geddes in India (London 1947), p. 45. 
167Geddes used the term `folk-planning' which he contrasted to `mere place-planning'. 
Cited in Tyrwhitt, p. 22. 
168BC, 25 March 1915. 
169ibid. 
170Cit. in Tyrwhitt, p. 24. 
171BC, 25 March 1915. 
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Geddes observed that it was perfectly possible to `build a large number of decent 
homes with playgrounds without exceeding two storeys' if the residential town were 
expanded towards the north-west of the island. This, he observed, had been `too long 
delayed'. 172 Well-designed, low-built, low-density homes would ensure that houses 
were not only habitable but, unlike existing Bombay chawls, `dignified and 
desirable'. 173 Moreover, the actual process of designing had to include `the 
constructive powers of the people themselves'. It was likely that these designs would 
incorporate aspects of `old-world village life' which constituted the `vital secret' of the 
working-class urban neighbourhood. As a result, an `urban village' residential plan 
including gardens and open spaces would emerge; 174 as in the villages, workers would 
be able to build their own homes using bricks and plaster at a fraction of the cost of 
official housing schemes constructed out of the modem', '. ' materials of concrete 
and steel. 
In an era which witnessed the emergence of international town planning 
movements, the Bombay government showed some interest in the new approach. At a 
discursive level, planning was placed on the governmental agenda via the well-trodden 
routes of resolutions, committee reports, and even the odd measure of legislation. The 
local colonial state followed up its 1909 Resolution by seconding local officials to study 
town-planning schemes in English and German cities. 175 The report on Germany, the 
acknowledged world leader in the design of cheap working-class housing, was 
particularly enthusiastic. At the same time, its emphasis on the extensive nature of 
German municipalities' powers and initiatives, particularly their strategic co-ordinating 
role and their policy of urban land acquisition for public purposes, exposed the political 
gulf separating the public vision of modem urbanism from the fragmented mode of 
172BC, 31 March 1915. 
173BC, 25 Aug. 1914. 
174Cit. in Tyrwhitt, pp. 88,57. 
175GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1913, pp. 273,345. 
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city administration presided over by a local colonial state primarily concerned with its 
own accumulative ventures. 176 
The Bombay Town Planning Act of 1915 was an extremely limited measure, and 
did not reflect any new official awareness of the necessary concomitant transformations 
in the role and functions of local government. It theoretically gave municipalities 
powers of control over building operations which they had neither the mandate, nor the 
political will, nor the financial and human resources to make use of. Initially only 
applicable to the regions of suburban Salsette awaiting "development", the Act 
essentially served as a means of enabling colonial agencies to bring suburban land 
suitable for building on to the market. 177 It did not mark a break with the piecemeal 
colonial approach to urban development and continued to envisage building operations 
which did not include, simultaneouly, any provision for water-supply, drainage, 
sanitation, or transport. 178 
The Act's extension to Bombay city proper in 1919, at the request of the Municipal 
Corporation, was even more restricted in scope. It simply required private owners of 
building lands to submit for municipal approval plans showing the lay-out and plotting 
of the land to be built upon as well as the height and sanitary facilities of the buildings 
to be erected) 79 At the same time, the building by-laws were finally amended, though 
not in favour of a uniform code. The `sixty-three and a half degree rule' for light and 
air was now adopted for all buildings to be constructed on land previously unbuilt 
upon. This provided for the design of open spaces around newly erected buildings 
equal to half their height; 180 however, developers in congested areas could still apply 
for `a standard of open space around buildings appreciably lower than that required by 
176B. W Kissan, Report on Town-Planning Enactments in Germany (Bombay 1913), 
pp. 20,26-27. 
177A. E Mirams, The Bombay Town Planning Act of 1915 (Bombay 1916), p. 14. 
178GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1919, p. 449. 
179ibid., pp. 245-46. 
180Clifford Manshardt (ed. ), The Bombay Municipality at Fork (Bombay 1935), p. 
58. 
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the sixty-three and a half degree rule.. '181 The new regulations, moreover, did not 
apply to the Fort and Girgaum, or to government, railway, and military lands. 
Town planning was thus not conceived as an active, co-ordinated process 
undertaken by a public authority in the interests of all citizens. Indeed, it was something 
of a euphemism, boiling down in effect to a wholly inadequate attempt to control the 
private use of building land in the city. The new measure was inapplicable to existing 
built-up sites and to the substantial tracts of land owned by the colonial authorities, and 
only partially applicable to congested areas. Moreover, responsibility for its 
implementation in relation to new buildings lay in the dubious hands of a Municipal 
Corporation controlled by landlords and only elected by Bombay's richest citizens just 
one percent of the urban population. In this situation, it came as little surprise that the 
Act had virtually no effect on checking either the production of sick buildings or the 
increase in congestion. 182 
Moreover, "town-planning" may have been about building, but it was definitely not 
about housing. In a telling comment on the social contradictions of the colonial urban 
order, new powers were conferred on a local government agency, the Bombay 
Municipal Corporation, which represented the class faction most resolutely opposed to 
any municipal sponsoring of public housing. Meanwhile, the `social filter' of 
domination and its accompanying drawbacks of lack of consultation and accountability, 
guaranteed the failure of the state-devised housing scheme. It ensured that the Bombay 
government's new Development Department would attempt to devise a housing project 
without any of the architectural, design, lay-out, sanitary, and community 
considerations characteristic of the best of contemporary urban planning schemes. In 
effect, planning remained an alien and elusive concept for the Bombay government to 
grasp. As a result, the DD chawls were not about the creation of a new kind of social 
181 GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1919, pp. 449,785. 
182The proportion of the city's population living in 1-room tenements rose from 66 
percent in 1921 to 75 percent in 1931. The figures for Glasgow and London in 1931 
were 13.8 percent and 6 percent respectively. CI, 1931, vol. ix, pp. 89-90; Cage, p. 84. 
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space: they merely succeeded in extending northwards the degraded environment of 
much of the central inner city. 
62 
4. Empty suburbs, congested city streets: transportation and the failure of 
suburbanization. 
The Bombay government did not conceive of suburbanisation as an optimal option 
capable of generating opportunities for all the citizens of Bombay. Its class-bound 
perspective continued to privilege the southern and south-western localities of the old 
city as the prime social spaces for elite residence. Indeed, migration to the northern 
suburbs was an option envisaged essentially for middle income professional groups-- 
essentially clerks and public service employees. Moreover, the local colonial state had a 
very superficial understanding of the complex social and technological factors 
conducive to the process of suburbanization. 
For those interested in moving out of congested localities where their workplaces 
would however remain, there were considerations of affordability and convenience: the 
relationship between real wages and transport and housing costs, but also whether the 
speed of transportation made commuting possible in the light of working hours; there 
was also the issue of improvement in lifestyle, ie whether the new places of residence 
provided a higher level of satisfaction of home-centred material needs. This was not 
only a question of more room and compound space and lower residential and building 
densities, but also of the provision of water-supply, drainage, and sewage systems. 
The availability of accustomed collective services such as local transport, markets, 
schools, dispensaries, post offices, and places of amusement, was another important 
consideration. Finally, there were the crucial variables of `sentiments' and symbols as 
attached to buildings, places, and people in the old city. Ancestral homes, places of 
worship, sacred sites such as dargahs, wells, and tanks, the accustomed 
neighbourhood spaces of festivals and processions, kinship associations and patterns of 
sociability, were all liable to impede the desire to move out of the city. 183 Moreover, 
these cultural traditions were likely to be stronger amongst the older established middle 
183On the sacred geography of the city, see R. P Masani, Folklore of Wells (Bombay 
1918); S. M Edwardes, By-Ways of Bombay (Bombay 1912); Rahul Mehrotra & 
Sharada Dwivedi, Banganga: Sacred Tank (Bombay 1996). 
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classes-the target group for suburbanisation-than amongst the more recently arrived 
mill hands and labourers. 
Even more significantly, the colonial government's new zeal in promoting 
suburban development was once again liable to come up against the disintegrative 
effects of differing inter-colonial interests. The Willingdon administration which came 
into office in 1913 was certainly more enthusiastic about railway electrification than the 
previous Sydenham regime which had rejected the idea in its 1909 Resolution on urban 
development. Indeed, another government-appointed Bombay Development 
Committee assumed, in 1914, that electrification `up to the northern limit of Salsette 
residential development' was imminent. 184 The BB&CI Railway Company already 
operated a rather slow, commercially-oriented service between Colaba and Borivli in 
Salsette. Railways enabled a deeper radial penetration into the northern suburbs than 
tramways, and their electrification was essential for a quicker and more frequent 
passenger service between Bombay and Salsette. It only remained for the Bombay 
government to convince the Railway Board and the Government of India. 
The BB&CI Company wished to build a new terminal station in Colaba in 
anticipation of the envisaged Back Bay reclamations designed to create new elite 
business and residential quarters in south Bombay. The Willingdon Administration 
was willing to give the go-ahead provided the BB&CI Board was prepared, initially, to 
electrify the railway line `south of Dadar at least'. As additional justification, it stated 
that `steam traction on this part of your line must cease as it is a public nuisance'. For 
the Board, however, the only issues were costs and profitability: it had grave doubts 
whether electrification would yield a `sufficiently satisfactory return on the capital 
expended'. In vain did the Bombay government attempt to argue that the `added 
convenience to the general public' would be `well worth the small extra cost entailed'. 
In January 1915, the Agent of the BB&CI Railways finally advised that neither the 
184Report of the Bombay Development Committee, p. xviii 
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Company, nor the GOI were prepared to countenance the spending of `a sum 
approximating to one hundred thousand pounds' to electrify their lines. 185 
Without the increase in both transport mobility and capacity consequent upon rail 
electrification, any large-scale population movement to the northern suburbs was 
impossible. This would affect not only the projected settlement and development of 
Salsette, ie the sparsely populated localities between Bandra and Borivli, but also the 
regions immediately to the south, between Mahim Creek and Dadar. The Bombay 
government nonetheless pushed ahead with the rest of its plans, appointing a `Special 
Officer, Salsette Building Sites' whose functions included the compulsory purchase of 
land under the Land Acquisition Act, the overseeing of land reclamations and of new 
coastal transport initiatives. 186 The construction of a local tramway link between the 
BB&CI station at Andheri and the agreeable fishing hamlet of Vesava on the Arabian 
sea-coast three and a half miles to the north, was regarded as especially important. It 
would link the railway with `an attractive stretch of coast line', providing `an impetus to 
the development of the intervening vacant tract of country'. 1 87 
The Bombay government anticipated a considerable increase in the population of 
Vesava as a result of the arrival of the new tramway. 188 With the BEST Company 
showing no interest in extending its operations to Salsette, a local promoter, R. D 
Curranee, proposed to undertake the venture and construct a single line petrol-powered 
tramway. The agreement with the Bombay government, which itself offered no 
contribution to the infrastructural costs of the project, stipulated the payment of a 
deposit of five percent of the capital costs to the treasury on the part of Curranee's 
Andheri Tramway Company by June 1915. However, with the raising of loans on the 
money-market now severely restricted as a result of war-time conditions, Curranee 
185GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1915, pp. 487-95. 
186ibid., 1913, p. 805. 
187ibid., 1914, p. 667. 
188ibid., p. 676. 
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requested a six-month extension of the period to raise the deposit. The Bombay 
government refused, and the entire project was shelved. 189 
The collapse of the key transport dimension of its suburbanisation strategy 
effectively left the Bombay government with only the dubious--and tempting-- 
"developmental" lever of land acquisition. Entire villages, such as Kolhe-Kalyan and 
Wakola near Santa Cruz railway station were compulsorily acquired from their maliki 
owners at well under the market value of the lands, in spite of protests from 
landowners and displaced rice-cultivating villagers; 190 in Sahar, 3500 acres of land 
were acquired at 4-8 annas per square yard and a small proportion was then resold to 
developers at Rs. 3-5 per square yard. Most of the land, however, found no buyers., 91 
A worried A. E Mirams, Consulting Surveyor to the Bombay government, urged the 
General Department to issue `.. a brochure describing the schemes and giving the area 
of plots thus made available as building sites and their values.. ' 92 
Mirams premised his request by asserting that since the `Town Planning schemes 
of Salsette' were now `approaching completion', urgent steps needed to be taken `to 
facilitate building development as much as possible'. This was, once again, an odd 
understanding of town planning, as it appeared to conceive of built structures entirely 
independently of their intended recipients. Indeed, the absence of improved transport 
links with Bombay effectively undermined any strategy of attracting substantial 
population to the area, nor was there any immediate prospect of an adequate local public 
transit service. There were, moreover, other problems which often seemed to take the 
colonial authorities by surprise, and which they were unable to address given the 
fragmented and poorly resourced nature of the public administration system they 
presided over. It was not until 1919, for instance, that the Bombay government 
appeared to realise that no single agency was actually responsible for the water-supply 
189ibid., 1915, pp. 880-8 1. 
190BC, 29 April 1921. 
191BC, 26 May 1923. 
192 GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1918, p. 729. 
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in Salsette which was, as a result, considerably worse than even the poorly supplied 
northern wards of the city. 193 
Indeed suburban "town planning" closely followed the fragmented model of the 
development of Bombay itself. The failure to appreciate the developmental inter- 
relationships between city and suburbs meant that no attempt was made, until the late 
1920s, to reassign Salsette to Bombay municipal jurisdiction. Town planning schemes 
were initiated within an unchanged structure of local government which in Salsette 
consisted of multiple and unequal local authorities, all under the revenue jurisdiction of 
North errv 
the Bombay Presidency Divisional Commissioner based at Ahmedabad. 194 
Bandra, Kurla, and Juhu had their own municipalities, while Santa Cruz, Andheri, 
Ville Parle, and Goregaon were under the jurisdiction of `Notified Area Committees' 
with considerably less powers; the overwhelmingly rural localities to the east and north 
of these catchment areas had virtually no capacity to raise their own public revenues. 
Bandra, the closest settlement to Bombay, also had the most population and the highest 
value properties, and therefore the highest municipal revenue derived essentially from 
property taxes. Even so, Bandra, and still less any of the other authorities, was hardly in 
a position to generate the financial resources to meet the needs of the envisaged 
expansion in population. 195 
From 1913 onwards, the Bombay government allocated a meagre annual grant of 
forty thousand rupees--or double a year's salary of the Special Officer, Salsette 
Building Sites--to be distributed by the latter amongst all the local authorities for 
`original works' (eg the construction of roads and markets) in relation to residential 
town planning. 196 This was clearly inadequate for its intended purposes and also 
underlined the local colonial state's inability to imagine a new administrative 
framework consistent with its professed "planning" objectives. Existing arrangements 
193ibid., 1919, p. 471. 
194GOB Development Proceedings 1920, p. 47. 
195GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1925, pp. 871-895; BC, 11 Aug. 1925. 
196GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1913, p. 329; 1917, p. 381; 1918, p. 
529. 
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rendered any coordination of (eventual) services such as transport and water-supply 
across the whole of Salsette impossible. Colonial parsimony, compounded by the 
uncoordinated nature of suburban schemes, ensured that, by 1925, the entire area still 
had no drains, sewers, hospital, or fire brigade services, very few schools, and only 
three dispensaries-at Bandra, Andheri, and Kurla. 197 
By this time, only Bandra, Santa Cruz, Andheri, and Kurla were supplied-very 
inefficiently--with a piped water-supply by the Bombay Municipality; the rest of 
Salsette made the best of the vicissitudes of well water. Streets were lit with kerosene 
lamps, and even these were described as `few and far between'. 198 "Town planning", 
in these circumstances, amounted to a grave misnomer. Much of the acquired land 
remained undeveloped: while in the urbanized areas, fifteen years of poorly devised, 
under-resourced, uncoordinated, and unsupervised schemes signally failed to create 
sanitary buildings and healthy suburbs. Santa Cruz, Vile Parle, and Andheri were 
described as harbouring `hideous slums' due to `non-existant sanitation', while Kurla 
was perceived as `a slum-land and a serious menace to the city of Bombay'. 199 These 
"urban" settlements, moreover, only extended from Bandra to Andheri in the west, and 
from Kurla to Ghatkopar in the east, mirroring the limited services respectively offered 
by the BB&CI and GIP Railways. The major part of Salsette remained underpopulated, 
and probably to the great relief of its inhabitants, `almost wholly rural'? 00 
Thus, in a trend diametrically opposite to contemporary European patterns of 
suburbanization, a suburban region about six times the surface area of Bombay city 
only contained one-eighth of its population. 201 Moreover, by the end of the 1920s, 
one-third of the approximately 150,000 inhabitants of Salsette lived in Bandra alone. 
Juhu was recorded as having a mere 1,851 inhabitants, Santa Cruz 2,461, Andheri 6, 
197ibid., 1925, p. 873. 
198ibid. 
199ibid., pp. 893-94. 
200ibid., p. 871. 
201BC, 2 Sept. 1923. 
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510, Ghatkopar 8,168, and Vile Parle 11,290.202 Although one of the major objectives 
of his own specially created Development Department was the development of south 
Salsette, 203 George Lloyd, who succeeded Willingdon as governor, attempted to 
dampen the hopes that plans for the northern extension of the city had previously 
raised. Singularly obsessed by his Back Bay Reclamation Project, he now rejected any 
immediate prospect of the suburbanisation of Salsette. He attempted to argue, ironically 
just as London suburban rail services were about to be electrified within a 15-mile 
radius from Charing Cross, that there was `little analogy' between Bombay and the 
`great urban' conurbations of London and New York. There, suburbs were much 
closer to the heart of the city, while from the Fort, `it was 12 miles to Bandra 
alone'. 204 
He could not persuade the railway companies to electrify their lines; even if they 
did, passengers could not be carried at cheap enough rates `to make the clerical and 
business population willing to live there without some considerable enhancement of 
their wages'. Nor were such wage rises desirable as they would simply mean `.. heavy 
new charges upon the business trade of the city.. '205 In a nutshell, Lloyd propounded 
the logic that underlay colonial capitalism's lack of economic dynamism, and which 
dictated the fate of suburbanisation. 
The railways, the technology of colonial interests par excellence, 206 were primarily 
oriented towards freight rather than passenger transport; in turn, notoriously low wages, 
which included most of the city's `middle class' employees, ensured that passenger 
demand for commuter services to the northern suburbs remained weak; this was 
compounded by the substantial raising of third-class fares and season tickets by the 
202C1,1931, vol. ix, pp. 18-3 1. 
203 GOB Development Proceedings 1920, p. 47. 
204BC, 13 Aug. 1921. 
205ibid. 
206Ian J. Kerr, Colonialism and Technological Choice. The Case of the Railways of 
India in Itinerario xix: 2 (1995), p. 94. 
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railway companies in 1922-23.207 In an era of rising prices, the railway companies, 
and the colonial state which politically controlled them, were reluctant to incur the costs 
of electrification: the railways were unable to see a profitable return on the basis of 
projected increases in passenger traffic, while the Government of India, in the 
pessimistic postwar financial climate, was even less keen than usual to undertake any 
public investment. Thus, within colonial paradigms, there was no real solution to this 
situation since the Bombay government and the indigeneous capitalist class were 
equally hostile both to wage increases and to any form of travel subsidies. 
If the "middle class" Bombay clerk was the quintessential would-be suburban 
migrant in the eyes of colonial officialdom, it was easy to see why such hopes were 
profoundly misplaced. By the early 1920s, his monthly wage was still under fifty 
rupees208 while, of all the professional groups in the city, he was the most likely to 
face redundancy as a result of the economic recession that followed the boom of the 
early postwar years. 209 Moreover, his long, sometimes 12-hour working day ending at 
8 p. m, would have made even the (optimistically) forty minute train journey to Bandra 
in the notorious third-class passenger compartment a daunting prospect. 210 In these 
circumstances, relocation was both inappropriate and unaffordable. In the suburbs, 
moreover, most bazaar articles of daily consumption had to be brought in by train from 
Bombay and were therefore more expensive than in the city. 211 Finally, the stark 
absence of amenities necessarily meant a harder daily life which could only be assuaged 
by the employment of a vast retenue of servants. By definition, this was an option only 
available to the upper classes. 
207Third-class fares, which formed 83 percent of the rail companies' income, were 
increased by over 16 percent while season tickets were raised by 25 and 15 percent 
respectively by the BB & CI and GIP Railways; first and second class fares, which 
contributed 17 percent of the total income, were left unchanged. The vast majority of 
Indians, of course, travelled third-class. New Times, 15 April 1923; BNNR, no. 15, 
1923. BC, 19 Jan. 1923. 
208BC, 23 Jan. 1923. 
209BC, 8 Sept. 1922. 
210Report of the Bombay Development Committee, part II: Oral Evidence, p. 239; part 
I, p. xxiii. 
21 1BC, 27 Oct. 1919. 
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If railway electrification was indispensable for vertical suburbanisation, the 
tramway could also play an important supporting role by extending its lines northwards 
to link up with train stations, thus multiplying points of access and accelerating mobility 
between city and suburbs. However, neither the Bombay government, nor the 
Municipal Corporation ever came close to devising a coherent transport policy that 
would integrate train and tram services. The management boards of both the privately- 
owned BEST Company and the state-controlled BB&CI Railway Company vyed with 
each other for the only promising passenger market, that of south and central 
Bombay. 212 To complicate matters further, the Bombay Development Committee, 
while recommending northward tramway extensions from Byculla Bridge to Dadar, 
Tardeo to Worli and Mahim, and Parel to King's Circle, also advocated a new 
electrified underground rail system for local passenger traffic between Grant Road and 
Colaba. 213 
Unlike train services, the tramways were electrified between 1905 and 1908, a 
technological innovation virtually simultaneous with street railway developments in 
Europe. 214 At this time, the tram network, essentially a legacy of the horse-drawn era, 
comprised 20.8 miles of track overwhelmingly concentrated in the inner city, merely 
extending as far north as Elphinstone Road in Parel. Over the next 20 years only a 
further 6.5 miles were added, of which the one northward extension, from Parel to 
Dadar, comprised just 1.2 miles. 215 Moreover, poor roads and, especially, the 
cumulative problems of human and traffic congestion quickly nullified the envisaged 
increases in speed. 
212Appearing before the Bombay Development Committee in 1914, the Managing 
Director of BEST, Frank Rimington, felt compelled to point out the tramways' 
advantages of greater frequency and more extensive street network over the railways. 
Report of the Bombay Development Committee, p. 174. 
213ibid., p. xviii; Pestonji D. Mahaluxmivala, The History of the Bombay Electric 
Supply and Tramways Company Limited, 1905-1935 (Bombay 1936), pp. 136-37. 
214Here the electrification period was generally between 1895 and 1901, eg Berlin 
(1895-1899), Glasgow (1898-1901), Milan (1896-1900); London (1901-1905) 
followed close behind. Capuzzo, Between Politics and Technology.., p. 4. 
215Mahaluxmivala, p. 150. 
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Technically, electrification enabled a maximum speed of 18 m. p. h: however, over 
the first five years following the inauguration of the new service, the average speed of 
trams averaged only 6.75 m. p. h `owing to the very frequent stopping resulting from the 
density of the population and the narrowness and crowded conditions of many of the 
streets'. 216 Moreover, an increase in accidents led the police and the Municipal 
Corporation to advise the Tramway Company to fit its cars with more effective brakes. 
Rather than invest in new brakes, however, the Company, with the agreement of the 
Municipal Corporation, simply opted to lock the brake controllers thereby cutting the 
maximum speed to 12 m. p. h. In increasingly congested streets, the average speed of 
the "electrified" trams declined still further, reaching, by 1925,4.8 m. p. h, slower than 
the old horse cars, and making the Bombay tramways `the slowest in the world'. 217 
While electrification did not produce any appreciable gains in speed, it did enable 
the running of more and bigger tram cars and consequently an increase in the daily 
number of passengers: from 71,947 carried by 195 horse-drawn tram cars in 1905, to 
120,800 accomodated in 230 `single truck' cars and `bogie trains' in 1916, and to over 
200,000 transported by 520 `train cars' in 1925.218 But passengers could only travel 
seven and a half miles more on the electrified circuit than on the old horse tram network 
and the overwhelming proportion of this extra mileage was taken up by extensions to 
inner city lines. 
Like the railways, the BEST Company's policy on extensions was essentially 
guided by the need to secure a `fair return' on its capital outlay. 219 -Even before the 
War, it was clear that the Company was reluctant to undertake any development `from 
which profit was not really or immediately discernible'220 In the absence of any direct 
216Report of the Bombay Development Committee, p. 174. 
217Mahaluxmivala, pp. 237-39. 
218Frank Conlon, Tramways in the Urban Development of Colonial Bombay, 1870- 
1935, p. 14; Paper presented at a conference on "Suburbanising the Masses: Public 
Transport and Urban Development in Historical Perspective", at the National Railway 
Museum, York, UK, November 1997. BC, 18 July 1916; Mahaluxmivala, p. 157. 
219ibid., p. 245. 
220Report of the Bombay Development Committee, p. 30. 
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financial incentives from the Bombay government or the Municipal Corporation, 
northward extensions, even within Bombay city limits, were not perceived as 
economically viable owing to low passenger projections. The BEST management 
impeccably adhered to the class logic of colonial urban development: lines would only 
be driven in the proximity of the old city's commercial localities or of its well-to-do 
residential areas. 
The two exceptions to this rule which dictated the confined spatial geography of 
tram line expansion merely confirmed its general validity. In 1917, the Tramway 
Company undertook an extension from Parel to Dadar, just to the north, where the 
meeting of the BB&CI and GIP railway lines would guarantee remunerative traffic; and 
in 1921, it agreed to a request by the East Indian Cotton Association to extend its lines 
along Reay Road to the new Cotton Green Depot in Mazagaon, even though it had at 
the time suspended consideration of new lines pending the resolution of a dispute with 
the Municipal Corporation over tram fares and electric supply tariffs. This was, stated 
the Managing Director, an `exceptional case', justified by its `extreme importance to a 
very large section of the commercial communities of this city'221 
In contrast, BEST relied on the Bombay government's own argument in rejecting 
the proposed extension from Tardeo along Mahaluxmi Road to Worli: the `smell 
nuisance' caused by the Love Grove sewage pumping station precluded the emergence 
of upper class residential settlements in the area and therefore any `viable demand for 
improved communications'. Moreover, while an alternative tram- route could be 
devised to reach Worli, the lack of demand from the existing working class chawl 
population there meant that there was `no hope of a tramway paying at present'. 
Instead, the Managing Director stated that he was willing to investigate the possibility 
of running a local omnibus service in Worli on condition that the Bombay government 
assisted the venture with a `small subsidy'. He suggested a figure of around `.. Rs. 3000 
per month' for an experimental daily bus service, with buses running every ten minutes 
221 Mahaluxmivala, pp. 96-99. 
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from 6 a. m to 8 p. m for a three-month trial period. The Bombay government rejected 
the request 222 
The proposed northward extension from Dadar to King's Circle was similarly 
rejected on grounds of economic unviability, while an alternative trackless trolley 
experiment over the same route was ultimately dismissed as unsuitable for Bombay 
and as likely to cause the Tramway Company `a considerable loss'. 223 Indeed, in the 
post-war era, BEST became unwilling to undertake virtually any proposed tramway 
development. The War had resulted in a tripling of the costs both of building rolling 
stock and of laying electrified tracks, while the price of coal had increased by 250 
percent; 224 between 1913 and 1919, on the other hand, the number of passengers had 
only risen by 54 percent: 225 these circumstances soon led the Tramway Company to 
conclude that `.. we can discern no extension of the tramways which would pay the 
Company, even if fares were readjusted over the whole system'. 226 
Instead, BEST switched investment to its electricity supply branch though it 
significantly declined the option of applying for the license to supply Salsette. 227 
Within Bombay, there was now an increasing demand for electric power from 
commercial and industrial enterprises, from government offices and public buildings, 
and from individuals and private bodies for domestic and ceremonial purposes; in 
addition, the emergence of cinema and the development of illuminated "neon" 
advertising signs, 228 all combined to place the supply of electricity at the cutting edge 
of commercial opportunity. By the mid-1920s, it was solely the electricity branch that 
made BEST a profitable enterprise: in 1925, for instance, the Company's overall profit 
222ibid., pp. 114,120-2 1. 
223ibid., pp. 111-12. 
224ibid., p. 187. 
225Administration Reports of the Government of Bombay, 1914-1920. 
226Mahaluxmivala, p. 246. 
227ibid., p. 381. 
228ibid., p. 334. 
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of sixty-two percent was derived from the revenue gained from expanding power 
supply operations. 229 
A permanent bone of contention between BEST and the Municipal Corporation 
was the latter's refusal to sanction any increase to the near-universal one-anna fare 
negotiated in 1905. While opposition to any rise was enthusiastically supported by 
nationalist activists, it is important to note that the vast majority of urban workers, who 
earned between eight and twelve annas a day, could not, as Geddes observed, afford a 
two-way tram ride. The one-anna ticket was essentially a popular middle-class fare, but 
by the early 1920s it was clear that the numerical limitations and the unchanged fare 
structure of the urban middle-class passenger market had become further obstacles to 
tramway expansion. The peaking of this class-based demand for public transport and 
the resulting paralysis in the expansion of tram communications served as an ironic 
commentary on the entire process of colonial suburban development. The high hopes 
of increased northward mobility that had accompanied electrification had been undone 
both by the exclusionary workings of an anti-social market economy and by the urban 
middle class's determination to maintain its fare privileges. 
These conditions merely enabled the trickling of an upper class elite towards the 
northern suburbs, with no effect on the desperate levels of congestion in the inner city. 
Indeed, they accentuated the tendency for the Indian town to creep further and further 
southwards. By the mid-1920s, Homby Road was no longer quite the prestigious 
centre of the European business world, and had already acquired a predominantly 
Indian commercial population. 230 With public transportation unable to sustain even 
middle class suburbanisation, the arrival of the private motor car, and the powerful 
colonial and moneyed lobby it immediately gave rise. to, soon reinforced the elitist 
character of official discourse on suburbanization. Much less prominent were 
considerations of spatial impact on an overcrowded city, pressure on existing road 
surfaces, and pedestrian safety and well-being. 
229BC, 18 March 1926. 
230Times of India Directory 1925, pp. 569-75. 
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In the early years of the century, the Motor Union of Western India began to 
organise "Bombay Motor Trials" under the patronage of the Governor and with the 
cooperation of the Public Works Department and the police. Only the Railways held 
aloof, apparently fearing the eventual competition of the automobile. 231 These trials, 
held on the highways between Bombay, Poona, and Mahableshwar, were initially 
carefully made to appeal to the needs of colonial officialdom. Their objective, the Motor 
Union stated, was to discover `the best type of vehicle' suitable for those officials who 
`have to go on tour during the cold season'232 The Anglo-Indian Bombay Gazette, 
however, felt that there was much more at stake: in an era of acute competition for 
markets between British, American, and French car manufacturers, it hoped `for the 
sake of British prestige' and commercial profitability that the trials would affirm the 
superiority of British made cars 233 
Indeed, of all the artifacts of the second industrial revolution, the Gazette seized 
upon the motor car as the magical instrument of modem progress, possessing an 
unparalleled ability to transform life in India. In cities like Bombay, it proclaimed, `the 
motor car has succeeded where even the tram car has failed, for it is teaching the native 
to look ahead and to perceive that the middle of the road is not the place for an aimless 
saunter'. 
The act of `raising the eyes' would help promote a new `habit of activity' amongst 
`natives', essential for an understanding of the importance and value of time which in 
turn was a vital precondition for economic development! The Gazette was in earnest. 
Moreover, unlike the railways, there were few places where the car could not go, 
making it an invaluable asset in enabling `ruling and ruled races' achieve a better mutual 
understanding. 234 
231BG, 7 Oct. 1904 and 11 Jan. 1906. 
232BG, 4 Jan. 1905. 
233BG, 24 Feb. 1905. 
234BG, 13 Dec. 1904. 
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Car ownership rapidly became a prime symbol of upper class affluence. From the 
small number initially registered in the city in 1905, cars increased rapidly to 2,123 by 
1914; a decade later, there were over 10,000.235 The movable space of the automobile, 
moreover, also gave rise to new built structures: between 1901 and 1921, newly erected 
garages for motor vehicles contributed substantially to the increase in the number of 
buildings in Bombay. 236 There were now high hopes amongst the various 
development agencies that the motor car would become 'a potent factor' in the 
northward diffusion of the `wealthier classes', initially at least as far as Matunga until 
amenities in Salsette were improved. 237 The automobile, the Improvement Trust 
believed, would help overturn the lack of demand for its plots in the north of the city. 
During the war years, the Trust embarked on luxury residential schemes adjacent to the 
Worli and Dharavi water fronts, designed `.. for the upper classes who can afford to 
keep motor cars'. 238 
Even the motor car, however, failed to generate any major thoroughfare to the north 
of the city, or any new roads in the north itself, 239 nor did it have any substantial 
impact on road improvement during this period. Although the long envisaged major 
north-south highway was finally embarked upon by the Improvement Trust, the 
dramatic escalation in costs during the War years coupled with the colonial state's 
policy of financial retrenchment, made progress painfully slow. By 1924, the new 
"Eastern Avenue" only comprised an extension of Parel Road from Sandhurst Road to 
Lalbaug. 240 Further north, not only was Mahim characterized by lanes in `wretched 
235Annual Reports of the Bombay City Police 1914 and 1924. 
236CI, 1921, vol. ix, part B, p. vii. 
237Report of the Bombay Development Committee, pp. 148, vii. 
23 8B1TR 1916, p. 15. 
239With the exception of Dadar where roads were built to enable the tramway 
extension from Parel and to provide access to the Improvement Trust's new Dadar- 
Matunga residential estate. There were, significantly, complaints that these `broad 
roads', had been opened for the `pressing needs of motorists' while water-supply in 
these northern localities continued to be very poor. Dwivedi & Mehrotra, op. cit. pp. 
168-171; BC, 4 May 1918. 
240Bombay Presidency Administration Report 1923-24, p. 165. 
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conditions' rather than proper roads, but there still was `.. no general plan for the 
development of future roads and drains'241 
Although this section of Eastern Avenue--like the Trust's Princess Street and 
Sandhurst Road--was constructed with an asphalt surface and a cement concrete 
bottom, few other roads outside the Fort were able to withstand the crushing pressure 
of the new motor vehicles. 242 The greater part of the one hundred and sixty-eight-mile 
road network still lacked any foundational subcrust while surface and sub-soil drainage 
was generally defective. 243 The macadam and mud surfaces often tended to break up, 
while the rubber tyres of motor vehicles were held responsible for throwing up `at least 
six times as much dust' as the iron bound wheels of ox-carts and ticca-gharries. 244 
During the monsoon, on the other hand, roads were transformed into `ankle deep' 
slush which speeding cars liberally sprayed on to hapless pedestrians. 245 
The motor car thus affected the materiality of the urban landscape itself as well as 
citizens' safety and well-being. In an age before the full health implications of air 
pollution from petroleum vehicle exhausts were recognised, there was still considerable 
alarm, in a city prone to respiratory diseases, at the `clouds of dust raised by passing 
motor-cars which go to swell the doctor's bill and the city's death-rate.. '246 By the 
mid-1920s moreover, the twelve thousand motor vehicles in circulation contributed 
substantially to the increasing congestion, competing for street space with trams, ox- 
carts, victorias, bicycles, and pedestrians. Pedestrians were now at risk in virtually any 
of the city's roads: in the crowded working class neighbourhoods in the centre and 
north-west of the island where narrow thoroughfares also tended to have the busiest 
street-life. A concerned citizen wrote to the Bombay Chronicle: 
241 Orr, The need for co-operation.., p. 8; BC, 31 Jan. 1923. 
242GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1915, p. 90; BMCR 1921-22, pp. ix-x. 
243Report of the Bombay Development Committee, pp. 30,163. 
244BC, 14 Nov. 1914. 
245BC, 23 Sept. 1920. 
246ibid. 
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Vehicular traffic on Ferguson Road (in Lower Parel) during the daytime is very heavy 
as it is one of the main thoroughfares of the mill district. It is only about 20 feet wide 
and the small footpaths on both sides are rendered useless by the people living on the 
ground floor of the chawls on this street. (Moreover) some portions of the footpaths 
are occupied by the vegetable and fruit sellers.. (so that) people have no other way but 
to walk through the centre of the road though constantly in danger of being over-run by 
the fast driven Military Cars.. 247 
But accidents were probably even more frequent in the broader avenues of south 
Bombay where motorists were more likely to indulge in the new "sport" of racing. The 
long, winding Queen's Road was a particular danger spot, with its three railway 
stations at Churchgate, Marine Lines, and Chami Road, unloading passengers directly 
on to the main road, a situation described as having `no parallel' to any other city. 248 
By the war years, the new dangers of the street had become `a perennial subject of 
discussion' in the city. 249 The architect Claude Batley called for the creation of 
`breathing spaces' around landmarks such as Bori Bunder, Flora Fountain, and 
Wellington Fountain `where the pedestrian can stand and pause or saunter at his ease'. 
Surrounding streets, he observed, had now become `wide expanses of bewilderingly 
dangerous' motor traffic, and needed to be reclaimed for trams and pedestrians? 50 
As elsewhere in the world, the fatalities and injuries suffered by pedestrians were 
causing increasing concern. Victims tended to be predominantly children and the 
elderly, the most vulnerable age-groups to speeding traffic. 251 `Rash driving' was 
componded by the absence of an agreed system of signalling and the confusion over 
the rules regarding overtaking--on the right in the case of other motor vehicles and 
247BC, 25 July 1919. 
248According to a Committee appointed by the Bombay government to consider the 
`better regulation of traffic' in the city; GOB Judicial Proceedings 1923, p. 1320. 
249BC, 22 May 1916. 
250BC, 8 Dec. 1923. 
251Annual Report of the Bombay City Police 1918, p. 17. 
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horse-driven conveyances, but on the left in the case of tram cars. 252 Moreover, the 
haphazard nature of the city's built structures meant the existence of a large number of 
blind comers, while dust by day and poor lighting by night aggravated problems of 
visibility. 253 
The colonial approach to traffic control and street safety was characteristically 
dictated both by an unwillingness to confront a powerful upper class lobby and by 
considerations of `financial priority'; unlike Britain, therefore, official response to the 
new conditions was very slow. The initial speed limit, only introduced in 1915, was set 
at a relatively high twenty miles per hour, though the absence of trained traffic control 
police meant that even this rule was `.. more honoured in the breach than the 
observance'. 254 The press called on magistrates to impose severe penalties on rash 
drivers `.. as London magistrates had recently done on Lord Curzon'255 Nor were 
owners of motor vehicles legally liable for injuries to persons. 256 The provision and 
training of specialized traffic police personnel, on the other hand, had to await a 
`favourable financial climate', and it was only in May 1925 that the Bombay 
government released funds for the setting-up of a self-contained Traffic Control 
Department within the Bombay police force. 257 
The Bombay pedestrian, whom the motor car was intended to awake from an 
alleged age-old `habit of contemplation' and whose apparent `lack of traffic sense' the 
police tended to regard as responsible for most accidents, was perhaps not such a 
singular individual after all. Indeed, there is little to suggest that his reponse to the novel 
phenomenon of motorised street traffic was any different from his counterpart in 
European cities. Universally, the arrival of the motor car now meant that the rules 
implicit in the accustomed habit of walking the streets, when pedestrians merely had to 
252The Times of India Illustrated Weekly, 11 June 1919; GOB Judicial Proceedings 
1920, p. 843. 
253ibid., 1923, pp. 1322-23. 
254ibid., 1920, p. 719. 
255Sanj Vartaman, 15 June 1920; BNNR no. 19,1920. 
256BC, 18 July 1922. 
257GOB Judicial Proceedings 1922, p. 1543; and 1925, p. 1346. 
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make small adjustments in their speed to avoid collisions with one another, were no 
inttIIi)ble- 
longer sufficient. The mutually -*_" communication through glances and signs 
were obsolete in the face of the new relentlessness of moving machines. The citizens of 
Bombay, as elsewhere, were very liable at this stage to make errors in judging the 
`arrival' time of motor vehicles moving at variable speeds. But, as in so many areas of 
their social lives, they were less able than their European contemporaries to draw on 
any solid regulatory protective framework. 258 
258Pedestrians were given little attention by traffic police who were very reluctant to 
hold up motor vehicle traffic. As a result, they usually had to wait `.. for the passage of a 
long stream of vehicles of all descriptions-with considerable loss of time and temper', 
making them all the more liable to run across the street. BC, 27 Sept. 1916. 
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Chapter two: War, Censorship, and Civic dissent: Bombay in the 
First World War. 
1. War and the militarization of the city. 
August and September were normally the quietest months of the year in Bombay 
as the city settled into its annual monsoon season. But George V's declaration of war 
on Germany on behalf of the entire British Empire at 11.00 p. m on 4 August 1914, 
rapidly disrupted this tradition. Very quickly, trains arriving into the city were filled 
with soldiers and military officers either bound for the Western Front or coming to take 
up residence in Bombay on staff duty. Passenger liners from Britain poured in more 
military personnel as well as colonial officers and civilians whose holidays at home had 
been cut short by the outbreak of war. 1 
Even though J. D Tata offered the use of the exclusive Taj Mahal hotel to the 
military, accomodation in the city rapidly ran short with hotels reportedly having to 
sleep three in a room. 2 In October, a number of hoteliers, including the manager of the 
prestigious Watson's on the Esplanade, were each fined five rupees for failing to notify 
the police about their foreign residents, in contravention of a Government of India War 
Ordinance .3 Indeed `hostile aliens', a term describing German and Austrian nationals, 
immediately felt the full impact of being caught up in "enemy" territory. 4 
Germans employed by various government departments and by transnational firms 
such as Thomas Cook &Son found themselves detained and despatched to prisoner of 
war camps set up in Ahmednagar district. Bombay University and St. Xavier's College 
both lost, by the same process, a number of their staff, while German women and 
children from British East Africa were soon ushered into detention camps in 
Belgaum. 5 
IBC, 14 Sept. 1914. 
2TO1,23 Oct. 1914; BC, 14 Sept. 1914. 
3BC, 23 Oct. 1914. 
4GOB Confidential Proceedings 1915, pp. B1-1, B2-1. 
5ibid.; GOB Financial Proceedings 1915, part B, p. 96; FR, first fortnight February 
1915. 
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Both Bombay city and the wider hinterland were perceived as fertile grounds for the 
recruitment of soldiers and auxilliary army workers. The Millowners Association, the 
--t Municipal Corporation, the Port Trust, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, all received letters from the Government of India's 
Political Department requesting them, as large employers of labour, to actively assist 
the city's Recruiting Officer. 6 Bombay's labouring "warrior" Maratha population and 
other "turbulent" lower castes were quickly identified as `excellent material' for 
soldiering and soon Maratha, Mahar, Konkani, and Bhandari regiments were formed 
while Native Christians provided the bulk of army `cooks, boys and mates'? 
War also immediately brought about the militarization of social space which 
accentuated the city's congested and insanitary character. Half a century of continuous 
spatial development of commercial establishments had nonetheless not been allowed to 
impinge on the significant colonial military presence in south Bombay. Even before 
1914, Upper Colaba was regarded as `practically a military reservation" .8 With the 
outbreak of war, the army also occupied vast tracts of land owned by the Improvement 
Trust in Dadar `at a nominal rent' and without reference to the Trust Board. 9 
The military also virtually took over the running of the Bombay port which 
emerged as the centre of India's war effort, particularly when the conflict spread to the 
geopolitically crucial eastern arena of Mesopotamia in late 1914.10 The port became the 
6GOB Confidential Proceedings 1915, p. B-2. 
BFR (2) January 1918. 
8C1,1911, vol. viii, part I, p. 3. 
9BC, 14 Oct. 1916. 
10Between 1914 and 1918, one and a quarter million Indian soldiers and auxiliaries 
embarked from Bombay. Almost half of them were despatched to Mesopotamia (Iraq). 
Indians also served in France on the notorious Western Front, as well as in the 
Dardenelles, Egypt, Aden, and East Africa. In London, the Imperial War Cabinet noted 
that `Mesopotamia was largely conquered by Indian troops' while also emphasizing the 
geopolitical importance of the entire region: 
`.. The swift and brilliant stroke which gave us Basra in November 1914 assumed the 
protection of the installations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Abadan and the 
oilfields, in which the Admiralty are so largely interested, and probably arrested a Pan- 
Islamic movement on a large scale throughout Mesopotamia, Persia, and Afghanistan, 
which might easily have developed into a "Jehad" on the Indian frontier. It may justly 
be asserted that this timely offensive stroke saved India from being involved in a great 
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base from which over a million Indian army personnel embarked for the various 
theatres of war. It also served as an immense storage facility for the hardware, 
equipment, and food supplies destined for military use, particularly in the Middle 
East. 1 
Docks now extended for four miles along the eastern shore of the island, from the 
Fort to Mazagaon; 12 in the Fort itself, over sixty-six acres of land on its eastern side 
became occupied by dockyard establishments, including Royal Indian Marine 
Dockyard Officers' quarters; while on the western side, the erection of new barracks 
reinforced the character of Queen's Road as the residence of the upper ranks of the 
military. 13 At the same time, workers employed in docks, harbour works, and ships 
increased threefold to around thirty thousand between 1914 and 1917. Once again, 
however, little attention was paid to their accomodation needs, forcing the majority of 
dock labourers to `provide themselves with shelter under the most insanitary 
conditions' in Dongri and Mandvi. 14 As a result, `B' Ward had become, by 1918, the 
most residentially overcrowded locality in the city, with houses containing on average 
two and a half times their optimum number of dwellers. 15 
Increased overcrowding also became a feature of public transport: a large number 
of cars were taken out of the tramway service and transformed into tram ambulances 
for ferrying wounded soldiers from the docks to the hospitals; 16 while the 
war on her borders, the consequences of which would have been a serious strain on the 
vital resources of the whole British Empire.. 'IO, Political and Secret Annual Files: L/P 
&S/11/1918: Imperial War Cabinet--Memorandum on Events in India 1917-18; L/P 
&S/1919: Mesopotamia; BC, 6 Jan. 1919. 
11Nithya K. Chari, History of Bombay 1918-1939 (unpublished PHD thesis, 
University of Bombay 1983), p. 2. 
12The new Alexandra Dock, with its 17 berths, was the first to be built as a non-tidal 
dock. This meant that ships could now enter at any time without having to wait for the 
high tide, a situation which also led to the speeding up of the dock labouring process. 
A. R Burnett-Hurst, Labour and Housing in Bombay. A Study in the Economic 
Conditions of the Wage-Earning Classes in Bombay (London 1925), pp. 73,76. 
Report on the Administration of the Bombay Presidency 1919-1920, p. v. 
13GOB Development Proceedings 1921, p. 19. 
14ibid., pp. 19-2 1. 
15GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1919, p. 1657. 
16TO1,25 Nov. 1914. 
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requisitioning of rail wagons for military needs reduced the passenger carrying capacity 
of the railways. 17 In early 1916, the Army also instructed the Bombay government to 
furnish them with a full list of civilians owning motor vehicles in the Bombay 
Presidency. 18 With the gradual requisitioning of ships, both commercial shipping and 
civilian maritime travel were soon drastically curtailed, and by 1916 women and 
children were no longer permitted to travel by sea. 19 Moreover, as a result of a 
perceived threat to the city from German submarines, regulations requiring the night- 
time extinguishing of lights in buildings along the western shore of the island also soon 
came into effect. 20 
In the city, the maidans which comprised the bulk of the relatively few open spaces, 
now came to serve as temporary billets for troops on their way to the various theatres 
of war. The Cooperage and Marine Lines maidans were occupied virtually 
permanently, raising serious problems of drainage and sanitation. 21 The city also 
served as the primary medical centre for the war wounded: between January and 
October 1916 alone, over 120,000 sick and injured soldiers from the Mesopotamia 
campaign arrived in Bombay. 22 Existing hospital accomodation rapidly became 
inadequate, and the military authorities requisitioned new public buildings such as the 
Royal Institute of Science and the Prince of Wales Museum which were converted into 
war hospitals. By 1917, twelve military hospitals employing large numbers of staff had 
come into existence. Similarly, the War Purposes Board, set up by the Bombay 
17Periodically, as in November 1915 and May 1916, the press carried daily letters of 
complaint against overcrowding on trains. See BC, November 1915 and May 1916. 
Moreover, railway officials in charge of goods traffic also took advantage of the 
situation and traders found themselves having to pay `large sums of money' to secure 
wagons. DCI Reports, July 1920. 
18GOB Judicial Proceedings 1916, p. 521. 
19FRs (1) Nov. 1915 and (1) Feb. 1917. 
20GO1 Home Pol. A Proceedings June 1917,380-394. 
21BC, 24 Sept. 1914. 
22Willingdon to Lloyd George, 7 Oct. 1916. Willingdon Papers. 
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government to coordinate the local production of war materials, occupied the first floor 
of the new Customs House. 23 
The GIP Railway Workshops in Parel were expanded and diversified, working 
through the night to produce munitions, ambulance wagons, and armoured cars. Bonus 
payments for piece-rates were introduced `with excellent results', the productivity of the 
workers being described as `three times as great as on time-work'. 24 By 1916, the 
cotton mills had reversed their initial slowdown owing to the reduction in coal supplies, 
and were `once more working full time' producing, in addition to an increasing volume 
of piece-goods, military khaki clothing and blankets, with the demand for labour now 
exceeding supply. 25 
The three floors of the new General Post Office, the nerve centre of the now 
amalgamated postal and telegraphic communications, became one of the Bombay 
government's key war offices. 26 Telegraph workers became subject to working 18- 
hour shifts which included compulsory overtime 27 Here too sat the Postal Censor and 
his staff who were authorized to detain any `suspect literature'; they also went through 
letters from Bombay students studying in England. Moreover, as the distributing centre 
for all mail destined for Indian troops engaged on both fronts, a special department was 
set up to handle this increased volume of correspondence. 28 
This initially smooth process of militarization was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
virtually unanimous support for the war from the city's political elite. Throughout July, 
the eventuality of war had been a hot topic of conversation in political circles, and the 
23 GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918, p. 223; GOB Judicial Proceedings 1919, p, 
559. 
24Bumett-Hurst, pp. 3,99; BC, 27 June 1923. 
25Bombay Confidential Proceedings 1916, p. 1; 10, Political and Secret Annual files: 
L/P&S/11/136; Chari, pp. 5-6. 
26The War also brought the horse conveyancing of postal mail to an end in the city, 
now replaced by a motorized mail service, the first of its kind in India. BC, 2 Oct. 
1915. 
27BC, 20 Nov. 1916. 
28TOI, 23 Oct. 1914. Letters from Indian soldiers serving on the Western Front were 
censored by the military authorities in Delhi. GOI Home Po1. B Proceedings Aug. 
1915,54; DCI Reports, April 1917; GOI Home Po1. D Proceedings June 1915,18. 
86 
demand for news led many newspapers to bring out special evening editions. Once 
India was declared to be `at war' with Germany, loyalty resolutions were passed by 
most of the major community organisations in the city. 29 Bombay's veteran nationalist 
father figure, Pherozeshah Mehta, presided over a `War Meeting' at the Town Hall 
which was reported as being `crowded to.. capacity'. The audience heard speaker after 
speaker, nationalist and loyalist, affirm the city's unconditional support for Britain and 
her allies 30 There were also calls for the setting up of an Indian Defence Force, made 
up entirely of Indian volunteers, to defend the country's territorial integrity. 
Nationalist leaders like Tilak, Jinnah, and Annie Besant, and potential leaders like 
Gandhi, viewed the war as a `window of opportunity' for India 31 The Bombay 
Chronicle echoed the views of the nationalist press when it asserted that the prospect of 
Indian and European `standing shoulder to shoulder' on the field of battle involved `the 
assertion of an ethical principle: the common equality and unity of the human race, the 
denial of which is the greatest danger of our time. '32 Similar considerations prompted 
the leaders of both the Labour33 and Suffragette movements in England as well as the 
African National Congress in South Africa, to support the Allied cause. For colonized 
29Amongst others, the Pathare Prabhu Social Association, the All-India Bhatia 
Conference, the Mahratta Educational Conference, the Dawoodi Bohras, the Lingayats, 
the Depressed Classes Mission Society, the Anjuman-I-Islam all passed resolutions of 
loyalty to `the King-Emperor' in the days immediately following the outbreak of war. 
BC, 8,13,20,21 August, and 15 and 29 September 1914. GOI Home Po1. B 
Proceedings Nov. 1915,228. 
30BC, 4 and 14 Aug. 1914. 
31Tilak addressed a mass meeting at Shantaram's Chawl in which he urged support for 
Britain and the Allies; Gandhi, who spent the first 4 months of the war in London, on 
his way back to Bombay from South Africa, presided over a meeting organised by the 
Indian Volunteer Committee held at the Regent Street Polytechnic; back in India, he 
actively involved himself in the recruiting campaign. Addressing a meeting in Nadiad, 
Gujarat, he stated that `Home Rule without military power was useless, and this was 
the best opportunity to get it'. His speech was not well received. Jinnah, delivering the 
welcome address to Gandhi in Bombay on his return in January 1915, stated that `.. this 
war.. had brought about a feeling of solidarity and complete unanimity among all 
classes of Indian communities and enabled them to give practical proofs of their deep 
and staunch loyalty to the British Government. ' BC, 26 Oct. 1914; FR, (2) June 1918; 
TO1,16 Jan. 1915. 
32BC, 3 Sept. 1914. 
33Virtually alone amongst European socialist parties, Labour, however, did 
accomodate an influential pacifist wing. 
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peoples as much as for the metropolitan working-class and women's movements, 
participation in the life-and-death struggle that was about to be waged seemed to make 
strategic sense as a means of validating their claims for political and social equality. 
In Bombay, only the Subodh Patrika, organ of the social reformist Prarthana 
Samaj, raised a questioning voice about the very morality of war itself. Refering to the 
influential pacifist movement in England opposing the war, the paper prophetically 
anticipated `the enormous sufferings' that the `present terrible war' would bring in its 
wake, the result of `nations having cherished mutual hatred instead of trying to remove 
mutual misunderstandings' 34 
It was during these years that Bombay surpassed the one million population mark, 
with an additional half a million temporary residents in the city at any particular time. 35 
While the Bombay government appears to have viewed the maintenance of the city in 
as healthy a condition as possible as a `military necessity', it could not undo the 
overcrowded, disease-prone urban environment produced by decades of anti-social 
development policies; nor was its cause helped by war-time `financial retrenchment' 
and the consequent curtailment of expenditure on urban sanitation. 36 
In these circumstances, official sanitary policy simply boiled down to funding the 
Municipal Corporation's anti-malaria campaign, believing soldiers to be particularly 
susceptible to the disease. 37 The municipal campaign centred on the attempted closure 
of the numerous tanks and wells attached to private houses and places of worship, seen 
as breeding-gounds for malarial mosquitoes 38 However, in a city suffering from a 
chronic shortage of water for domestic consumption, such an eradication method was 
doomed to failure. It also reflected a misguided health priority: malaria contributed a 
34Subodh Patrika, 30 Aug. 1914. BNNR no. 36,1914. 
35Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme 
(Government of India, 1926). Part II, Evidence, p. 391. 
36GOB Confidential Proceedings 1916, p. 189. 
37GOB Financial Proceedings 1915, part B, p. 76; GOB Local Self-Government 
Proceedings 1917, p. 126. 
38BMCR 1919-20, part II, p. 106. 
88 
very small fraction of the city's epidemiological mortality compared with deaths from 
respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, and plague. 39 
Indeed, the sudden spiralling of the city's population during the war years created 
an easily predictable health crisis. Mortality rates tripled between 1915 and 1919, and 
increased fatalities from respiratory illnesses were compounded by the re-emergence of 
cholera which "reached epidemic proportions" towards the end of 1918, and especially, 
by the world-wide influenza epidemic ironically brought to Bombay by soldiers 
returning from Europe 40 Just on one day, 11 October 1918, influenza accounted for 
489 deaths in the city. Once again, death was class-oriented, reflecting the city's uneven 
spatial environment. The highest number of fatalities (95) were recorded in Byculla in 
the north, and the lowest (26) in the Fort. 41 In India, the disease would kill 12 million 
people in the 6 months following the Armistice. 42 
39This was later pointed out by Geddes in an article in the Chronicle. Not all private 
wells, he argued, necessarily bred mosquitoes. A more potent source were the stagnant 
pools of water which tended to accumulate in the city during the monsoon months as a 
result of poor drainage. Moreover, in times of rainfall scarcity, wells provided an 
indispensable additional supply of water. 
Properly maintained tanks also contributed to the health of the city as they tended to 
cool the air, in turn, exposure to maximum direct sunlight and fresh air gave wells the 
protection of organically natural disinfectants. Geddes advised that, instead of closure, 
wells could be kept clean by the use of suitable chemicals while the water should not be 
allowed to remain stagnant but be drawn often by means of the Rahat (Persian Wheel). 
BC, 4 June 1920. 
40BMCR 1919-20, p. xii. 
41BC, 12 Oct. 1918. 
42The virulent new strain of influenza which originated in a US Army Camp in March 
1918 was rapidly propagated by the unprecedented human mobility of the First World 
War. It developed into the worst pandemic the world had ever known, killing 40 
million people, nearly five times as many lives as claimed by the war itself. Secret 
History: Killer Flu. Channel 4 Documentary, 1998. 
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2. Censorship and Propaganda: Communications, the press, and cinema. 
On the outbreak of war control over both people's physical movements, and 
messages emanating from the diverse network of modem communications, became an 
urgent priority for both government and army. The passing of the Defence of India Act 
in early 1915, coupled with subsequent amendments, gave the authorities sweeping 
powers of censorship and of arrest and detention without trial; rights of free speech 
were also restricted through simplified powers to prohibit public meetings 43 In June 
1917, the Government of India introduced for the first time a general passport system 
in India. 44 
Delhi advised the Bombay government to use the new powers affecting individual 
civil liberties sparingly, lest they provided an additional platform for nationalist 
agitation. 45 Nonetheless, Governor Willingdon, who favoured a stronger line against 
the gathering Home Rule movement, forbade Abul Kalam Azad from entering the 
Presidency, played an active part in Annie Besant's internment in 1917, and prohibited 
Tilak from speaking in public-except under `approved circumstances'--a year later. In 
fact, the terms of the new legislation were somewhat harsher than the corresponding 
Defence of the Realm Act in Britain where detainees still had recourse to a judicial 
investigation of their cases and the alternative of a jury tria146 
Censorship of messages emitted by modern technologies of communication was 
now under the authority of a "Deputy Chief Censor" based in Simla (the "Chief' sat in 
London). A military appointment, the Censor exercised authority over submarine, 
cable, and radio-telegraphic communications which linked India to the rest of the world. 
By January 1915 he felt confident enough to assert 
43N. Gerald Barrier, Banned. Controversial Literature and Political Control in British 
India 1907-1947 (Missouri 1974), p. 69. 
` 4GOI Home Pol. A Proceedings June 1917,220-28. 
45GOI Home PoL. A Proceedings March 1916,317-25. 
46BC, 26 Feb. 1917. 
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I have now .a fairly tight hold over telegraphic traffic all over 
India which will get 
tighter every day. No uncensored news regarding naval or military movements of any 
sort, in and out of India; nothing sensational or seditious or objectionable is accepted 
or allowed to pass over any wires, Government or railway. All codes and ciphers are 
also prohibited.. 47 
Radio telegrams to and from Britain were immediately suspended, `except for 
official government business' 48 Just north of Bombay, two wireless stations were 
installed `to trace the illicit stations' which `were believed to exist somewhere along the 
coast' 49 In Bombay itself, a radio-telegram interception unit was set up on Butcher 
Island to break through cypher telegrams sent by the German ambassador in Turkey to 
German consuls in Teheran and Isphahan. 50 The work of this unit appears to have 
been rather more successful than that of the `postal appraiser' whose appointment to 
assist the Postal Censor at the Bombay General Post Office was terminated in June 
1916 following his failure to find `much seditious literature in the mail from the UK 
passing through the GPO' 51 All new private residential telephone connections were 
also suspended while, in contrast, `extra expenditure' was incurred to connect the 
residences of CID Inspectors to the central telephone exchange. 52 
Both civil and military authorities were particularly concerned to regulate the flow 
of telegraphic news coming into India. The Reuters News Agency, which held a virtual 
monopoly in the supply of news to the British Empire, had always enjoyed a `special 
relationship' with the Government of India. 53 Even before the passing of the Defense 
of India Act, Edward J. Buck, Reuters Indian representative, voluntarily agreed to 
submit all news telegrams to the Deputy Chief Censor before releasing them 
47G01 Home Pol. A Proceedings Jan. 1915,105-27. 
48BC, 5 Aug. 1914. 
49G01 Home Pol. B Proceedings March 1915,437-38. 
5010, Political and Secret Annual Files: L/P&S/11/91,1915. 
51 GOB Judicial Proceedings 1916, p. 337. 
52BC, 25 May 1918; GOB Financial Proceedings 1915, p. 226. 
53Milton Israel, Communications and power : Propaganda and the press in the Indian 
nationalist struggle, 1920-1947 (Cambridge 1994), p. 100. 
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internally. 54 This was in marked contrast to Reuter's frequent complaints to the Press 
Bureau about the workings of the censorship system in Britain itself. 55 Buck also 
impressed upon the colonial administration Reuters' unique capacity to keep India's 
example of loyalty constantly before the eyes of the Empire and the rest of the world. 
As a result, in December 1914, Buck was provided with an advance of five thousand 
rupees (a very large sum) to `from time to time cook up suitable telegrams for 
transmission through Reuter to all parts of the British Empire' 56 
One such "cooked up" telegram read: 
War has united Hindus and Muslims in one great body determined to lay down their 
lives for Empire and to sacrifice everything for the ultimate victory of England. It has 
wielded together creeds and classes in common bond of sympathy unheard of in Indian 
History and, as in time of King's Durbar, has evoked warmest expressions of loyalty 
and devotion to Sovereign and Crown from Maharaja to poorest peasant. The small 
section of seditionists about whose activities much was heard prior to the war has 
receded into the background. 57 
The use of Reuters suggests the extent to which censorship and propaganda were 
two sides of the same coin for colonial administrations during the war. While 
suspecting the Agency of failing to convey to the outside world the evolving 
complexities of Indian public opinion in relation to the war, the Indian press also 
complained of Reuters' failure to transmit any substantial news about Indian soldiers 
back to India. The perceived misinformation about wholly fictitious Russian victories 
was also regretted, 58 but most criticized was the withholding of information about the 
developing Irish situation. 59 When in April 1918, Reuters reported on Irish nationalist 
54GOI Home Po1. A Proceedings Dec. 1914,230-31. 
55Donald Reed, The Power of News. The History of Reuters 1849-1989 (Oxford 
1992), p. 138. 
56G01 Home Po1. A Proceedings Dec. 1914,230-31. 
57ibid. 
58Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1914; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1915, p. 136. 
59BC, 8 and 24 July 1916. 
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moves against conscription in the British army, the `most objectionable passages' were 
expunged by the Deputy Chief Censor on the advice of the Home Department which 
urged that `.. as little currency as possible should be given in this country to messages of 
this character about the position in Ireland.. '60 
Responsible to the Deputy Chief Censor were the new Press Advisers whose role, 
in each of the provinces, was to decide on the suitability of news items for publication 
in consultation with the local military authorities. Newspapers could only publish, 
without reference to the Press Adviser, items from Reuters and the Indian Press 
Agency (already censored in Delhi), telegrams released by the Government of India, 
and communiques issued by provincial governments supplying the "correct" war 
news. 61 In Bombay, however, the situation was complicated by the Willingdon 
administration's reluctance to cede control to the man from Delhi, Major Hingley. 
Willingdon had written to the Government of India to request that `a civil officer', ie 
one of his own officials, be placed in charge of censorship arrangements in the city only 
to be curtly informed that `in time of war censorship must be maintained as a military 
and not as a civilian process' 62 
Willingdon's persistence in trying to go it alone immediately created problems for 
his own administration. The news of the sinking of the German destroyer Emden 
which had been bombarding Madras and was seen as a threat to Bombay itself, was 
initially censored by the military authorities in Delhi. Journalists, though well aware of 
the event, were forbidden from publishing it. Willingdon, however, took it upon 
himself to reveal the destruction of `the stormy petrel of the Eastern Seas' to an 
astonished private gathering at the Bombay Yatch Club. This prompted a strong 
reaction from the editor of the Bombay Chronicle, Benjamin Guy Horniman. In an 
editorial which marked his political baptism, Horniman asserted that `we are quite 
content to deny ourselves on fair terms, but if news that the Censor is sitting on at Delhi 
60G01 Home PoLD Proceedings May 1918,39. 
61 GOI Home PoLD Proceedings Feb. 1915,29. 
62GOI Home Pol. A Proceedings Nov. 1914,49-55. 
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is to be divulged at private gatherings by persons in high authority, there is an end of 
the bargain. In future, we propose to exercise our own discretion and risk the 
consequences. '63 
In a bold move, Horniman bypassed the Bombay government and directly took up 
the matter with the Viceroy's secretary. He wrote pointing out that the Governor had 
also acted in a way which had favoured some (Anglo-Indian) newspapers, whose 
editors had been present at the private function, at the expense of (nationalist) organs 
such as the Chronicle, whose editors were outside the colonial garden-party circuit. He 
was anxious to cooperate with the authorities in the light of war-time conditions and his 
paper had, he pointed out, `scrupulously complied' with the terms of the Censorship 
Ordinance. At the same time, however, he felt that `.. we should be shown a 
corresponding amount of consideration seeing what it means to a newspaper day after 
day to withhold news of public interest. It is very much like telling a shopkeeper that he 
is not to sell.. (his) most important and profitable articles.. 'M 
Moreover in Bombay, he complained, the censorship of news was not `centralised 
in any one office' so that newspapers had no one person they could turn to for 
guidance. Apart from Major Hingley, `there were frequent communications from the 
Political Department of the Bombay government, while the Commissioner of Police, 
the General Staff Officer, and others also joined in the business of advising what we 
should or should not publish.. '65 
The Government of India responded by reasserting the primacy of the Press 
Adviser who was henceforth to be based within the Political Department of the 
Bombay government. One result of this episode was that it earned Horniman and the 
Chronicle the undying hostility of Willingdon and his officials; it increased the Bombay 
government's belligerence towards the nationalist press, particularly in the light of 
complaints by other editors about the circulation of Reuters telegrams in private clubs 
63BC, 12 Nov. 1914. 
64G01 Home PoLA Proceedings Jan. 1915,105-27. 
65ibid. 
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frequented by high government officials and the Anglo-Indian elite. This had prompted 
another rebuke from Delhi to (amongst others) the Bombay government who were 
reminded of `.. their responsibility for the strict observance of the rule that these 
telegrams should not be published' 66 
Editors like Horniman felt that they were being unjustifiably denied vital 
information in the public interest on narrow "party political" grounds even though, on 
the issue of the war itself, their response had been beyond reproach. Indeed, the Annual 
Report on Indian Papers congratulated the press for grasping `.. the vital issues at stake 
with a.. remarkable clearness of vision" and for having ".. done everything in its power 
to help Government, especially in the first few critical months of the war'. 67 
Bombay journalists, however, underestimated the demonic nature which a section 
of the nationalist press had increasingly come to assume in the eyes of the colonial 
authorities. The press was credited for the growing emergence of a hostile public 
opinion and, under the terms of the Indian Press Act of 1910, it had easily become the 
most favoured recipient of surveillance, harassment, and punishment. The Press Act, 
the child of that reactionary of reactionaries Sir Herbert Risley'68 was a powerful piece 
of intimidatory legislation in the hands of the colonial state. It was effectively designed 
to secure state control over the production and circulation of printed matter within India 
as well as over the dissemination of literature from abroad. 69 Under its terms, 
newspapers were liable to the "anticipatory penalty" of security deposit. Exemption 
was only granted if papers were deemed by a police report to be of `irreproachable' 
character. 
Many presses were strangled at birth by this requirement of the `heavy tax' of 
security. Exemption, moreover, was always under review and could be withdrawn at 
any time. The Press Act created a wholly interpretive offense of `sedition': proceedings 
66GOB Financial Proceedings 1916, p. 11. 
67Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1914. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1915, pp. 130,134. 
681n the words of Horniman. GOB Home Special 204 (A) 1,1919. 
69Batrier, Banned.., pp. 46-47. 
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could be taken against newspapers deemed to have incited `public contempt for the 
Government of British India' as well as `interference with the maintenance of law and 
order. ' "Incitement" could be produced not only by words but also by `signs or visible 
representations' which were likely `.. directly or indirectly, whether by inference, 
suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise' to bring about the said 
situations. 70 Repeat offenders were liable to a demand for enhanced security and 
ultimately, to the final sanction of security forfeiture and shut-down. The event of war 
increased rather than lessened the colonial state's paranoia about the press--its support 
for the Allied cause notwithstanding-as the "enemy within". 
Moreover, the Bombay nationalist press's general support for the war did not of 
course mean that it was prepared to give the colonial state carte blanche in terms of its 
conduct of internal affairs. There was, to be sure, an initial honeymoon period of about 
six months following the outbreak of war. 71 However, as the implications of the 
Defense of India Act became clearer, with such high profile cases as that of the 
internment of the All Brothers, newspapers voiced concerns that it was being utilised to 
suppress peaceful and legitimate political agitation since any person could now be 
arrested and detained without the State having to prove its case in a court of law. 
There was also resentment that Indians, unlike their government, were not given the 
freedom to raise the issue of Home Rule and discuss its implications in relation to the 
promised post-war constitutional reforms 72 The press also, of course, echoed popular 
complaints about war-time hardships, particularly the abnormal rise in prices of food, 
fuel, and house rents, 73 and at the consequences of government spending restrictions 
70G01 Home Po1. A Proceedings March 1917,374-75. 
71 Writing in 1923 and looking back over the war years, Horniman observed that `.. We 
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on sanitation and public health. 74 The potential conflict flashpoints between press and 
government were therefore numerous. 
Editors and proprietors continued to see the Press Act, locally referred to as `the 
Gagging Act', 75 rather than the new wartime legislation as the prime threat to the 
existence and well-being of their newspapers. 76 In December 1915 Horniman seized 
the opportunity presented by the presence of a large number of reporters in the city 
covering both the Congress and Muslim League sessions, to set up the first Indian 
journalists' union, the Press Association of India. This new body identified its 
objectives as `.. protecting the press of the country by all lawful means from arbitrary 
laws and their administration, as well as from all attempts of the legislature to encroach 
on its liberty or of the executive authorities to interfere with the free exercise of their 
calling as joumalists.. 'n 
Fears that the Press Act would be used to further stifle political dissent in the light 
of the considerably enhanced opportunities inherent in the emergencies of war, were 
soon realised. In June 1916, following its campaign in favour of `Home Rule', a 
demand for security was imposed on Annie Besant's Young India. The Press 
Association immediately convened a protest meeting at the Empire cinema. Nine 
months later, amid a flurry of new prosecutions, Horniman led a Press Association 
deputation to the Viceroy to request a repeal of the Press Act. 
The delegation pointed out that the conditions of journalistic activity had become 
`oppressive in the highest degree' since they were compelled to write `.. with one eye 
always.. on the susceptibilities' of the local administration and the police. Moreover, the 
extraordinarily wide powers which were now in the hands of the Executive and which 
could be exercised `without the previous sanction of any judicial authority' gave 
government a weapon which was `bound on occasion to be abused'. The deputation 
74Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1915; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1916, p. 189. 
751n the words of the Praja Bandhu. BNNR no. 37,1915. 
76BC, 24 Oct. 1916. 
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demanded the restoration of their professional status as journalists and of their `rights 
as ordinary citizens' to be tried in a court of law for whatever offenses they might 
allegedly have committed. The Viceroy, bolstered by the Bombay government's 
hawkish stance on repeal, rejected these arguments, invoking the continued 
`intemperate' criticism of government in these `difficult times' when the press had to 
be relied upon to be `loyal and responsible'. 78 
By mid-1917, the CID had fingered three papers which, it alleged, were 
`determined to give Government every possible trouble' even though their attitude to 
the war and to the Allied cause continued to be irreproachable: the Chronicle, Sandesh, 
and Young India. A new heading, `Extremism in Bombay' now emerged in the CID's 
weekly reports, primarily devoted to combing the contents of papers perceived as 
"radical". 79 The Tilakite Sandesh was the city's leading Marathi daily, and its criticism 
of the enhanced police powers under the Defense of India Act had first brought upon it 
the penalty of a large security deposit in April 1915. When further criticism of the 
government over food prices in 1918 incurred the forfeiture of the Rs. 1,500 security, 
the paper had to cease publication 80 The Bombay government had achieved their 
objective without recourse to any wartime legislation. 
That the suppression of dissident newspapers was a primarily civilian rather than 
military initiative is indicated by the contrasting treatment of papers taken to task for 
alleged infringement of purely war ordinances. In these cases, actual punishment tended 
to be rare, a pattern consistent with the treatment of the British press under the Defense 
of the Realm Act. When the Chronicle was addressed `.. with reference to the 
publication of news from enemy sources', Horniman was simply requested `.. to place 
the letter of Government before the management of the paper and to communicate to 
Government the views of the management on the subject.. ' Similarly, the Hindusthan 
78G01 Home Pol. B Proceedings Sept. 1917,333-344. 
79DC1 Reports, Sept. 1917. 
80FR (2) April 1915; GOB Judicial Proceedings 1919, p. 180. 
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was warned for `sensational headlines in connection with war news' while even the 
Times of India was admonished for `revealing troop movements out of Bombay'. 81 
Again, in 1917 the Gujarati was addressed for `making very objectionable 
comments on the situation in Russia' and was given final notice that unless the editor 
`gave up publishing such alarmist articles, Government would be constrained to insist 
on pre-censoring all his articles on the present war' 82 In none of these cases however 
was any punitive action taken under the Defense of India legislation. This was in 
marked contrast with the enhanced use of the Indian Press Act to intensify the pre-war 
pattern of newspaper intimidation. 
It was predictable that sooner or later, Horniman and the Bombay Chronicle would 
become the targets of the veritable arsenal of repressive legislation now in the hands of 
the colonial state. In July 1917, the Chronicle published a number of letters alleging 
brutalities by Recruiting Parties and British soldiers billeted at the Dadar Military 
Labour Camp in the north of the city, against the local working-class population. There 
had for some weeks been considerable industrial unrest in the north of the city caused 
by the spiralling cost of living, which was now further fanned by rumours of the 
behaviour of the military. The issue was taken up and discussed in other papers like 
Sandesh and Kesari. The Willingdon administration immediately invoked section 
153A of the Indian Penal Code against writings `likely to promote feelings of enmity 
and hatred between different classes of His Majesty's subjects' together with the DOI 
articles proscribing any `hampering of the production of materials required for the 
prosecution of the war' and `prejudicing recruiting operations, . 
83 
The editors were served with a DOI Order prohibiting them from opening their 
columns to any further correspondence and discussion relating to the affair. Moreover, 
Horniman was requested to disclose the names of his informants. While Sandesh 
complied with the request, Horniman would not give any guarantees and refused to 
81FR (2) June 1915; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1916, pp. 177-78. 
82GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918, p. 80. 
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name names. To the Secretary of the Bombay government he wrote `.. The Editor of a 
newspaper, has to consider his responsibility to the public which looks to a responsible 
journal to publish news and not to suppress it. In cases where events or rumours have 
produced a state of apprehension in the minds of any section of the public, I think that 
publicity is helpful and in the public interest. ' He merely offered to insert a paragraph in 
the paper `to the effect that the Commissioner of Police would be glad if anyone who 
can assist with information would communicate with him' 84 
It is doubtful whether any investigation of the allegations was ever carried out, and 
the true facts of the affair never emerged publicly. Nonetheless, the government quietly 
moved the Dadar Military Camp personnel on to Karachi and ordered a temporary 
freeze on recruiting operations north of Grant Road. Willingdon considered unleashing 
the full force of the DOI powers against Horniman--arrest, search of premises, police 
interrogation, and internment-but vigorous public protests in the city appear to have 
detered any such action on the part of the local colonial state. 85 In the end, it was back 
to the Press Act, the Chronicle being made subject to an enhanced security demand of 
two thousand rupees 86 
Indeed the elusive narratives of popular rumour seem to have posed particular 
problems for the Bombay government throughout the war years. These oral tales which 
circulated primarily in the bazaars of the city operated of course outside the transparent 
circuits of either colonial or nationalist discourse. They could neither be effectively 
traced nor assigned to individuals or organisations and were therefore beyond the reach 
of colonial censorship and control. At the same time bazaar rumours could not simply 
be dismissed as "false" as they provided a graphic expression of urban popular opinion 
which the authorities had to contend with. Unchecked rumours could, moreover, 
propagate and gain a wider hearing. For this reason they always featured prominently in 
84ibid. 
85G01 Home PoLB Proceedings Jan. 1918,242; GOI Home Po1. D Proceedings Feb. 
1918,35; GOI Home PoLB Proceedings April 1918,20. 
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the Fortnightly Reports while the Times of India devoted many a critical editorial to 
`the gossips of the bazaar' 87 
The authorities were particularly concerned to neutralize 'harmful rumours' well 
aware that in the popular discourse of "gossip", British and Allied military strength 
tended to be consistently denigrated in the bazaars. 88 The sarkar itself appears to have 
been generally cast in the role of an untrustworthy figure of authority, engaged in 
various subter%vges to conceal how badly things were going for Britain and 
inconsiderate to popular wartime difficulties. In February 1915, anxieties about the state 
of popular morale led the Army to order several seaplane flights over Bombay 
Harbour. The Fortnightly reporter was sanguine in the belief that `.. a good effect has 
been produced in so far as their appearance has tended to convince people that Germany 
is not the only nation which possesses flying machines' 89 In contrast, the action taken, 
in early 1917 of prohibiting women and children from leaving Bombay by sea fuelled 
rumours of imminent raids by German submarines and destroyers. 90 
When in early 1918 shortages in the availability of metal led to the issuing of the 
one-rupee note, rumours immediately began circulating that the government was 
`.. taking all the silver out of the country and flooding it with notes' and that even the 
`copper paise was going to be replaced by cardboard pieces' 91 For itinerant groups of 
the urban poor, hawkers, water-carriers, vegetable and fruit sellers, milkmen, the solid 
feel of the rupee metal coin tied up in the corners of their dhotis, was reassuringly 
substantial. In contrast, the paper note, light and flimsy, had all the appearances of a 
cheap con-trick. 92 Indeed the Bombay government feared at the time that `.. the one- 
rupee note had done more to help German propaganda.. than even the campaign of 
sedition inaugurated and carried out under Home Rule or extremist auspices. '93 It did 
87TO1,18 Nov. 1914. 
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not however appear to realise that it was implicitly also admitting its own failure in the 
realm of communication. 
Rumours were disruptive intrusions into the colonial discourse of war, functioning 
as a means of evoking popular fears and feelings about worsening social conditions. 
Never wholly autonomous from the various channels of information--formal and 
informal--circulating in the city, they represented an intuitive resistance to official 
propaganda sometimes acquiring, for this very reason, an uncanny ability to forecast 
actual happenings. `Bazaar rumour' was identified as the initial source of a story 
circulating in the city in May 1917, that Russia had concluded a separate peace with 
Germany. 94 This `rumour' would actually become fact six months later. The 
authorities were always on their guard against such anonymously influential tales and 
affirmed that the people of Bombay and of other large cities were `.. much more 
influenced by adverse rumours than the rural population'. 95 This in itself, however, 
reveals the existence of a popular undercurrent of mistrust and hostility which, feeding 
off the diverse channels of information circulating in the modem city, found expression 
in alternative constructions of "news" beyond the control of government. 
Existing channels of official propaganda had little effect on urban popular 
mentalites. The Fauji Akhbar war bulletin, issued in Marathi and Gujarati as from 
April 1915 to be read aloud on street corners `as a means of circulating reliable war 
news among the natives' had virtually no impact 96 In this respect, the new technology 
of the cinema offered at least the promise of reaching a wider audience, including the 
rural masses. Shortly after the outbreak of war, the Home Ministry's Department of 
Information in London set up a Cinema Branch which became responsible for the 
distribution of war films to India. The Department was `most anxious to act in the 
closest harmony with the India Office and the Government of India'. Its Director, John 
Buchan, emphasised the importance of the new medium as a means of propaganda: 
94FR (1) May 1917. 
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`The Department of Information', he wrote to Delhi, `considers that the subject is one 
peculiarly deserving of the consideration of the Government of India and urges that a 
population which cannot read or write is the more liable to suggestion through the 
eye. '97 
The colonial state, however, had no tradition of active involvement in the provision 
or promotion of cinema, a technology and an industry about which it still effectively 
knew very little. So far, its only involvement with the medium was a concern to ensure 
that `proper censorship arrangements' were in place to deal with `objectionable' films, 
defined as those either inimical to British rule or, more particularly at this stage, those 
portraying "Western culture" in a negative light 98 In Bombay city, the centre of the 
war effort as well as the home of cinema in India, the distribution and exhibition of 
films was in the hands of private entrepreneurs, British as well as Indian, whose 
primary objective was profit-making. This meant the segregation of audiences on a 
class basis, with only an elite circuit of cinemas in the Fort showing the most select 
Western films which were patronized by the educated classes. These audiences were by 
and large representative of the social groups who strongly favoured India's participation 
in the conflict. Within days of the declaration of war, these cinemas began advertising 
`stirring patriotic military dramas' which were certain to `appeal to every patriotic 
citizen' 99 
Cinemas such as the Gaiety, the America-India, and the Imperial began showing 
documentary war films such as England Expects, A Soldier's Duty, and England 
Prepared, as part of their regular daily programmes. Audiences applauded the entrance 
of British troops and all shows closed with the ritual singing of "God Save the 
97GOI Home PoI. A Proceedings Feb. 1918,148-59. 
98Many American films, in particular, were perceived as being in poor taste. Hence, 
the first major piece of cinema legislation, the 1918 Cinematograph Act, was premised 
on the view that India was becoming `.. the dumping ground for the cheap, low and 
vulgar type of objectionable films rejected elsewhere'. Also under consideration was 
censorship of cinema posters in large cities, described as being `.. disgraceful from an 
aesthetic or moral point of view.. ' GOI Home Pol. A Proceedings May 1918,595-604; 
GOI Home Pol. A Proceedings March 1915,263-71. 
99BC, 24 Oct. 1914. 
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King. "l Oo The most exclusive, the Excelsior, soon introduced Pathe's `Weekly War 
Gazette' and informed its patrons that `.. by the Cinema alone' was it `possible to be 
brought into close touch' with `.. the most gigantic struggle that the world has ever 
seen'. 101 A few days later, the same cinema was able to announce a major coup: 
`Actual Fighting Films-The British Navy At Antwerp and The Indian Troops In 
France. ' 
These were shown alongside the main feature, England's Menace, a `war drama' (a 
new genre), which was billed as `a magnificent film showing up the German spy 
system in England. Splendid foreign naval scenes. Thrilling motor cycle incidents. The 
danger of private wireless installations. ' I 02 
On this and other occasions, owing to `.. the great expense entailed in securing these 
films', the theatre raised its admission prices on its most expensive seats, rightly 
confidant in its clientele's ability to pay the extra cost. 103 The Excelsior also pioneered 
the practice of patriotic cinema advertising: 
WHY NOT SEE BRITISH FILMS! l--TWO LITTLE BRITONS by the London Film 
Co. Ltd and CHARLES CHAPLIN! ANOTHER BRITISHER!! in "THE 
ROUNDERS. 104 
By the summer of 1916, however, the recruitment needs of the British Army drew 
the colonial state into exploring ways of using cinema to `bring the war home to the 
people' which meant reaching out beyond the select theatres of south Bombay 
`.. frequented by Europeans or the higher Indian classes only.. '105 The military 
authorities were targetting the labouring classes in the north of the city as well as in the 
mofussil and both central and provincial governments now considered the case of 
having `special Indian films' produced and exhibited more strategically. They also 
100BC, 11 Sept. 1914. 
101BC, 31 Oct. 1914. 
102TO1,10 Nov. 1914. 
103BC, 12 Nov. 1914. 
104BC, 16 Oct. 1915. 
105 GO1 Home Pol. A Proceedings Feb. 1918,148-59. 
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realised that this would necessitate a departure from dominant economic norms as such 
a project could not be accomplished `on a commercial basis'. 106 The Bombay 
government began taking an active interest in the work of a locally-based company, 
Vernon and Co. who were pioneering the production of a number of topical films of 
local interest. 
Vernon's first production, in early 1917, was a documentary in aid of the local war 
effort, The Sick and Wounded in Bombay, `.. a complete pictorial record of the 
arrangements for treating wounded British and Indian troops from the moment they 
arrive here on a hospital ship until they are sent away either to a hill station or to 
England to recuperate. '107 This was followed by another "first" on life in the city after 
dark, Bombay By Night. 108 Although these films were shown at the Coronation in 
Girgaum, they still primarily attracted an elite audience. Like Edward J. Buck at 
Reuters, however, Vernon were only too keen to offer their services to the colonial state 
and to reach a mutually beneficial "patriotic" arrangement with the Bombay 
government. 
The latter were very keen to strike a deal with the aim of facilitating local recruiting 
operations, but the final decision rested with the Government of India. As the war 
entered its fourth year, however, Delhi was under increasing pressure from the India 
Office to `practice economy in every possible direction'. 109 In an attempt to break 
through the colonial state's indecision, Vernon forwarded to the Secretary to the 
Government of India a detailed and practical plan of action, couched in the new 
language of advertising: `.. At present there is no means of bringing home to the average 
Indian matters essential to his individual welfare-he thus falls.. victim to the sedition 
monger and can.. never see the right side of the question-Why not consider the claims 
of the Kinematograph which can mould his ideas? ' 
106ibid. 
107BC, 28 April 1917. 
108BC, 12 May 1917. 
109GOB Financial Proceedings 1918, p. 385. 
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What reads as a veritable paean of self-publicity then went on to enumerate a list of 
colonial concerns which films produced by the Company would help solve. Featured at 
the top of the list were `Home Rule Agitation' and `War Recruitment for both 
combatant and non-combatant forces' followed by other "problems" such as public 
health, agriculture, and investment. The following is an extract from what was clearly 
intended as the most persuasive part of the document--a lengthy "Synopsis for the 
Recruiting Film": 
Show some Recruits (young) marching with Recruiting Sargeant to the Recruiting 
Ofce, a Poster should be hanging up where they meet, and also at Recruiting Office 
(with a view to familiarising the Poster) and money being given to them. 
Show the hut containing the usual Paraphanalia of cooking pots, the village Pig, a 
Goat, and the Byle (sic) stabled in the House-then the Recruit's expression of surprise 
when he sees a Model Barrack Room and its orderliness and cleanliness. 
Show him discarding his dirty Dhotie and Coat and receiving his Rifle, Khaki and fine 
boots the like of which he has never worn before. 
Now show recruits undergoing training. Show Cavalry Manoeuvres. Artillery at 
Practice-building a Pontoon. 
Show him drawing his rations and feeding on better food than he has ever had before. 
Show him at Games and Polo and Party swanking through the Bazaar carrying all 
before him-here the glad eye from a couple of Damsels would appeal to the Don Juan 
spirit in most of their manly bosoms, the Charmers spurn the attention-of a Civilian but 
are visibly attracted by the Soldiers.. 110 
Vernon did however warn of a `heavy' initial outlay on production costs though 
they were willing to `.. furnish estimates for a Programme of Films which it would be 
necessary to produce'. In the end, this turned out to be the clinching factor in the 
decision over the issue. Under unprecedented financial accountability to the India 
Office, the Goverment of India would not, in the end, release funds to be spent on a 
110GOIHome PoL(A), Feb. 1918,148-59. 
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product whose possibilities they had not as yet quite grasped. Vernon's bid failed 
because it involved spending money, coupled with the fact that it was probably too 
imaginative for the conservative mind-set of colonial officialdom. Moreover, the 
immediate issue of the recruitment of more Indian soldiers fell by the wayside when 
the war came to an end in November 1918. 
107 
3. Price rises, war profits, and popular discontent. 
On 4 August, the day of Britain's declaration of war on Germany, a bag of flour 
was selling for Rs. 13 in Bombay city. Within a few days, it had gone up to Rs. 15.111 
Even more spectacularly, a packet of sugar increased by over 50 percent, from Rs. 10 to 
Rs. 16, while tinned provisions of various kinds doubled in price. 12 Meat also rose by 
about 6 annas a pound while the cost of more basic items of popular consumption such 
as rice and potatoes immediately spiralled. 
A city characterized by high levels of poverty rapidly descended into a state of 
panic. While the increases drastically affected popular consumption of even the most 
basic food necessities, the well-to-do attempted to purchase several months' supplies in 
the belief that stocks were about to run out. 13 Meanwhile, newspapers received letters 
of complaint alleging that shopkeepers were refusing to serve customers unless they 
agreed to `.. pay high prices without complaining'. 114 
In view of the immediate rise in freight and insurance rates, the Bombay Collector 
of Customs had allowed a `reasonable' increase to shopkeepers on imported goods. 115 
The Bombay government, however, soon felt that retailers had taken undue advantage 
and fearing food riots, issued a notification that the basic necessities of life should not 
be sold above certain prices, which it would itself fix in consultation with a Committee 
of eminent citizens) 16 
Through the streets of the city, a bataki was beaten, proclaiming that anyone who 
raised their prices above the fixed level would be subject to prosecution. » 7 Willingdon 
was congratulated by the Viceroy for having `.. given a lead to other local Governments' 
on this issue, especially as there was no `. justifiable reason for an enhancement of the 
I 11 TOI, 14 Aug. 1914. 
112BC, 7 Aug. 1914. 
113BMCR 1914-15, part 1, p. 11. 
114TO1,15 Aug. 1914. 
115TOI, 23 Oct. 1914. 
116BMCR 1914-15, part I, p. 11. 
117TO1,23 Oct. 1914. 
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prices of the necessaries of life for the poorer classes'. 118 The dominant commercial 
class, however, was immediately alarmed, the Times of India voicing the Anglo-Indian 
elite's concern that `the regulation of prices beyond those fixed by supply and demand 
is a dangerous thing and very likely to defeat its own object. '119 
Evidence from the popular market-place, however, suggests the ineffectiveness of 
the government order. Mill-hands meeting at Jacob's Circle compared prices charged 
by Bania food grain retailers for cereals and pulses with those at which the same items 
were available at the two cheap grain shops which had been established by the 
Municipality within the premises of a few of the mills. They found that the Banias were 
charging three annas more--9 compared to 6 for the same quantity--well in excess of 
the price fixed by the authorities. They had also observed the superior quality of the mill 
shops' grain and demanded the setting up of shops in all the mills of the city which 
might also compel retail dealers to reduce their prices. 120 
Moreover, in addition to the unheralded rise in prices, the war also confronted the 
urban working classes with an immediate breakdown of their customary method of 
obtaining goods. The cotton textile bosses' practice of withholding 6-8 weeks' wages in 
arrears meant that the mill-hands were permanently in a state of chronic indebtedness to 
Marwari and Pathan moneylenders, and were generally compelled to purchase food and 
other basic provisions on credit from Bania and other petty shopkeepers. With the 
outbreak of war, many shopkeepers now refused to provide goods on credit. 121 
Moreover, the exodus from the city of a large number of Marwari money-lenders 
who feared an imminent attack from the Emden, further added to the mill-hands' 
problems, while rents, too, immediately shot up. 122 Young labour organisations such 
as the Kamgar Hitvardhak Sabha urged the Bombay government to exercise strong 
118Hardinge to Willingdon, 10 Aug. 1914. Willingdon Papers. 
119TOI, 30 Sept. 1914. 
120GOB Confidential Proceedings 1916, p. 3. 
121BC, 27 Aug. 1914 and 12 May 1916. 
122 TOI, 16 Nov. 1914; GOB Confidential Proceedings (General Dept. ) March 1916. 
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pressure on large employers of labour to set up cheap stores that would provide 
workers' with the basic necessities of life. 123 
The outbreak of war also led to a large number of railway workers and lower-grade 
clerks, employed by some of the city's largest private firms, being immediately laid 
off. 124 In September, a number of cotton mills such as Greaves Cotton & Co. 
introduced short-time working which resulted in a substantial reduction in mill hands' 
wages. The following month, the workers informed management that they would 
withdraw their labour unless they were given guarantees of at least twenty-two days' 
work and a restoration of their September wages in full. 
When management responded by stating that `.. working the mills full-time was not 
profitable under present conditions', the mill hands resolved on a day of action: A 
crowd of men, women, and children marched from Parel to the Mill Agents' offices in 
Forbes Street, Fort. On the streets, they stated their grievances to curious citizens, 
showing for the first time perhaps, an appreciation of the importance of cultivating 
public opinion: under present conditions, eighteen days' work did not provide them 
with living wages. A deputation of mill hands was granted an interview by the Agents, 
and eventually agreement was reached on the September wages though not on short- 
time work. 125 
In many respects, this situation was not unique to Bombay. In the predominantly 
working-class East End of London, for instance, food prices rose by sixteen percent by 
the end of the first week of war alone, causing high levels of economic hardship to the 
urban poor. 126 There were, of course, stronger demands from trade unionists and 
socialists for stringent government price controls than in Bombay though paradoxically, 
it was the Bombay government which acted well before the Home authorities on the 
issue of price control. Crucially, however, the Willingdon administration failed to set up 
123BC, 27 Aug. 1914. 
124FR (1) Sept. 1914. 
125TO1,15 Oct. 1914. 
126Julia Bush, Behind The Lines: East End Labour 1914-1919 (London 1984), pp. 
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any effective mechanisms to monitor and enforce price levels, nor was it prepared to 
intervene in relation to food shortages and the non-obtention of goods which rapidly 
became the more important issues for the working classes. 
War conditions do, of course, invariably lead to a substantial reduction in civilian 
consumption in so far as important sectors of economic production are redirected to 
serve military requirements. This was the case as much in London as in Bombay. 
However, one crucial difference in the experience of war-time sacrifices appears to have 
been in the contrasting levels of sacrifice-sharing between classes in the two cities. 
In Britain, the government was initially reluctant to move on price controls. In 
London's East End, food prices had by December 1915 climbed to 46 percent above 
their August 1914 level, surpassing 100 percent by early 1918. However, a wide range 
of popular organisations--local trades' councils, the Co-Operative Movement, the 
recently formed War Emergency Workers National Committee, labour newspapers 
such as the Daily Herald--urged workers to take militant action in defense of their 
living standards while continuing to demand stronger government price controls. 127 
The spring of 1915 saw a massive wave of strikes against rising prices which 
culminated in demands for higher wages. As the East End was one of the centres of 
food and armaments' production, industrial militancy seemed to pose a serious threat to 
the war effort. 
The government encouraged employers to concede wage rises: Tate's Sugar 
Refinery workers, for instance, obtained an immediate twelve and a half percent rise. 
Although the July 1915 Munitions of War Act rendered strikes in the munitions 
industries illegal, workers received, in return, guarantees that wage levels would be 
maintained in the face of cost of living increases, and that profits would be restricted. 
As prices continued to escalate, food shortages and rationing had become common 
by 1917. Only then did the government move to impose the stringent price controls 
which socialists had been demanding from the early days of the conflict. Local food 
127ibid., pp. 39,43-44. 
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control committees were set up to enforce the new regulations on prices and 
distribution and crucially, the labour movement undertook to shadow the official 
committees by maintaining its own independent Food Vigilance Committees in several 
parts of the East End. This task was rendered somewhat easier by the fact that by 1918, 
there were eighty percent more trade unionists in East London than there were in 
1914.128 
In London, direct pressure from the popular classes whose local organisations were 
gaining in strength and militancy, compelled increasing government intervention to 
limit the decline in workers' living standards. The British State, particularly during the 
crisis years of 1916-18, appears to have perceived the advantages of a higher degree of 
internal social cohesion in the interests of war efficiency. It thus increasingly intervened 
in labour issues, acting as mediator between capital and labour. The Colonial State, on 
the other hand, had somewhat different priorities. Its main purpose was to obtain men, 
materials, foodstuffs, and supplies as rapidly and as cheaply as possible from its Indian 
colony. Indeed, the Government of India's Army Department became both a 
substantial and a privileged purchaser and consumer of Indian produce and goods. 
Moreover, the war massively reinforced the prevailing tendency for both internal and 
external demand to increase at a faster rate than the production of foodgrains. 129 
Jowari and Bajri cereal grains were essential items of food consumption for the 
working classes in Bombay. As the city's population grew, deficiencies in supply from 
the Deccan were ordinarily met by inter-provincial imports from Panjab. Throughout 
the war years, however, the colonial government restricted inter-provincial grain 
movements so as to maintain its own privileged consumer position in the market. 
Indeed, by 1918 it had purchased forty million pounds sterling worth of Panjabi 
1281bid., pp. 112,43,83,103. 
129j( L Dutta, Report on the Enquiry into the rise ofprices in India (Delhi 1914), p. 
61. 
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foodgrains, causing a depletion in stocks which largely contributed to the doubling in 
the price of cereals in Bombay city. 130 
A similar pattern existed in the availability of rice, another basic item of popular 
consumption. Here again the city experienced shortages throughout this period which 
were generally attributed both to the spectacular increase in freight rates and to the 
government's willingness to pay above-the-odds prices for Burma rice. 131 In effect, 
the colonial state was engaged in a situation of unequal competition with the urban 
popular classes over the obtention of basic food resources. 
As in Britain, food shortages created an ideal climate for the growth of speculation 
and profiteering. Large wholesale operators such as the grain and cloth merchants, 
anticipating the arrival of ever more desperate times, began to hoard supplies in the 
expectation of making huge profits, offering an example which many smaller retailers 
invariably found hard to resist. 132 Indeed, merchants and traders made `immense 
money' both from wartime speculation in scarce commodities, and from trading in 
strategic raw materials required by the military. 133 It was this rapid accession to wealth 
of many "middling" merchants that would fuel a new postwar ambition to become 
politically influential via the nationalist movement. 
War thus intensified the arbitrariness of colonial takings from India, while also 
creating new opportunities for Bombay's dominant class factions. While merchants 
were accumulating unprecedented wealth, the setting up of the Indian Munitions Board, 
combined with the curtailment of imported cotton articles, provided industrialists with 
new levers for the expansion of production. As a result, the war years witnessed a 
redistribution of wealth in favour of the dominant class in Bombay city. 134 
130A. D. D Gordon, Businessmen and Politics. Rising Nationalism and a 
Modernising Economy in Bombay, 1918-1933(Delhi 1978), p. 32; GOB Confidential 
Proceedings 1919, p. 32; BC, 25 July 1919. 
131The decrease in commercial shipping pushed up freight rates from 12 shillings per 
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The Bombay cotton textile industry now became a primary source for military 
khaki clothes, as well as developing into the effective supplier of markets in the Middle 
East and East Africa, previously the preserve of European manufacturers. By mid- 
1916, short-time working in the cotton mills had come to an end. Industrialists' profits 
rose to unprecedented levels not only as a result of the increased volume of production 
and of the abnormally high price of raw cotton (four times its pre-war level by 1917), 
but through a policy of keeping workers' wage rises well below the level of 
inflation. 135 Dividends paid to shareholders rose from 6 percent in 1914 to over 30 
percent in 1917 while in 1920, sixteen mills were able to pay 100 percent or more on all 
shares; in contrast, during the first three years of the war the index of mill workers' real 
wages fell by fourteen points. 136 
A substantial proportion of the war profits made by industrialists and merchants 
went into land transactions: into the acquisition, both of land developed for residential 
purposes by the Improvement Trust, and of undeveloped land which was bought and 
kept idle. In 1917, the Trust reported that `all previous records' had been beaten in 
terms of the `number and value of plots disposed of, largely as a result of `the 
accumulation of war profits in Bombay'. 137 At the same time, speculative purchases 
led to the spiralling of land values: the price of a square yard of land in Malabar Hill, for 
instance, rose from between Rs. 8-15 in 1916 to Rs. 109 in 1919; even the northern 
suburbs witnessed a staggering increase, the price of an acre shooting up from between 
Rs. 200-1500 to Rs. 5000-25,000 during the same period. 138 Rents followed this 
upward movement, more than doubling on average over the war years, 139 while 
135Chari, pp. 5-7; Chandavarkar, The Origins.., p. 251. 
136Judith Brown, War and the Colonial Relationship. Britain, India and the War of 
1914-18 in M. R. D Foot (ed. ), War and Society (London 1973), p. 98; Dick Kooiman, 
Bombay Communists and the 1924 Textile Strike in EPW vol. xv (19 July 1980), p. 
1224. Gordon, p. 32. 
137BITR 1917, p. 1. 
138Chari, p. 13. 
139The official view from the Department of Statistics, that rents had only increased by 
an average of 18 percent in the city, was regarded as a gross underestimation. BC, 22 
May 1918. 
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prospects for both cheap house-building and affordable suburban settlement received a 
massive setback. 
The colonial state was thus able to obtain its wartime requirements and at the same 
time provide new profitable ventures for the dominant merchant and industrial class 
factions. Indeed, the relationship between the colonial authorities and the dominant 
urban class grew even closer as a result of Britain's deteriorating financial position over 
the war period. It was the Bombay capitalists' enthusiastic response to the various `War 
Loans'-voluntary payments by India into the British war exchequer amounting to one 
and a half thousand million pounds sterling-which ensured their success between 1915 
and 1918. In this situation, the Bombay government was not particularly inclined to 
intervene with the city's industrialists on behalf of the textile workers, in spite of its 
periodic formal denunciations of mill-owners' lack of social conscience. 140 
Moreover, the Bombay government itself became, during this period, one of the 
city's largest employers, following a high number of `war appointments,. 141 As a 
major player in the field, it also had a vested interest in not encouraging wage rises for 
fear of their effect on its own employees. A continued adherence to laissez faire 
economics, coupled with wartime exigencies and constant pressure from the 
government of India for cuts in public expenditure, dictated a general policy of low 
wages, intensified work regimes, and social non-intervention. As a result, wages fell 
further and further behind prices, obliterating the small margin between bare 
subsistence and destitution for the majority of urban workers. Escalating food prices, 
rises in basic items of clothing, as well as in fuel and house rents, all contributed to 
deepening social distress. 
Between 1914 and 1917, the lowest priced jowari and bajri cereal grains rose by 
300 percent, potatoes by 150 percent, sugar by 120 percent, rice, milk, and salt by 100 
percent, kerosine oil by 87 percent, onions by 83 percent, and ghee by 71 percent. 142 
140Gordon, p. 23; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, p. 35. 
141 GOB Financial Proceedings 1917, p. 551. 
142GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, p. 32; BC, 8 Oct. 1917 and 25 June 1919. 
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During the same period, average wages in the city rose by under 50 percent. In the 
cotton textile industry, real wages, as measured by their commodity purchasing power, 
fell from an index of 56 (1934=100] to 42, their lowest point since the turn of the 
century. 143 
Little, moreover, was done to meet the popular demand for cheap grain shops. By 
1917, there were only twelve such shops throughout the city, all run by the 
Municipality, out of which nine were themselves found to be engaged in profiteering 
practices! 144 According to a survey carried out by the Journal of the Indian Economic 
Society, the cost of living between 1914-18, taking the Bombay median family of four 
as the basic unit, rose 150 percent in the case of mill hands and labourers, 103 percent 
in the case of artisans, and 85 percent in the case of clerks. 145 
This process of increasing pauperisation was, moreover, not limited to unskilled 
industrial and transport workers--mill-hands, labourers, railway workers; it was now 
invading the world of skilled labour, particularly the various categories of clerks 
employed in government, municipal, post and telegraph, tramway, and railway offices, 
and affecting even the generally higher-grade European personnel. 
In July 1916 Henry Barton, general secretary of the Indian Telegraph Association, a 
body entirely made up of European staff, was arrested and interned under the DOI Act 
for `.. creating discontent and organising agitation among the employees of the 
Telegraph Department'. 146 Besides the rise in the cost of living, the strategically-key 
Bombay telegraph staff were increasingly bitter about issues such as compulsory 
overtime, inadequate meal breaks, and Sunday working. 147 In October 1918, their 
postal colleagues sent a desperate telegram to the Viceroy's Secretary pleading for 
financial assistance on the grounds that their families faced imminent starvation owing 
143 Gordon, pp. 257,32. 
144BMCR 1916-17, p. xv. 
145Reported in BC, 25 June 1919. 
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to the `irresistible onslaught of high prices' and the local colonial state's failure to 
sanction any war relief. 148 
Indeed the last eighteen months of the war saw an escalating wave of social unrest 
and strikes in Bombay city which was to culminate in the mass general strike of 1919. 
Sixty-one strikes broke out in 1918 compared to just one in 1915.149 Between June 
and August 1917, a strike by virtually all grades of GIP railway workers severely 
disrupted rail services. Mill-hands' unrest over the Dadar Military Camp affair in July 
was partly fuelled by popular anger at recruiting parties' increasing resort to physical 
intimidation and the taking of bribes from would-be recruits-150 In the Bombay 
hinterland recruiting parties now often came under physical attack as the earlier 
enthusiasm for joining up gave way to resentment and indignation over their 
methods. 151 In the city itself, an attempted official inquiry into the social and economic 
conditions of industrial workers living in Parel had to be abandoned when the 
investigators were mistaken for army recruiting personnel and `roughly handled'. 
Significantly, Marathi leaflets distributed by the Social Service League which attempted 
to explain the objectives of the inquiry had no effect at all. 152 
In September, it was the turn of postmen to walk out over an alleged broken 
promise of higher wages, the start of a long drawn out six-months' strike which greatly 
alarmed the authorities. On the night of 24 January 1918, groups of mill-hands and 
railway workers joined in the looting of one hundred and fifteen shops in the Parel- 
Matunga area. They raided grain and cloth shops as well as wood depots belonging to 
Marwaris and Banias, destroying the owners' personal effects and account books in the 
process. Both Police and CID sources explained the riots as the result of growing 
148BC, 23 Oct. 1918. 
149Bumett-Hurst, p. 146. 
150FRs (2) March and (2) Sept. 1916; G01 Home PoLB Proceedings Sept. 1917. 
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popular anger `.. at the exorbitant prices being asked by shopkeepers for food and 
commodities of all kinds'. 153 
This 24-hour upheaval which posed the police serious problems belatedly stirred 
the Bombay government into action, though what followed were little more than 
measures designed to restore and preserve civil order. The Defense of India Act was 
invoked to sanction the double appointment of a `Controller of Prices' and a `Food 
Commissioner', together with the issuing of licences to control traders. However, this 
merely had the effect of driving commodities off the market altogether rather than 
making distribution fairer. Speculation and profiteering continued to flourish, 
`sanctioned by the privileges and licenses issued in the name of Government'. 154 
Only in June 1918 was a Rent Bill intoduced: this was a measure designed to limit 
the increase of rents in working-class accomodation (calculated to be premises offered 
at under Rs. 20 a month) to 10 percent above the levels of January 1915. Instead, it had 
a diametrically opposite effect: tenants, unaware of their new rights under the law, were 
frequently intimidated by landlords into paying increases of between 50 and 100 
percent. In other cases, landlords simply took their premises off the housing market 
rather than rent them unprofitably. 155 The Rent Act also provided a further incentive 
for the Improvement Trust to move away from working-class housing provision 
towards more profitable rental opportunities; in some cases it now charged rents `5-6 
times those at which the same plots had been let in January 1916'. 156 `.. The people are 
powerless, the Controller is powerless, even Government are powerless, only those 
153Annual Report of the Bombay citypolice 1918, p. 24; DC1 Reports, Feb. 1918. 
154y1,16 April 1919; BNNR no. 16,1919. Gordon, pp. 34-36. 
155Bumett-Hurst, pp. 22-23; BC, 27 July 1918; Chandavarkar, The Origins.., p. 183. 
A tenant of Hanuman Buildings on Lamington Road wrote to the Chronicle, pointing 
out that `.. rabid capitalism can find a hundred and one other ways of harrassing men of 
ordinary means in spite of the protection of the Rent Act. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that this Act leaves a grabbing landlord free to get premises vacated on plea 
of repairs and to charge additional rent to meet such costs. ' BC, 10 Jan. 1921. 
Landlords also responded to tenants' refusal to pay enhanced rents by shutting off 
water pumps, thus depriving the upper floors of rented buildings of water. BC, 18 June 
1918. 
156BC, 8 June 1921. 
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who plunder the people on every pretext are powerful', exclaimed in exasperation the 
usually moderate Rast Goftar. 157 
Indeed, when the Bombay government finally sanctioned, in June 1918, special war 
allowances to all its `low-paid' employees and `menials' (sweepers and hamals), this 
provoked a wave of demands for similar treatment from various groups of skilled 
workers. Besides the clerks of the Post and Telegraph Department, administrative 
employees of the BB&CI Railway and telegraph signallers at all the main stations in the 
Presidency also put in their bids. The city's postmen also joined in the movement, 
threatening a return to strike action if they were denied the allowance. 58 
The local state's moves to support low income groups tended to follow a regular 
pattern: what were sanctioned were bonuses and special allowances rather than wage 
increases, and the groups that benefitted were primarily government employees whose 
functions were of strategic importance to both the war effort and the maintenance of 
civil order. By far the chief beneficiaries were the already privileged city police force, 
the only group in the city to secure additional accomodation at public expense during 
the war as well as foodgrain, rent, and travelling allowances. Watchmen and 
chaukidars guarding rail stations and port stores, also obtained foodgrain and house 
rent allowances. 159 
What emerges from the general trend of Bombay government initiatives is a 
concern to limit civilian consumption without interventionist compensatory measures to 
ensure either minimum living wages or popular access to basic foodstuffs. When the 
War Purposes Board was setup in 1917, one of its main objectives was to encourage 
`economy in consumption and use of locally produced articles'--already a way of life 
with the working classes! 160 
157Rast Goftar, 25 July 1918. BNNR no. 26,1918. 
158FR (2) July 1918. 
159GOB Financial Proceedings 1917, p. 889; ibid., 1918, pp. 2,114,172; ibid., 
1919, p. 269. 
160GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918, p. 223. 
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By this time, provincial budgets were under intense scrutiny from the Government 
of India to ensure that `.. any measure involving increased expenditure' be based purely 
on `its imperative and immediate necessity or its immediately remunerative 
character'. 161 As a result, the substantial surpluses accumulated by Bombay 
government budgets throughout the war years were held in reserve at the potential 
disposition of the Government of India, 162 while urgent local priorities in terms of 
housing, public health, and education remained unattended to. 
War, and the spiralling inflation it induced, transformed what had been a steady, 
progressive upward movement of commodity prices since the turn of the century into a 
catastrophic event for the popular classes in Bombay city. Declining access to basic 
foodstuffs and other means of subsistence led to a wave of strikes and, occasionally, 
direct action against Marwari and Bania shopkeepers whom they identified as the 
immediate source of their difficulties. The Bombay government did not appear too 
perturbed by this particular form of popular anger. `.. Last Friday the millhands did 
some very thorough looting owing to high prices and rents which incidentally 
frightened the Marwaris out of their lives and made them lower their prices at once', 
Willingdon wrote sardonically to Chelmsford. 163 Even though such spontaneous 
outbreaks of popular violence did require some palliative measures, it still very much 
left the local colonial state in the clear essentially, social non-intervention meant that 
other, less important links in the chain of popular exploitation, also took most of the 
risks. 
161 GOB Financial Proceedings 1916, p. 811. 
162In 1917, for instance, the Bombay Budget showed a closing surplus balance of over 
Rs. 2 crore. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918, p. 100; GOB Financial 
Proceedings 1918, pp. 385-86. 
163Willingdon to Chelmsford, 31 Jan. 1918. Willingdon Papers. 
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4. Radical voices: Horniman, the Chronicle, and the subversive narration of the 
city. 
The First World War brought together newspaper, film, photography, and wireless 
telegraphy, each element reinforcing the others to produce a revolutionary impact on 
public opinion. In this process, the portable artifact of the daily newspaper emerged as 
pre-eminent, enabling it to embark on a new `romance with speed'. 164 The increased 
volume of messages, and the shortening of the time between their production and 
reception, provided a tremendous impetus to newspaper expansion in most urban 
centres of the world, including Bombay. 
In spite of the demand for increased security deposits, the quadrupling of the price 
of paper and the consequent rise in newspaper prices, 165 the daily press expanded at an 
unprecedented rate during the war years. Between 1914 and 1918 the combined 
circulation of the ten leading daily papers in Bombay went up from 37,800 to 64,400, 
an increase of seventy percent. 166 The two newspapers which provided the most 
extensive war coverage, the Bombay Chronicle and theTimes of India, trebled their 
sales, rising from approximately 4,000 in 1913 to 12,000 in 1918.167 
Indeed, those newspapers which either could not or elected not to keep up with war 
events (and which were also, perhaps not altogether coincidentally, pro-government) 
such as the `faultless and irreprochable' Akhbar-e-Islam, 168 and the Islamic Mail, 
164Peter Fritzsche, Reading Berlin 1900 (Harvard 1996), p. 181. 
165Barrier, Banned.., p. 71; BC, 16 Dec. 1916. 
166GOB Confidential Proceedings 1914, pp. 284-351; and 1919, pp. 222-293. To 
these must also be added the influential weeklies Kesari (30,000) and Gujarati (17, 
600). 
167ibid. The Times oflndia was the only paper to manage a-spectacular-lowering of its 
price, from 4 annas to 1 anna, on 1 May 1915. It attributed this both to the recent 
`.. growth in India of the appetite for news' as well as to having installed `new rotary 
presses of the latest type'. TOI, 17 April 1915. The Bombay Chronicle, on the other 
hand, felt compelled to raise its price from 1 to 2 annas on 1 January 1917. It was only 
in 1925 that it modernised its presses and returned to its pre-war price of I anna. BC, 
16 Dec. 1916 and 6 Feb. 1925. 
168In the words of the Oriental Translator to the GOB. GOB Confidential Proceedings 
1916, p. 174. 
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immediately dropped in circulation, the latter eventually ceasing publication in 1918.169 
Many papers also produced a daily evening war supplement which was eagerly 
snapped up by people alighting at tram stops or queueing at railway stations and outside 
newspaper offices on Medows Street and Hornby Road. 170 
As the war settled into stalemate on the battlefield, and as its effects on Indian life 
began to appear more clearly, this accelerated circulation of words and images tended to 
focus less and less on directly reporting the conflict. Instead, newspapers began to 
concentrate increasingly on its social, economic, and political consequences for both 
Bombay and India. 171 The drama and speed associated with war news influenced the 
way in which newspapers now discussed Indian issues, from everyday urban 
discontents to anticipated postwar constitutional changes. Nationalist newspaper 
columns became pervaded by a new sense of urgency and impatience, and a new 
resolve to articulate meaningful possibilities of political and social change in the light of 
the perceived opportunities created by the war. 172 Significantly, newspapers that were 
becoming increasingly radical in tone such as the bilingual (English-Gujarati) Praja 
Mitra & Parsi were increasing their circulation, while those that remained or had 
become "moderate", like the Gujarati Bombay Samachar, were seeing their sales 
plummet. 173 
The new political discourse of the nationalist press was largely constructed out of 
the words of war-time. As the Allied war effort was grinding to exhaustion by early 
1917, the combined effects of internal social unrest, American intervention, and the 
Irish and Russian rebellions forced British politicians to adopt an increasingly 
169GOB Confidential Proceedings 1917, p. 18; FR (1) Sept. 1918. 
170Veering left off Flora Fountain and emerging on to Rampart Row in the Fort, 
Medows Street was the veritable "Fleet Street" of Bombay, the home of a large 
number of the city's newspapers. 
171pnnual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1916; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1917, p. 117. 
172Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1917; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918, pp. 82-85. 
173Annual Report on Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1918; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, p. 176. 
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democratic rhetoric in relation to war aims with a new emphasis on social justice and 
`self-determination'. In the Chronicle's reformulation, the fundamental aim of the war 
was now `.. to free the world from competitive nationalism' and to secure a `united 
world-order-on a common basis of justice, equality and self-determining freedom'. It 
credited America's President Wilson with having given the Allies a new global vision, 
detached from `the confused motives of European politicians'. 174 
For nationalists, the key phrase around which political hopes were now crystallizing 
was of course `Home Rule' (Swarajya), boosted by the Irish Easter uprising of 1916 
and the political advance of Sinn Fein. Its semantic progression from the margins to the 
centre of political discourse175 provides powerful testimony as to how unprecedented 
changes in material experience-the sufferings and sacrifices brought about by war-- 
were rapidly leading to the discursive redefining of political values. 176 Moreover, 
swarajya now had potentially more radical connotations than in the pre-war era, 1n its 
emphasis on political autonomy from colonial rule being accompanied by the 
breakthrough of a whole new vocabulary of democratic and social aspirations. 178 
In India, the launch of the two Home Rule Leagues by Tilak and Annie Besant was 
virtually simultaneous with events in Ireland; in July 1916, moreover, a British branch, 
the Home Rule for India League was set up in the Strand, London, under the 
174BC, 23 May 1918. The Kesari observed that even though the Russian masses were 
`more uneducated and superstitious' than those of India, Russia seemed nonetheless to 
be moving to `an original form of direct democracy'. GOB Confidential Proceedings 
1918, p. 88. 
175The idea of `home rule' went back to the nineteenth century with the formation of 
the Irish Home Rule League in 1873. Then however, the nationalist Indian Public 
Opinion and Punjab Times had commented that `At present no one knows exactly 
what Home Rule means, for the simple reason that it means nothing. ' H. V Brasted, 
Irish Models and the Indian National Congress 1870-1922 in Jim Masselos (ed. ), 
Struggling and Ruling: The Indian National Congress 1885-1985 (London 1987), p. 
26. 
176Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1916; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1917, p. 120. 
177Gandhi's Hind Swaraj was still little known; in spite of its intended timelessness, 
moreover, there is an unmistakable nineteenth century feel to this text. 
178This, in essence, distinguished the contemporary Home Rule campaign from the 
Swadeshi movement in Bengal in 1906-1908, with its marked Hindu revivalist 
overtones. 
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presidency of no less a figure than George Lansbury himself. Its objective was to 
`secure recognition for India as a partner and not as a dependency in the approaching 
reconstruction of the Empire' by `educating British democracy' about Indian affairs, 
particularly `.. the British masses in whom power lies,. 179 
Bombay, one of the main centres of the movement in India, was flooded by an 
unprecedented wave of pamphlets and handbills in Marathi, English, and Gujarati, 
revealing the expanding importance of print as the carrier of political ideas. In their first 
year the Leagues sold 347,000 copies of English and Marathi pamphlets. 180 Indeed, 
during this period, the main Home Rule newspapers, the Chronicle, Sandesh, and 
Kesari, became far more influential than a divided and weakened Congress in Western 
India. The influence of this `extremist press' was attributed to `the assiduous circulation 
in many directions of single copies'. The soon-to-be appointed Director of the Bombay 
government's new Information Bureau, J. F Gennings, wrote to the Governor that his 
investigations had ascertained that for every person who bought one of these papers, at 
least twenty became acquainted with its contents. 181 
Newspapers and pamphlets fed platform oratory, lecture tours, and discussion 
groups throughout Maharashtra, their words fermenting the numerous wartime social 
grievances, and ushering in a new relationship between print and orality. Indeed, 
platform oratory was generally performed by the same group of bilingual activists who 
wrote in newspapers and produced pamphlets, amounting in effect to `oral 
journalism'. 182 The Bombay government began to recognise that `inflammatory 
harangues and journalistic rhetoric' now went hand-in-hand, a situation which it viewed 
with increasing dismay. 183 Traditionally, it was the vernacular rather than the English 
press which was the object of greater surveillance and the Bombay government was 
179DCI Reports, Sept. 1917, July 1916, and Oct. 1915. 
180H. F Owen, The Home Rule Leagues 1915-18, in D. A Low (ed. ), Soundings in 
South Asian History (London 1968), p. 174; Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947 
(London 1989), pp. 151-52. 
181 G01 Home Pol. A Proceedings Nov. 1919,281-87. 
182GO1 Home Po1. A Proceedings July 1920,265-278. 
183 GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 26. 
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rather obsessed with identifying "friendly" vernaculars which could be propped up as a 
counterweight to the nationalist press. With this aim, it subsidized the Marathi Jagat 
Vritta and the Gujarati Akhbar-e-Islam, two very low-circulation anti-nationalist papers, 
thoroughly inadequate for the purpose. 184 
A substantial part of colonial officials' problem was their lack of skill in `playing 
the press', their inability to imagine its potentialities. Certainly no Governor or Viceroy 
appears, during this period, to have made any effort to cultivate the press as an 
instrument of policy, whether in terms of favouring particular journalists with 
information, judiciously "planting" stories, or even maximizing photo-opportunities. 
This was in contrast, not only to British politicians at home, but to astute colonial 
operators such as Milner in South Africa. The Times oflndia's Stanley Reed may have 
been the Bombay journalist closest to government circles, but he was no confidante. 
When he questioned the capabilities of the ageing British field commanders leading the 
Mesopotamia campaign, Viceroy Chelmsford wrote to Willingdon: `Please give Sir 
Stanley Reed a strong hint as coming from me personally that the leading article in the 
Times of India of August 7 (1916) is decidedly embarrassing.. '185 
An old-school distaste for the press as a `damned nuisance' limited the scope for 
colonial propaganda. Such rigidity was also reflected in the stilted English of official 
pamphlets and publications which even the Anglo-Indian press viewed as `ineptly 
written' and completely lacking in journalistic skill. 186 Inevitably, this put a premium 
on censorship and repression. "Words" and their "authors", rather than political figures 
or social groupings in the traditional sense, became the primary colonial target during 
the war as the struggle to mould public opinion, now open to a wider range of 
communicative influences, intensified dramatically. Here the colonial authorities 
184GOB Confidential Proceedings 1917, p. 216. 
185Chelmsford to Willingdon, 10 Aug. 1916. Willingdon Papers. 
186This was a view expressed by J. A Sandbrook, Editor of The Englishman of 
Calcutta. GOI Home PoLA Proceedings Nov. 1919,21. 
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suffered a major setback when the Bombay High Court ruled, in November 1916, that 
the demand for Home Rule did not amount to sedition. 187 
`Such papers only as Government from time to time sanction shall be admitted to 
reading rooms of schools and hostels or subscribed to by students' proclaimed a 
somewhat naive Bombay government circular of June 1917 banning students from 
political activities. 188 Papers like the Chronicle now provided outlines for an alternative 
modernist "curriculum" compared to the archaic, classical framework of higher 
education imparted by Bombay University and Elphinstone College with its emphasis 
on a narrow range of English texts drawn from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth 
centuries. 189 At risk now was the continued dominance of the established conventions 
of colonial discourse whose veils and silences masked knowledges deemed unsuitable 
for Indian society. The possibilities of urban renewal, the new social challenge posed by 
the labour movement, women's campaign for the franchise, the development of the 
situation in Ireland and the emergence of socialist ideologies, all expressed a gathering 
momentum towards an expansion of political and social rights which would all too 
easily be echoed within India. 
In the process, moreover, the West was losing its essentialized monocultural 
character, a significant hegemonic mystification of colonial rule. A vibrant, alternative 
West, producer of a critical modernity, was being discovered as another anti-colonial 
source: its discourses disseminated expanding aspirations for civic rights now carried 
by concepts such as `home rule', `self-determination', `socialism', `suffragette', `trade 
unions', `town planning'. That these ideas were, in their original form, being accessed 
by a small minority of the English-knowing intelligentsia in no way lessened their 
potential danger in a city where much of the press, and virtually all political and labour 
1870wen, p. 171. 
188BC, 14 June 1917. 
189The History Curriculum was significantly dominated by Edmund Burke's 
Reflections on the French Revolution--not by Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man. 
McDonald, English Education and Social Reform.., p. 459. 
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activists, were bilingual. 90 The loyalist, conservative Islamic Mail was well aware of 
this when it accused the Chronicle of instilling a `deadly poison' in the public mind by 
providing the vernacular nationalist press with opportunities for inflammatory 
translations and renderings of its already `hostile' articles. 91 
Moreover, some of these `subversive' ideas were being re-worked in their Indian 
context, vernacularized, and, with the unprecedented mobility of texts, sent back to the 
metropolis. As a result, contestations of the colonial status quo were beginning to occur 
in England virtually simultaneously with the agitation in India, in spite of increasingly 
stringent restrictions on people's physical movements. 192 In October 1918, the CID 
reported to the Government of India that the Home Rule for India League was 
now publishing and circulating pamphlets dealing with burning Indian questions from 
the Home Rule point of view with the object of educating the English public in general 
and the members of both Houses of Parliament in particular. It posts copies of all its 
pamphlets and larger publications in book form (eg Keir Hardie's India) to each MP 
and to all important political personalities in England. Latterly it has taken to 
countering the activities of the Sydenham League by issuing and distributing "counter" 
pamphlets. It is not an unusual sight in London to see 2 sets of girls distributing pro' 
and 'anti' Indian pamphlets respectively to visitors at the public entrance to a meeting 
organised by the Women's International League or the Britain and India Society or the 
Labourites.. 193 
190Four of the city's ten leading dailies in 1917 were bilingual: Sanj Vartaman 
(English-Gujarati), Praja Mitra&Parsi (English-Gujarati), Jam-e-Jamshed (English- 
Gujarati), Dnyan Prakash (English-Marathi), while a fifth, the leading Marathi paper 
Sandesh, eventually brought out an English edition, The Message. Their combined 
circulation amounted to around 30,000. Of the two most influential weeklies, the 
Marathi Kesari had an English edition, Mahratta, while the Gujarati was a bilingual 
paper (Gujarati-English). Annual Reports on Indian Papers 1914-19; Bombay 
Confidential Proceedings 1915-20. 
1911slamic Mail, 31 Jan. 1915; BNNR no. 6,1915. Most of the vernacular nationalist 
papers routinely carried translated extracts from the Chronicle. GOI Home Pol. A 
Proceedings Nov. 1919,281-87. 
1921n 1917, the Government forbade a Home Rule deputation from proceeding to 
England while the introduction of the passport system gave it further leverage to restrict 
travel abroad. 
193DC1 Reports, Oct. 1918. 
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Thus, to the great surprise of the colonial authorities whose eyes remained fixed on 
the vernacular press, it was the English-language Bombay Chronicle `s critical 
modernist articulations that came to pose the most radical challenge to the wartime 
regime. The paper's offices at no. 8 Medows Street provided a convivial, if somewhat 
chaotic, 194 interactive space which encompassed some of the most prominent 
nationalist members of the bilingual urban intelligentsia. 195 The varied wartime 
activities of this group, at once producers of the most widely circulated daily urban text, 
and principal actors in a range of public arenas outside the newspaper office, enabled it 
to exercise immense influence over urban public opinion. 
Horniman was not only editor, and therefore leader of the paper's production team; 
he was also a home rule, labour, and humanitarian activist. 196 Another member of the 
editorial staff, Sayud Hossain, a recently returned barrister from London where he had 
been active in Indian student circles, brought the paper a host of useful Western 
contacts; in the city, he embarked upon nationalist consciousness-raising work amongst 
students. Sayed Abdullah Brelvi, a graduate of Elphinstone College, described by 
Horniman as a `brilliant young writer', 197 and effectively the paper's number two, had 
a keen interest in labour issues and was a prominent member of an emerging group of 
nationalist Muslims in the city; this group's effective leader was Jinnah, 198 who served 
1941ye original work habits of its journalists and the fervent, hyperactive atmosphere 
of the press room provoked the consternation of the Chronicle's "old guard" directors. 
One of them, Jehangir Petit complained that unlike the `well-regulated' Times of India 
where the editor arrived at his desk at 10.30 a. m and finished work by 6 p. m, the 
editorial staff of the Chronicle usually started work in the evening and went on till the 
early hours of the morning. GOIHome PoLD Proceeddings Nov. 1917,16. 
195Generally referred to by members of the Bombay government as `the Chronicle 
gang'. GOB Home Special file 204,1919. 
196During the GIP Railway strike in the summer of 1917, for instance, Horniman 
enlisted the help of the prominent nationalist and grain merchant L. R Tairsee, and 
organised a relief fund and the opening of cheap grain shops for the striking workers 
and their families. BC, 8 Feb. 1921. 
197GOB Home Special file 204A (1) 1919. 
198Indeed Jinnah's leadership of the Home Rule campaign against the dominant 
class's attempts to present departing Governor Willingdon with a `memorial' on behalf 
of grateful `citizens of Bombay' briefly made him the city's leading "radical" 
nationalist figure towards the end of 1918. James Masselos, Some Aspects of Bombay 
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as the Chronicle's legal counsel while being a leading activist, along with Horniman, of 
Annie Besant's Home Rule League. In turn, the League provided the paper with an 
outer circle of `staunch friends', such as Sarojini Naidu, Umar Sobhani, and Shankerlal 
Banker. 199 
The paper shared with the "extreme left" of nationalist opinion a macro-level 
discourse on `Home Rule', repeatedly articulating the view that `.. the cure for most of 
our social and economic distress lies in the transfer of State-power to the 
representatives of the people, who are best qualified by intimate knowledge and 
sympathy to introduce social reforms at a pace which it is inherently impossible for the 
present bureaucratic government to equal. '200 
It was however at the arguably more crucial micro-level, in the building up of a 
local, civic model of Home Rule, that the paper's voice was distinctively unique. It 
provided a narrative that revealed the city and its problems in a new light. "Citizenship" 
was perhaps the keyword in this discourse which sought to educate urban civil society 
into the realisation of rights and responsibilities inherent in the collective life of a 
metropolis201 Against the dominant belief, shared by colonials and most nationalists, 
in the privileged power of capital to shape the city, the Chronicle emphasised the rights 
of ordinary people to good housing, wages, health, and public transport. 
The Chronicle thus amended the official sociology of the city to include workers 
and the urban poor. It repeatedly emphasised the plight of various groups of workers- 
mill-hands, labourers, railway workers, but also the vast numbers of low paid clerks 
employed in Government, Municipal, and private offices--from price rises and 
City Politics in 1919, in Ravinder Kumar (ed. ), Essays on Gandhian Politics: The 
Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 (Delhi 1971), pp. 161-166. 
199Sarojini Naidu wrote the introduction to A Friend of India, an edited collection of 
Horniman's speeches and writings in which she praised his `mastery of political 
issues', his `rare combination of imagination, humour and tenderness' and the lively, 
satirical quality of his writing, reminiscent `of Swift and Voltaire'. L. R Tairsee and R. 
Venkat (eds. ), A Friend of India (Bombay 1918), pp. 19-21; GOB Home Special file 
204 A (1), 1919. 
200BC, 14 March 1919. 
201 See chapter four. 
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shortages during the war. This established the context for a series on the future of the 
working classes which dwelt on the official neglect of workers' well-being, the 
excessive hours of work permitted by the Factory Act, the lack of opportunities for 
education, and the atrocious housing conditions. 
Illustrations from the evolving world of European labour, moreover, were used to 
amplify the sense of these oppressions. Reports of urban labour struggles were 
intersperced with regular features on `Socialism and War' which traced the various 
episodes through which the deprivations of war had given rise to militant demands for 
social justice and equality in British society. New methods of industrial labour 
organisation, such as the introduction of the three-shift system over 24 hours in British 
munitions factories, were highlighted. 202 Editorials then argued that demands for 
higher wages in Bombay were inherently just, but what was also required now was for 
`labour itself to raise its collective voice' by forming trade unions, a route along which 
England was already moving. These would serve to educate the public, enabling it to 
arrive at a `.. just appreciation of the dignity and value of labour'? 03 
The narrative skill which enabled the construction of relationships between the local 
and the global gave the paper a unique angle of vision, necessarily subversive of the 
narrow colonial world-view. 
When the city's postmen went on strike in September 1917, the Chronicle became 
an active participant in the event. The dispute, which lasted six months, inaugurated the 
technique of investigative reporting which shed new light on aspects- of the unknown 
world of postal labour. The paper provided regular, often daily, coverage of the strike's 
progress which included hour-by-hour accounts featuring interviews with leading 
personalities (labour leaders, advocates, the Postmaster-General) who were followed to 
different locations. At the same time, a dossier on the rise in the cost of living provided 
the background for an analysis of the postal workers' motivation; while editorials 
described the lower grades as `notoriously overworked' making their conditions `.. in 
202BC, 24 July 1916. 
203BC, 27 Nov. 1915 and 6 Jan. 1919. 
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these days of war prices and privation' doubly `insupportable'. 204 Moreover, 
throughout the strike period, the paper published a series of letters critical of the 
authorities' response to strikers' demands while editorials elaborated on the consequent 
inconvenience to the public. 205 
Indeed, its indispensability as a source of both information and analysis enabled the 
Chronicle to enter the neighbourhood meeting-places of the postal workers. Here, the 
Cambridge-educated barrister and Union activist, Vinayak Ganpat Dalvi, 206 used the 
paper as an instrument in the struggle, translating the relevant articles into Marathi for 
the benefit of the rank-and-file. An article which appeared on 18 September was 
reported to have `.. had a very considerable effect on the temper of the postmen and to 
have caused many waverers to throw in their lot with those who were anxious to 
strike' 207 In this instance, the process of vernacularization was immediate, serving the 
pressing needs of militant labour action and providing workers with a language to 
define, and seek solutions to, their discontent. The following day, virtually all the city's 
eight hundred postmen went on strike. 208 
Horniman himself was an influential figure in the strike, addressing workers' 
meetings in different parts of the city, and providing logistic support and advice on the 
establishment of a trade union. When the strike ended with an offer of a pay increase of 
between ten and twenty percent for the various grades and the formation of a 
Postmen's Union, the editor of the Chronicle became an immensely popular figure 
amongst the postal workers. The CID described an ensuing meeting held at the 
Gandharva Maha Vidyalaya in Girgaum as follows: 
B. G Horniman presided. Vinayak Ganpat Dalvi.. thanked Horniman for the trouble he 
had taken in championing their cause during the last postal strike. He was followed by 
two postmen who were loud in their praises ofHorniman's services. Horniman replied 
204BC, 22 Sept. 1917. 
205GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 16. 
206Bumett-Hurst, p. 104. 
207G01 Home Pol. D Proceedings Feb. 1918. 
208GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 16. 
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thanking the speakers for the honour done to him. He pointed out that the condition of 
labour in India was miserable and that wherever possible unions should be 
established. He added that such unions existed in Western countries and wielded a 
great deal of influence. His speech was translated into Marathi by V. G Dalvi.. 209 
While involving much fewer workers than in textile mill labour disputes, militancy 
in the postal service radically struck at the Bombay government, for it directly revealed 
the sarkar as an exploitative employer while demonstrating the ability of workers to 
paralyse a strategically key department in the war effort. This much was understood 
both by the Postmaster-General who queried with the Bombay government whether 
any legal steps could be taken to prevent Horniman from `deliberately instigating' the 
postmen `to mischief, 210 and by the Commissioner of Police who wrote that `.. the 
intrusion of the professional agitator between the employer and the employee is 
objectionable enough when the employer is a private individual or concern, but 
infinitely more objectionable when the employer is the State. '211 
The paper's discursive style involved a particular assembling and juxtaposing of 
events which imposed a coherence on the events described; this in turn invited a critical 
reading or `decoding' of the colonial order. In the space of a few days in July 1917, for 
instance, the Chronicle provided a structured narrative linking the stories about the 
Dadar Labour Camp with other events that were occurring simultaneously. The letters 
alleging the molestation and abduction of women were featured alongside reports of 
unrest among mehtas at the Mulji Jetha Market, and of a strike by railway workers of 
the GIP workshops. This included an account of the strikers' march to the Fort and 
their less than welcome reception by the police. The feature described in some detail 
how the workers were `marshalled up' in an enclosure on the Esplanade Maidan in the 
monsoon heat for five-and-a-half hours without food or water, it ended with a carefully 
weighted fingering of the Police Commissioner, suggesting that `.. if the attention of the 
209DC1 Reports, April 1918. 
210GOB Judicial Dept., part B, June 1918; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918. 
21 1DC1 Reports, April 1918. 
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Commissioner of Police is called to the matter, he will surely arrange should such an 
occasion again occur, for water and refreshment.. ' 212 
In such instances, the newspaper report of the event itself constituted part of its 
eventfulness. In a Bombay characterized by class and community-based spatial 
segmentation, the Chronicle revealed diverse aspects of the city beyond the knowledge 
of communities and individuals. It attempted to elucidate the problems of Bombay's 
milk supply by carrying out a week-long fact-fording mission to ascertain conditions in 
the city's milch cattle stables. 213 It also published the stream of complaints sent in by 
citizens about rising prices, low wages, food shortages, lack of water, bad roads, 
overcrowding on public transport, and municipal apathy. When the Bombay 
government issued its circular banning students from participation in home rule 
agitation, the Chronicle opened its columns to letters protesting against College 
principals' attempts to `control the activities of their students outside the four walls of 
the College'214 
Horniman and the Chronicle were dangerous not only because they relentlessly 
preached the ideological virtues of home rule, but because their critiques of the urban 
colonial regime offered practical insights into how swaraj might be lived locally. It is 
significant that the CID's file of the Chronicle's `objectionable articles' included not 
only direct criticisms of government ('Where Lord Chelmsford has failed') but also 
pieces on everyday grievances such as as `The Third-Class Passenger', `Public and 
Tramways: Hardships of Passengers', `Economy and Extravagence', `Sacked For 
Being Assaulted'. 215 
In August 1917, in the wake of the Chronicle's attempts to elucidate happenings at 
the Dadar Military Labour Camp, Willingdon enquired about the possibility of 
deporting Horniman to England only to be informed by the Government of India's 
212GO1 Home Pol. B Proceedings Sept. 1917. 
213BC, 16-29 July 1918. 
214BC, 25 Nov. 1915. 
215G01 Home Pol. A Proceedings May 1919. 
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Legal Department that there was `.. no power in the DOI Rules which will authorise 
sending a European British subject to England . 216 Two months later, the Governor of 
Bombay was back on the offensive. This time, he made a dramatic attempt to secure 
Horniman's dismissal from the paper by putting pressure on the Chronicle's Board of 
Directors, still essentially made up of the moderate followers of Pherozeshah Mehta. 
They were secretly summoned to the Secretariat and warned of the severest 
consequences that would ensue if the paper did not desist from its `constant calumny' 
of government 217 
Horniman, furious that the Directors had gone behind his back, resigned 
immediately and briefly seems to have entertained the idea of returning to England to 
stand as a candidate for the Labour Party in the 1918 General Election--though the 
Bombay government hoped for a rather more sinister fate: 
The Government of Bombay are of opinion that Horniman constitutes the driving 
power of the mischievous element in Bombay and that if he went to England and stayed 
there, the Chronicle would cease to be a power. It is possible that it might become more 
violent in tone, but in that case it would be easier to deal with it. On the other hand, it is 
possible that in England Horniman would be regarded as a degenerate, and the Home 
authorities would find no difficulty in dealing with him. Indeed he might find himself at 
the Front. 218 
216Exile to Aden was also discussed. The Secretary to the Bombay government wrote 
that `.. A Horniman wielding a clever pen in a language generally understood and 
surrounded by a noisy crowd of admirers would be a very different thing to a 
Horniman not allowed to speak or write to the public, or even to private people, except 
under censorship.. Mr. Horniman as a private individual is a much less dangerous 
person than as Editor of the Bombay Chronicle.. ' GOI Home PoLD Proceedings Feb. 
1918,18-30. 
217DCI Reports, Nov. 1917. 
218GOB Home Special 204,1919. The reference to Horniman's `degeneracy' 
concerned his alleged homosexuality which the colonial state played up in its attempt to 
displace his political opposition (unthinkable since he was supposed to be "one of 
them") on to the terrain of sexual deviance. The Secretary, Home Department, GOI, 
advised the Viceroy that Horniman was `.. notoriously reputed to be of bad moral 
character'; Willingdon also wrote to the Viceroy that he was `a vicious, degenerate 
brute' who exercised `a hideous influence here and would be better in a munitions 
factory at home than as a leader of thought here.. ' GOI Home PoLA Proceedings 
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Within days, however, Horniman's supporters among the shareholders and staff, 
`in a series of adroit moves' had secured the resignations of Jehangir Petit, Chimanlal 
Setalvad and other members of the party which had "visited" Willingdon. In their 
place, a new unambiguously pro-Home Rule Board came into existence; its members 
included Jinnah as chairman, Umar Sobhani, and M. R Jayakar. Horniman was back as 
editor, `on his own terms', and in an even stronger position. 
The colonial authorities now viewed deportation as the only solution, and for most 
of 1918 discussions between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India 
focused on setting up the appropriate legal machinery to make this possible and on 
seizing the most `opportune moment' for `a big coup against the Home Rulers'. By 
August 1918 the legal framework had been devised: the amendment of Defense of 
India Rule 3A by the insertion of a new clause (d) empowering local governments to 
`remove from British India', without reference to the Courts, any person(s) whose 
activities were `prejudicial to public order' 219 
That Horniman's use of the assertive techniques of modem journalism could 
appear so threatening reveals the extent to which the world of colonial officialdom 
feared and recoiled from the profound changes that were affecting the world during this 
period. As a clearly worried Home Department chief Sir William Vincent wrote to the 
Viceroy: `.. There is at least a possibility that the views of the Government of India and 
of the Secretary of State may be swept aside in a fit of generosity and gratitude on the 
conclusion of peace by a nation which is daily becoming more democratic during the 
war! `The British people', he went on, `are at present much influenced by the political 
views of dominions even more democratic than the UK. '22o 
As from 1918, the authorities banned the entry into India of British labour 
newspapers and journals such as the Daily Herald, Common Sense, The Labour 
March 1918,374-75; GOI Home Pol. A Proceedings Aug. 1918,64-65; GOI Home 
Pol. D Proceedings Feb. 1918,30. 
219GOI Home Po1. A Proceedings Aug. 1918,18. 
220GOl Home PoI. D Proceedings May 1917. 
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Leader, and the New Statesman, 221 while the Bombay Postal Censor intercepted 
"Home Rule" correspondence with Labour figures in England. The rising tide which 
Chelmsford, Willingdon and their officials were increasingly struggling to contain was 
no longer a feature just of Bombay and other parts of India, but a global movement of 
peoples variously affected by the war. Horniman asserted that neither the political nor 
the labour unrest in India could be checked since both were `.. part of the world-wide 
movement prompted by the aspiration for freedom and equal rights'. 222 
Both on the streets and in discourses, the old hierarchies of power and domination 
seen as responsible for the fatalities, deprivations, and dislocations of war, were being 
increasingly confronted, inspired by either nationalism or socialism (and sometimes by 
a combination of the two). Throughout 1918 the CID was reporting on the socialism of 
the growing `Labour Parties in England', a socialism, it warned the Government of 
India, that was strongly in support of India's right to `national self-determination'223 
The difficulties faced by colonial officials in India were perhaps caused as much by 
their dismay at the emergence of a new Britain as by their desire to hold on to an old 
India. 
The revolution in communications which the war had dramatically intensified was 
bringing the world closer together. A key feature of this situation was that more words 
circulated around the world at a faster rate than ever before, thus multiplying the uses to 
which they could be put and enhancing their disorderly, subversive potential. Out of 
this global interchange of concepts, ideas, and aspirations, new critiques and new 
visions of society were emerging. The rapidly deteriorating state of the city, moreover, 
ensured that Bombay's bilingual intelligentsia would seek their virtually immediate 
vernacularization. The guardians of colonial power and privilege now faced a new and 
221These were referred to by the CID as `literature prejudicial to war morale.. ' The 
main fear was that the pacifist viewpoints they expressed would `infect' the Indian 
press `which has up to the present been almost free from the taint of pacifism'. DCI 
Reports, July 1918. 
222BC, 11 Jan. 1919. 
223DCI Reports, February 1919. 
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unheralded threat, the sources of which were potentially multiple. The strengthening of 
the legal regime of censorship, ostensibly a war measure, was in fact a response to the 
new danger, guided by the sentiments that had inspired the Press Act a few years 
earlier. to check `the campaign to sow the poison of sedition by means of the printed 
word'. 224 
The Chronicle `s narratives fashioned new designs for the city by drawing 
connections between the seemingly different worlds of urban labour struggles, national 
aspirations for home rule, and international movements for social change. This process 
enabled an ongoing diffusion and exchange of ideas which contributed to the 
radicalisation of public opinion. Born on the eve of the war, the new daily had hardly 
elicited a mention in the weekly newspaper reports in 1914 and 1915. By 1917, 
however, it was described as `.. easily the most important of all the papers included in 
the Weekly Report; it has a large circulation and is a power in Indian politics today. '225 
In the space of eighteen months, the Chronicle had moved from the undistinctive 
middle ground of Bombay politics to a clear position of hegemony and leadership 
within the nationalist press. By the end of 1917, the Annual Report on Indian Papers 
was commenting on the `remarkable change' that had come over virtually `the entire 
Indian press' which was now in favour of some form of `Home Rule', including 
`.. previously anti-Congress organs such as Rast Goftar' 226 
The paper even appears to have restricted the influence of forces favouring a more 
conciliatory attitude towards the government. `The main difficulty I see in the future', 
wrote the departing Willingdon to Montagu in July 1918, `is as to whether we shall 
ever get the Moderates to combine. I have seen several and implored them to form an 
organisation, but they are all frightened of what the "Chronicle" will say about 
224GOI Home Po1. A Proceedings March 1917. 
225GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, p. 177. 
226GOB Confidential Proceedings 1918, p. 74. 
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them. '227 A mere artifact, the Bombay Chronicle appears nonetheless to have redrawn 
the boundaries of political discourse in wartime Bombay. 
227Willingdon to Montagu, 11 July 1918. Willingdon Papers. 
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Chapter three. Urban confrontations: Gandhi, Horniman, and the 
material test of spiritual politics. 
1. Gandhi and the challenge of Horniman's Bombay. 
The political philosophy of Gandhi was, it can be argued, largely constructed in 
response to the modem energies of city life. Drawing on the reactionary anti- 
modernism of Carlyle and Ruskin, Gandhi claimed in 1909 that it was not the British 
people who were ruling India but `.. modem civilisation through its railways, telegraphs, 
telephones, and almost every invention which has been claimed to be a triumph of 
civilisation' including `tram-cars and electricity'. These `purely material' technologies 
were synonymous with the "corruptions" of modem urban living, making `Bombay, 
Calcutta, and other chief cities.. the real plague spots' of India. 1 
Hind Swaraj's indictment of a civilisation based on the twin pillars of machines and 
large cities was not lessened by Gandhi's face-to-face encounter with wartime Bombay. 
Arriving in the city in January 1915, he wrote to his nephew Maganlal: 
I don't like Bombay, though. It looks as if it were the scum ofLondon. I see here all the 
shortcomings of London but find none of its amenities; this is also one of the benefits of 
living in India. It would seem that Lady India had resolved to exhibit nothing but the 
scum of London lest we should be thrown off our balance by the amenities. 2 
It is doubtful, however, whether the people of Bombay viewed the absence of civic 
amenities'as "benefits". It was precisely the everyday problems arising from the lack of 
adequate wages, decent homes, and an amenable environment that made living in "the 
second city of the Empire" such a harsh experience. This situation considerably 
worsened during the war years which brought an unprecedented increase in both 
commodity prices and urban congestion. While Gandhi's exploits in South Africa 
ensured that he received an enthusiastic welcome from all strands of nationalist opinion 
in the city, Horniman and the Bombay Chronicle were already engaged in articulating a 
'Anthony J. Parel (ed. ), Gandhi: Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (CUP 1997), pp. 
110,130. 
2CWMG, vol. xiii, pp. 4-5. 
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powerful multi-dimensional critique of the colonial order in which urban regeneration 
and `civic reconstruction' were posed as indispensable aspects of any anti-colonial 
nationalist project .3 
As the war ended, Horniman intensified his militant activities in the city while the 
Chronicle multiplied narratives subversive of the colonial order. During the Great 
Textile Strike of early 1919 Horniman made regular visits to the striking mills in the 
north of the city, while the Chronicle's daily coverage of events put the case of the mill 
hands squarely before the public .4 The labour unrest was the `.. manifestation of a 
growing, deep, and widespread though silent discontent' caused by the `cumulative 
hardships of abnormally high prices of necessities of life and of the ravages of famine 
and epidemics'. The new tactic of general strike was, moreover, `a legitimate weapon 
of organised Labour against organised Capital' since their relations were founded `on 
injustice and inhumanity' which amounted to `a modern but more sinister form of 
human slavery'. 5 
Throughout the duration of the strike the Chronicle kept up the pressure for a 
settlement in favour of the mill hands, launching pieces carefully designed to encourage 
government intervention. Letters were also published regretting the `dead silence' of the 
Home Rule Leagues' leaders over the labour conflict .6 At the height of negotiations 
between the Bombay government and the city's leading industrialists, a carefully 
crafted editorial expressed `the fullest faith in Sir George Lloyd's good intentions' 
while reminding readers of the local colonial state's traditional anti-labour bias.? 
The rise of a labour movement asserting its rights to urban citizenship was, for 
Horniman, an essential component of a regenerated post-war Bombay. The war's 
culmination in `a people's victory' had resulted in a `tremendous rise in the world- 
status of the labour movement' and he welcomed `the growing regard for the amenities 
3See previous chapter. 
4GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 18. 
5BC, 11 Jan. 1919. 
6BC, 20 Jan. 1919. 
7BC, 20 Jan. 1919. 
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of life' as promising to mark an end to the `mean streets, mean houses, and mean 
backyards' of pre-war urban society in which peace was merely `a transparent 
camouflage for cut-throat commercial warfare'. 8 The emergence of trade unions 
signified a new emphasis on collective needs and promised to bring a fresh vigour in 
combatting prevailing urban inequalities. 
Horniman's activism drew upon a wide organisational basis, shaping a world-view 
which integrated local, national, and global perspectives. As editor of the Chronicle, he 
pioneered a new assertive journalism which was impacting on both public opinion and 
the colonial state; as a trade unionist, he founded the Press Association of India; a 
prominent member of Annie Besant's Home Rule League, Horniman had by the end 
of the war years outgrown its limited mobilizational strategies; he also chaired the Fort 
District Congress Committee and was now an influential figure in all-India nationalist 
circles. Locally, he was instrumental in the formation of the Postmen's Union while 
also championing tramway passengers' grievances; 9 his activities within the Bombay 
Humanitarian League included relief work amongst the poor in the city's working-class 
neighbourhoods during the influenza epidemic of 1918.10 Finally, his encouragement 
of student political participation had brought upon him the vice-presidency of the 
Young India Student Society. 1 I 
It would appear that Horniman developed an interest in using "passive resistance" 
as a weapon against colonial wartime repression independently of Gandhi. On 12 
August 1917, he introduced a motion at a meeting of the Bombay Provincial Congress 
Committee advocating non-violent mass action to secure Annie Besant's release from 
internment. 12 Thus when Gandhi launched the Kaira satyagraha in early 1918, it 
immediately received Horniman's enthusiatic endorsement. A reporter was sent to 
8BC, 7 Jan. 1919. 
9BC, 3 April 1919. 
10BC, 14 July 1919 and 26 Jan. 1921. 
11 Government of Maharashtra, Source Material for a history of the Freedom 
Movement, vol. ii (1885-1920), p. 811. 
12ibid. 
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Gujarat and the Chronicle gave his despatches constant coverage, Horniman once again 
making effective use of modem journalistic devices (bold headlines, juxtaposition of 
events) to invite an anti-colonial reading of the satyagraha--to the great disconcertion of 
Gandhi. 
At Homiman's invitation, Gandhi arrived in Bombay in early February and 
addressed a public meeting at the Mulji Jetha cloth market on the situation in Kaira. 
Although Gandhi was the only scheduled speaker, Horniman was forced to address the 
gathering `in response to persistent calls from the audience'. 13 This probably 
persuaded Gandhi not to confront Horniman directly: instead he instructed his 
secretary, Mahadev Desai to attempt to prevail upon his childhood friend Sayed 
Abdullah Brelvi, Horniman's number two at the Chronicle, to see Gandhi's `point of 
view'. Desai's letters to Brelvi reveal Gandhi's futile attempts at controlling the news 
emanating from Kaira, and his failure to comprehend the new journalism of 
investigative and dissenting reporting: `Gandhiji', wrote Desai to Brelvi on 22 February 
1918, `was very much annoyed when he read the Chronicle's article on the Kaira 
distress. He took the correspondent to task and has charged him not to send any 
information of the sort in future.. I hope you will see to it and kindly speak to Horniman 
in the matter. ' I4 
Gandhi, who on other occasions insisted on absolute openess of thought and deed, 
apparently considered the article akin to `revealing to our enemies our points-weak or 
strong'. 15 A few weeks later, the Mahatma was bemoaning the Chronicle's `absolute 
lack' of all `clear knowledge of facts, moderation, and perspection' and by mid-April 
was determined `not to have anything to do with the Bombay people and with the 
Press'. 16 It would not be for the last time, moreover, that the Gandhian perspective 
13GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 16 
14Mahadev Desai to Sayed Abdullah Brelvi, 22 Feb. 1918. Brelvi Papers. 
15ibid. 
16Desai to Brelvi, 9 and 14 April 1918. 
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would coincide with that of the colonial authorities: the Bombay CID also condemned 
the paper's `booming' of the Kaira agitation as `most objectionable'. 17 
The Chronicle carried on its coverage regardless. The conflict here was between 
Horniman's commitment to reaching public opinion through the construction of a 
coherent anti-colonial narrative out of contemporary events such as the Kaira agitation; 
and the politically ambivalent moral authoritarianism implicit in Gandhi's determination 
to see `.. the cleanest and straightest of agitations that was ever organised in Gujarat' in 
which not even a hint of any animosity `on the part of the workers towards the 
Government and Government officials' should be displayed. 18 When in August 
Horniman invited Gandhi to chair the working committee of the Humanitarian 
Conference, convened to organise famine relief in the Presidency, the Mahatma, who 
confessed to being `recruiting-mad', refused. 19 
While all sections of the nationalist movement in the Bombay Presidency opposed 
the Rowlatt Bills, this was largely a piecemeal rather than a structured opposition. A 
general sense of shock and astonishment greeted this first post-war measure and 
Gandhi very much shared the general reaction that the proposed legislation represented 
the `breaking of a promise', a "wrong" that was `out of character' with colonial 
intentions. Horniman however perceived Rowlatt as intrinsic to a new phase of colonial 
repression inaugurated by the Press Act and reinforced by the War, a phase 
characterized by an increasing abrogation of civil rights. 
In an editorial on 27 January 1919 calling for a campaign of mass protest against 
the Bills, he observed: `the appetite for repression seems to grow with feeding. 
Whoever has heard of anticipatory repressive legislation?.. '20 The best riposte would 
be an India-wide protest through a series of simultaneous, locally organised events. 
This would reveal `the lightening speed with which the older ideas are being thrust 
1 Government of Maharashtra, Source Material for a history of the Freedom 
Movement, vol. iii. Mahatma Gandhi 1915-22, p. 81. 
18Desai to Brelvi, 9 April 1918. Brelvi Papers. 
19Mahadev H. Desai, Day-to-Day with Gandhi (Varanasi 1968), vol. i, p. 225. 
20BC, 27 Jan. 1919. 
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aside and fresh aspirations springing up in the hearts of a united India. '21 It would 
open colonial eyes to a new Indian political consciousness whose democratic 
aspirations no longer tolerated such authoritarian and repressive measures. 
The required scale of mass protest was ideally suited to the technique of satyagraha. 
At an anti-Rowlatt public meeting in Bombay in mid-February, Horniman urged the 
adoption of `passive resistance' pointing out that the new powers were likely to be used 
to crush the Home Rule movement. 22 But the question was to persuade Gandhi. In 
between addressing several anti-Rowlatt protest meetings, Horniman led a Bombay 
delegation to meet with Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel at the Ahmedabad ashram on 22 
February. 
The delegates included Umar Sobhani and Shankerlal Banker, who were on the 
Chronicle's Board of Directors, as well as the city's leading woman activist, the 
poetess Sarojini Naidu. Horniman once again issued an invitation to Gandhi, this time 
to launch and to lead, from Bombay city, an all-India "passive resistance" campaign 
against the Rowlatt Bills. After much hesitation and much discussion which lasted two 
full days and nights, Gandhi finally agreed. The text of a "Satyagraha Vow" was 
collectively drafted, with a view to obtaining as many signatures as possible pledging to 
disobey the Rowlatt laws as well as `such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter 
appointed may think fit'. 23 
While the Bombay delegation deferred to Gandhi's experience as an organiser of 
non-violent protest campaigns, it retained, in all important respects, co-authorship of the 
anti-Rowlatt movement in the city. During February and March, the city remained the 
centre of public protests against the `dangerous' escalation in `.. infringement of public 
liberties'24 On 3 March, the CID reported that `.. the Rowlatt Bills are the talk of the 
21BC, 7 Feb. 1919. 
22FR (1) Feb. 1919. 
23YI, 12 March 1919; BC, 1 March 1919. 
24YI, 5 Feb. 1919. 
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town at present. The Chronicle has helped to keep them prominently before the public 
by publishing M. K Gandhi's Satyagraha Vow in bold type for the last 3 days. '25 
Between March and early April, the vast majority of signatories were Bombay 
citizens and the campaign of local mobilization largely owed its success to the activities 
and speeches of Horniman and other bilingual Home Rulers informally associated with 
the Chronicle, and to the paper's `campaign of extraordinary vehemence' in favour of 
civil disobedience. 26 Horniman's close associate and legal adviser to the Chronicle, M. 
K Azad, produced an Urdu pamphlet on passive resistance derived from Thoreau's On 
Civil Disobedience, primarily targetted at the educated Muslims of Madanpura. 27 The 
campaign also involved a number of public meetings for women in which Sarojini 
Naidu played a prominent role, usually electing to address her audiences in 
Hindustani. 28 
Less than two weeks after the Ahmedabad meeting, the proposed Committee was, 
on Gandhi's suggestion, set up as the Satyagraha Sabha. While Gandhi claims all credit 
for its creation in his Autobiography, 29 its headquarters were significantly located in 
Bombay: on Apollo Street in the Fort, a stone's throw away from the Chronicle's 
offices on Medows Street. Moreover, Gandhi as president had Homiman alongside 
him as vice-president with Umar Sobhani, Shankerlal Banker, Sarojini Naidu, M. K 
Azad, and the labour activist D. D Sathaye as secretaries 30 They quietly resisted the 
Mahatma's high-handed attempt to impose Gujarati as the Sabha's language of 
deliberation. 31 Gujarati, incidentally, was also being contested in the cinema where the 
early, silent Indian mythological film tended to be `.. explained in Gujarati wordings 
25Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, January-June 1919, p. 155. 
26Statement prepared by the GOB for the Disorders Inquiry Committee relating to the 
1919 disturbances in the city of Bombay. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 20. 
27Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, January-June 1919, p. 187. 
28BC, 10 March 1919. 
29M. K Gandhi, An Autobiography (London 1982), p. 411. 
30GOB Home Special 355(74) II-1919; BC, 5 March 1919. 
31Gandhi,: 
___ 
Rn, a obiojraPhy , p. Ott. 
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only on the screen'. There were demands for subtitles in the more inclusive Hindustani 
which would be `.. found convenient by both Gujarati and Marathi cinema-goers' 32 
For the first time, not only would the venue for launching an agitational campaign 
not be of Gandhi's choosing, but it would happen as an urban satyagraha--a testimony 
to the primacy of Bombay as the centre of gathering anti-colonial dissent, but a concept 
which fitted uneasily with the Mahatma's well publicized anti-urban views 33 
For Horniman, Bombay was the ideal launch-pad of civil disobedience, precisely 
because of its receptivity to `the new world forces' which had made its citizens 
`conscious of their rights and privileges', and now ready to escalate the pressure on the 
colonial bureaucracy through peaceful mass agitation 34 Gandhi's emphasis was, from 
the start, somewhat different: `Satyagraha', he explained in a letter to the press, `.. is 
essentially a religious movement.. a process of purification and penance. It seeks to 
secure reforms or redress of grievances by self-suffering. '35 
For Gandhi the question was whether "materialist" city people could adhere to the 
"truth" of non-violence in their quest for justice; for Horniman it was whether 
satyagraha would enable the attainment of a new level of political pressure on the 
colonial state. In many ways, the 24-hour hartal announced by the Satyagraha Sabha for 
Sunday 6 April represented a compromise between Gandhi's cautious and introspective 
orientation and Horniman's more activist quest. 
Horniman was determined that the citizens of Bombay should pass Gandhi's 
rigorous test and reveal the possibilities of urban satyagraha. At a mass public meeting 
at Shantaram's Chawl on 1 April, he counseled action `.. in a true Satyagrahi spirit.. 
(people) must show by their behaviour that Bombay was at the forefront of every 
movement that was going to free them from the bonds of repression. '36 Moreover, 
32"Indian Films. " Letter to the Chronicle, 23 Jan. 1921. 
33Gandhi's discomfort was clear from the start: `I soon found that there was not likely 
to be much chance of agreement between myself and the intelligentsia composing this 
Sabha', he wrote in his Autobiography. Gandhi, p. 411. 
34BC, 4 April 1919. 
35BC, 25 March 1919. 
36BC, 2 April 1919. 
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along with the labourite D. D Sathaye, he favoured working-class participation in the 
observance as an assertion of their social rights to citizenship 37 Gandhi, however, was 
more cautious: addressing a meeting of five thousand mill hands on the Friday 
preceding the hartal, he advised them to participate in the movement only with the 
express permission of their employers 38 The Mahatma subsequently admitted his 
reluctance to involve the mill workers at all, yet his failure to make an open declaration 
to this effect indicates the extent to which he had to contend with the new visibility of 
labour on the urban political scene. 39 
The Mahatma envisaged the hartal as a low key day of mourning which should not 
appear as an attempt to `put any pressure upon Government' 40 However Horniman 
and other members of the Satyagraha Sabha insisted on the inclusion of public 
speeches and processions, effectively making a bid to transform the hartal into a day of 
action. Gandhi finally agreed on condition that the processions took place quietly and 
the speeches were listened to `in silence'. Thus "National Humiliation Day" in Bombay 
city was marked by a negotiated amalgam of Gandhian techniques of `self purification' 
and urban forms of popular protest--demonstrations, processions, public speeches-- 
which had been gathering momentum over the latter part of the war years. 
Specifically Gandhian rituals on 6 April41 included the early morning purificatory 
bath in the sea at Chowpatty, designed to cleanse the mind and body from the 
37GO1 Home Pol. D Proceedings, March 1921,8. 
38Source Material..., vol. iii, p. 109. 
39During the general textile strike of January-February, over 150,000 workers 
demonstrated on the streets of the city for 12 days, a situation described by the Bombay 
government as `unprecedented in Bombay'. Mill hands were joined by striking 
municipal, tramway, and Mint workers. GOB Home Special to GOI Home, February 
1919; GOB Home Special to GOI Commerce and Industry, 17 January 1919. GOB 
Confidential Proceedings 1919, pp. 23,32-33. 
40Source Material.. , p. 107. 41 This account of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Bombay city is drawn from the Bombay 
Chronicle, 7-15 April 1919; the Times of India, 7 April 1919; Young India, 9 April 
1919; Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan: June 1919, pp. 265-66. See also Masselos, 
Some Aspects of Bombay city Politics.., in Kumar (ed. ), Essays on Gandhian Politics.., 
pp. 145-88. 
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attachments of the "impure" material world. Gandhi's address to the crowd42 which 
had gathered around him following the sea bath was very much a continuation of this 
theme: a cautious reminder of the necessity of attaining `the necessary standard of 
knowledge and discipline' in satyagraha before citizens were fully able to undertake 
mass civil disobedience: `.. It is.. necessary for us till we are sufficiently disciplined and 
till the spirit of Satyagraha has permeated large bodies of men and women to obey all 
regulations regarding processions and gatherings. Whilst we disobey certain selected 
laws it is incumbent on us to show our law-abiding character by respecting all other 
laws. ' 
As the crowd made its way from Chowpatty to the nearby Madhav Bag temple, 
people on both sides of the procession-route strained to gain Gandhi's darshan. 
Another novel feature was the role of the Volunteers who led the procession in solemn 
silence, a small group of them holding black and red banners aloft with the inscription 
`Mourn for Justice' written in Gujarati and English. 
Essentially however, the Rowlatt satyagraha was closer in spirit to a mass general 
strike and can be seen as the culmination of protests against the deterioration of urban 
life which had accompanied Bombay's participation in the war. The organisational 
success of the 6 April hartal in Bombay owed less to Gandhi than to the activities of the 
"Chronicle group" around Horniman who skilfully presented the new legislation not as 
a unique, one-off event, but as integral to the hegemony of a colonial order ultimately 
responsible for the many grievances of city life. Rowlatt was constructed as a symbol 
of everything that was wrong about how both Bombay and India were governed, 
enabling a large number of citizens to take to the streets in an unprecedented 
demonstration of public dissent. 
Once again, the circulation of texts and the impact of oral speeches fuelled rumours 
through which the abstract issue of civil rights was made meaningful to the everyday 
lives of citizens. In particular, they appear to have reconstructed Rowlatt as a threat to 
42Read out by his faithful lieutenant during the Rowlatt satyagraha, Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas. 
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the freedom of convivial community life in the city as a result of this granting of 
`tyrannical powers to the police'. It was believed that the police, the most immediate 
daily oppressors of citizens, were now empowered to break up all social gatherings, 
weddings, funerals, `or even a meeting of three friends at the roadside', arrest 
individuals without warrant and lock them up in jail. Cre deuce was also given to 
stories that the colonial state could now levy `a wedding tax of half the bride's dowry'. 
This perceived threat to the domestic realm of community probably secured a wider 
street mobilization than Gandhi had envisaged. In vain did the Bombay government 
hastily put out an English pamphlet, subsequently translated into Gujarati and Marathi, 
which had virtually no effect in combatting these `most prevalent' rumours 43 
Approximately eighty percent of shops and businesses in the city remained closed, 
including the cloth, meat, fish, and vegetable markets. Apart from merchants and small 
traders, those who abstained from work on a large scale also included mehtas and 
clerks, taxi and hackney victoria drivers, hawkers and various street vendors, barbers 
and dhobis. Moreover, while only eleven of the eighty cotton mills closed, this must be 
seen in the context of the recent concessions extracted from the millowners following 
the general strike of January; mill hands must have hesitated to stay away from their 
factories once more, particularly as Gandhi's ambivalent appeal placed them somewhat 
at the mercy of their employers. 
Nonetheless, mill hands, postal workers, tram drivers and conductors, were among 
the large crowds which attended the public meetings in different parts of the city in the 
afternoon and evening. Indeed, it was these events which the Chronicle regarded, in 
terms of numbers, as `the greatest feature of the Satyagraha Day' emphasizing that 
`.. never in the political history of Bombay had there been so many meetings held on 
one and the same day.. ' The various speeches in Gujarati, Hindustani, and English, 
were, in the words of the CID, `distinctly exciting' and anti-Government, including `a 
suggestion that the British Empire must fall like a spray from a fountain'. 
43G01 Home Political A Proceedings, July 1919,69-70. The pamphlet was entitled 
The Rowlatt Act. Its origin, scope and object. 
149 
At French Bridge `the crowd was so great that the speakers could not make 
themselves heard' and two overflow meetings became necessary. For the first time too, 
here, a representative of the Labour Party, John Scurr, was among the crowd, 
suggesting the wider ramifications of the event; his presence, Horniman hoped, `should 
be able to give the lie to any garbled versions that might be sent to England by lying 
news agencies and correspondents' 44 
Perhaps the single most exciting event of the day was the Hindu-Muslim 
fraternisation which occurred at the Sonapur Masjid, where for the first time in the city, 
Hindus were welcomed into a Muslim place of worship. 45 The CID described this as 
`a very remarkable affair which appears to have been carefully stage-managed'. This 
was probably true, in the sense that the predominantly Hindu crowd outside the 
Madhav Bag temple were clearly directed towards the Grant Road mosque on the 
pretext of a Muslim `anti-Satyagraha meeting' only to find themselves welcomed with 
open arms on reaching their destination. These scenes represented a re-enactment of 
events at the Juma Masjid in Delhi on 31 March when Hindus had been invited to join 
in the funeral service of the Muslim `satyagrahi martyrs' killed by police fire the 
previous day, and had helped carry the bodies to burial. 
But if the scenes at the Sonapur Masjid had a theatrical quality, it was drama of a 
highly original and creative genre. The streets of central Bombay took on the character 
of an urban stage for an experimental play designed to question and open up received 
ideas about accustomed sacred space. Such implicit questioning of the separateness and 
44A clear reference to Reuter's. In London, the influential Daily Herald which the CID 
accused of being `financed largely from India' issued a feature length `Appeal to British 
Workers' to demonstrate in support of Indian attempts to repeal the Rowlatt Act. DCI 
Reports, June 1919. 
45Gandhi, Sarojini Naidu, and other leaders were invited by the Maulvi to address the 
joint congregation from the minar of the Masjid. While Gandhi simply `appealed to his 
Muslim brethren to join the Satyagraha movement in large numbers' and suggested 
that the two communities `take a vow of eternal friendship', it was Sarojini Naidu's 
Hindustani which had the greatest impact. She brought tears to the eyes of many of her 
audience by linking the struggle against Rowlatt to the martyrdom of Imam Hussain at 
Karbala--'this from the lips of a woman and a Hindu' wrote a clearly astonished CID 
observer. 
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boundaries of religious faith represented a boldness that Gandhi did not advocate, 
notwithstanding the fact that his emphasis on the importance of Hindu-Muslim unity 
was second only to his faith in satyagraha. If little evidence has come to light about the 
play's "authors", it might nonetheless be possible to reconstruct a "production script" 
from local representations of the `Delhi Tragedy' and their repercussions in the city. 
The rumours circulating about the new powers of police zulm heralded a threat to 
the rituals of domestic and social life affecting, clearly, both communities. The Delhi 
shootings seemed an immediate factual confirmation of these fears. Moreover, in the 
days immediately preceding the hartal, the Chronicle provided massive coverage of the 
Delhi events which was echoed in some of the vernacular press. The emphasis shifted 
from the original act of police brutality to the `remarkable scenes of fraternisation' that 
had occurred between Hindus and Muslims 46 In addition, Home Rulers circulated 
Gujarati and Urdu handbills in the city's Muslim neighbourhoods about the shootings 
in the capital: 47 as the `Satyagraha Day' approached, letters began appearing in the 
press suggesting that the hartal should be marked by joint Hindu-Muslim prayers. 
`Delhi', the Chronicle was advised, `has shown to the country that on the question of 
Satyagraha there will not be any difference of caste and creed. Bombay should now 
follow in the footsteps of Delhi. '48 
While official sources considered the day's events as `a strategical victory for 
Gandhi', 49 Horniman could perhaps derive even greater satisfaction. Both could agree 
that Bombay had acted as `the home of Satyagraha' offering India- another path to 
freedom than `by bloody revolutions and violent revolts'. 50 However, the mobilization 
of citizens had occurred essentially on a political basis: the press and platform agitation 
against the new threat to civil liberties had been amplified by the popular discourse of 
46BC, 5 April 1919. 
47Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan. -June 1919, p. 265. 
48BC, 5 April 1919. 
49Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan: June 1919, p. 266. 
50BC, 7 and 9 April 1919. 
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rumour. Significantly, the stories circulating in the city about the Rowlatt Act never 
strayed from the fundamental issue of public oppressions and rights. 
Horniman could thus observe, with some justification, that the `political conscience 
of the people had been stirred as never before'. 51 The CID indeed feared that `.. the 
logical sequel would be a great increase in the force of the movement which will 
probably develop in many and varied directions... It is probable that the real ultimate 
object of the movement is to paralyse all the activities of Government. '52 At this stage, 
this was closer to the objectives of Horniman than to the politically cautious thinking of 
the Mahatma. - 
Against Gandhi's reservations, the Satyagraha Sabha had conceived the hartal of 6 
April as a prelude to the launch of a civil disobedience campaign. Horniman's 
leadership of the agitation against the Press Act now ensured that this `dangerous 
engine of oppression' became its primary target. It took the form of the printing, by the 
Chronicle presses, of prohibited pamphlets53 and the launch and non-registering of a 
newspaper by satyagrahis who would, in the process, court imprisonment. This was 
intended to educate citizens into methods of non-violent direct action capable of 
pressurizing Government into withdrawing the repressive legislation that had 
progressively undermined civil rights. From his residence in Laburnum Road, Gandhi 
himself printed the first two issues of Satyagrahi, requesting readers to `copy and 
circulate' the paper `among friends' and promising that `this paper will.. exist so long 
only as the Rowlatt legislation is not withdrawn. '54 This, once again, was a bilingual 
publication, in English and Gujarati. 
The Bombay Government, impressed by the scale of the movement, shrank back 
from immediate confrontation and took no action. In its statement to the Disorders 
Inquiry Committee eight months later, the Lloyd administration conveniently took the 
51BC, 7 April 1919. 
52Secret Abstracts, Jan-June 1919, p. 266. 
53Including Gandhi's Hind Swaraj and Sarvodaya. 
54BC, 9 April 1919. 
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view that the pamphlets were not in fact prohibited; it further strained credulity by 
declaring that `.. it was no offence to publish a written unregistered newspaper'; in fact, 
the provisions of the Press Act clearly made it illegal `to keep a printing press without 
having made a declaration of the fact before a magistrate'. 55 As we shall see, the 
Bombay Government was simply biding its time. 
A week later, Gandhi, primarily as a result of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre of 10 
April, called off the activist, civil disobedience dimension of the campaign against the 
Rowlatt Bills. There had also been riots in Bombay itself on 11-12 April following 
rumours that Gandhi had been arrested in the Panjab. The Mahatma elected to see the 
violence in Bombay and elsewhere as evidence that `the true spirit of Satyagraha has 
not yet permeated the people' and rather contradictorily, that `Satyagrahis are not yet in 
a position to control the masses' 56 
The suspension of the anti-Rowlatt movement dealt a heavy blow to the advanced 
politics of Bombay not least because the city, in initiating a successful experiment in 
civil disobedience, was actually at the forefront of practical satyagraha. The immediate 
effect of the suspension of the movement was to trigger off a loyalist counter-offensive 
which put Horniman and the Chronicle group on the defensive. Umar Sobhani and 
M. K Azad were immediately concerned at the potential consequences on the new 
momentum for Hindu-Muslim unity. 57 Justifying their fears, the Gujarati Akhbar-e- 
Islam now appealed to `Muslim leaders of Bombay to cooperate with the Government 
in maintaining peace and order by weaning the handful of Satyagrahi Mussalmans 
from that movement' and condemned the `.. inflammatory and profane speeches made 
by idol-worshipping Hindus in mosques'. 58 
55GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, pp. 23,379. 
56BC, 15 April 1919. In contrast, the Times of India, a bitter critic of the satyagraha 
movement, showed perhaps a keener understanding of events when it observed that 
`.. the explosive force of the Satyagraha doctrine on the body of people who took part in 
this manifestation (ie the disturbances of 11-12 April) was immensely accentuated by 
the times in which we live. They are times of intellectual and social ferment, affecting 
the whole world. ' The Times oflndia Illustrated Weekly, 30 April 1919. 
57Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan. -June 1919, p. 303. 58Akhbar-e-Islam, 22 and 11 April 1919. BNNR nos. 17 and 15,1919. 
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The Times of India praised Gandhi's `great moral courage' in readily admitting his 
`error' while implicitly calling for action against `the small but extremely energetic 
party of political violence' which had taken control of politics in the city `since the death 
of Sir Pherozeshah Mehta'. 59 Faced by an open onslaught from the conservative press, 
Horniman responded by a series of editorials which asserted that the Satyagraha 
movement had been `an asset of peace', potentially capable of providing a creative 
outlet for `all the evil consequences of repression'. 60 In his last editorial, on 25 April, 
Horniman berated the Times of India for `.. having joined the shocking fraternity of 
Anglo-Indian journals calling for repression and yet more repression' and for 
`persistently trying to invite Government action against the Chronicle' 61 
The following day, Saturday 26 April, the Bombay Government took up the 
invitation and moved against both Horniman and the Chronicle. Lloyd signed Orders 
simultaneously placing the Chronicle under pre-censorship while authorizing the 
removal through deportation of Horniman from India. This was achieved by a military- 
style operation in which speed and control over communications were deemed essential 
to the outcome. 62 
Horniman was convalescing at his bungalow in Worli following a recent operation. 
Shortly after 3 p. m, the Bombay Commissioner of Police accompanied by CID 
Officers arrived to serve the Order. Two accompanying army medical officers hastily 
examined him and declared him fit to travel. The editor of the Chronicle was allowed to 
pack only a few absolute necessities and within the hour, he was on his way to 
Alexandra Docks in a shuttered ambulance where the steamer S. S Takada was 
anchored. By 4.30 he was installed on board, under armed guard, to await departure for 
59The Times of India Illustrated Weekly, 30 April 1919. 
60BC, 12 April 1919. 
61BC, 25 April 1919. 
62This account of Horniman's deportation is based on GOB Home (Special) 204- 
1919: "B. G Horniman: Deportation under Defense of India rules"; GOB Confidential 
(Judicial Dept. ) Proceedings May 1919; Source Material.., vol. ii, p. 808; GOI Home 
Political (D), March 1921,8: "Summary of the activities of Mr. Horniman. " See also 
Milton Israel, Communications and power.., p. 221. 
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England at mid-day on 27 April. He was allowed a supervised eight-minute 
conversation with M. K Azad to discuss personal matters. 
Telephone communications between Worli and the rest of Bombay were 
interrupted between 2.00 and 4.30 p. m, coinciding almost exactly with the duration of 
the police operation. Throughout the afternoon, moreover, a squadron of soldiers was 
kept on the alert at Worli, while all traffic on the road to the harbour was held up until 
the police party escorting Horniman had reached its destination. As a result, the 
majority of people only heard of the dramatic events in the late afternoon, through a 
special supplement of the Sanj Vartaman. 
At the same time, Sobhani, Jinnah, and Jayakar, as Directors of the Chronicle, were 
served with the Pre-Censorship Order which also included forfeiture of the paper's two 
thousand rupee security under section four of the Press Act. The Bombay Government, 
the Order stated, were of the opinion that the Chronicle had used `words' which were 
`likely.. directly or indirectly whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, 
implication or otherwise to bring into hatred and contempt the Government established 
by law in British India. ' It singled out the paper's various pieces on the Rowlatt Act, 
especially focusing on its "incitements" to civil disobedience. While Horniman was 
being sequestred, the police were also raiding the Chronicle's offices on Medows Street 
and confiscating all remaining copies of the "seditious" issues 63 
Although the Government of India had, the previous year, amended the Defense of 
India regulations to enable deportation specifically with Horniman in mind, Delhi still 
appeared to be taken aback by the Bombay Government's timing. The following day, 
Bombay Castle was informed that while the Government of India were `fully prepared 
to defend the action taken' it would still appreciate `fuller details' in view of the 
`peculiar knowledge of the local circumstances possessed by the Government of 
Bombay'. 64 Both in its immediate response and in its prepared Statement for the 
Disorders Inquiry Committee a few months later, the Lloyd administration indirectly 
63GOB Confidential Proceedings (Judicial Dept. ), May 1919, pp. 107-110. 
64GOB Home (Special) 204-1919. 
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testified to the unique breadth of Horniman's political activism as well as to the 
effectiveness of his particular style of journalism. 
Horniman's removal had been necessary because he had managed to provide 
`concentration, impulse, and direction to (the) formidable but latent and diffused forces' 
that had arisen as a result of `the abnormal economic conditions created by the war'; 
these forces essentially comprised Home Rule agitation for a new political order, labour 
unrest, and everyday urban discontents. They provided opportunities for Horniman to 
use the Chronicle to `misrepresent' the actions of authorities `in such a way as to 
inspire popular imagination with hostility to the Officers of Governmen't'. While the 
paper's columns had a `profoundly and comprehensively mischievous effect on the 
political situation and the public.. over an extended period', Horniman's own speeches 
and activities had also made him an influential figure in his own right. At public 
meetings he `was singled out for special attention by the audiences which evidently 
regarded him as a popular champion. ' 
These activities reached a new level as from January 1919 with the initiation of 
`intrigues preliminary to the Satyagraha outburst of April'. They included the 
encouragement of industrial militancy and a `remarkable' attempt to `subvert the 
discipline of British troops in India' by publishing `.. a series of letters.. purporting to 
have emanated from British soldiers on the subject of demobilization grievances'. The 
Chronicle played a leading part in orchestrating public opinion against the Rowlatt Bills 
while its Editor was one of the leading advocates of the `law-breaking' implicit in civil 
disobedience. Homiman's personality, his range of political interests, and his grasp of 
the techniques of modem journalism made him the `prime mover' in anti-colonial 
agitation in Bombay and it was no accident that his career as journalist and politician, 
terminating with his deportation, coincided `.. with the ascending and descending arcs of 
the wave of intensive agitation' in the city. 65 
65GOB Confidential Proceedings (Judicial Dept. ), Jan. 1920, pp. 13-20. 
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In terms of local political pre-eminence, the Bombay Government perceived 
Horniman as more influential than Gandhi, Annie Besant, and Jinnah in April 1919. As 
news of his sequestration filtered through, crowds began to gather in the Fort and in 
Girgaum amid rumours that a general strike was about to be called in protest. Gandhi 
however despatched the Satyagraha Volunteers to move about and advise the crowds 
reading the bilingual Special Supplement of the Sanj Vartaman to disperse and return 
quietly to their homes. That evening, prominent members of the Chronicle group 
visited Gandhi at his residence in Gamdevi and demanded a strong response to the 
Bombay Government's zulm, but the Mahatma was immovable. The following day he 
issued the first in a two-week long series of daily leaflets on `Mr. Horniman's 
Deportation'66 in English and Gujarati, appealing for calm and opposing the idea of a 
strike. 
`Horniman', Gandhi's opening "manifesto" stated, `has given us the Mantras of 
Liberty, he has fearlessly exposed wrong wherever he has seen it and has thus been an 
ornament to the race to which he belongs.. ' However, the situation also presents `a fine 
opportunity for demonstrating the purity and invincibility' of Satyagraha. All true 
Satyagrahis can `demonstrate their affection for Mr. Horniman only by remaining 
perfectly calm. It will be sheer thoughtlessness to break the peace. ' The response to the 
Editor of the Chronicle's deportation provided yet another test in which `.. Modern 
civilization challenges the Ancient. Satyagraha now going on is based on the teachings 
of the Ancient Civilization and if India accepts Satyagraha the superiority of the Ancient 
Civilization will be indicated. ' The Bombay Commissioner of Police observed that 
`.. there is no doubt whatever that (Gandhi) has used his influence on this occasion in 
the best interests of Government and that he has strained every nerve to preserve Law 
and Order. '67 
The citizens of Bombay, however, remained unimpressed. For a whole week, 
Gandhi continued to be mercilessly assailed, by members of the Satyagraha Sabha, by 
66For the full text of these leaflets, see Desai, vol. ii, pp. 340-359. 
67Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan-June 1919, p. 336. 
157 
Home Rulers, and by individual representations, all demanding some form of protest 
action, preferably an all-out strike. The Volunteers, moreover, reported that opinion in 
the city strongly favoured a demonstration of public feelings. Still, the Mahatma 
persisted with his daily production of leaflets which attempted to take the heat out of the 
situation. He attempted to achieve this by asserting the superiority of "satyagraha" over 
modem-day strike action: `.. What we expect to attain by acclamations in ordinary 
movements, we often gain by silence in Satyagraha. The human voice can never reach 
the distance that is covered by the still small voice of conscience. ' 
The conflict between Gandhi and Horniman's supporters within the Satyagraha 
Sabha erupted at a stormy session of the Sabha on 30 April. Gandhi was severely 
criticized for holding back protest and doubts were raised about the very doctrine of 
satyagraha itself; it was even suggested that the deportation was facilitated by the 
Mahatma's weakness in suspending civil disobedience. Gandhi attempted to mount a 
defense of his position through an article in the English (but not Gujarati) columns of 
the Sanj Vartaman of 1 May in which he asserted that `.. Satyagraha consists at times in 
civil disobedience and at other times in civil obedience. It consists at times in declaring 
hartal, or holding large public meetings or arranging processions, and at other times in 
refraining from any one or all of these things. '68 
In an attempt to pacify his critics, Gandhi promised a resumption of civil 
disobedience `by the beginning of July next' if the Rowlatt legislation were not 
withdrawn in the meantime. But even this failed to quell calls for immediate action and 
after holding out until 5 May, the Mahatma was forced to concede that `.. discussions at 
the meetings of the Satyagraha Sabha and reports of popular discussions show that the 
minds of the people are by no means appeased-The people will never forget what Mr. 
Horniman has done for them. He has given them a new life, a new hope. ' 
The leaflet, published this time in both the English and the Gujarati columns of the 
Sanj Vartaman, now the leading nationalist daily in the absence of the Chronicle, went 
68Sanj Vartaman, 1 May 1919; GOB Home (Special) Proceedings, File 204-1919. 
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on to call for hartal for Sunday 11 May. However, it would be `confined to independent 
businessmen' and would involve a 24-hour fast as well as `private religious devotion' 
in every home. Gandhi thus attempted to give the observance a restrictive class 
character, which was the only way in fact that he could assert tight control over it. 
The Mahatma went on to explain that hartal was `an ancient Indian institution for 
expressing national sorrow.. more powerful than monster meetings' and thus most 
suitable for demonstrating `our grief over the deportation' Hindus and Muslims should 
have their scriptures read to them so as to gain a deeper understanding of `the true 
nature of Satyagraha' through `the stories of great Satyagrahis such as Prahlad, 
Harishchandra, Mirabai, Imams Hasan and Hussein, Socrates and others'. 
Meanwhile the Satyagraha Sabha organised a monster petition condemning the 
victimisation of the Chronicle and the deportation of its Editor, which was signed by 
over fifty thousand citizens and presented to George Lloyd on the day preceding the 
hartal. 69 Participation in the "day of mourning" itself was indeed wider than Gandhi 
had intended. 70 As on 6 April, shops and all the city's main markets remained shut, 
and the heart of the Indian town-Pydhuni, Bhuleshwar, Bhendi Bazaar, Girgaum--'all 
wore a mournful aspect' in contrast to their usual `busy, bustling manner'. While the 
mills in the north of the city appear to have functioned as normal, dockers, postal, and 
telegraph workers observed the hartal in large numbers. On the streets, vehicular traffic 
was scarce: there were few hackney carriages, while `the khatarawallas who drive a 
roaring business by plying their overladen vehicles were conspicuous by their absence', 
and `even taxi drivers seem to have felt for Mr. Horniman who to them was a great and 
indulgent patron. ' 
The Horniman hartal was the first public demonstration in the city of which Gandhi 
took charge as virtually "sole author" and it represented a considerable scaling down of 
69 yl, 10 May 1919. 
an hartal" is based on Young India, 14 May 1919 and 70This account of the "Horn m P 
on GOB Home (Special) 20481919. 
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the anti-Rowlatt protest of 6 April. The omission of public speeches71 and processions 
in favour of private `religious contemplation' marked a rupture with evolving modern 
rituals of urban protest which, since the war years, had seen progressively larger 
crowds occupying the streets of the city. On 6 April, the sheer variety of public events 
had given structure to the protest and inspired a civic imagination which had brought 
together a representative cross-section of citizens amid unprecedented scenes of Hindu- 
Muslim fraternisation. Public space had been appropriated as an experimental arena for 
words, gestures, images, and movements to disrupt the conditions of colonial 
normality. 
While Gandhi could claim that hartal was a genuine and proper expression of 
citizens' collective sorrow at Horniman's deportation, the evacuation of streets and 
neighbourhoods in favour of the domestic sphere of the--essentially--merchant home 
on 11 May, also carried somewhat less positive implications. "Collective" sorrow 
became defused into separate, domestic observances, denying citizens the opportunity 
of any shared, public expression of protest. Privileging the home and the cultural 
conservatism of the merchant class, ensured that sacred spatial boundaries would not be 
crossed and that religious ritual would be contained within normative bounds. The 
Gandhian hartal can thus be read as a device for reducing the impact of the deportation 
on public consciousness, effectively serving as an alternative agent of "public order" 
which was not, in this instance, wholly at odds with the wishes of the local colonial 
state. 
Gandhi was most concerned to ensure that the city broke with an evolving pattern 
of marches, processions, assemblies, and meetings as the substance of public protest. 
From 7.30 a. m he established his headquarters, significantly, at the Mulji Jetha Market 
on Shaikh Memon Street, right at the heart of the indigeneous business world. The 
Volunteers, considerably reinforced in numbers, were despatched in small groups to 
71Approving Horniman's deportation, the loyalist Muslim Herald stated that `the fiery 
words which were formerly uttered at various meetings will be suppressed. ' Muslim 
Herald, 2 May 1919; BNNR no. 18,1919. 
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move around the city. They were instructed to ensure that people were not, in any 
numbers, gathering in the usual open spaces--the Esplanade Maidan, Chowpatty beach, 
Shantaram's Chawl, Madhav Bagh, Mastanshah Tank. Throughout the day, the 
Mahatma received regular reports from the Volunteers who worked tirelessly to ensure 
that his `very elaborate instructions to the people' were obeyed; the following day, in 
his final leaflet on the deportation, Gandhi's tone was positively elegiac: 
Brothers and Sisters, Bombay covered itself with glory by preserving perfect calm, and 
the citizens have shown by their peaceful hartal that they have understood a portion of 
Satyagraha.. Many causes contributed to the success of this remarkable demonstration, 
but the chief among them was the performance of their duty by Volunteers under Mr. 
Vithaldas Jeerajani.. 72 
Those associated with the publication of the Chronicle, meanwhile, were taking 
stock at the implications of the Bombay Government's move against the paper. The 
Board was informed that Pre-Censorship would mean the expunging of `all criticism of 
the action of any Government in British India in regard to the present crisis' as well as 
`all reflections on the conduct of Police or military forces in dealing with riots or 
disturbances'. 73 The Bombay Government had taken exception not only to what the 
Chronicle said but also to how it said it: Horniman had developed the daily act of 
presenting news to maximum effect into a fine art. It now attempted to introduce a 
novel dimension to pre-censorship by suggesting that not only the contents but also the 
`make-up' of each issue of the paper was subject to the censor's gaze. 
Brelvi, who had taken over as Acting Editor, immediately questioned the validity of 
this particular interpretation of the DOI Rules. Censorship, he argued, could only cover 
the substance of `.. matters approved by you.. not the place or manner of their insertion 
in the paper'. From aboard the S. S Takada, Horniman had written to Jinnah, as 
President of the Chronicle's Board of Directors, advising him to suspend publication 
`until the return of sanity'. This view, strongly backed by Brelvi and Gandhi, now 
72Desai, 
_' 
may-to-ýay", p"3ss 
73 GOB Home (Special) 204-c 1919. 
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prevailed and the Chronicle did not appear between 26 April and the end of May. When 
the paper resumed publication on 31 May, 74 its editorial columns were left 
conspicuously blank in protest at pre-censorship. Two weeks later, confidant that the 
worst of the agitation was over, Lloyd rescinded the pre-censorship Order though the 
Bombay Government still insisted on a penalty deposit of ten thousand rupees, the 
maximum imposable under the Press Act. 75 
The suspension of the Chronicle had meanwhile led to moves to produce a 
Bombay newspaper of similar quality to fill the void. 76 Umar Sobhani and Shankerlal 
Banker were involved in the running of another local paper, the Besantite English 
weekly Young India. This was now converted into a bi-weekly and Gandhi was 
approached to take over as editor. Although he was willing to provide contributions, the 
Mahatma was at this stage reluctant to take up the challenge. He stated that `he preferred 
to educate the people by oral discussion on the subjects of Swadeshi and Satyagraha' 
and that he would `call Satyagraha meetings twice a week' at his Mani Bhavan 
residence in Gamdevi. 77 
In essence, newspapers were, after all, part of the dubious "mediations" of 
modernity and Hind Swaraj had unreservedly condemned their influence on public 
opinion in England. 78 While Gandhi had of course himself been a journalist in South 
Africa, he perceived journalism in moralistically instructional terms rather than in the 
more subtly suggestive colours of the Chronicle. When the Mahatma did finally 
assume control of Young India and Navajivan in September 1919, significantly 
74Welcoming its reappearance, the Sanj Vartaman observed that `without the 
Chronicle, the public life of Bombay was as dull as ditch-water. ' Sanj Vartaman, 21 
June 1919; BNNR no. 26,1919. 
75GOB Home.. 
76The moderate Praja Mitra & Parsi was one of a number of newspapers to pay 
homage to the Chronicle, stating that the `.. progress observed in the administration of 
this presidency during recent years is to be attributed to its fearless and vigorous 
advocacy of the people's rights, and the whole political consciousness during recent 
years of our presidency, is due largely to its spirited and stimulating columns.. ' Praja 
Mitra & Parsi, 29 April 1919; BNNR no. 18,1919. 
77Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan: June 1919, p. 463. 
781-ind Swaraj. Parel, pp. 32-33. 
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adhering to the bilingual strategy of Bombay journalism in spite of his reservations 
about English, he made his journalistic objectives quite clear: 
I want to send Navajivan to the cottages of our farmers and weavers.. (and) it is my 
earnest desire that women in every home should read Navajivan. Who else but women 
will protect our religion?.. Navajivan will therefore try to keep women alive to their 
duties and well-informed, and it will also keep men awake to their duties towards 
women.. 79 
Gandhi felt vindicated by the quiet and orderly observance of the Horniman hartal, 
declaring enthusiastically that the arrival of Swaraj would be hastened `when India 
adopts the example of Bombay as a permanent way of life'. The city appeared now as a 
promising base for the spread of his teachings, and the Mahatma attempted to use the 
Wednesday and Saturday meetings at his residence to build up a personal following of 
devoted Satyagrahis, outside the purview of the Satyagraha Sabha. Gandhi's interest in 
the city was thus limited to the search for `.. intelligent, strong-willed and well educated 
men' who would assist him in offering civil disobedience at the appropriate time, and 
his extreme punctiliousness is indicated in the award of special badges to those who 
swore `that they would adhere to the principles of Satyagraha to the last'. Meetings now 
tended to be increasingly screened and declared open only to those "who carried 
Satyagraha badges. "80 
Gandhi's intimation that civil disobedience could only be offered by people of a 
particular class effectively left the vast majority of urban citizens out of his political 
project. His determination, moreover, to exercise sole authorship over the meanings of 
"satyagraha" thwarted the emergence of a more open, collaborative process which 
might well have democratized and enriched the Gandhian vision. Indeed, his dismissal 
of existing modes of urban protest also signified the silencing of the material grievances 
which strikes, demonstrations, and public meetings were in the process of articulating. 
79YI, 13 Sept. 1919. 
80Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, :. -_. Tan. -Tunt /4/Y, p"So?. 
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Gandhi's social exclusivism represented a significant retreat from the range of civic 
aspirations which Horniman had facilitated and championed. 
When a large number of resignations from the Satyagraha Sabha followed the 
Horniman hartal, Gandhi declared that `he greeted these resignations with joy because 
they did not signify the atrophy of Satyagraha but rather the purification and refinement 
of the movement. ' He added that `few, if any' of the members of the Sabha were `true' 
satyagrahis according to his definition of the term. 81 When the Mahatma failed to 
resume, as promised, civil disobedience against the Rowlatt Act, he came in for severe 
censure at a meeting of the Satyagraha Sabha in late July: 
One drew his attention to the wording of the Vow which he had taken, to the effect that 
Satyagraha should be continued until the Act was abolished. Another asked whether he 
had received any definite promise that the Act would be abolished if he suspended civil 
disobedience. A third asked whether he had started the movement of his own accord or 
whether he had been led into it by others.. (Someone else) suggested that his policy.. had 
interfered with the good work that was being done by the Home Rule League and other 
associations.. Gandhi tried to disperse the meeting but many shouted that they had 
questions to ask. 82 
Following this meeting, Gandhi effectively allowed the Satyagraha Sabha to die a 
lingering death. 
81 Source Material.. vol. iii, pp. 151-52. 
82FR (1) Aug. 1919. 
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2. Hartals, strikes, and the persistence of material aspirations. 
Gandhi's unwillingness to risk mass civil disobedience over the Rowlatt issue soon 
gave way to the identification of the Khilafat question as a more promising avenue to 
educate Indians into the values of satyagraha. On the eve of the hartal in honour of 
Horniman, he addressed a meeting of the Anjuman-Zia-Ul-Islam on Falkland Road. 
Speaking in a Gujarati sprinkled with Urdu expressions, the Mahatma described the 
likely fate of the Khilafat as a `great misfortune (afat) for our Muslim brothers, and `the 
afat on our Muslim brothers is an afat on us too. '83 Moreover, of all the burning 
issues of the day, Khilafat was `.. the greatest of all, greater than even the repeal of the 
Rowlatt legislation for it affects the religious suceptibilities of millions of 
Mussalmans. '84 
Here, then, was a cause which provided richer opportunities for the 
"spiritualisation" of politics than the secular reclaiming of civil rights that was after all 
the primary objective of the anti-Rowlatt agitation. Here was an issue that held greater 
promise for the vindication of the realm of "ancient civilization" against the creeping 
invasions of modernity and its urban manifestations. 
As both an instrument and a symbol of colonial misrule, Rowlatt represented a 
relatively clear-cut basis for nationalist political mobilization. Khilafat, however, was a 
politically more complex issue. The recognition of the Ottoman sultan as "caliph" of 
Islam, and thus as an eternal symbol of Islamic power and solidarity, was limited to 
Indian Sunni Muslims. Moreover only the Sunni elite--the ashraf castes connected to 
the former Mughal ruling class, and the ulama, who viewed the institution of the 
caliphate as symbolic of the supremacy of Islamic law--perceived the fate of the 
Ottoman Empire as a significant political issue. 85 
83Bombay Police Secret Abstracts Jan. -June 1919, p. 399. 84YI, 14 May 1919. 
85Gai1 Minault, The Khilafat Movement. Religious symbolism and political 
mobilization in India (Delhi 1982), pp. 6-7. 
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In contrast, the majority of the actual Muslim Arab subjects of the Empire had, 
during the First World War, taken up arms against Turkish rule in an assertion of their 
right to self-determination. Thus, however dubious British post-war colonial motives in 
relation to the territories of the Turkish Empire, Indian Sunni Muslim demands for the 
maintenance of the temporal powers of the sultan were hardly consistent with the "new 
world forces" of democratic rights and national self-determination. When Mohamed 
Ali reiterated these "Indian" demands at the 1922 Paris Conference, an Egyptian 
nationalist commented that `he could not understand what religious aspect there could 
be about the question.. '86 Two years later, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk abolished the 
Caliphate in order `to make a clean sweep of all contributory causes of the decay of the 
Turkish Empire.. '87 
A significant difference between the anti-Rowlatt and Khilafat movements in 
Bombay lay in their contrasting sources of Muslim support. Muslim participants in the 
April hartal were primarily young Shia nationalists, `young party'88 Bohras and 
Khojas who were very much the products of the Congress-Muslim League entente of 
1915-16 and the subsequent Home Rule agitation. In contrast, the city's loyalist Sunni 
press had welcomed the Rowlatt legislation and accused Muslim nationalists `who go 
so far as to say that they are Indians first and Mussalmans afterwards' of showing little 
interest in the specifically Islamic issue of the Khilafat. 89 
86GO1 Home (Political) 1922,847. 
87Salahi R. Sonyel, Ataturk The Founder ofModern Turkey (Ankara 1989), p. 100. 
88Francis Robinson has shown how, from around the first decade of the century, 
young middle-class Muslims `of progressive tendencies', generally professionals and 
western-educated, began to challenge the old landed UP aristocracy for the leadership of 
Indian Muslims. Shias were well represented amongst these "young progressives". By 
the war years they had largely prevailed and were instrumental in forging the Lucknow 
Pact between Congress and the Muslim League. Francis Robinson, Separatism Among 
Indian Muslims (Delhi 1993ed. ), pp. 175-256. In Bombay, on the other hand, the `old 
party', merchants and landlords `of property and influence' continued to dominate 
Muslim affairs with the open support of the local colonial state. They were 
overwhelmingly Sunni. See Jim Masselos, Power in the Bombay "Moholla"; 1904- 
15: An initial exploration into the world of the Indian Urban Muslim in South Asia, no. 
6 (December 1976), pp. 91-95. 
89Akhbar-e-Islam, 14 March 1919; BNNR no. 11. Mufid-e-Rozgar, 14 March and 20 
Feb. 1919; BNNR nos. 11 and 8,1919. 
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The Gujarati Akhbar-e-Islam regretted that a similarly impressive public display of 
feeling as was manifested during the Rowlatt satyagraha had never been shown by 
Bombay Muslims over the issue of the Khilafat. 90 The paper went on to publish a 
letter from the Secretary of the Dawoodi Bohrajamat, Mohammed Ali Alabux, calling 
on all his fellow Dawoodis to remain loyal to the authorities. 91 Also condemned were 
Muslim interest in satyagraha and the `sacrilegious' Hindu-Muslim fraternisation in 
mosques. 
In the Chronicle, Horniman had supported the `Muslim demand' as an additional 
means of embarrassing the colonial government. The Khilafat issue was never, 
however, a major consideration and it occupied relatively little space in relation to the 
paper's major preoccupations in the early months of 1919: the Rowlatt bills and the 
problems of urban life. Fanning the flames of Pan-Islamic agitation was virtually the 
only subversive activity that Horniman was not accused of by the Bombay 
Government, in their lengthy memorandum justifying his deportation. The Sunni press 
supported his banishment, the Akhbar-e-Islam issuing a supplementary handbill in 
Gujarati advising Muslims not to participate in the hartal in his honour since `Horniman 
has no connection with us, and he has rendered no service to Islam. '92 
Sunni loyalism ensured that the Khilafat issue was slow to get off the ground in 
Bombay. Although a Khilafat Committee93 had been set up in the city in March, it was 
only as a result of Gandhi's cultivation of the more radical, up-country Sunni ulama 
and intelligentsia, particularly Abdul Bari, Hasrat Mohani, and the imprisoned Ali 
Brothers, that Bombay became a centre of Khilafat activity. Gandhi's home on 
Laburnum Road became an important meeting place where moderate local Committee 
members and UP radicals exchanged views over tactics and strategy, a process which 
90Akhbar-e-Islam, 7 April 1919; BNNR no. 15,1919. 
91Akhbar-e-Islam, 22 April 1919; BNNR no. 17,1919. 92Akhbar-e-Islam, 28 April and 10 May 1919, and Mufid-e-Rozgar, 11 May 1919; 
BNNR nos. 18-19,1919. 
93This comprised 62 Sunnis and 6 Shias. Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan. -April 1920, p. 301. 
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culminated in the formation of an All-India Khilafat Committee, based in Bombay, in 
September. 94 At a meeting at Mastanshah's Tank, Bellasis Road, shortly afterwards, 
Gandhi fully aligned himself with his Sunni hosts and told his Muslim audience that 
they `had failed in their duty' over the `life and death' question of the Caliphate, adding 
that `Satyagraha was the only remedy for them in the evil circumstances in which they 
found themselves.. '95 
The All-India Khilafat Committee decided to observe a national Khilafat Day on 17 
October, with Bombay once again at the nerve-centre of the movement. The funding of 
the movement by the city's Sunni merchants was a crucial element here, as was 
Gandhi's presence and strategical leadership of the day of action. Khilafat Day was to 
be modelled, not on the Rowlatt satyagraha, but on the Horniman hartal. It was to 
consist in a general closure of business, a withdrawal into prayer and fasting, but no 
public meetings or processions. However, Gandhi clearly conceived the observance as 
a greater test for the citizens of Bombay than the previous hartal as it involved the 
launch of an authorized experiment in Hindu-Muslim unity: `I hope', he wrote in the 
Chronicle, `that every Hindu man and woman will observe the 17th instant and thus 
put a sacred seal on the Hindu-Muslim bond. '96 
Such unity was to be based on the traditionalist premise of shared religious "faith" 
which the Mahatma assumed to be fixed and "pure", unconnected to the materialities of 
urban life and to competing class interests. 97 The active forces co-authoring the hartal 
alongside Gandhi were of a very different complexion to those who had presided over 
the Rowlatt satyagraha. The bilingual Home Rulers associated with the Chronicle had 
virtually dissipated, while none of the nationalist Muslims associated with the paper98 
94Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan. -June 1919, p. 507. 95FR (2) Sept. 1919; Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 1919, p. 825. 
96BC, 13 Oct. 1919. 
971n particular, Gandhi's identification of the city's merchants as the likely backbone of 
the movement and as the social pillar of religious unity was fraught with dangers. His 
appeal to the cloth merchants to boycott foreign yarn drew the response that Muslim 
cloth merchants were `poorer' than their Hindu counterparts and therefore stood to lose 
far more. Muslim Herald, 29 July 1921; BNNR no. 30,1921. 
98That is Jinnah, Brelvi, M. K Azad, and Umar Sobhani. 
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played a significant part. Prominent now were merchants and maulvis, exemplified by 
the president of the Bombay Khilafat Committee Seth Mohamed Mian Chotani `who 
had made a fortune trading with the British in lumber and other strategic raw materials 
during the war. '99 
Preparations for Khilafat Day in Bombay--the 17th: jumma-Friday, the Muslim 
prayer-day with its compulsory noon salat -certainly exceeded those for the Homiman 
hartal. For weeks a very thorough Gujarati and Urdu handbill campaign was carried out 
in the city `to ensure as complete a hartal as possible' spearheaded, once again, by 
groups of Volunteers. l 00 This time, Gandhi's Satyagrahis were joined by the 
Mohammedan and Young Muslim Volunteer Corps, all drawn from the `respectable 
classes'. 101 The Sunni press called for a widespread Muslim observance and appealed 
to `.. Shias and Khojas to join Sunnis in their demonstration'. 102 Gujarati posters, 
clearly targetted at the Hindu trading class-Banias and Bhatias--requesting citizens to 
abstain from work and spend the day in prayer as a measure of their sympathy and 
support for the Muslim cause, were widely disseminated. Gandhi's `appeal to Hindus', 
published in the Chronicle, once again included the injunction `.. that the mill-hands 
should in no way be encouraged to stop work'. 103 
The Horniman demonstration had virtually been imposed on Gandhi by the city's 
radical intelligentsia. Khilafat Day, in contrast, involved a `remarkable amount' of 
engineering: a great deal of `organization and expense'104 went into attempts to rouse 
the interest of the city's Muslims-particularly the merchant class--in the Turkish issue 
and to convince "Hindus" to make common cause with their Sunni "brethren": such 
was the proposed basis for Hindu-Muslim unity. In fact, none of the day's major 
99Minault, p. 73. Chotani also ran a profitable business dealing in motor vehicle 
accessories: as the sole agent for the "Ensign Carburator", he promised motorists that it 
guaranteed a `saving of 50%' on petrol costs. BC, 22 Jan. 1921. 
100BC, 18 Oct. 1919; Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 1919, p. 931. 
101BC, 19 Sept. 1919. 
102Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 1919, p. 931. 
103BC, 13 Oct. 1919. 
104FR (2) Oct. 1919. 
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objectives were achieved. Even within its own terms, Khilafat Day was less of a 
success than the Horniman hartal, with more shops open in the city than during the 
May protest. Many Muslim shopkeepers and tea stall holders refused to comply with 
Volunteers' requests to close, and the prayer congregation at the Juma Masjid `was 
noticeably smaller than is usual at the Bakr-Id'. 105 While most of the markets did shut 
down, the Bania-dominated Javeri Bazaar and the adjoining shops carried on business 
as usual. 
Hindu traders' response was indeed partial, both as a result of their failure to see the 
necessity of material sacrifice over the Khilafat issue, and of the fact that that particular 
day was `.. regarded as a peculiarly auspicious day upon which to purchase account 
books. ' 106 Even amongst the Muslims observing the hartal, many did not heed 
Gandhi's call for a twelve-hour fast. 107 While the idea of a joint Hindu-Muslim prayer 
meeting at the Juma Masjid appears to have been discussed, it was quickly abandoned 
possibly in anticipation of the kind of hostile Sunni reaction that the fraternisation at the 
Sonapur Masjid in April had provoked. 108 The limits to unity were underlined by the 
Akhbar-e-Islam which, while professing itself to be `immensely gratified' by `Hindu' 
support warned against any `expectations of reciprocity'. 109 
Once again, Volunteer patrols ensured the evacuation of public urban space. 
Throughout the day, they kept people `on the move', dispersing groups of citizens who 
seemed to be gathering in open areas and encouraging them to seek interior spaces to 
mark the observance. Even the Juma Masjid was surrounded by Volunteers to ensure 
against any act of crowd spontaneity that would affect the organisers' pledge to 
preserve `order and peace' and the spirit of "mourning. "110 
105Sabira Dossa, The Khilafat Movement in Bombay City (Unpublished PHD thesis, 
S. N. D. T Women's University Bombay 1993), p. 364; Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 
1919, p. 976. 
106ibid., p. 929. 
107ibid., p. 976. 
108FR (1) Sept. 1919. 
109Akhbar-e-Islam, 17 Oct. 1919; BNNR no. 42,1919. 
11 0BC, 18 Oct. 1919. 
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Gandhi and the local Khilafat leaders had two public order objectives: on the one 
hand, they did not wish to present the police with any excuse for intervention, but their 
class positions also entailed fear of the unpredictability of mass gatherings: a fear of the 
urban poor who, deprived of the material comforts of the private space of the home, 
were accustomed to using public space--streets, maidans, sea-fronts--to protest rather 
than to suffer, to revel rather than to mourn, to indulge the life of the senses rather than 
that of the "spirit", and, increasingly, to confront the power of private interests through 
collective action. 
An instance of such public exuberance had been in evidence only a few days before 
the Khilafat hartal during the Mohurrum celebrations in the city which, that year, 
happened to coincide with Dashahra. Since the banning of the "non-religious" toll 
processions by Police Commissioner Edwardes from the city limits, the suburb of 
Bandra had become the popular venue for `the big crowds of Bombay accustomed to 
revel in tabut demonstrations other than those of a religious character. ' In Bandra, 
Mohurrum and other popular festivals such as Narial Purnima (Coconut Day) were 
still noted for their gaiety and colour. 111 In early October 1919, crowds of revellers 
from the Muslim neighbourhoods in central Bombay swelled the local toll processions 
and joined in the immersion of the tabuts 112 into the sea. Hindus celebrating their own 
Dashahra festival were welcomed into the procession, and the singing and dancing on 
the streets seemed devoid of `any religious distinction'. 113 
When Gandhi's Young India proclaimed that Khilafat Day had been `a triumph of 
satyagraha' which had strengthened the bonds of Hindu-Muslim unity, it implicitly 
revealed the class assumptions of the Gandhian project by attributing the success of the 
demonstration to the avoidance of `mass meetings and everything tending to bring 
together crowds of ignorant and irresponsible people'. 114 Such triumphalism, 
111Aloo Dastur, Bandra Communities. Paper presented at the 1985 Heras Institute 
Bombay Local History Seminar, St. Xavier's College, Bombay. 
112That is models of Imam Hussein's tomb made from paper, tinsel, and bamboo. 
113BC, 8 Oct. 1919. 
114 Y1,22 Oct. 1919. 
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moreover, concealed the fact that the hartal of 17 October was the city's least successful 
demonstration during this unprecedented year of protest. Indeed, "satyagraha", far 
from being triumphant was now under increasing ideological question as the Khilafat 
movement, boosted by the release of the Ali Brothers and of Abul Kalam Azad and by 
their alliance with an increasingly assertive ulama, took a "radical" turn in the early 
months of 1920. 
The leading Khilafat ideologue Abdul Bari now refused to take the `satyagraha 
vow', stating that the satyagraha movement `.. was only concerned with dying if the 
need arose. Where, however, one might have to kill, every step would have to be 
taken. '1 15 At a Sind Provincial Khilafat Committee meeting in early January, Hasrat 
Mohani reiterated his proposals for a total boycott of English goods and for a gradual 
withdrawal of cooperation from government if the issue of the Khilafat was not 
resolved in accordance with Muslim wishes. Gandhi and Chotani made common cause 
in opposing the boycott resolution, the Mahatma emphasising his `expertise' in the 
matter. He was bluntly informed that he was `an expert on satyagraha and on nothing 
else'. 116 
Shaukat Ali's arrival in Bombay in February, following his election as Secretary of 
the Central Khilafat Committee, 117 increased the pressure both on the moderate local 
leadership and on the existing "satyagraha"-based agitational framework devised by 
Gandhi. In danger of being politically overrun by the religious fervour he had helped so 
much to encourage, Gandhi looked once again to the city of Bombay and to its 
merchants to provide a national lead and deliver another controlled protest to vindicate 
the Khilafat claim. 
This time, an all-India hartal would be the prelude to `non-cooperation' if Turkey 
was not restored `what was hers before the War'. Gandhi reiterated his support for the 
Indian Sunni view on the grounds that `.. when a just claim is supported by scriptures, it 
115ibid. 
116Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Jan: March 1920, p. 138. 
117ibid., p. 187. 
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becomes irresistible' and once again appealed to "Hindus" to demonstrate their 
support. 118 Preparations for the hartal of 19 March in the city were this time led by the 
Central Khilafat Committee with the Mahatma's active assistance. Attempts to achieve 
a greater mobilization of the Muslim population than during the previous hartal in 
October relied on an unprecedented volume of communications centred on religious 
discourse and symbols. 119 
Maulvi Abdul Karim Dars closed a meeting with the warning that `.. Muslims who 
do not suspend business on the 19th will cut the throat of Hussain. '120 Such oratory at 
public meetings, in mosques and bazaars, supported by handbills and posters in 
Gujarati and Urdu conspicuously placarded in the central neighbourhoods of the city, 
and by appeals in the Muslim vernacular press, were designed to ensure that, this time, 
the hartal was `a really big affair'. 121 Since October, moreover, Muslim `Volunteer' 
organisations had mushroomed in the city and were now `provided with motor 
vehicles' to tour the various Muslim neighbourhoods and ensure compliance with the 
wishes of the Central Khilafat Committee. 122 Meanwhile, Gandhi prevailed on the big 
cloth merchants to declare themselves in favour of the observance, while Gujarati 
handbills, supported by writings in the nationalist press, targetted small traders. Once 
again, Muslims and Hindus were called upon to worship separately. 
Gandhi's `letter to the press', on the eve of the hartal, again emphasised the 
importance of leaving the mill-hands `untouched' and showed the usual lack of 
enthusiasm for any worker or private employee participation. 123 The Central Khilafat 
Committee endorsed the Mahatma's exclusion of the textile workers, but did appeal to 
non-industrial Muslim workers such as municipal labourers and domestic servants to 
abstain from performing their duties. 124 
118GOB Home (Special) 355-10-D/1920. 
119For a full description of these, see Minault. 
120Dossa, p. 369. 
121Secret Abstracts, Jan. -April 1920, p. 307. 122ibid., p. 368. 
123'Letter to the Press', Yl, 10 March 1920. CWMG, vol. xvii, pp. 73-76. 
124Dossa, p. 369. 
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A crucial consideration for the organisers of the second Khilafat Day was the 
unprecedented wave of strikes that rocked the city between November 1919 and 
February 1920. The continuing rise in the cost of living125 had unleashed another 
massive labour protest involving over 150,000 workers, predominantly cotton spinners 
and weavers. 126 With daily worker gatherings on the streets and maidans, urban space 
was once again the site of popular protest. Such appropriations of public space in 
pursuit of a "materialist" agenda clearly placed the popular classes beyond the pale of 
the disciplined Gandhian hartal. `In these days of tension between employers and 
employees in the various industries', the Mahatma proclaimed, `we may not encourage 
labourers to be absent from work without the willing consent of employers. '127 
The second Khilafat Day appears to have been observed by more Muslim traders 
than the previous hartal in October. There was a general business shut-down in the 
predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods between Crawford Market and Bhendi Bazaar 
and Friday prayers were attended by a larger number of worshippers than usual. 128 
However, the organisers' hopes that the hartal would be a `big affair' once again failed 
to materialise. Working-class Sunni Muslims remained largely unaffected, including 
those groups to which the Khilafat Committee had appealed to stay away from work. 
Labourers on daily wages made representations to the organisers, pointing out that they 
could not afford to abstain from work unless the Committee provided them with the 
equivalent of a day's pay as maintenance. The Khilafat Committee refused and the 
labourers went to work as usual. While some Hindu traders did suspend business, 
fewer shops were closed and a smaller number of citizens observed the second Khilafat 
Day as compared to the first, in spite of increased Volunteer pressure. 129 
125By 1920, showing a continuous upward trend, the working-class cost of living 
index had officially risen to 183 points (1914=100,1918=154,1919=175). RCLI, 
Evidence, vol. 1 part I (Bombay), p. 157. 
126GOB Judicial Proceedings, Feb. 1920, pp. 377-78. 
127BC, 20 March 1920. 
128Secret Abstracts, p. 401. 
129Dossa, pp. 371-72. 
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In terms of numbers and social composition, both Khilafat observances in 
Bombay failed to match the protest over Horniman's deportation, nor did they 
approach the enthusiasm that characterized the Rowlatt satyagraha. Indeed, the second 
Khilafat hartal had considerably less impact on the city than the generally successful 
wave of strikes it more or less coincided with. Here, workers demonstrated their 
increasing collective ability to disrupt significant areas of urban life: cotton mills and 
docks were severely hit, public transport was curtailed, drainage workers left their 
duties unattended, and both the loyalist Times of India and the nationalist Sanj 
Vartaman were forced to come to terms with the demands of their print and machinery 
workers. 130 
Strike action enabled a wide variety of both skilled and unskilled workers, Hindus 
and Muslims-cotton spinners and weavers, printers, electricians, car mechanics, and 
tramway workshop operatives, dockers, municipal sweepers, and hamals--to improve 
their conditions through pay increases and, in some cases, shorter working hours. 131 It 
thus proved an effective modem strategy for the poorer citizens of Bombay who, 
excluded from the shuddh Gandhian hartal, 132 were able to press their aspirations for a 
better life. 
In February 1921, the Chronicle observed that `.. it seems Bombay cannot pass 
through a single week without strikes, and they have come to stay.. It has been seen for 
the last 6 months that before one strike ends 3 new ones spring up.., 133 In the same 
130They conceded a pay increase of 35 percent. GOB (Judicial) to GOI (Commerce 
&Industry), 24 Feb. 1920. GOB Judicial Proceedings 1920, pp. 377-78. 
131 Cotton spinners and weavers, in addition to wage increases of between 55 and 75 
percent, also obtained a reduction in working hours from 12 to 10. Motor mechanics 
and Port Trust sweepers were also granted pay rises as well as half day working on, 
respectively, Saturdays and Sundays. ibid. 
132The third Khilafat hartal, specifically called to launch Non-Cooperation on I August 
1920, followed much the same pattern with, initially, limited popular participation. As 
news of Tilak's death broke during the middle of the day, however, workplaces were 
gradually deserted and large crowds began gathering on the streets. A far more 
extensive hartal took place on Tilak's tenth day observance and `passed off without 
regrettable incident' amid an unprecedented level of participation by mill hands, dock 
labourers, and railway workers. Secret Abstracts, May-Sept. 1920, pp. 1156,1174. 133BC, 2 Feb. 1921. 
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month, five and a half thousand workers employed at the BB&CI workshop in Parel 
went on strike in protest at the delay in the payment of January's wages. They also now 
demanded higher pay as well as house rent and bonus allowances. 134 This was 
immediately followed by the first All-India Railwaymen's Conference held at the 
Empire cinema, with Bombay providing 300 out of the 500 delegates; here, twenty 
new railway unions became affiliated to the Conference. 135 
A few months earlier, workers had gathered outside the dockyards to protest 
against the continued exporting of foodstuffs while high prices and scarcities prevailed. 
Dock labourers were urged to follow the example of their British counterparts by 
refusing to load exports of rice and wheat. 136 The difficulties associated with the high 
cost of living were compounded by increasing water shortages which once again 
heightened the insanitary condition of the city's poorer neighbourhoods. The early 
months of 1921 witnessed the coincidence of a virulent outbreak of influenza and 
pneumonia; throughout March and April, the daily death-toll exceeded 200.137 
It was precisely at this juncture, with reports of `a considerable undercurrent of 
unrest' 138 amongst the labouring population, that Gandhi proposed another 
`experiment' in civil disobedience; this time in pursuit of the nationalist objective of 
`swaraj within one year', again in carefully selected areas amenable to Gandhian 
control. But first, the Mahatma looked once again to Bombay to provide the testing- 
ground for mass peaceful agitation, this time over the issue of the Prince of Wales's 
visit. The city was to lead the rest of India in another satyagrahi hartal designed to 
boycott the official welcome and demonstrate the strength of `national' feelings against 
colonial `wrongs'. Once again, posters and handbills in Gujarati, Urdu, and Marathi, 
134FR (1) Feb. 1921. 
135ibid. 
136FR (1) Oct. 1920. 
137Bombay Samachar, 21 April 1921; BNNR no. 17,1921. 
13 8FR (1) Sept. 1921. 
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calling for abstention from `the illuminations, processions, and functions' connected 
with the royal visit, were put up all over the Indian town. 139 
This time, however, Bombay exploded into three days of class war, with the 
authorized peaceful conflict between loyalists and non-cooperators rapidly superceded 
by a violent confrontation between sections of the city's possessing and labouring 
classes. 140 On the day of the arrival of the Prince of Wales, 17 November, the hartal 
jointly called for by the local Congress and the Central Khilafat Committee was widely 
observed in the Indian town north of the Fort. From Girgaum through Grant Road to 
Parel, most shops and all the bazaars remained closed. In the morning, Gandhi 
addressed a crowd of about fifty thousand-predominantly traders--in the compound of 
the Elphinstone Mills at Dadar, owned by Umar Sobhani. He then proceded to torch a 
pre-assembled pile of foreign clothes, whereupon the crowd quietly dispersed. 
Meanwhile, the streets of the city were occupied by crowds converging from the 
centre towards the south to cheer the Prince on his procession route. The air was filled 
with the noise and bustle of motor cars, taxis, tram cars, and hack victorias ferrying 
excited passengers towards the Fort. A very nervous Bombay government further 
fuelled the prevailing tension through its heavy-handed security arrangements: military 
pickets were liberally posted throughout the southern part of the city along the royal 
procession route which was chosen so as to virtually cut out the entire Indian town. 
From Apollo Bunder, the Prince was driven to Government House on Malabar Hill via 
Cruickshank Road, Princess Street, Queen's Road, and Walkeshwar Road. Official 
arrangements seemed to underline the splendour and sanctity of colonial space while 
reinforcing the inferiority of the Indian town. 
Indeed, the Lloyd administration feared that the visit would also be disrupted by 
another tram workers' stoppage and by a rumoured strike at Bombay's central Electric 
139Bombay Police Secret Abstracts, Oct. -Dec. 1921, p. 1648. 140The following account of the November 1921 riots is based on the Bombay 
Chronicle, 18-28 Nov. 1921; see also Ravinder Kumar, From Swaraj to Purna 
Swaraj: Nationalist Politics in the City of Bombay 1920-1932 in Ravinder Kumar, 
Essays in the Social History of Modern India (Delhi 1983), pp. 257-260. 
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Supply Station. The threat to the State ritual of night-time electric illuminations to 
celebrate a royal visit was taken particularly seriously, and `all necessary precautions' 
were in place `.. for the continuance of the service in the event of a strike being 
declared'. 141 
The politically loyalist welcoming crowds were by no means exclusively made up 
of Parsis, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Jews: they also included well-to-do Gujaratis 
and Marathis, Hindus as well as Muslims. In effect, they largely consisted of the richer 
segment of the class-divided city: probably for the first time, the possessing classes 
appeared to be in control of public space and, in a climate of unprecendented social and 
political divisions, to be throwing down a challenge for street supremacy. 
The territorial morphology of the city was represented primarily in "community" 
terms, 142 which meant that class antagonisms were understood through the dominant 
discourse of "community". While there were no exact correlations between class and 
community, community identity also generally expressed occupational status and thus 
also manifested the perception of class divisions. 143 Moreover, during times of social 
and political polarization, some jatis would merge into wider community (eg Banias 
and Bhatias into "Hindus", Memons and Bohras into "Muslims") groupings to take on 
those identified as the "enemy". Thus, in November 1921, non-cooperating, nationalist 
"Hindus" and "Muslims" faced loyalist "Parsi" and "Anglo-Indian" communities 
whose visible sartorial affluence also now made them targets for the class anger of 
mill-hands. 
Thus, the street battles of November essentially took the form of a series of 
physical confrontations through which various groups attempted to assert sovereignty 
over "their" parcel of urban territory by attacking and excluding others identified both 
as members of a different community, and by and large, of a different class. The self- 
14 1FR (1) Nov. 1921. 
142That is as jatis or caste groups, the basis of the formation of the city's population. 
See Masselos, Power.. 
143For instance, `Maratha-Kunbi' mill-hands would, in times of scarcity, loot `Bania' 
and `Marwari' traders' shops. 
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conscious wearing of clothes, particularly caps, became an essential marker of political 
identity during the riots. 144 
On the morning of 17 November, ever increasing numbers of "Muslims", whom 
Gandhi later described as `not an unintelligent crowd.. (who were) not all mill hands' 
gathered at Bhendi Bazaar and Madanpura, in defiance of the hartal instructions. They 
proceeded to stop motor cars and trams carrying passengers to the Gateway of India in 
the Fort to welcome the prince. Pedestrians in foreign caps--Europeans, and 
particularly Parsis--were beaten up and deprived of their headwear, Parsi women 
molested, while several motor cars and trams were either damaged or wrecked. A 
European police sargeant was set upon by the crowd and killed. In the evening, 
roaming groups of both "Muslims" and "Hindus" set about smashing most of the 
street lamps throughout the Indian town, undisturbed by the police who concentrated on 
guarding the streets, buildings, and properties in the Fort. Thus, by nightfall, `while the 
Fort blazed with light, the Indian town was mostly in darkness. ' 
The following day, the Maratha mill-hands, this time completely disregarding the 
Gandhi-Khilafat Committee appeals, came out in full force, lining the streets from 
Dadar to Pydhuni. They proceeded to hold up all tram traffic and molest passengers 
dressed in Western-style clothes while similarly-clad pedestrians were stoned. By the 
evening, they `reigned supreme over the suburbs between Nagpada and Dadar. '145 
Meanwhile, armed groups of `middle-class Parsis' began patrolling "their" 
neighbourhoods in north Fort, establishing `at the corner of Princess Street an actual 
reign of terror'. With shouts of `Gandhi topiwallah ko pakro' and `maro salah ko', they 
exacted physical retribution on individual Hindus and Muslims whom they identified as 
non-cooperators. Among these were six Volunteers who were on their way to Parel to 
attempt to pacify the mill hands, but who now returned `with broken heads,. 146 
144Emma Tarlo, Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India (London 1996), pp. 
97-98. 
145Kumar, From Swaraj.., p. 259. 
146CWMG, vol. XXI, p. 464. 
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Similarly, in the European neighbourhoods of Byculla stretching from Byculla 
Bridge to the J. J Hospital, armed Anglo-Indian youth, `slinging their rifles on their 
shoulders', dragged out people wearing Gandhi-caps from tram-cars, forced them to 
surrender their headgear and, in some cases, proceeded to rob them. According to the 
Chronicle reporter, `this example of the "saheb log" turned into bandits' in turn spurred 
on `the very large numbers of Muslim and Hindu hooligans' from the poorer 
neighbourhoods of Byculla to break into and loot local shops, before stoning European 
homes. Over the next two days, `street brawls, murder and arson' characterised the 
central neighbourhoods of the city north of Princess Street, creating particularly 
advantageous conditions for the poor to engage in widespread looting, in spite of the 
risk of being shot at by the military. 
The city was effectively brought to a standstill. All mills and offices as well as most 
shops, cinemas, and theatres were closed for three days; tram and taxi services were 
suspended, while the closure of post offices meant no delivery of telegrams. Bombay 
was far more effectively paralysed than during any hartal. 
On 20 November, Gandhi issued an `appeal to the men and women of Bombay', 
proclaiming his intention to go on a fast until peace was restored. The following day, 
motor lorries carrying community leaders and Volunteers toured the central districts of 
the city appealing for a return to calm, and in their wake military lorries, consisting of 
`foot soldiers, armed police and mounted soldiers with machine guns' began patrolling 
the troubled areas. It was not until the 23rd, however, that normality returned with the 
withdrawal of the military pickets, the reappearance of the tramways, and the Fort 
`resuming its busy appearance'. The disturbances left over 50 dead and about 300 
injured: for the first time, most of the dead succumbed to small-arms fire perpetrated 
not by the police, but by gun-wielding members of the upper classes. 
The November riots effectively sealed the fate of Gandhian `non-cooperation' in 
Bombay. Gandhi, the Khilafat leaders, and the nationalist press were all unanimous in 
their verdict on the violent urban upheaval. The government was certainly blamed both 
for its stubborness in going ahead with the prince's visit in the face of hostile public 
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opinion and for openly colluding with the violence perpetrated by its upper class 
supporters. Essentially, however, the events had been caused by the `riff-raff of the 
various communities', `badmashes' and `illiterates' who had not yet been `sufficiently 
penetrated' by `the virtues of patriotism and spirituality', as a result of which the city 
had been left `at the mercy of human nature'. 
Deeply chastised, the Mahatma was now unwilling to consider mass civil 
disobedience `until we have obtained complete control over the masses'. He accused 
the mill hands of being `in criminal disobedience of the wishes of their masters' by 
abstaining from work and taking to the streets and issued a somewhat pompous `appeal 
to the hooligans of Bombay' which dwelt once again on the `moral necessity' of non- 
violence. 147 
Yet the popular classes had not been impervious to the nationalist discourse on 
"swaraj", however little the specifics of the non-cooperation programme addressed 
their needs and aspirations. While they understood that `self-rule' meant the end of the 
existing Raj of the foreign "sahebs", they also imbued the coming "swaraj" with a 
primarily materialist content, drawn from their daily grievances: as the Bombay weaver 
Arjun Atmaram Alwe was to explain at the Meerut Conspiracy Case Trial seven years 
later, swaraj meant `.. that our indebtedness would disappear, the oppression of the 
moneylender would stop, our wages would increase, and the oppression of the owner 
on the worker, the kicks and blows with which they belabour us, would stop by 
legislation, and that as a result of it, the persecution of us workers would come to an 
end. '148 `Swaraj', the Chronicle commented, was essentially an issue of `freedom 
and power' for the "classes" but one of `decent amenities of life' for the 
"masses"'. 149 
Perhaps the main reason for the protest against the Prince of Wales' visit exploding 
out of the orbit of the respectable classes was its unanticipated highlighting of the spatial 
147BC, 22 Nov. 1921. 
148Cit. in Kumar, From Swaraj.., p. 254. 
149BC, 3 April 1925. 
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juxtaposition of affluence and revelry side-by-side with poverty and despair. The plight 
of the urban poor was made more wretched still by the rare spectacle of the rich 
manifesting their exuberance out on the streets of the city, explicitly challenging the 
arrival of the promised new order through their very celebrations. 
The news of Gandhi's arrest, four months later, was received very quietly in 
Bombay. There was `no sign of restlessness anywhere in the city' and `no spontaneous 
desire for a hartal'. Congress and Khilafat Volunteers went around advising nationalist 
supporters to remain calm and putting up posters to that effect. 150 Significantly, there 
were no calls from either the trade unions or from within the radical intelligentsia for 
any protest action. 
This was in marked contrast to the city's reaction at Horniman's deportation three 
years earlier when public pressure had compelled Gandhi to call for a hartal. The editor 
of the Chronicle had, moreover, not been forgotten. In January 1921, a letter to the 
paper accused Gandhi of doing little to secure `the gallant Englishman"s return, 
dismissing Congress resolutions on the subject as `unconsoling eye-wash'. 151 The 
Mahatma responded by simply asserting that Horniman's return was dependent on 
`the advent of Swaraj'. 152 
A few months earlier, in November 1920, amid escalating social unrest, George 
Lloyd had felt compelled to receive a delegation of the newly formed All-India Trade 
Union Congress. While discussions ranged over labour issues, the delegation also 
urged the lifting of the Bombay Government's veto on Horniman's return to India. It 
stated that `.. the continued deportation of Mr. Horniman is also causing much 
discontent among all classes and especially among the workers of Bombay for whom 
he laboured strenuously even at the risk of his life. '153 
150SecretAbstracts, Jan. -June 1922, p. 400. 151BC, 6 Jan. 1921. 
152BC, 20 May 1921. 
153FR (1) Nov. 1920. 
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Each year, moreover, the anniversary of his deportation was commemorated in the 
city. In April 1921, workers from the mills, docks, railways, tramways, and oil 
companies held a mass meeting at Chinchpokli to demand his return. A few days later, 
a full house attended a benefit performance of K. P Khadilkar's Marathi play 
Swayamvara at the Elphinstone Theatre, in aid of the former editor of the 
Chronicle. 154 
Behind the scenes, however, there is evidence that the Gandhian Congress initiated 
a number of quiet moves designed to limit, even in England, Horniman's influence as a 
nationalist activist. His presence and potential impact at the heart of the imperial centre 
had been perceived in Bombay as the only mitigating factor in his removal from the 
city. In London, Horniman had infused new vitality into the somewhat moribund 
British Committee of the Indian National Congress and its newspaper India, now 
edited by Syud Hossain. These had now been transformed into indispensable sources 
of information for `every MP and public man who studies Indian questions' and was, 
for the first time, reaching the growingly influential British labour movement. 155 At its 
Nagpur session in December 1920, Congress resolved to abolish the British 
Committee and discontinue India. In place of the Committee, a much more modest 
"Indian Information Bureau" was set up under Ben Spoor, a member of the Labour 
Party which, a year later, swung a political volte-face by announcing its support for the 
Government of India Act. 156 
The December 1921 Ahmedabad session confirmed Congress's new line in 
relation to `foreign propaganda'. From London, Horniman warned of the `unnecessary 
and indefensible self-stultification' involved in the decision to discard the possibility of 
influencing an ever growing audience ready to hear India's case. 157 The Congress 
decision ran counter to an age where effective communications and propaganda were 
154Secret Abstracts, Jan: May 1921, p. 578. 
155BC, 10 Jan. 1921. 
156BC, 23 June 1921 and 25 July 1922. 
157BC, 15 Aug. 1922. 
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increasingly measured by their global reach. The wheel had indeed come full circle 
from the days of the Kaira satyagraha when Horniman's effective use of the full 
techniques of investigative journalism had encountered Gandhi's opposition, premised 
on a traditionalist emphasis on the virtues of oral communication; an emphasis which 
also went hand-in hand with a code of political behaviour which favoured hierarchy, 
discipline, and control from above. 
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3. Khadi, tea, and coffee: the urban reception of Gandhi's anti-consumption 
drives. 
In June 1921, Gandhi stated that it was Bombay's `duty' to provide the giant share 
of monetary contributions to the Tilak Swaraj Fund to atone for its `sin' in flooding the 
whole of India, `every town and village.. with foreign piece goods'. 158 The city stood 
condemned as the primary point of entry of Lancashire textile fabrics while its citizens 
were deemed to be morally tainted because they seemed to embody the highest 
fascination for "modem civilization": they ardently consumed an increasing range of 
material goods and artifacts, including machine-made clothes and new `stimulating 
foods'; their lives seemed to increasingly revolve around modem machines such as 
motor-cars and tram-cars, and they allowed their `passions' to be kindled by `cinemas 
and theatres'. 159 Gandhi's indictment did not spare the urban poor, accusing mill- 
hands of being interested `only in their own wages' and of having no sense of the 
`public welfare'. 160 
Gandhi thus viewed Bombay as a citadel of material consumption whose `love of 
luxury' appeared as the very anti-model of the envisaged "good life" that a new India 
needed to embrace. 161 The sub-text of Gandhian activism in the city during the non- 
cooperation era embodied a vehemently anti-consumerist message. To be fit for 
swaraj, Bombayites of all classes needed to purify themselves of their material 
attachments by reducing to a minimum all their purely physical and sensual orientations 
towards comfort and pleasure. 162 
Instead, it was the `soul' that needed to be fed and fortified through a variety of 
spiritual exercises that reduced acquisitive worldly desires and emphasised physical 
ascetism: prayers, fasts, hartals. The Mahatma thus took up the task of restoring the 
158BC, 27 June 1921 
159BC, 20 Oct. 1920. 
160BC, 9 July 1921. 
161Navajivan, 29 Aug. 1920; BNNR no. 36,1920. 
1621n the Gandhian vernacular, "home rule" thus became devoid of any material 
aspirations. 
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citizens of Bombay to what he believed to be the "virtues" of "ancient Indian 
civilization": religiosity, simplicity, and self-denial. Moreover, while the Khilafat 
leaders never shared Gandhi's preoccupation with "soul-force", they echoed very 
similar anti-consumerist calls: the preservation of the Khilafat, and hence of Islamic 
values, demanded from the faithful all `worldly sacrifices', particularly the boycott of 
British goods. 
Gandhi made the wearing of clothes the pre-eminent symbol of the `degrading' 
consumption of foreign goods. `We should', he wrote in Navajivan, `dislike foreign 
cloth just like any unclean thing.. we should also clearly realise that the root-cause of our 
slavery is foreign cloth. '163 Addressing a Khilafat meeting on Grant Road in July 
1920, he explained that `Swadeshi', was `as dear' to him `as life itself' and the 
fundamental aspect of a non-cooperation programme conceived `in a spirit of self- 
sacrifice'. `Pure Swadeshi', he added, `meant sacrifice of their liking for fineries.. and 
their taking to the coarse but beautiful fabric woven on their handlooms out of yarns 
spun by millions of their sisters. 'l64 
Only `khadi' or 'khaddar' clothes made in India out of such hand-spun, hand- 
woven cloth were, henceforth, suitable wear for all non-cooperators. 165 Indeed, the 
great lengths that Gandhi was prepared to go to re-emphasize their dharmic and 
magical properties166 reveals his fear that in the city, the wearing of clothes was 
"slipping" into the purely material world of consumption. Khadi was `sacred cloth', 
endowed with a purifying influence on the wearer's lifestyle, and wearing it became a 
moral duty to the 'nation'. 167 
163Navajivan, 24 July 1921; BNNR no. 31,1921. 
164BC, 31 July 1920. 
165G01 Home Pol. Proceedings 1921,70. 
1660n the spiritual meanings of cloth in traditional Indian society, see Christopher 
Bayly, The origins of swadeshi: cloth and Indian society, 1700-1930 in Arjun 
Appadurai (ed. ), The social life of things: Commodities in cultural perspective 
(Cambridge 1986), pp. 285-321. 
167Tarlo, p. 89. 
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Between 1920 and 1923 a massive effort was made to persuade the people of 
Bombay to produce, buy, and wear khadi. Gandhi himself assumed active leadership of 
the campaign: he was motored to Byculla where he sought to convince his `carpenter 
brothers', reknowned for their furniture-making, not to `waste time' on things like 
almirahs and busy themselves instead in equipping the city's homes with spinning- 
wheels. 168 He visited the city's largest mandirs to demonstrate the use of the spinning- 
wheel; 169 spinning classes were started in the city, while both spinning and weaving 
were made compulsory in the newly set up `National Schools'170--still essentially 
divided into `Hindu' and `Muslim'. 
Congress and Khilafat leaders presided over the opening of khadi stores in the main 
shopping areas of the Indian town amid a fanfare of publicity. Particular days of 
religious observance, such as Diwali and the Ranizan Id, were preceded by extensive 
poster and leaflet campaigns in Gujarati and Urdu (but significantly not in Marathi) 
calling on citizens to mark the auspicious day by using khadi `in accordance with the 
commandments of religion and the injunctions of the country.. '171 
Gandhi linked his attempts to modify urban trends in the consumption of clothes 
with the success of his simultaneous campaign to bring about the complete boycott of 
the importing of foreign cloth. Significantly, in the summer of 1921, he used the 
Chronicle to make daily appeals in turn to merchants, millowners, and consumers to 
make the boycott a success. 172 The Mahatma wished to see this achieved by 
September 1921, and realising that Bombay's prosperous Gujarati cloth merchants 
were the key to the success of the campaign, he spent the three summer months 
personally attempting to obtain written pledges of boycott. 
168BC, 29 July 1921. 
169Source Material, vol. iii, p. 177. 
170SecretAbstracts, Jan: May 1921, pp. 152,646. 
171 ibid., January-June 1922, pp. 625,693. 
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Gandhi was in luck, as, for the cloth merchants, `nationalism in 1921 neatly 
coincided with short-term business interests': 173 their payments in direct income tax, 
considerrblj enhanced 
ý., _c 1 by the colonial government :.: t_L: during the war, had virtually 
trebled since 1914; while the fall in the rupee-sterling exchange rate had considerably 
put up the price of foreign cloth, resulting in a loss of `some thirty percent or more' on 
importers' contracts. 174 Even so, the Mahatma was taking no chances, reportedly even 
threatening non-boycotters with the picketing of their shops `.. by Volunteers drawn 
from the Untouchable classes'. 175 
Gandhi's pressure on members of a class amongst whom, after all, could be 
counted his most loyal supporters, immediately paid dividends: in a year, imports of 
foreign cloth into Bombay fell from 1,492 million yards in 1920-21 to 1,080 in 1921- 
22.176 With the Mahatma now also encouraging millowners to play their part in the 
promotion of khadi, this now led to a rise, within a few months, in mill-manufactured 
of khadi'yarn from 4-5 annas to Rs. l-1.50 a yard. 1 77 Since many Bombay mills did not 
use foreign yam in the first place, Swadeshi immediately brought millowners huge 
profits especially as some of them resorted to `deliberately turning out coarse cloth 
badly woven in imitation of khadi.. ' 1 78 
Gandhi was accused of effectively imposing an indefinite `heavy tax.. upon home 
consumers for the benefit of a small section of home producers'. 179 Indeed, khadi 
garments were beyond the means of the vast majority of low-waged citizens. Not only 
could they not afford the pure hand-spun khaddar dhoti, but even the thirty percent 
cheaper factory-made "khadi" cloth was generally still too expensive. 180 
173Sarkar, p. 207. 
174Gordon, pp. 24,161. 
175FR (2) June 1921. 
176Kooiman, Bombay Communists.., p. 1227. 
177Indu Prakash, 20 Aug. 1921; BNNR no. 35,1921. 
178S. Bhattacharya, Cotton Mills and Spinning Wheels. Swadeshi and the Indian 
Capitalist Class 1920-22, in EPW no. 47 (1976), p. 1832. 
179BC, 9 Aug. 1921. 
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Unlike merchants and millowners, the city's highly skilled Muslim handloom 
weavers, the Momins, the very group of artisanal producers whom the Mahatma 
wished to see restored to their `former position of pre-eminence', were less amenable 
to persuasion. In July 1921, a delegation called on Mohamed Ali at Khilafat House, 
Mazagaon, to explain their difficulties. In response to the latter's remarks that `he could 
not understand what objection the weavers could have to using Indian-made yarn', the 
weaver Mahomed Isa abruptly pointed out that the fundamental issue for them `.. was 
whether they could make a comfortable living by using Indian yarn; they were not 
prepared to wreck their business merely on the promises of some leaders that they 
would secure custom for them. ' To Mohamed Ali's consternation, the Momins refused 
to give a pledge of boycott, merely agreeing to experiment with Indian yarn for a period 
of time and ascertain whether or not they could make a living out of it., 81 
Congress and Khilafat Volunteers hawked khaddar through the streets, 182 while 
Khadi Exhibitions were regularly held in open spaces such as Madhav Bagh. 183 
Volunteers shouting `Bande Mataram' also went round the city's prosperous 
neighbourhoods in search of foreign clothes which were collected in bullock carts, 
ready to be consigned to the bonfire. 184 Gandhi described the ceremonial rituals of 
clothes' burning, such as the bonfire outside the Elphinstone Mill on the day of the 
Prince of Wales's arrival, as `noble' and `inspiring'. On this occasion, the clothing was 
arranged in a circle, with the most beautiful, colourful saris prominently displayed. He 
attached particular value to the public burning of attractive clothes--'the finest sarees, 
shirts and jackets'--which he viewed as serving to liberate audiences from the shackles 
of "sinful" desires. Anticipating criticism in a city so deeply marked by poverty, 
Gandhi asserted that `.. it would have been a crime to have given such things to the 
181 Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 1921, p. 1147. 
182FR (1) Dec. 1922. 
183Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 1922, p. 1252. 
184ibid., p. 1303. 
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poor. The dress of the middle classes has undergone such a transformation that it was 
not fit to be given to poor people. ' 185 
Yet, while premised on colonial relations of exploitation, the British introduction of 
cheap machine-made versions of the finely textured traditional Indian fabrics had 
nonetheless made these increasingly accessible to the poorer classes. The new range of 
bright colours made possible by the use of aniline dyes had a particularly strong 
popular appeal. 186 Contemporaries were vividly struck by the rich colourfulness of 
women's attire on the streets, which contributed to making Bombay one of the most 
visually striking cities in the world. 187 
Indeed, the Mahatma quickly perceived women as the chief obstacle to his 
Swadeshi plans in Bombay, and his appeals to them alternated between attempted 
cajolery and harsh admonishment. Whereas he had been prepared, in 1919, to tone 
down the first "Khadi Vow" `to suit the fashionable sisters of Bombay', 188 by the 
summer of 1921, the Mahatma was placing the entire burden of the success of 
Swadeshi squarely on their shoulders. If women, he pondered bitterly in Young India, 
did not `shake off their fascination for foreign cloth' and insisted `on having dreadfully 
coloured saris, satins and muslin', what could `poor men' do? 189 
In spite of the often overwhelming moral pressure, however, the majority of the 
women of Bombay firmly rejected khadi--at least in the heavy, coarse, white, and 
undecorated form favoured by the Mahatma. In October 1921, at the height of 
Gandhi's campaign in the city, out of an audience of ten thousand spectators who had 
turned out for a ritual bonfire of foreign clothes at the Elphinstone Mill, there were only 
two hundred women. While virtually all the men wore Gandhi-caps, only twenty 
women were clad in khaddar. 190 
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Six months later, following the Mahatma's arrest, Sarojini Naidu embarked on a 
speaking tour of the city designed to keep up the pressure on women to use khaddar. 
She stated that `.. women complain that khaddar was too heavy to wear, but in Bombay 
now many rich women were wearing khaddar, spinning yarn, and selling khadi 
clothes-hence they had no excuse for not wearing it. '191 
However, whether in domestic or labouring contexts, the desire for light, 
comfortable clothing could not be dismissed so easily, while in a colourfully-dressed 
city, lower-caste Hindu women might also have been instinctively rebelling against the 
mournful associations of plain white khadi. Indeed, Sarojini Naidu omitted to mention 
the fact that she herself never wore plain coarse khadi, preferring her `rich Indian 
silks'. 192 As Gandhi himself admitted, sales at the main Khadi Bhandar Store in 
Girgaum were plummeting: from a value of Rs. 18,000 in July 1921 to just Rs. 7000 in 
September. 193 
Indeed, the Mahatma's austere and purist view of sartorial propriety underestimated 
the active and fluid strategies through which women were transforming European 
fabrics into Indian styles. As Emma Tarlo has shown, while retaining the distinctive 
sari, `they simultaneously followed European fashions in fabrics, colours and designs, 
thereby incorporating the latest trends from Europe and giving them a new Indian 
form. ' I 94 Bombay was at the heart of this process of modernist cultural 
reappropriation with the locally-based National Council of Women, set up in 1921, 
taking the initiative to produce a variety of coloured, printed and decorated khaddar 
saris, quietly subverting the Gandhian creed. 195 In contrast, the invented traditionalism 
of khadi derived its meaning as a "natural Indian" product entirely from its opposition 
191 Secret Abstracts, Jan. -June 1922, p. 547. 192Tarlo, p. 111. 
193Source Material.., p. 445. 
194Tarlo, p. 46. 
195ibid., p. 111. 
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to machine-made Western manufactures; this meaning was thus indirectly produced by 
the very forces that khadi set out to counter. 196 
While Gandhi attached overriding importance to the boycott of foreign cloth, 
"radical" Khilafat leaders such as Abdul Bari and Hasrat Mohani pressed him to extend 
the boycott to cover all British goods imported into India. The Mahatma initially 
resisted these calls197 on the grounds of both practicability and a concern not to appear 
too politically extreme, but at the Calcutta Special Congress in September 1920, the 
`boycott of foreign goods' found a place in the non-cooperation programme. While 
apologising for its inclusion, Gandhi clearly regarded the measure as another powerful 
stimulus against the `galloping consumption' of urban life. 198 If the boycott 
`stimulates us to sacrifice our luxuries and superfluities', he wrote in Young India, `it 
would have served a good purpose'. 199 Indeed, `every non-cooperator' was `in duty 
bound to simplify his or her wants and dispense with all luxuries that are dependent on 
the use of foreign articles. '200 
From the start, however, Bombay merchants vigorously opposed the complete 
stopping of indent for foreign goods, as did the local Khilafat Committee. 201 
Eventually, even the Congress Economic Boycott Committee came to favour a boycott 
`by degrees'. 202 The Khilafat Committee pointed out that `more than 76 percent of the 
Bombay Muslim merchants have dealings in English goods and if boycott is enforced, 
it would spell ruin to them all', adding that `the costs of producing Indian goods to 
replace the goods boycotted would raise prices to such an extent as to make it 
196Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford 1987), p. 114. 
197In explaining his concerns and in offering advice to Khilafatists on the subject, 
Gandhi tended to use English newspapers or the English columns of bilingual papers. 
He was accused by the Praja Mitra & Parsi of fearing a loss of popularity and his 
position as leader of the movement if he expressed his views on boycott through the 
vernaculars. Praja Mitra & Pars!, 10 March 1920; BNNR no. 11,1920. 
198BC, 17 Oct. 1921. 
199YI, 15 Sept. 1920. 
200ibid. 
201FRs (2) Dec. 1919 and (2) May 1921. 
202Bhattacharya, p. 1832. 
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impossible for the poorer classes, including the lower middle class, to purchase such 
goods. '203 
Some nationalist newspapers also voiced concerns, pointing out, for instance that 
`there are British goods such as books, newspapers, several medecines, and medical 
and scientific instruments which it does good to the country not to boycott. '204 Close 
to the city's Bania merchants, the Gujarati warned that `the daily life of the entire 
population is bound up with the imports of foreign goods in some form or other' and 
that citizens currently had no available alternatives to articles such as `sugar, paper, 
matches, kerosine, petrol, glassware, soap, needles.., pencils, pens. '205 
No doubt, both the trade in, and consumption of, foreign goods were generally 
restricted to the affluent few in the city; while the colonial structure of the economy 
meant that indigeneous manufacturing of modem products, such as Birla Brothers' 
bicycle factory in Worli, 206 was still very rare. Nonetheless, both as traders and 
professionals, Indians were on a day-to-day basis engaged in increasing the scope and 
demand for the products of the new age. This is borne out by a foray into virtually any 
commercial neighbourhood at the heart of the Indian town in the early 1920s. 
Adjoining premises on just a portion of Kalbadevi Road, between the junctions of 
Princess Street and New Hanuman Lane, were, for instance, occupied by the 
`Kalbadevi Shorthand and Typewriting Institute', P. Gomes & Co., `Artists & 
Photographers', Khilji & Sons, `Electric Contractors', M. Rabadi & Co., `Tea and 
Coffee Merchants', `Dinshal & Menesse Cycle Mart', F. H Katrak &-Co., `Dealers in 
Cinematograph & Films', K. L Mehta & Co. `Dealers in Electrical Goods', and Gopal 
Narayen & Co., `Booksellers & Publishers.. '207 
Indians were now dealers in Reinforced Concrete, motor vehicles, film, 
photographic, and lighting equipment, clothes, furniture, tea and coffee, watches and 
203Dossa, p. 338. 
204New Times, 19 Sept. 1923; BNNR no. 38,1923. 
205Gujarati, 19 and 26 Sept. 1920; BNNR nos. 38-39,1920. 
206K. Jhangiani (ed. ), Bombay Municipal Corporation (Bombay 1945), p. 10. 
207The Times of India Directory 1925, p. 581. 
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clocks, but they were also advertisers, architects, surveyors, film-makers, 
photographers, electrical engineers, hotel and restaurant owners, printing press 
owners.. Two of the city's leading non-cooperators, Shaukat Ali and Shankerlal Banker 
were noted for their love of motor-cars: the latter was much chagrined by the auctioning 
of his prized Berleit 5-seater upon his refusal to pay a fine incurred as a result of his 
civil disobedience activities in April 1919.208 
Gandhi thus brought his austere counsels into a city which was characterised by an 
increase in material artifacts of all kinds. Upper class lifestyles were being transformed 
by new patterns of residence in which the appartment, or "flat" was becoming 
increasingly dominant, by the new speed of the motor-car, by the taste for new foods, 
clothing, and furniture styles, and by the appearance of new forms of leisure: the 
cinema, eating out, holidays; this is the era that witnessed the emergence of the practice 
of young Hindu couples going on "honeymoon". 209 Shopping had also arrived with 
the brightly-lit arcaded buildings on Hornby Road housing modern department stores 
such as Whiteways and the Bombay Perfumery Mart. Here customers could purchase, 
besides perfume and toiletries, mineral water, biscuits, tea, coffee, jam, marmalade, 
mcclcine210 
-. 21 sardines, sausages, pickle, black pepper, Bovril, and a range of, --: _' . 
Moreover, in an urban formation characterized by spatial proximity, it should not be 
assumed that the popular classes were completely outside the orbit of these new 
patterns of consumption and leisure. Even in this age of the silent screen, with relatively 
few Indian film productions, working-class audiences provided the bulk of spectators 
in cinemas such as The Globe, The Crown, and The Royal in the city's central districts 
which specialized in the `Thunder, Thrills and Fights' genre of western films. 211 
208TO1,12 April 1919. 
209The Times of India Illustrated Weekly, 23 June 1920; K. L Dutta, Report on the 
Enquiry into the Rise of Prices.., p. 76; G. S Ghurye, I and Other Explorations 
(Bombay 1973), p. 292. 
210BC, 31 July 1916. 
2111ndian Cinematograph Committee 1927-28. Evidence, vol. i, pp. 548-49. Gandhi 
refused to respond to the questionnaire sent to him by the Committee, proclaiming his 
"unfitness" to deal with the subject. He simply issued a statement to the effect that `the 
evil that cinema has done and is doing is patent. ' ibid., vol. iv, p. 56. 
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Indeed, both `educated and illiterate classes' would frequent the same cinema if a 
`comic film with a favourite actor' was being exhibited. 212 
The Committee appointed by the Bombay government to look into industrial 
disputes noted, in 1922, the emergence of a universal tea-drinking habit amongst the 
working classes which it regarded as `one of the most remarkable social changes of our 
times'. 213 Tea was, of course, one of the basic commodities of Empire, and the 
exploitation of cheap indentured labour on the tea plantations of Assam had initially 
contributed to a reduction in tea prices in Britain, making it affordable to the working 
classes for the first time. Now, the further rationalisation of production which 
accompanied the second industrial revolution once again slashed prices and made 
possible the universal consumption of the beverage. 214 
In Bombay, the itinerant tea seller's cry of `chah, chah garam'215 was eagerly 
awaited in the vicinity of the prison-like chawls, particularly on Sundays. To the mill 
hands, relaxing on their charpais outside the chawls, tea-drinking probably enhanced 
pleasurable possibilities of sociability which contrasted with the harshness of their 
cramped living conditions. Popular cinemas such as The Globe on Sandhurst Road, 
also now opened tea-rooms on their premises. 216 The Committee also observed the 
rapid growth in the number of small restaurants and tea-shops in many 
neighbourhoods, attributing this new `demand for cooked food' and refreshment to the 
212ibid., vol. i, p. 471. Like elsewhere in the world, the films of Charlie Chaplin and 
Harold Lloyd were particularly popular, and amongst all classes. ibid., p. 239. Noting 
their keen `cinema sense', the Committee observed that audiences were not alienated 
`by the screen portrayal of culturally different worlds and characters' so long as films 
appealed to their `human emotions'. Indian Cinematograph Committee 1927-28. 
Report, p. 112. 
213Report of the Committee appointed by the Government of Bombay to consider the 
practicability of creating machinery for the prevention and early settlement of industrial 
disputes. GOB Judicial Proceedings, April 1922, p. 674. 
214Lipton's, one of the companies that pioneered the advertising revolution that 
achieved new heights for the tea retail trade, also now established control over all stages 
of tea production--cultivation, processing, blending, and packaging--thus eliminating 
the various middlemen previously associated with the commodity. Commodities: Tea 
Fortunes. Channel 4 Documentary 1990. 
215Edwardes, By-Ways.., p. 115. 
216BC, 4 May 1925. 
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`increasing distances between the workshop and the home'. 217 Increasingly in the 
1920s, tea-shops came to serve as convivial meeting-places in popular neighbourhoods 
where newspapers would be read out, workplace problems discussed, and workers 
recruited into unions. 
Moreover, as tea came to be seen as a promising antidote to alcohol, some 
employers also set up tea-shops on work premises. At the Repairs Workshop of the 
BEST Company, for instance, the tea-shop was reported as doing a brisk trade 
amongst the five hundred employees. Meanwhile, the Social Service League ensured 
that `tea and refreshments of good quality at reasonable rates' were available at the 
Currimbhoy Ebrahim Workmen's Institute, which covered workers employed in 
eleven cotton mills. 218 
Coffee, too, was becoming almost as popular as tea. On the streets of the city, one 
could hear `the chink of the little empty coffee-cups' awaiting their refill from the 
portable coffee-pot now routinely carried by the bajri and chawal selling itinerant 
hawker. The demand for these novelties was so high that many itinerant vendors now 
began to specialize in either tea or coffee. Requiring little capital, tea and coffee-vending 
rapidly became popular amongst the poorer category of small traders in the city. The 
more prosperous owners of the tea and coffee shops also generally provided a range of 
other modem refreshments including soda-water, as well as ice-cream and a variety of 
cold drinks which were now possible as a result of the availability of the 
refrigerator. 219 
Thus, modern commodities were not only being increasingly consumed by citizens 
but were providing transactional opportunities for some of the poorer sections of urban 
society to earn new livelihoods. Most prominent among these, perhaps, was the 
217Report of the Committee..; GOB Judicial Proceedings April 1922, p. 674. 
218RCLI, pp. 39,535. 
219Edwardes, pp. 10,115,118. 
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"depressed caste" of Bombay Mahars who, throughout this period, displayed rare 
alacrity in seizing new opportunities to improve their social status and condition. 220 
Mahars had shown a keen interest in motors and had been recruited as motor 
vehicle drivers for the army in the Mesopotamia campaign during the war. 221 Upon 
demobilisation, they effectively cornered the professions of private chauffeur and taxi- 
driver in the city. The `wealth and prestige' of these new occupations led to the 
emergence of a `Mahar-Driver' sub-caste which promptly ceased inter-marrying with 
the caste as a whole. 222 These Mahars thus used their association with a new 
glamorous upper class mode of consumption as a weapon of exclusion vis-a-vis other 
members of their own caste, revealing at the same time a sense of the slim 
opportunities for social mobility available to the lower castes. 
In 1921, the Bombay Commissioner of Police, lamenting the lack of recruits to 
the Police Constabulary, attributed the police service's loss of popularity to the `rising 
expectations of those classes from which the force is traditionally recruited. ' The 
would-be recruits, essentially drawn from the same "agricultural classes" of Ratnagiri 
as the labouring mill hands, were not only attracted by the `higher pay and better 
conditions' consequent upon the city's industrial expansion (and upon, surely, the 
labour struggles of 1919-20), but were also influenced by `the arrival of leisure'. 223 
They were no longer prepared to submit to the long irregular hours of police work, 
prefering `fixed hours' employment which left them free not only to attend akhadas 
(gymnasiums) or roam around with friends, but increasingly now to visit the cinema 
and tea-shop. 
In this sense, the strikes of 1919-22 were perhaps not solely motivated by rising 
prices and the high cost of living but may also have implied higher consumer 
220The Maharpanchayat showed an early interest in the concept of `sanitary housing' 
and secured the building, by the Improvement Trust, of well ventilated, open 
community chawls in East Agripada. BJTR 1920, p. 12. 
221BC, 16 Feb. 1917. 
222R. E Enthoven, The Tribes and Castes ofBombay (Bombay 1920-22), vol. 1, p. x. 
223Bombay Commissioner of Police to Secretary, Government of Bombay, Home 
Department, 5 Jan. 1921. GOB Judicial Proceedings, Feb. 1921, p. 385. 
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expectations in a city offering the spectacle of virtually daily novelties. Significantly, in 
addition to higher wages, new demands for shorter working hours and half-days on 
weekends were now being made. No less than twenty-nine trade unions were 
established in the city between 1920 and 1923224 and unionisation was particularly 
marked amongst the artisanal and public service working-class: railway, tramway, 
postal, and telegraph workers. Labour militancy on the part of these skilled workers 
who now `almost spoke of Bombay as their home', probably also expressed the 
beginnings of a new urban consumer consciousness. 225 It is significant that during the 
1920s, there was an increasing demand by trade unions for a minimum monthly living 
wage of around thirty-five rupees, calculated on the basis that it would provide `.. not 
merely the bare necessities but .. some comforts as well. 
'226 
The failure of the leaders of the non-cooperation movement to understand the 
changing dynamics of urban life led to a number of somewhat farcical attempts to 
disrupt the enjoyment of new pleasures. Chief among these was the short-lived 
campaign against tea and coffee drinking in the city towards the end of 1920. This 
campaign emerged as a result of some rather bizarre (and probably misunderstood) 
comments by Gandhi who apparently `complained of the large amount of milk 
consumed in tea and coffee drinking' which, in the city, was `raising the price of milk 
and preventing many poor children from obtaining proper nourishment'. 227 He was 
followed by Yusuf All, captain of the Madanpura Volunteers who addressed a Muslim 
congregation at a local mosque on the "evils" of tea drinking. 228 
224Bhattacharya, p. 1832. 
225GOB Judicial Proceedings 1922, p. 669. Unionisation can partly be seen as a 
cooperative attempt by increasingly domiciled workers to reduce their dependence on 
middlemen so as to be able to dispose more freely of their income on goods and leisure 
pursuits rather than on exhorbitant debt repayments to moneylenders. This was in 
contrast to the majority of the textile workers who experienced lower levels of 
unionisation and still strove to retain their rural connections. 
226RCLI, part 11. Oral evidence, p. 286. 
227FR (2) Oct. 1920. 
228FR (2) Nov. 1920. 
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These comments led to mobs targetting Parsi coffee-shops on Grant Road, raiding 
and damaging shop premises and forcing them to close down. A `similar rush' was 
made on tea-shops in the mill area where the jobbers running the shops were warned to 
rid themselves of their stocks of tea and serve milk instead. Both Gandhi and the 
Khilafat leaders were quick to condemn these intimidatory attacks, and the arrest and 
prosecution of the Volunteer ringleaders immediately brought an end to the campaign 
in Bombay city. 229 Clearly, however, this targetting of the new venues of popular 
conviviality owed its impetus to the moral climate created by the non-cooperation 
leaders in which such attempts at "purifying" citizens' tastes could appear legitimate. 
Similarly, attempts to convince citizens not to celebrate Diwali and to observe Id-ul- 
Fitr as a day of mourning met with little success. Writing in Navajivan in October 
1920, Gandhi stated that `.. in this Kaliyuga, we have no right to celebrate the Diwali 
festival' and he called upon the people of Bombay to contribute the savings made to the 
funds set up for the Non-Cooperation campaign. 230 The response was poor, with the 
Mahatma's affluent merchant supporters in Girgaum and Bhuleshwar showing far 
greater concern to ensure an adequate supply of electric power-still a relative novelty in 
the city--to boost their illuminations; 231 while in the northern neighbourhoods of 
`Girangaon' more modest but equally widespread arrangements of small oil diyas were 
prominent. 
A few months earlier, a campaign to observe Id-ul-Fitr as a day of mourning rather 
than one of festivities and to persuade Muslims to donate their savings to the Khilafat 
funds, failed to make any headway and was quietly dropped. 232 In October 1922, 
similarly, a massive leaflet appeal, in Marathi and Gujarati, to the public by the Bombay 
229FR (2) Oct. 1920. 
230Navajivan, 6 Nov. 1920; BNNR no. 45,1920. 
231The previous year, great disappointment had greeted the circular sent round by the 
BEST Company regretting their inability to supply power for Diwali illuminations `due 
to the shortage of cables and plant-as a result of a great increase in load over the past 
year'. TOI, 15 Oct. 1919. 
232DC1 Reports, June 1920. 
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Provincial Congress Committee to abstain from Diwali celebrations until Gandhi's 
release from imprisonment, seems largely to have fallen on deaf ears. 233 
Throughout this period, the people of Bombay were continually exhorted to modify 
their "materialist" norms and seek alternatives to their everyday pleasures. In 
November 1920, Gandhi told a group of students that `cricket, football, and tennis had 
been introduced to make them forget their proper method of exercise in the fields. '234 
Simultaneously, Shaukat Ali launched a campaign, with the support of some local 
maulvis, to prevent any Muslim player from participating in the city's Quadrangular 
Cricket Tournament, scheduled for December. 235 Inaugurated in 1912, this annual 
event, played between `Hindu', `Muslim', `Parsi', and `Presidency' (ie Anglo-Indian) 
teams, had grown into one of the city's most eagerly anticipated public sporting 
occasions. 
A British import, cricket had nonetheless caught the mood of an urban population 
seeking new ways of enjoying themselves, with children improvising their own 
cricketing implements in the backstreets and gallis of the city. During the nine days of 
the tournament, most schools and colleges, with the exception of the Jesuit St. Xaviers, 
only held classes in the morning, while talk in bazaars, shops, offices, and eating- 
houses, was of little else. The Esplanade Maidan once again provided the ludic space 
for the sporting fixture, with a public stand erected on the north-east corner and tents, or 
shamianas, pitched on the western boundary of the playing fields for higher class 
spectators. 236 
Shaukat Ali's campaign utterly failed, particularly in a context where both the 
Muslim and the Hindu teams were increasingly challenging the traditional invincibility 
of the Parsis. The 1920 Quadrangular Tournament attracted bigger crowds than ever 
before, with a particularly conspicuous increase in the number of women spectators, 
23320,000 leaflets were printed. Secret Abstracts, July-Dec. 1922, pp. 1291-92. 
234ibid., Oct: Dec. 1920, p. 1679. 
235Secret Abstracts, Oct. -Dec. 1920, p. 1674. 236BC, 1 Dec. 1919. 
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prompting the Chronicle to comment `.. that the sporting instinct is as greatly developed 
in this city as, for instance, the commercial instinct. '237 Indeed, it estimated that `.. the 
enthusiasm displayed by the public in Bombay is even greater than that shown by the 
English, Australian, or South African crowds.. '238 
This quintessentially English game had captured the Indian urban imagination. The 
passion of these crowds was certainly out of tune with the austerity of the Gandhian- 
Khilafat world-view whose purist assumptions could not conceive of any such 
appropriation of "Western" modes of leisure. Cricket was already well on the way to 
being recast into the exuberant, colourful tamasha it now has become. 
The non-cooperation movement's descent into such moral authoritarianism, 
premised on an increasingly fanatical disparagement of all Western products as 
"sinful", evoked a critical response from the poet Rabindranath Tagore in May 1921. In 
an exchange of letters with Gandhi in the pages of the Chronicle, the Nobel laureate 
criticized the world-view underlying `non-cooperation' which, he stated, was 
attempting to foster an `.. intense consciousness of the separateness' of Indians from 
other peoples. He pointed out that in the contemporary world, `we are beginning to 
discover that our problem is world-wide, and that no one people on earth can work out 
its salvation by detaching itself from others.. ' Moreover, if `national vaingloriousness' 
decrees that `the West has produced nothing that has an infinite value for man, then we 
but create a serious cause of doubt about the worth of a product of the Eastern 
mind.. '239 
The philosophy of the charkha, he went on, was being thrust upon the people 'in 
blind faith' without any rational, democratic debate about its economic feasibility. It 
was turning into a nationwide exercise in mimicry and breeding a new and dangerous 
conformism to irrational impulses. Tagore invited readers to `rejoice at any lamp being 
lit at any corner of the world knowing that it is a part of the common illumination of 
237BC, 16 Dec. 1920. 
238BC, 1 Dec. 1919. 
239BC, 13 May 1921. 
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our house.. ' He concluded by pointing out that `whatever we understand and enjoy in 
human products instantly becomes ours wherever they might have their origin'. 240 
In Bombay, the actual enjoyment of these products was largely determined by the 
class locations of citizens. Still, the poorer sections of urban society chose to pursue 
"material aspirations" even when the powerful ideology of the Gandhian movement 
insisted that their real interests lay elsewhere. In a sense, they were maximizing some 
of the possibilities of modernity though under the constraint of more limited resources. 
The arrival of industrial consumer products such as machine-made clothes and tea was 
clearly premised on the exploitative relationship between imperial Britain and colonial 
India: nonetheless, the actual use of these products by the city's poorer citizens can be 
seen as a positive appropriation which distanced these commodities from their original 
exploitative processes of production and recast them as genuine expressions of 
culture 241 Indeed, the ultimate failure of the Gandhi/Khilafat movement in the city, 
and the sectarian spiritualism which it embodied, derived ultimately from the fact it 
would not-and in fact could not owing to its own specific class basis242--address the 
material problems of the urban poor who themselves were beginning to discover 
alternative ways forward. 
240ibid. 
241For this idea, implicit in Tagore's words, of "creative consumption" as potentially 
the negation of "exploitative production", see Miller, Material Culture.., pp. 16-17. 
Such a perspective does not however imply that the struggle to reverse exploitative 
relations at the point of production, and the political conditions that maintain them, must 
cease. 
242Indeed, in the context of the prevailing labour agitation, Gandhian hartals in the city 
can be read as designed to minimize the threat to dominant capitalist interests and to the 
colonial regime of public order that underpinned this dominance. 
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Chapter four: Visions of urban citizenship: the agitation for civic 
rights, public opinion, and colonial resistance. 
1. Civic constraints: colonial hegemony, municipal government, and the exclusive 
nature of urban citizenship. 
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, civil liberties were widely 
perceived, in both nationalist and "moderate" circles of public opinion, to have 
regressed in the city. The local operation of the Press Act, the war-time curtailment of a 
range of freedoms, and the subsequent enactment of the Rowlatt legislation, were all 
seen as expressions of growing colonial authoritarianism in the face of unprecedented 
demands for an expansion of rights. This emphasis on executive coercion, moreover, 
seemed to run counter to the global spirit of an age characterized by widening 
democratic rights and the emergence of new social aspirations. 
Authoritarianism and repression were of course implicit in the premises of colonial 
state formation in India. The central state gradually emerged as the location of political 
power which needed to be exercised as much against, as on behalf of, its `feuding' 
1Historical perspectives on urban citizenship are as yet rather scarce. Helen Meller, 
Urban renewal and citizenship: the quality of life in British cities, 1890-1990 in Urban 
History vol. 22 part 1 (May 1995) pp. 63-84, provides a useful introduction to 
developments in Britain. 
General discussions on citizenship have tended to follow T. H Marshall's classic 
account, Citizenship and Social Class (1950) which provides a developmental sequence 
of civil, political, and social rights, linked to the emergence of the forces of urban 
industrial capitalism and labour between the 18th and 20th centuries. Civil citizenship 
comprises both property rights and expressive and legal rights such as freedom of 
speech, freedom from assault, and equal treatment under the law, and constitutes a legal 
framework indispensable to a competitive market economy; political citizenship is 
defined the right to participate in the exercise of political power through the franchise, 
and social citizenship as the right to a modicum of material and social welfare 
guaranteed by the State. For a recent reappraisal, see Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and 
Civil Society. A Framework of Rights & Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social 
Democratic Regimes (Cambridge 1998). 
In the case of India, while some political scientists (eg Khilnani, below) have 
considered the issue of citizenship in relation to contemporary Indian democracy, 
historians, while recognising the modernity of the concept (eg Parekh, 1989), have 
surprisingly tended to shy away from investigating this important dimension of the 
struggle for political self-determination. 
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subjects. 2 It was not, however, the sole location. The political transactions involved in 
the process of delegation of powers to provincial governments meant that they enjoyed 
a considerable measure of autonomy from the central Government of India. As local 
states with substantial financial and law-enforcement powers, provincial governments 
were usually able to choose their own `ways and means' of achieving common colonial 
objectives, according to the complex diversities of local conditions .3 As well as 
legal 
prohibitions, the local state apparatus of domination involved both surveillance (by the 
CID and police) and positive sanctions (nomination to various official bodies and other 
rewards such as the grant of inams4). 
During the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the combined political 
impact of the East India Company, and of the central and local colonial states, led to the 
emergence of Bombay as a limited urban civil society which was essentially a 
"Hegelian" arena of particular needs and self-interest, 5 dominated by the exigencies of 
the laissez-faire market economy. The legal rights which the Company progressively 
granted to particular Gujarati merchant communities to encourage the settlement of the 
islands were consistent with colonial commercial objectives: they centred on enabling 
civil property rights which included the freedoms to trade, to own land and to build 
homes within the fort walls guaranteed by military protection, as well as the right to 
religious practice. 6 
The gradual strengthening of capitalist land rights consolidated the market sphere of 
urban society, which largely prevailed over the political and civil rights of the 
population. It provided the basis for indigeneous class formation in Bombay, resulting 
2Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London 1997), p. 21. 3The Government of Bombay also enjoyed direct access to the Secretary of State, on all 
except financial matters. It could thus appeal against virtually any order of the 
Government of India. Moreover, it possessed a special cadre of the Indian Civil Service 
and had full autonomy in making provincial appointments. Ramona C. Lobo, The 
Working of Dyarchy in the Bombay Presidency 1921-1937 (Unpublished PHD thesis, 
University of Bombay 1983), pp. 35-36. 
4That is official land grants which once ceded remained rent-free and could be held in 
permanent and hereditary occupation. 
5Tom Bottomore (ed. ), A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford 1985), p. 72. 
6Dwivedi & Mehrotra, Bombay.. , p. 18; Dobbin, Urban Leadership.. , p. 2. 
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in the emergence of the class factions of merchants, landlords, and industrialists by the 
end of the nineteenth century. Wealth brought a desire to participate in the city's public 
life, initially as Justices of the Peace alongside non-official European merchants and 
entrepreneurs.? Indeed, when the colonial state launched local government reforms 
with the objective of transfering a greater share of the financial burden of providing 
local civic amenities on to Indian taxpayers, landlords and industrialists secured a 
dominant presence in the Bombay Municipal Corporation. 
The Municipal Acts of 1865,1872, and 1888 anchored a somewhat restive alliance 
between the elitist and selective urban development ambitions of the local colonial state 
and landlord-millowner class interests. This dualism was expressed in the person of the 
Municipal Commissioner in whom complete executive power was vested, appointed 
by the Bombay government, but theoretically responsible to a Municipal Corporation 
predominantly made up of Indians. 8 The Commissioner's involvement in the 
apparatus of the local colonial state was further strenghtened when he was nominated as 
an ex-officio member of the Bombay Legislative Council in 1915.9 
Eligibility for both membership of the Corporation and the municipal franchise was 
fixed at Rs. 50 per annum paid in house rates, or Rs. 30 in wheel or general taxes. This 
excluded the majority of ratepayers who contributed to non-property taxes--water (for 
domestic purposes), lighting, police, and halalkore. 10 This high property qualification, 
moreover, checked the democratizing potential of the simultaneous introduction of the 
elective principle. 
Out of a Corporation of 80 members, half were to be elected by the highest 
ratepayers, a quarter by sitting JPs, leaving the remaining 16 to be nominated by the 
Bombay government) > Moreover, within the municipal chamber, representatives of 
7ibid., pp. 24-25. 
8ibid., p. 132. 
9GOB Confidential Proceedings 1916, p. 196. 
10Dobbin, pp. 144,178; The City of Bombay Municipal Act 1888, pp. 7-8. The Act 
also barred women from serving as Councillors. 
11 Dobbin, p. 144. 
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the dominant class factions strove to ensure that their respective sources of wealth- 
generation were not adversely affected by municipal taxes and regulations. At the same 
time, they were continually attempting to shift the burden of raising the revenue 
required for the (limited) urban amenities on to small traders and professionals, groups 
considerably less influential in civic affairs. 12 
Landlords strove to keep property taxes, particularly house rates, to a minimum, 
while opposing all attempts to regulate building in the city; millowners combined to 
ensure the lowest possible taxes on industrial property, while merchants were always 
keen to secure the transfer of as many articles of local consumption as possible from 
the non-refundable to the refundable town duty. Generally, representatives of the 
propertied classes, whether Indian or European, would unite to oppose the raising of 
any taxes that affected their interests. 13 In large measure, they were simply following 
the lead provided by the Bombay government which had secured, in the Municipal Act 
of 1888, a one-fifth rebate on the rateable value of its properties, apparently in 
appreciation `for making Bombay the capital of the Presidency'. 14 
Urban political rights were thus limited to the dominant class factions and 
inextricably interwoven with substantial land and property ownership. Moreover, 
boundaries between the factions of big landlords, large merchants, and textile 
industrialists were extremely permeable: Dinshaw Petit, who led the large landlord 
faction within the Corporation, also had substantial millowning interests; 
Manmohandas Ramji, another leading Municipal Councillor, was a major landlord as 
well as a millowner and cotton merchant; the largest piecegoods bazaar in the city, the 
Mulji Jetha market, was owned by the industrialist families of Naranji and 
12Gordon, Businessmen and Politics.., p. 119. 
131n January 1915 for instance, a proposition to raise the water tax on mills from eight 
to nine annas and on the railways and the Port Trust from six-and-a-half to eight annas 
was overwhelmingly defeated. BC, 29 Jan. 1915. 
14The annual amount to be paid by the GOB was fixed at four-fifths the amount of 
property taxes payable by an owner of property of similar rateable value. N. S 
Kowshik, How the City gets its money, in Manshardt (ed. ), The Bombay Municipality.., 
p. 46. 
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Goverdhandas. Perhaps the most influential elite figure during this period was Ibrahim 
Rahimtoola, a substantial landlord, industrialist, and member of the Improvement 
Trust, before being nominated to the Governor's Council and placed in charge of the 
Bombay government's General Department. 15 
It was estimated that around 1910, almost half the land of Bombay was owned by 
about five hundred landlords, while the greater proportion of the remainder belonged to 
the Bombay government and its various agencies, to the Municipal Corporation, and to 
a small number of commercial and industrial enterprises. 16 These interests thus made 
up the pre-eminent sphere of an urban civil society17 characterized by the dominance of 
property entitlements over other civil rights. Indians suffered, for instance, a wide range 
of racial restrictions in employment, and discrimination in the dispensation of justice: 
assaults by Europeans in public places and particularly on the railways were rarely 
punished by the courts. 18 The Bombay press indeed often referred to `the scandal of 
European juries' regularly acquitting `white-skinned offenders' in the city. 19 
Indeed, the colonial state faced its strongest early challenge over the civil issue of 
freedom of the press, largely as a result of the growth of Indian newspapers in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. This was particularly significant in Bombay city 
which, by 1885, already counted forty-three Indian newspapers. This press served 
essentially as the organ of the English-educated professional intelligentsia largely 
excluded from the restrictive political citizenship established by the colonial- 
indigeneous men of property municipal alliance. Elections based on such a limited 
franchise, commented the Native Opinion in 1883, barred the return of `a suitable 
15Gordon, pp. 77-79,133-37,247. 
16R. P Masani, Evolution of Local Self-Government in Bombay (Bombay 1929), p. 
364. 
171 accept Thomas Janoski's definition of civil society as an arena of `dynamic public 
discourse' between its four `interactive components': the state sphere, the private 
sphere, the market sphere, and the public sphere. Janoski, Citizenship.., p. 12. 
18YI, 23 April 1919. 
19New Times, 2 July 1920; BNNR no. 28,1920. 
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proportion of representatives.. whose privilege rests on their intelligence and 
education. '20 
From very early on, many newspapers adopted a bilingual strategy to address their 
different audiences--the local and central colonial states and the linguistically diverse 
Indian publics. Bilingual writing endowed the press with a powerful tool. Such 
expanded linguistic competence provided papers with alternative, culturally evocative 
ways of expressing the same message to different readership groups while also 
allowing them to make choices about what to convey in each language. During the war 
years, for instance, the Gujarati would attract official attention for its strategic espousal 
of radically opposite points of view, politically `extremist' and `a champion of Hindu 
orthodoxy' in its Gujarati columns while `moderate' and pro-social reform in its 
English pages. 21 Newspapers' generally campaigned for an extension of the municipal 
franchise as well as for greater and more direct Indian representation on both Provincial 
and Imperial Legislative Councils; they also focused on exposing corruption amongst 
the dominant shetia class, while keeping up attacks on the colonial state on a range of 
civil rights' issues 22 
It was the press's role not merely in interpreting, but in actually constituting at this 
stage the predominant element of, public discourse, that was perceived as a threat to the 
narrow class basis of the urban colonial regime. Even with the limited expansion of 
educational opportunity, the press was invariably promoting both a more critical public 
opinion and it drew the clampdown of the Vernacular Press Act of 1878.23 Although 
this Act was repealed only three years later, it clearly signposted the emerging 
battleground over the crucial expressive dimension of civil rights, and anticipated the 
Press Act of 1910. 
20Native Opinion, 18 February 1883. Cit. in Dobbin, p. 184. 
21Annual Report on newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency for the years 
1914-1918; Bombay Confidential Proceedings 1915-19. 
22Dobbin, pp. 196-199. 
23This empowered magistrates to demand deposits from printers and publishers, while 
the printing of "seditious" material could lead to the forfeiture of the deposit and seizure 
of the printing press with no right of appeal in the courts. Chatterjee, The Nation.., p. 25. 
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What the press in its diversity could, and ultimately would, highlight were the 
material consequences, for the urban habitat, of the limited nature of political 
citizenship. As we have seen, by the early years of the twentieth century, the formula of 
urban colonial hegemony: virtually unrestricted commercial and industrial indigeneous 
enterprise in exchange for contributions to prestige colonial projects and political 
(ac)quiescence, had entailed heavy social and environmental costs. The 1888 Municipal 
Act had mapped out a potentially rich field for municipal enterprise, including housing, 
public transport, the maintenance of libraries, museums, and public gardens, and the 
provision of entertainments. This field remained largely unexplored by a Municipality 
primarily intent on safeguarding the privileges of the dominant class. This made for a 
minimalist conception of local government in which the particular class location of 
political citizenship went hand-in-hand with municipal neglect of urban amenities. 
For a period of 35 years, from 1888 to 1923, there was no democratic advance in 
terms of a widening of the municipal franchise, in striking contrast to the evolution of 
local government in Britain, increasingly based on elective public involvement. By 
1914, one per cent of the urban population only--11,500 citizens--had the right to 
vote. 24 At this time, seventeen landlords, fifteen millowners, seven large merchants, 
and twelve European businessmen, made up fifty-one out of the seventy-two members 
of the Corporation. 25 Meanwhile, a city like Glasgow, comparable in many ways to 
Bombay, 26 had moved irreversibly from the nineteenth century era of `elective 
oligarchy' to one of `expanding democracy', with over twenty-five percent of its adult 
population possessing the municipal franchise. 27 
24The "community" figures were: Hindus, 4924; Parsis, 2806; Muslims 2578; 
Europeans 784. BC, 25 Jan. 1916. 
25Gordon, p. 132. 
26Both Bombay and Glasgow had an almost identical population count of just over a 
million and shared similar "image" aspirations in terms of seeking to be recognised as 
`the second city of the Empire'. Both were expanding colonial port-cities with a 
substantial industrial population and similar urban problems seen as requiring official 
"City Improvement" schemes. 
27As a result of local government reforms of 1888 and 1894. Arthur Midwinter, A 
Return to Ratepayer Democracy? The Reform of Local Government Finance in 
Historical Perspective, in Scottish Economic and Social History, vol. 10-1990, p. 64. 
209 
The slow pace of official initiatives in relation to political participation rights in 
India was of course predicated on the dominant colonial view of the sub-continent as a 
static and "undeveloped" society characterized by fixed and mutually antagonistic social 
groupings. This rendered Indians suitable, not for a progressively participatory system 
of government, but merely for one based on `interest' representation. 28 The colonial 
state, moreover, maintained this perception long after the British state, under pressure 
from a successive wave of domestic popular movements, had been compelled to 
concede increasing democratic rights to its citizens. 
Translated into the urban arena of Bombay, this meant, as we have seen, that 
political representation was awarded to those making the strongest class-based claims. 
Moreover, as new `interests', such as "professionals" identified themselves, they 
could, according to their wealth and social power, be utimately accomodated within this 
hierarchical and authoritarian system of representation. Such a theory of political 
representation29 was ideally suited to colonial needs in Bombay city. It allowed the 
local state to `bind the city's leading communities to it by ties of interest'30 which 
included substantial regular financial contributions by the shets to colonial urban 
development projects 31 
The colonial model of urban citizenship thus entailed the confering of certain civil 
rights while downplaying others, and of political representation and participation rights 
closely tied to class privilege. Indeed, the emphasis on property and trading rights, 
supported by the freedoms of movement, residence, and religion, ensured that the 
individualist economic motives promoted by unregulated market forces would 
28'Being representative.. was pre-eminently a question of being typical of the 
represented, rather than of acting politically for or on their behalf. ' Farzana Shaikh, 
Community and Consensus in Islam. Muslim Representation in Colonial India 
(Cambridge 1989), p. 69. 
29It also enabled the colonial state to discriminatingly grant the franchise to "special" 
electorates. 
30Dobbin, p. 27. 
31Particularly to the building of new roads in south Bombay (Esplanade, Hornby, and 
Queen's Roads) and to erection of public buildings such as the Bombay University 
Library, the Rajabai Clocktower, the JJ School of Art, the Institute of Science. CI, 
1901, vol. x, part iv, pp. 128-29; Dwivedi & Mehrotra, pp. 147-48. 
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overwhemingly prevail over the development of public civic consciousness. Ironically, 
the internal caste and community bases of these economic aspirations objectively 
supported the limitations of colonial citizenship. While the rules of the market-place 
ensured inter-community rivalries, the values of caste emphasized communitarian 
obligations to promote particular group interests, largely impervious to any wider 
notion of collective urban solidarity. 
Moreover, the granting of political rights to an affluent but largely uneducated class 
meant that even the one per cent of property owners who possessed the right to vote in 
municipal elections showed little interest in the franchise. R. P Masani writes: 
It was an open secret that in certain wards, particularly in B ward (ie Mandvi, Chakla, 
Umerkhadi, and Dongri), a vote had to be paid for, not merely in the form of 
refreshments and free rides in hack victorias and motor cars, but also in hard cash. 
But despite all coaxing and allurements, nearly half the number of voters did not care 
to exercise the franchise. 32 
Similarly, municipal councillors' sense of their corporate duties and responsibilities 
left a great deal to be desired. Unless matters affecting their interests were on the 
agenda, many members would attend as infrequently as they could get away with: an 
appearance once every three months was enough to guarantee retention of membership. 
Others would show up five minutes before the end of a session which ensured that they 
were entered as `present' on the Corporation register. 33 In the interests of colonial 
hegemony, political citizenship thus remained essentially passive and private. 
32Masani, Evolution of Local Self-Government.., p. 363. 
33BC, 17 Dec. 1925. 
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2. Winds of change: Geddes, the Chronicle, and the emergence of a new discourse 
of inclusive citizenship. 
In March 1915, Patrick Geddes, the foremost figure of an emerging international 
town-planning movement, arrived in Bombay with a portable exhibition on "Cities and 
Town Planning'. His attempts to publicize his innovative approach to the `urban 
question' by touring various European countries with this visual display had been 
interrupted by the war. 
Writing to the Bombay government in July 1914, Geddes made clear his 
objectives. Since the bulk of his exhibition material focused on European and American 
cities, he requested for inclusion `plans, drawings, perspectives, photos etc. contributed 
by architects and engineers in India'. The aim of the Bombay Exhibition would be to 
give prominence to `local, regional, and civic contemporary endeavour' which would in 
turn be `stimulated and encouraged by comparison with the contributions we bring 
from elsewhere' 34 The Improvement Trust, together with architects and newspapers, 
contributed plans, maps, drawings, and photographs of various neighbourhoods, sites, 
and buildings in the city. 
The government clearly wished to make the Exhibition, the first of its kind in an 
Indian city, a high profile event. A `Bombay Town Planning Exhibition Committee' 
was set up, consisting of the usual formula of representatives from the dominant class 
factions (Rahimtoola, Ramji, Readymoney.. ). It was chaired by Pherozeshah Mehta, 
and also included his fellow veteran municipal reformer V. N Mandlik. The week-long 
event was held at the Town Hall in March 1915. About seven hundred tickets were 
issued, providing access both to the Exhibition and to the accompanying lectures and 
demonstrations, while the Municipal Engineer's Office provided a number of assistants 
to explain the exhibits in Marathi and Gujarati. Social reformers, nationalist politicians, 
municipal councillors, local government officials, press, and students were the main 
participants 35 
34GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1914, p. 876. 
35GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1915, p. 731; BC, 17 March1915. 
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Such a cross-section no doubt represented the professional urban elite, yet for the 
first time a high-profile focus on civic issues was given public space. The relatively 
open arena of the town hall constituted a break with the closed and secretive 
deliberations of government departments, official committees, and the Improvement 
Trust. It was, moreover, a town hall temporarily transformed into a museum. Geddes's 
innovatory concern to express complex ideas in visual form, his placing of Bombay 
scenes in a new context-next to `the garden cities and villages which are the outcome 
of the town-planning movement in England', were designed to stimulate fresh insights 
into the life of the city. 36 
Geddes's original contribution to the critique of colonial urban planning orthodoxy 
has already been discussed. 37 Here I will focus on his corollary understanding of the 
city not merely as a set of spatial and social structures, but as a living organism, a live 
environment whose quality and health depended entirely on `what citizens made it'. 
Through his lectures and demonstrations, Geddes problematized the concept of 
"citizenship" which colonial urban rule had hitherto narrowly identified with substantial 
property ownership and which the nationalist intelligentsia merely, at this stage, wished 
to see extended to the small middle class of educated professionals 38 
An expanding city like Bombay, Geddes stated, required `the broadest civics' to 
achieve its great potential. Refering to the general political disposition to focus on 
national life at the expense of local issues, he condemned the `deadly work done in 
every city' by those `shallow politicians who sneered at local affairs as "gas and 
sewage", "parish pump" and "coal cellars". ' Citizenship, he pointed out, was primarily 
about engagement and participation in the local arena. Water-supply and health were not 
optional issues, they were at the heart of the well-being of the entire urban population 
36ibid. 
37See chapter 1. 
38At almost exactly the same time, Vithalbhai Patel was moving a resolution in the 
Bombay Legislative Council which simply called for a two-thirds elected majority in all 
municipalities. BC, 15 March 1915. 
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and thus, of the city itself. As such, they had to be seen as common civic entitlements 
`and therefore most directly of political and imperial importance'. 
Geddes challenged what he defined as the prevailing orthodoxy `that a city like 
Bombay must depend upon its millionaires'. The wealth of a city could never be 
reduced to the money-making activities of a small affluent group, but lay `in its whole 
body of citizens', whose diverse aspirations, hopes, and capacities provided the 
energies for urban renewal. The harmonious development of a city was the logical 
consequence of the active endeavours of its citizens. 
Some ancient Indian temple-cities, such as Conjivaram in south India, 
`extraordinary in its beauty, spaciousness, and sanitation', had achieved such a high 
level of collective civic endeavour. In the contemporary world, he cited the advanced 
German municipal sense `which had achieved for Frankfurt and Hamburg such 
remarkable results'. He also referred to the activities of exiles and refugees from war- 
torn Belgium whose newspaper, the Independence Beige, `was full of ideas and 
discussions about how Belgian cities should be renewed'. 
The poverty of the urban working classes, Geddes pointed out, not only excluded 
them from a property-defined political citizenship, but also impeded the development of 
a sense of their own rights and entitlements. In particular, the basic material structure of 
housing required `the most urgent consideration'. Like other citizens, workers needed, 
not `warehouses', but `decent homes with playgrounds'. Citizenship grew in amenable 
social spaces, and homes for the city's industrial population needed to be designed as 
bright and airy cottage-like buildings not exceeding two storeys. Access to cheap public 
transport was also essential, and he criticized the fact that the majority of mill hands 
could not afford a ride on the tramway. 
Geddes identified a primary cluster of material entitlements which, for the first 
time, were presented as falling within the scope of the rights of citizenship: pleasant 
homes, affordable public transport, universal access to water-supply, and a 
comprehensive system of urban sanitation. This would give citizens a stake in their 
immediate local environment which they would, in consequence, be motivated to 
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protect and nurture. The absence of these facilities thus imperilled the entire fabric of 
urban life. Although he did not directly raise the issue of colonial and municipal 
responsibilities, the overall sense of his remarks was clear. Urban "development" could 
not be the unilateral prerogative of government or of a minority of elite citizens; to be 
sustainable it required the broader enabling base of mass participation by active 
citizens. 39 
Significantly, all the city's major dailies, from the loyalist Times of India and the 
nationalist San/ Vartaman, to Parsi papers such as Jam-e-Jamshed and Bombay 
Samachar extensively reported and commented on the Exhibition and lectures; as did 
the social reform-oriented weeklies, the Indian Social Reformer and the Servant of 
India. As the primary mediating institution of civil society, the newspaper press thus 
diffused a new language for understanding and acting upon the environment of the city, 
precisely at a time of unprecedented urban blight. The government's Town Planning 
Act came in for immediate scrutiny and criticism. The press pointed out that in its 
existing form, it was not `understandable by the ordinary man' and that no provision 
had been made for the public discussion of envisaged schemes and for suggestions and 
objections to be taken on board. 40 It also advised that the suburbanisation of Salsette 
would be better served by the island's immediate amalgamation with Bombay, on the 
administrative lines of Greater London 41 
The Bombay Chronicle accorded Geddes particular attention. We have already seen 
how the paper's radical narrative strategy deconstructed the colonial order and led to 
new perspectives on the city. Another aspect of this narrative was the discursive 
development of Geddes's local civic agenda, which amplified the potential meanings of 
urban citizenship in a deteriorating political climate. The paper assumed the role of an 
active citizen seeking knowledge about, and answers to, the grave problems of urban 
39BC, 17-31 March and 2-5 April 1915; TOl, 17-31 March and 2-5 April 1915. 
40Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1914; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1915, p. 147. 
41Annual Report on Indian Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1915; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1916, p. 197. 
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life. It did so by drawing on the broad canvas of hitherto marginalised and 
unrepresented urban aspirations. This also meant that, in the pages of the Chronicle, the 
sociolinguistics of English was being radically transformed. The paper's critical 
modernist version was taking the language into new social contexts, a radically 
subversive process because conducted from within the linguistic field of colonial 
hegemony. "English" was now itself a contested linguistic terrain increasingly serving 
as a battleground for the control of meanings to be assigned to particular keywords 
such as `citizenship' and `democracy' 42 This symbolic conflict over meaning was 
itself of course produced by the pressure of previously excluded material experiences, 
now demanding to be represented and heard. 
Moreover, like the discursive interventions of social reformers, the public discourse 
of the Chronicle was intentional: it was designed, not only to awaken civil society into a 
more critical disposition vis-a-vis colonial authority, but to directly engage with the 
Bombay government itself. In this, the paper was absolutely successful. The various 
departments of the Bombay government subscribed to more copies of the Chronicle 
than to any other newspaper, 43 and it more than had the attention of the local colonial 
state. 
Geddes had emphasized the right to good housing as a basic entitlement. The 
Chronicle now amplified the damaging effects of bad housing on civic life. To be a 
home, the fundamental unit for the creation of any genuine civic disposition, a building 
had at the very least to be designed to be compatible with parenthood and family life; 
but the very existence of children appears to have been `completely overlooked in the 
construction of chawls and other forms of housing for the poor' 44 
42The traditionalist, politically conservative Urdu daily Mufid-e-Rozgar commented 
that the new phase of unrest and agitation in India was being caused by those who had 
`.. acquired higher education in English'. Unlike these `liberty-mongers' who were at 
`the root of all evil deeds', those who read the vernacular press tended to be `old- 
fashioned, traditionally educated people' who had been `taught to fear God and obey 
their elders'. Mufid-e-Rozgar, 14 June 1915; BNNR no. 25,1915. 
43BC, 4 March 1924. 
44BC, 6 June 1917; also 10 and 25 May 1923. 
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This situation was the `inevitable result' of leaving the provision of public housing 
`almost entirely in the hands of private enterprise'. Rack-renting proprietors and 
speculative builders exacted high rents `for the privilege of occupying squalid 
buildings'. Their greed made them `willing to sacrifice the health and welfare' of their 
fellow-citizens 45 The political clout of land ownership and the unregulated building 
rights which it comprised were playing havoc with the urban environment while 
inhibiting the growth of civic consciousness. 
But this small landlord class were only able to ride roughshod over the aspirations 
of the people of Bombay because they were permitted to do so by a `.. soulless 
municipal administration carried on by a civilian nominated by Government and guided 
by a Corporation which though proud of being a `model institution' of its kind in the 
country, ironically enough represents only the Government, the landlords, and a 
handful of plutocrats.. ' 46 
It was on this issue that the Chronicle received perhaps the greatest volume of 
supportive correspondence, weighing in against a local administration dominated by 
`representatives' guarding `the rights and privileges of those who create.. slums against 
those who inhabit them. '47 Indeed, the manifold other problems of urban everyday 
life--low wages, water-supply, public health, the availability and quality of milk, the 
state of roads, public transport, drainage, and lighting, the lack of civic amenities-- 
conditions that would not be tolerated `even in a third-rate city of Europe', always 
seemed to lead back to the doors of the Municipal Corporation. 
The Municipality was thus constantly kept in the spotlight and the Chronicle led the 
nationalist press in repeatedly demanding `a radical overhaul of the BMC's 
Constitution' so as to transform it into `the thoroughly democratic body that it should 
be' 48 Only then could essential services be municipalised. The paper highlighted, as 
45BC, 22 July 1916. 
46BC, 23 Oct. 1918. 
47BC, 7 Dec. 1914. 
48BC, 23 Oct. 1918. 
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example, the Municipality-run Glasgow tramway which had maintained the universally 
affordable local tram fare at half-penny throughout the war years, in contrast to the 
BEST's discriminatory charges. 49 A February 1919 editorial on the forthcoming 
municipal elections lambasted the unchanged franchise as `an absurd anachronism'. 
`The people', it went on, `understand what their rights are. They want to exercise 
them.. The fundamental principle of all administration--no taxation without 
representation-appeals to them and they take their stand upon it. '50 
The continued primacy of a nominated Municipal Commissioner, `in sole charge of 
executive functions' tended `to produce the apathy that is born of domination on the one 
side and dependence and deprivation of self-respect on the other'. 51 A genuinely 
representative Municipal Corporation would be able to choose its own executive staff, 
and set its own objectives. It would provide the indispensable institutional framework 
for `civic reconstruction' and the emergence of a `new city', guided by participating 
citizens amongst whom there was now a `growing regard for the amenities of life'. 
Moreover, what were `politics.. but civics in their extended application to the 
country? '52 
The required expansion of municipal enterprise would be funded by the 
introduction of local direct taxation based on `the sound principle of obtaining the 
largest amount from those most able to pay', a progressive and equitable approach to 
municipal finance already in operation in some European countries. 53 The urban 
renewal functions of the Improvement Trust would be transferred to the democratic 
Corporation, signifying the curtailment of the authoritarian and arbitrary operations of 
colonial quangos. 
Echoing Geddes, the Chronicle also called for `the urgent necessity of a civic 
survey that would analyse and give intelligent expression to all the influences' that 
49BC, 17 June and 2 July 1919. 
50BC, 17 Feb. 1919. 
51BC, 6 Dec. 1918. 
52BC, 24 Jan. 1922. 
53BC, 6 Sept. 1917. 
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would need to shape a renovated urbanity. In addition to the satisfaction of everyday 
material needs and the expansion of public rights, it was now also time for a 
recognition of `art' and `everything that beautifies' in the making of the new Bombay. 
It was especially necessary to rediscover the `infinite potentialities' of Indian arts and 
crafts and develop an architectural style that would express `the life and the ideals of the 
city community'. There was an urgent need to break away from `the superstitions of 
the various government departments' which, disregarding local sources, and immune 
to popular sentiments, had carried out elitist experiments in `style' which had produced 
an `inarticulate and gloomy' city. 54 
The Chronicle's reading of the new public mood seemed to be confirmed by the 
unprecedented scale of the general strike of textile workers in January 1919; the 
culmination of wartime protests against their deteriorating economic condition, this 
event marked the effective arrival of the urban working class into the public arena. 
Crowds of workers estimitated at between 140-200,000 controlled the streets in the 
north of the city for a full twelve days, waving banners, and attempting to influence 
both employers and public opinion, a situation which the Bombay government 
described as `unprecedented in the city' 55 The Chronicle interpreted the general strike 
as an innovative collective attempt to secure the recognition of entitlements to a living 
wage and to decent homes, both of which implied the curtailment of the unregulated 
domination of capital. It looked forward to labour asserting its voice through the 
formation of trade unions. `The city', it proclaimed, `is one; the poor have as much 
right to it as the rich. '56 
Further evidence of the change in public consciousness was furnished by some of 
the city's women's associations: led by Sarojini Naidu, they now launched a campaign 
for the right of women to exercise both the municipal and reformed legislative council 
franchise. Initially, they endeavoured to secure the immediate repeal of section 16 of the 
54BC, 7 and 16 Jan. 1919. 
55GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, pp. 32-33. 
56BC, 6,11,16-17 Jan. and 4 Feb. 1919. 
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1888 Municipal Act which barred them from serving as Councillors. This right wa: S 
demanded on the basis that the vital life-giving, nurturing, and `civilizing' 
responsibilities of Indian society were `largely in the hands of women'. 57 The vote, 
moreover, had `nothing to do with religious and social prescriptions'. It was simply a 
`political right' which did not affect `the laws of Manu or the Koran' 58 
The Chronicle both led and was an integral part of the growing social awareness of 
the bilingual urban intelligentsia. This was now marked by the proliferation of 
voluntary associations and the growth of public interest pressure groups such as the 
Bombay Tenants Association and the Municipal Reform Association. Increasingly, the 
intelligentsia was becoming drawn to various forms of social work on behalf of the 
urban poor, significantly, a substantial proportion of these activities were oriented 
towards labour issues. This was the era that witnessed the birth of organisations such as 
the Society for the Amelioration of the Working Classes in the Presidency, the 
Workers' Welfare League, and the Proletariat Welfare Association. 59 
Perhaps the most active and influential among the new associations was the Social 
Service League, founded in 1911. Its objectives were to promote educational and 
57Letter from the Indian Women's Education Association to the Bombay Chronicle, 
25 Feb. 1919. This era was also marked by the growth of independant women's 
organizations based in Bombay and Poona. New `feminist' journals such as Stree 
Bodh were raising the issue of women's inferior status in Indian society and supporting 
their arguments by refering to the achievements of the Suffragette Movement in 
England. Vir Bharat Talwar, Feminist Consciousness in Women's Journals in Hindi, 
1910-20, in K. Sangart & S. Vaid (eds. ), Recasting Women (Delhi 1989), pp. 206, 
224. 
58"Franchise for Indian Women. " Letter from Lady A. Ali Baig, YI, 15 Jan. 1919. 
Under Gandhi's control, Young India was one of the few nationalist papers not to 
unequivocally support the campaign by women for the franchise, even though this was 
amongst the demands put forward by the Congress-Muslim League Constitutional 
Reforms Scheme. It stated, in an editorial, that `Our women will have best striven after 
and won their vote by rising equal to the traditions of the past in helping their men 
against a common foe. And how can they do this best? Surely not by an agitation of 
"votes for women", not by forming alliances with the women of other nations, but by 
working in complete accord with their men and assisting them in every possible 
manner.. ' Y1,24 Nov. 1920. An important dimension of the Mahatma's anti- 
modernism, of course, was his subordination of rights to duties. Parel, Hind Swaraj.., 
pp. 81-82. 
59GOB Home Dept. (Special) File no. 355 (74) 1920; DCI Reports, June-July 1920. 
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welfare activities in the interests of industrial workers as well as acting as a forum for 
`the discussion of social theories and social problems'. During the latter years of the 
War, the League began working on an innovatory scheme for `Workmen's Educational 
Institutes' which it hoped would be supported by the Bombay government, large 
employers of labour, and the general public. 60 
A report on the project in July 1918 stated that as a result of changes in the 
relationship between labour and capital in the West, the `labour question' had now 
assumed a new public importance in the city. The Railway strike during the latter part 
of 1917 appeared to confirm this view: while primarily motivated by the deteriorating 
economic climate, some new ideas `such as equality with the European employees in 
the Workshops' now emerged amongst strikers' demands 61 
The League asserted that while discourse on labour had hitherto been dominated by 
public health concerns, the key issues for public consideration were now `a minimum 
living wage and the number of working hours'. The 72-hour week authorized by the 
Factory Act ensured `almost universal illiteracy', keeping workers away from 
education and giving them little opportunity for leisure and recreation. The League also 
joined the chorus of voices now urging "the State" to give a strong lead on the issue of 
working-class housing provision. In January 1917, a paper on `State Aid for Housing' 
was read out at a meeting of the Bombay Cooperative Housing Association. The 
speaker asserted that 
.. there is now growing agreement on the point that unless 
Government afforded the * 
necessary aid and facilities, any increase in the supply of houses for people of small 
means would be impossible, and that a satisfactory solution to the housing problem 
would be increasingly difficult. State aid for encouraging the supply of peoples' homes 
in European countries has now become an established fact. 
60The first of these was opened in Parel in February 1922; this was followed by the 
setting up of a Textile Technical School which provided workers with elementary 
instruction in Marathi in the theory and practice of spinning and weaving. RCLI, vol. 1 
part I (Evidence), pp. 40-41. 
61 GOI Home PoLA Proceedings Nov. 1917,628-638. 
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Apart from direct provision, there were various enabling fiscal policies that the State 
could adopt. Financial aid could be provided in the form of long-term loans at low rates 
of interest to municipalities, cooperative societies, and employers; progressive land 
policies could be initiated involving government or municipal acquisition of building 
land which would be sold or let on favourable terms so as to encourage the construction 
of sanitary dwellings; and tax incentives, particularly the removing of workers' 
dwellings from the tax structure, would greatly assist in reducing working-class 
rents 62 
The Social Service League also organised fortnightly meetings in the city on social 
issues which rapidly became a recognised forum for the dissemination of new ideas. 
These deliberations were subsequently published in its journal, the English language 
Social Service Quarterly. A primary focus of interest was, once again, the performance 
of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. There were frequent international comparisons 
outlining `the variety of social welfare work' which modem European Municipalities 
were undertaking. Following Geddes, the activities of German Municipalities, in 
particular, tended to be highlighted. 
The major German cities provided their citizens with an impressive range of social 
amenities, including a healthy supply of milk, cheap housing, public transport, and 
lighting, as well as reading rooms and municipal employment bureaux. These were 
funded, not only out of local taxes, but from generous annual grants made available by 
central government. This was contrasted with the extreme parsimony of the colonial 
state's financial assistance to Indian Municipalities. 
Indeed, the Social Service Quarterly believed it had pinpointed the essential cause of 
the regressive outlook of the Bombay Municipality when it quoted an English observer 
of German local government as stating that `.. The mental horizon of the average 
English municipal politician, and therefore of the average Indian municipal politician, is 
still limited to drains, roads, and building operations, whereas nothing human is alien to 
625. S Talmaki, State Aid for Housing. Paper presented at a meeting of the Bombay 
Cooperative Housing Association, January 1917. BC, 10 Jan. 1917. 
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the German conception of town government. ' Like the Chronicle, the Social Service 
League looked to the post-war era for a `prodigious development in local self- 
government' so as to `accelerate the widespread growth in India of the civic idea'. This 
was now, it emphasized, a major responsibility of government and would help promote 
amongst Indians, `a keener sense of social equity'. 63 
Such invitations to the colonial state to reform governmental institutions and expand 
their welfare activities was a new departure for social reformers; previously, much of 
their focus had, with colonial encouragement and approval, been one-sidedly concerned 
with `self-improvement' and with securing the reform of indigeneous institutions seen 
as having outlived their usefulness 64 
Increasing awareness of the close and interdependant patterns of city living were 
also contributing to the new civic perspectives. Addressing students, the editor of the 
Indian Social Reformer, K. Natarajan, argued that 
.. Civic pro gress.. provides the much needed corrective to our conception of society as 
made up of hereditary castes. Civics, or the art and science of citizenship is, as the 
name implies, a special necessity of city life.. The germ of the civic spirit is 
neighbourliness.. (and it is a) curious fact that there is no word in our vernaculars 
conveying the precise idea of what is connoted by "neighbourliness. " There is plenty of 
the thing itself but that is mostly in places where neighbours are generally also people 
of the same caste. That a person who lives next to us, merely because he lives next to 
us, and not because he belongs to the same caste, stands in some social relation to us 
involving obligations on our part as well as his, that is what is implied in 
neighbourliness. 65 
In turn, the institution of caste now appeared to be philosophically beyond the pale 
when confronted by the modernist perspectives of democracy. There was an `inherent 
contradiction', stated the veteran social reformer Sir Narayan Chandavarkar in an article 
63The Social Service Quarterly, May 1918; BC, 15 May 1918. 
64McDonald, English Education.., pp. 466-69. 
65BC, 17 June 1921. 
223 
on `Caste and Reform', between the democratic idea which regarded human beings `as 
of equal worth', entitled to all the opportunities for their full development, and the caste- 
based philosophy of life which signified `.. isolation, submission to outward force or 
power more than to the voice of the inner conscience, perception of fictitious 
differences between man and man due to heredity and birth, a passive acquiescence in 
evil or wrong-doing, and a general indifference to secular well-being almost bordering 
on fatalism. '66 
Similarly, M. K Jayakar, in an address to the Bombay Provincial Social Conference, 
asserted that `the worst evil of caste is that it isolates and insulates'. However, 
authoritarian colonial rule provided no institutions or arenas that could serve as training 
grounds for democratic citizenship. Their absence meant the consolidation of caste 
identities and the perpetuation of a social system that was `no longer suitable to our 
present needs'67 
Both the propagation of civic ideas and the development of labour-oriented 
voluntary associations indicated a growth in the public sphere of urban civil society. In 
the discourse of critical modernism, labour rights and civic rights were inter-related and 
constituted the fundamental building blocks of sustainable urban renewal. The new 
prominence of labour issues also meant, moreover, an increase in public debates 
concerning the social class most deprived of rights. In turn, this increased the pressure 
on the colonial state since these discourses now formulated an unprecedented range of 
propositions and demands. Essentially, they called for the expansion, but also the 
recasting, of the framework of rights that lay at the heart of the colonial urban order. 
For the first time, the issue of social rights was being placed before the colonial state; 
moreover, it also had implications for the existing balance of political and civil rights. 
66N. Chandavarkar, Caste and Reform; BC 3 June 1919. Significantly, this civic 
discourse was shared although Natarajan, Jayakar, and Chandavarkar held different 
political views. 
67M. K Jayakar, Presidential Address to the Bombay Social Conference, May 1917. 
Jayakar Papers. 
224 
The achievement of social rights in the city (housing, water-supply, living wages) 
was now premised on the expansion of political rights through the democratization of 
the Municipality on the one hand, but also on the curtailment of civil property rights on 
the other. An enterprising municipality with progressive trading schemes would protect 
the public from the glaring inequalities of the market, while planned urban renewal 
would place limitations on the freedom of private owners and users of land; at the same 
time, the growth of trade unions would check the absolute rights of industrial capital 
vis-a-vis labour. Overall, this would, for the first time, add up to a substantial challenge 
to the systematic class bias in the existing framework of colonial citizenship rights. 
Thus, by 1919, Bombay had emerged as the centrepoint of public pressure on both 
the local and central colonial states on the issue of rights. The wartime spiralling of both 
material deprivation and state repression increasingly radicalised a bilingual 
intelligentsia ideally placed to make sense of, and interpret these oppressions in the light 
of modem discourses of public rights. On the streets, in quick succession, the general 
textile strike and the Rowlatt satyagraha posed the problems of social, civil, and political 
rights with unprecedented acuity. If the colonial state often seemed to be out of its depth 
during this period,. it was largely because, unlike the historical experience of western 
Europe, the clamour for these different rights did not occur gradually over the course of 
three centuries, 68 but was arriving on its doorsteps virtually simultaneously. 
Now, an expanded public sphere of press, political, and voluntary groups, was 
questioning the hitherto untroubled hegemony of the market sphere of urban civil 
society, guaranteed by the limited colonial framework of legal rights. In so doing, it 
was posing a qualitatively novel challenge to the local colonial state: to intervene against 
the private interests which effectively constituted the social basis of its own hegemony. 
680ne of Marshall's main contentions. T. H Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship 
and Social Class (London 1992), p. 17. 
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3. The spectre of civic democracy: colonial ambivalence, municipal reform, and 
local politics. 
Meanwhile, the transformative global impact of the First World War was creating 
another source of pressure on colonial officialdom. The discursive redefining of 
political values, marked by the breakthrough of a whole new vocabulary of democratic 
aspirations, was also occuring much closer to home than Bombay. "Home Rule" 
pressure from India now fed into a wider world of complementary forces, 69 goading 
the India Office into action. 
The Reforms were not preceded by any widespread consultation process in India 
itself and were essentially a pre-emptive move to conciliate moderate Indian opinion, 
spurred by the alternative Congress-Muslim League constitutional reform scheme. The 
achievement of `responsible' government within the Empire based on `the gradual 
development of self-governing institutions' became the new stated official colonial 
policy. The press noted however that the Reforms Bill did not embody a Declaration of 
Rights which effectively meant that the `fundamentals of citizenship' would continue to 
be absent `in the status of Indians'. 70 
Constitutional reforms, which came into effect in 1921, established the innovative 
framework of `dyarchy' whereby certain previously designated responsibilites of 
provincial governments (local self-government, agriculture, education, public health, 
public works) were now transferred to ministers accountable to elected provincial 
legislative assemblies. India Office discourse emphasized the `nation-building' 
potentialities of the transferred departments, their scope for the exercise of `genuine 
responsibility' and their suitability for the introduction of social and economic 
reforms. 71 
69Besides its currency in Irish and Indian nationalisms, the slogan of `Home Rule' was 
also appropriated by the new London Labour Party, founded in 1915. The LLP's 
manifesto for the first post-war London County Council elections called for "Home 
Rule for London. " James Gillespie, Municipalism, Monopoly, and Management: The 
Demise of 'Socialism in One County' 1918-1933, in Andrew Saint (ed. ), Politics and 
the People of London. The London County Council, 1889-1965 (London 1989), p. 104. 70FR (1) Dec. 1919; BC, 30 Dec. 1918. 
71 Lobo, The Working ofDyarchy.., p. 61; Chari, History of Bombay.., p. iv. 
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Two Government of India war-time Resolutions on local self-government 
conceded a general growth in civic aspirations, and an increasing urban demand for 
administrative decentralization as a means of achieving greater municipal efficiency, 
which they linked to a `similar tendency' in England. The GOI acknowledged that the 
time had come for an expansion in the numbers of elected representatives and an 
extension of the franchise. However, it refused to concede the principle of wholly 
elective local bodies while announcing its intention to maintain the institution of a non- 
elected, government-appointed Municipal Commissioner for large cities--even though 
local self-government was meant to be a "transferred" subject. 72 
This was entirely in line with the political contradictions of the Reforms scheme 
which provided for a limited extension of voting rights together with the consolidation 
of sectional interest representation. 73 Moreover, the colonial state did not offer any new 
ideas for the raising of municipal revenue and rejected the principle of regular grants-in- 
aid from central government. It re-emphasised that `services such as water-supply and 
electric (sic) lighting.. should, as far as possible, pay for themselves. ' When limits to 
local (indirect) taxation were reached, revenue could be supplemented by `the 
development of municipal property'. 74 
But not only was there to be no new formula for central government grant 
contributions to local bodies; the wartime financial crisis resulted in just the opposite 
process: a novel incursion by the centre into local sources of finance. Although 
graduated income tax was introduced in 1916, the new contributions75 went straight 
into the coffers of the central exchequer. By removing this new source of enhanced 
revenue from the local arena, the central colonial state forestalled its potential use as a 
72GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1915, pp. 835-37. 
73S. Bhattacharya, The Colonial State, Capital and Labour: Bombay 1919-1931, in S. 
Bhattacharya and R. Thapar (eds. ), Situating Indian History (Delhi 1986), p. 174. 
74GOB Local.., p. 142. 
75Bombay city paid 72 percent of the entire income tax of the Presidency in 1917. This 
fell largely on the dominant class factions, hitherto outside the colonial revenue 
structure. Gordon, pp. 17,19,21-22. 
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progressive, redistributive source of new funds for a post-war expansion in municipal 
services, thus striking a blow at the heart of local "nation-building". 
The Bombay government was bitterly opposed to the loss of the income tax from 
provincial revenues, a position confirmed by the Meston Committee in 1920.76 It 
argued on the basis of its new "popular" mandate and even went so far as to initially 
refuse, in 1923, to cooperate with a proposed GOI inquiry into Indian taxation on the 
grounds that the inquiry's terms of reference did not include `a critical examination of 
the recent (Meston) Settlement by which the various sources of revenue have been 
divided between the Central and Provincial Legislatures'. 77 Ironically, the GOI also 
attempted to justify the necessity for such an inquiry through a discourse of "public 
needs": all provincial governments, it asserted, now had to face `increasing and 
legitimate demands for expenditure on Services under popularly elected Ministers'. 
Accordingly, it was important to explore all posibilities `to provide local Governments 
and Municipalities with better opportunities for expanding their revenues'. 78 
This dispute over the jurisdictional boundaries of revenue allocation represented a 
long simmering outburst of inter-colonial rivalry: 79 but it should not conceal the fact 
the Bombay government and the GOI shared similar dispositions towards both public 
expenditure and to the full democratization of municipal government. It was a sure sign 
of the times, however, that both sides felt compelled to use idioms of popular 
accountability to justify their respective positions. 
Both the strength of local public opinion and the Reforms now finally made 
changes in the Constitution of the Bombay Municipal Corporation inevitable. Workers 
too were now beginning to intervene in the debate over municipal reform. A meeting of 
76ibid., p. 26 
77Secretary, Finance Department GOB, to Secretary, Finance Department GOI, 6 Sept. 
1923. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1923. 
78Secretary, Finance Department GOI, to Secretary, Finance Department GOB, 16 
July 1923. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1923. 
79The strained relations between the GOB and the GOI during this period is also 
evident in the Bombay government's protest to Delhi over the increase in ticket fares 
levied by the BB & CI and GIP Railway Companies in 1922. The GOB's 
representations were disregarded. Sanj Vartaman, 13 Jan. 1923; BNNR no. 3,1923. 
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mill hands in lower Parel in July 1922 urged the GOB to extend the franchise to those 
paying a monthly rent of five rupees; they also demanded that the Municipality urgently 
took steps to remedy the `filthy condition' of both chawls and streets in the lower Parel 
mill area. 80 Some local nationalists, such as L. R Tairsee, chairman of the Bombay 
Provincial Congress Committee, were now advocating universal adult franchise, as 
were the Bombay Chronicle and the labour-oriented Hindusthan. 81 
Women activists scored a notable victory when in September 1920, a majority 17- 
12 vote of the Standing Committee secured the removal of the bar against women 
serving as Councillors. The proposers argued that `.. in certain aspects of local self- 
government they could well draw on the experience of women with advantage. '82 
However, in spite of their protests and public meetings, women continued to be denied 
the franchise for elections to the new reformed Legislative Councils. 83 In other 
respects, moreover, the process of securing municipal reform proved to be painfully 
slow. Disregarding the press's warning that his predecessor had `insidiously 
undermined the fabric of local self-govemment', 84 Governor Lloyd set up in 1920 yet 
another unaccountable public body, the Development Department. 
Headed by a former Agent of the GIP Railway Company, Lawless Hepper, 85 it 
was to act both as `a department of Government and an executive authority', 86 thus 
carrying the process of rule by quango to novel heights. 87 The new Department was 
80BC, 20 July 1922. 
81BC, 17 Feb. 1922; Hindusthan, 15 July 1922; BNNR no. 29,1922. 
82BC, 28 Sept. 1920. 
83BC, 14 July 1919. Women held a large number of protest meetings in the city in 
1919-20. 
84Annual Report on Newspapers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 
1918. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, p. 195. 
85Hepper's salary was Rs. 6000 per month. Virtually unanimously, the press criticized 
the fact that in the supposedly new era of `Indianization', Britishers continued to enjoy a 
monopoly of all superior posts. The Chronicle observed that the basic flaw at the heart 
of the Reforms was its consolidation `in high positions' of `.. officials who have power 
without responsibility. ' BC, 21 May 1924. 
86GOB Development Proceedings 1920, pp. 65,45. 
87The Bombay Samachar commented that `during the regime of Sir George Lloyd 
many autocratic acts have been done, but the most autocratic and unjust of all of them is 
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given a directional function in relation to the Municipal Corporation, the Improvement 
Trust, and the Port Trust so as to ensure the co-ordination and subserviance of their 
schemes vis-a-vis its own. It became responsible for `all questions regarding the 
acquisition of land in Bombay city' and for dealing with Municipal Corporation and 
Improvement Trust applications for loans to finance their own urban schemes. 88 
The Development Department's programme of house building89 was primarily 
funded out of a new one-rupee town duty levied on each bale of raw cotton entering the 
city from other parts of India. The Department appropriated the lion share of this 
revenue leaving only a small proportion at the disposal of the Municipal Corporation to 
be spent, the Bombay government stipulated, on public works. 90 Again, a potential 
source of municipal revenue was largely appropriated by the local colonial state which 
at the same time effectively secured the removal of housing, the `very basis of civic 
progress', 91 from the sphere of municipal government. Moreover, a potential threat to 
the interests of landlords who, prior to the war, were facing possibilities of enhanced 
land assessment, was now also removed. 
Nationalists within the Corporation had urged the Municipal Commissioner to 
consider the levying of a tax on vacant lands based on their value as eligible building 
sites. When the Commissioner finally produced a report outlining his 
recommendations in 1921, there were loud cheers in the Corporation Hall when he 
declared that due to `practical difficulties', the introduction of any new system of land 
assessment was `inexpedient' although the idea was `theoretically justifiable'. The 
report was approved by majority vote, thus confirming the freedom of landlords to sit 
on their vacant lands and sell them at considerable profit when prices rose. 92 
the Bombay Development Department.. ' Bombay Samachar, 17 May 1923. BNNR no. 
20,1923. 
88GOB Development Proceedings 1920, pp. 45-46. 
89See chapter 1. 
90GOB Development-, p. 44. 
91 R. P Masani, The Social Function of Municipal Government in Manshardt (ed. ), 
Bombay Looks Ahead.., p. 11. 
92BC, 15 Oct. 1921. 
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Having let landlords off this particular hook, the Bombay government now moved 
to break their last ditch resistance to municipal reform93 and finally announced, in 
January 1922, the introduction of legislation to amend the Municipal Act of 1888: The 
new Bill was aimed at `broadening and simplifying the franchise in order to enable a 
larger number of citizens to take a direct interest in the administration of civic affairs'. 
Its main provisions were a new ten-rupee franchise based on monthly rent, the abolition 
of all other restricted franchises, and an increase in the number of Councillors to one 
hundred, four-fifths of whom were to be elected and the remainder nominated. There 
was to be no change in the method of choosing or in the status of the Municipal 
Commissioner. 94 The Bill thus maintained ultimate colonial control and had already, 
long before its enactment, been condemned by the press `in these days of advancement, 
reform, progress and self-determination' as being of `a highly retrograde character'. 95 
The "renewed" Municipal Corporation, moreover, would not be up and running 
until early 1923-more than two years after the inauguration of the "reformed" Bombay 
Legislative Council, and three years after the setting up of the Development 
Department-an indication of its relatively low priority in the eyes of the colonial 
authorities. 96 The extension of the franchise meant a fivefold increase in the number of 
voters, but in a city of one and a quarter million this still only amounted to 75,000 
people or 7 per cent of the urban population; 97 this amounted to one-eighth of the 
numbers now entitled to vote in Glasgow as a result of the Representation of the People 
93They dominated the Corporation's Franchise Sub-Committee and recommended a 
Rs. 20 franchise and an electoral college system comprising both rent and rate payers. 
They were once again championed by the ubiquitous Ibrahim Rahimtoola. The 
Bombay government's lack of urgency in breaking the resistance of the Corporation 
was indeed attributed to `the pressure of capitalistic interests.. in the counsels of 
Government'. BC, 17 Jan. 1922. 
94GOB Press Note, 11 Jan. 1922; GOB Local Self-Government Proceedings 1922, p. 
17. 
95Kaiser-i-Hind, 21 Sept. 1919; BNNR no. 38,1919. 96This was also indicated by the Bombay government's decision, in 1922, to deprive 
the Municipal Corporation of its representation on the Port Trust and allocate its place to 
the Indian Merchants' Chamber. BC, 30 Aug. 1922. 
97BC, 2 Feb. 1923. 
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Act of 1918.98 In effect, it represented the late enfranchisement of the professional 
intelligentsia and the commercial middle class; still excluded from political citizenship 
were industrial and other manual workers as well as the majority of the lower middle 
class-subordinate clerks, small traders, superior artisans. 
The new franchise enabled the emergence, for the first time, of party politics. The 
January 1923 election largely crystallized into a contest between the Nationalist 
Municipal Party led by Vithalbhai Patel and the Progressive Party led by Homi Mody. 
While millowners and landlords were prominent amongst the PP leadership, the 
NMP's leading members were predominantly Gujarati middle merchants: the party 
was indeed ideologically close to the Gandhian Congress. As the latter had excluded 
municipalities from the sphere of non-cooperation, 99 the NMP was able to set forth a 
relatively autonomous political manifesto. It advocated the municipalisation of public 
services, and, consistent with "nationalist"100 committments, pledged itself to 
promoting the rights of tenants as against landlords, as well as to campaign for a further 
lowering of the rental franchise and for a fully elected Municipality with the right to 
select the Commissioner. 101 
N t+7 P 
The' -' gained the support of the Bombay Chronicle, largely on the basis of its 
manifesto promise to work towards the municipalisation of public services. This, the 
paper emphasized, was a vital issue in the city in view of `the growing burdens' which 
the private utilities `seek to throw on the shoulders of the public'. The old Corporation, 
`under the inspiration of successive Municipal Commissioners', had been `very 
98BC, 30 Jan. 1923 
99The Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee in 1922 had come out 
against extending Non-Cooperation to municipal and local bodies. These, it pointed out, 
entered `more deeply into the daily life of the people' than Legislative Councils. It 
therefore advocated the desirability `.. for Non-Cooperators to seek election to Municipal 
and District or Local Boards with a view to facilitate the working of the constructive 
programme. ' Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee appointed by the All 
India Congress Committee, 1922, pp. 133-34. 
100Nationalists, though, were hardly a united or coherent force during this election. It 
was reported that in several sections, notably Girgaum and Mahim, there was 
`complete disunity amongst "nationalists", with each candidate working for himself.. ' 
BC, 30 Jan. 1923. 
101BC, 18 Jan. 1923. 
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indulgent-towards these bodies at the expense of the public'. It was now up to the 
newly enfranchised intelligentsia to `turn the scales' against the overwhelming 
domination of private interests. 102 
The paper professed satisfaction at the election result. The Municipal Nationalists 
emerged as the largest party, capturing 35 seats; with the support of sympathizers, the 
combined nationalist strength in the new Corporation increased from 15 to 47. The new 
class of `23 also included, for the first time in India, 4 women--Sarojini Naidu, 
Avantikabai Gokhale (Nationalist), Perin Captain (Progressive), Anne Hodgkinson 
(Independent). 103 
The Municipal Nationalists were close, but not close enough, to capturing the 
Municipality. In practice, the Progressives, with the support of government nominees, 
narrowly held the upper hand. Indeed Patel lost the subsequent mayoral election to 
Mody by a mere three votes (50-47). 104 The Chronicle now urged the Nationalists to 
adopt `a more constructive programme' and spell out practical policies. In the 
meantime, it had no hesitation in offering its own blueprint: 
.. the programme of civic development as tackled by the Government of Bombay in their 
Development Directorate is a direct invasion of the sphere of municipal activity which it 
is not even now too late to challenge. For with the main issue of civic housing are 
involved the side issues of transport development and improvements in such matters as 
water supply, sanitary appliances, open spaces, public parks and playgrounds, street 
alignment and lighting, civic education.. 105 
Most importantly, a `cheaper, healthier and more effective solution' to the problem 
of popular housing than that offered by either private enterprise or the local colonial 
state needed to be found. As Professor Jevons pointed out, the DD chawls' intolerable 
NrgP 
living conditions militated against all `dispositions of good citizenship'. 106 The ' -, 
102ibid. 
103BC, 2 Feb. 1923. 
104Gordon, p. 139. 
105BC, 2 Feb. 1923. 
106BC, 10 May 1923. 
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which was opposed to `.. the forces of capitalism cum landlordism which dominated the 
old Corporation' should now attempt to secure decent accomodation `either by 
promoting co-operative enterprise... or by the extension of municipal trading' to the 
building of a stock of social housing. 107 
Nr9P 
The _- 
-_ was 
however already under attack from some of the city's lower caste 
organisations. The party was accused of simply `making a show of democracy', while 
failing to select a single lower caste person or worker as candidate; significantly, it had 
opted for a large number of Brahmins as well as `out and out capitalists'. It was 
essentially representative of the Gujarati `middle and trading classes' which had been 
emancipated by the new franchise, and provided a telling `example of the kind of 
"Swaraj" in store for the Indian masses'. Indeed, municipal reform had not achieved an 
increase in the representation of the `Backward and Working classes' in the 
Corporation which remained at just three. More genuine democratic representation 
would be secured by lowering the franchise to three rupees, introducing ballot voting, 
placing limits on candidates' election spending, extending the opening of polling offices 
till 10 p. m, and reserving seats for the Backward and Working classes., 08 
Between 1923 and 1926, the Municipal Nationalists enjoyed some successes in the 
Corporation and introduced a few new ideas in the realm of local self-government. The 
right to make speeches in the vernacular, the opening of the Corporation Hall to the 
public, and the campaign against the increase in tram fares--greatly assisted by popular 
mobilization outside the Corporation, all seemed promising achievements within the 
first year of the life of the reformed Municipality. 109 
NmP 
In July 1924, the '_- 's Jamnadas Mehta moved a Resolution for the 
establishment of Ward-based municipal administration, arguing that greater 
decentralization, on the model of London, would lead to a better delivery of services 
and a quicker response to the numerous citizen complaints. The central body, which 
107BC, 2 Feb. 1923. 
108R. Yeshwant, Bombay Municipality and Backward Classes. Letter to the Bombay 
Chronicle, 2 April 1923. 
109BC, 20 Feb. and 25 April 1923; 27 Feb. 1924. 
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had grown increasingly bureaucratic through the passage of time, would thus be left 
free to focus on major city-wide issues. The Resolution, which was defeated by 
majority vote, represented an astute attempt to by-pass the Corporation's cumbersome 
decision-making body, the Standing Committee, on which nationalists comprised a 
small minority. 110 
NMP 
Driven by its deputy-leader, K. F Nariman, the __ - gis' also pressed for a further 
lowering of the rental franchise, a fully elected Municipality, and for the right of the 
Corporation to elect the Municipal Commissioner. Introducing a Resolution in July 
1925, Nariman argued that the maintenance of a government-appointed Commissioner 
who was virtually independent of the Corporation, was entirely opposed to the spirit of 
the Reforms and continued to make local self-government in the city `a sham'. The 
NmP 
:'_ 
. _' also opposed all attempts to 
foister communal representation on to the municipal 
Constitution on the model of the Bombay Legislative Council. Nariman successfully 
argued that the Corporation `represented a united and cosmopolitan city' and that any 
system of sectional representation was incompatible with the extension of civic 
democracy. 112 
NMP 
It was perhaps inevitable that the :_ 2's minority position in the Corporation 
should ensure the defeat of most of its Resolutions. It is equally true, however, that the 
party's narrow class base rendered it an increasingly less than reliable champion of 
democratic rights. The Resolution on the status of the Municipal Commissioner, for 
instance, was lost by the surprisingly large margin of 64-31. In effect, fifteen 
nationalists led by Kaka Baptista had joined forces with the Progressives to vote against 
the proposition. Baptista attempted to justify his crossing of the floor on the rather 
tenuous grounds that what he in fact wanted was `a complete overhauling of the 
110BC, 23 July 1924. 
11 IBC, 22 July 1925. 
112BC, 4 Sept. 1924. 
235 
Municipal Act' so as to `guarantee the independence of the Commissioner from 
political parties'. 113 
Nº7P 
Such opportunism was symptomatic of sharpening divisions within the 
which reflected its gradual immersion into the increasingly factionalized politics of the 
Bombay City Congress Committee in general, and the Bombay Swaraj Party in 
NIIP 
particular. The :- was theoretically committed to promoting the rights of tenants as 
against landlords, and therefore to an extension of the war-time Rent Act, due to expire 
at the end of 1925. It could only do so, however, with the support of the Bombay 
Swaraj Party which operated in the Legislative Council where any Bill for such an 
NMP 
extension would have to be introduced. Many of the leading members of the. 
including Patel, Nariman, Baptista, and Velkar, were also members of the BSP. 
The BSP, however, refused to endorse Nariman's Bill to extend the Rent Act for a 
further 3 years. Its leader in the Bombay Legislative Council, M. K Jayakar, issued a 
statement to the effect that the BSP `.. refuses to look upon the class of landlords as the 
enemy of national progress as much as it considers the class of tenants as the ardent 
supporters of national aspirations'. 114 Nariman's Rent Act Amendment Bill was 
heavily defeated. As a result, landlords immediately hiked up their rents, imposing, 
according to the Tenants' Association, rises on their tenants of between 129 and 833 
percent. M. K Irani, who ran the Empire cinema restaurant, saw rent for these premises 
shoot up from Rs. 315 to Rs. 1093, an increase of 347 percent; Tulsidas Munshiram, a 
small shopkeeper near Jakaria Masjid, faced an enhancement from Rs. 11 to Rs. 25, a 
rise of 227 percent) 15 In response, over seventy protest meetings against the 
liberalization of rents were held in the city during the summer months of 1925, while 
the press warned of serious and continuous social unrest. 116 
113BC, 22 July 1925. Baptista had recently been nominated by the Bombay 
government on to the Development Department's Advisory Committee for Bombay 
city. 
114Reported in BC, 21 Aug. 1924. 
115Reported in BC, 29 Jan. 1925. 
116BC, 17 Aug. 1925. 
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This debacle also demonstrated the powerful impact of the long dominance of civil 
market rights on the urban social structure. The newly enfranchised intelligentsia now 
discovered its own contradictory class locations: socially aware of the plight of the 
urban poor and willing to act to improve the condition of labour, but economically 
aspiring and therefore liable to having its reforming drives blunted by a powerful urban 
propertied class whose capitalist orientations it could not fully contest. 
NMP 
The - 's anti-landlord wing, led by Janmadas Mehta and Balubhai Desai, played 
a prominent part in the protest campaign. Inevitably, however, the party emerged 
weakened in the Corporation, a prelude to its formal split in 1926. Policy goals such as 
the `municipalisation of services' were abandoned, or left to individual members to 
pursue. When the Corporation's Tramway Committee recommended the acceptance of 
the levying of a twelve and a half percent increase in electricity charges on consumers 
by the BEST Company in return for the maintenance of tram fares at their existing 
NilP 
rates, most of the Councillors voted for the proposition. 117 
NnP 
The ------'s failure to make any headway on the issue of municipalisation also 
reflected the continuing constraints on the raising of fresh local revenues. Just prior to 
the inauguration of the reformed Corporation, the Chronicle had warned that the 
`current sources of revenue' were `practically exhausted'. New sources, moreover, 
which `.. rightly belong to the Municipality' had been `appropriated by the Provincial 
Government without any protest from the City Fathers'. The new Corporation needed 
to ensure that the colonial state restored the substantial portion of locally raised revenues 
back to the city. Moreover, it was important for the Municipality to reform the existing 
taxation structure `with a view to ensure that only those who are able to bear heavier 
burdens are called upon to do so and not the rich and poor alike'. 118 
Between 1914 and 1924, the total expenditure of the Municipal Corporation more 
than doubled as a result, not of any expansion in services, but of the increase in costs 
117BC, 15 Sept. 1923. 
118BC, 13 Jan. 1923. 
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brought about by the war. 119 New levies such as the refundable town duty were 
introduced, bearing on basic articles such as foodgrains, flour, ghee, sugar, timber, and 
firewood. In effect, this amounted to a `consumption tax' on citizens since wholesale 
merchants were reimbursed if the commodity left the city unconsumed. 120 In 1925- 
26, municipal revenue from the town duty alone equalled the combined revenue from 
the cotton duty and land taxes on mills and government-owned land. 121 Thus, the 
regressive pre-war municipal taxation structure was not only maintained by the 
"reformed" Corporation, but substantially enhanced. 
The demise of the Municipal Nationalists severed the already tenuous link between 
local nationalism and democratic urban renewal. R. P Masani, who for a very brief 
period in 1922-23 held the post of (acting) Municipal Commissioner, deeply regretted 
the widening gulf, in the post-1926 period, between the `all-absorbing' nationalist 
struggle and the `quiet task' of civic reconstruction. 122 This ensured that the local, 
empirical terrain of citizenship was increasingly lost sight of. Henceforth, rival 
Congress factions, embroiled in all-India struggles and driven by class compromises, 
would not perceive the city as a promising theatre for an experiment in democratic self- 
government, capable of ushering in a new era of social and material advance. Rather, 
Bombay became a glittering political prize to be won within the rules of authoritarian 
colonial governance, an influential arena for the exercise of a new hegemony. 123 
119Gordon, p. 130. 
120ibid., p. 142. 
121The town duty yielded Rs. 1,700,000, the cotton duty Rs. 1,600,000, while land 
taxes on mills and government-owned property brought in Rs. 712,626 and 320,820 
respectively. Gordon, p. 141. 
122Masani, Evolution ofLocal Self-Government.., p. 403. 
123Congress never availed itself of the opportunity of making use of Masani's civic 
talents, and he gradually drifted out of local politics. Rather more of a mainstream 
nationalist, the other contemporary champion of local issues, K. F Nariman, suffered 
an even greater demise. When he wrote a pamphlet criticizing Gandhi's `semi-religious 
ideology' which had `no relevance to practical politics', Sardar Patel and K. M Munshi 
hatched a plot, in the mid-1930s, to oust him as Congress leader in the city, a process 
that eventually culminated in his expulsion from the party. H. S Dalai, Veer Nariman-A 
Profile (Bombay n. d), pp. 20-22,24-25,30. 
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By the mid 1920s it was clear that the early post-war hopes for a radical 
restructuring of municipal government in Bombay city had not materialized. The 
Bombay government strongly resisted demands for democratic reform, and the 
maintenance of its power to appoint the Municipal Commissioner coupled with a 
limited extension of the franchise, signified the preservation of colonial `autocracy 
invested with parliamentary forms'. 124 
In spite of a rich surge in contestations, aspirations, and ideas, the political rights of 
urban citizenship remained severely constrained. Indeed, the authoritarian nature of the 
rule by quango system in force in Bombay city, and the `unhealthy rivalry'125 which it 
promoted, had in fact been reinforced. This was underlined by the official Vivesvarya 
Committee, set up to look into `Municipal Retrenchment and Reform', which 
published its report in May 1925. 
The Report stated that the expansion of municipal enterprise was being held back by 
the vesting of all executive power in the hands of the Municipal Commissioner `who 
has been more a master than a servant of the Corporation'. This had deprived 
Councillors of the 'effective initiative which the possession of power gives', while the 
largely excluded and unrepresented public had remained apathetic. Indeed, the 
`misfortune of Bombay' was that it was `the victim of experiments in "development"' 
by different bodies whose activities were not `harmonized by any co-ordinating 
authority'. 
The Committee advocated the dissolving of the Development Department, the 
Improvement Trust, and the Port Trust as separate institutions and the taking over of 
their functions by the Bombay Municipality. The Corporation needed to be given the 
necessary financial assistance by government to expand its activities, and it was also 
now necessary to devise procedures to ensure close public scrutiny over all municipal 
124Annual Report on Indian and Anglo-Vernacular Papers published in the Bombay 
Presidency for the year 1924; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1925, p. 116. 125BC, 19 Jan. 1924. 
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schemes. Indeed, the slowness and general costliness of many projects were primarily 
due to the absence of proper structures of accountability. 
This absence resulted in lax departmental procedures within the Corporation. The 
various departments needed to be regulated and controlled through systemized rules, 
manuals, and codes of procedure. Estimates for large and costly projects, for instance, 
required scrutiny and approval by an independent agency and not just by the 
Nr-1P 
Departments which devised them in the first place. Although the had raised the 
issue, no attempt had been yet made to explore how the municipalisation of public 
utilities such as the tramways, electricity, and gas might benefit the majority of citizens. 
There were also no regular surveys of the city in terms of citizens' access to basic 
material resources; such surveys might serve as the mechanism for setting 
`increasingly higher standards of efficiency in services'. These policies and procedures 
existed elsewhere, and Bombay `could benefit enormously from lessons to be drawn 
from the experience and development of cities like London, Manchester, Glasgow, 
Berlin, and New York.. ' 
The Report also dwelt on the 'crucial' social issues of housing and public transport. 
The slow progress of municipal house building could be improved by liberal tax 
concessions to private builders and co-operative societies. The high rates of house 
rentals in the city were, moreover, related to the problem of public transit. The city 
urgently required both an expansion of the tramway service and the electrification of the 
railways. The Municipality could play its part in tackling the problem of high prices by 
introducing subsidized housing for workers and by either taking over or granting public 
interest concessions to the BEST Company so as to secure improvements in the 
tramway service. Finally, no effective long-term improvement in public civic 
awareness was possible without a reversal of the Corporation's record of 'lamentable 
failure in elementary education'; this meant generous public expenditure on compulsory 
schooling for children and the introduction of `civics' in the primary curriculum. 126 
126Report of the Municipal Retrenchment and Reform Committee, 1925; BC, 11 May 
1925. 
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4. Expressive rights and the challenge of social citizenship: the press, strikes, and 
colonial legislation. 
The ambivalent and ultimately reactionary response of the colonial state to the 
demand for municipal democratization was just one aspect of the simultaneous 
pressures it was now facing for an expansion of public rights. The war years had seen 
the drastic curtailing by censorship of the civil rights of free speech, the infringement of 
which potentially incurred the loss of personal freedom. The imprisonment of the Ali 
brothers had led the Indian Social Reformer to comment on the colonial state's 
contradictory stance: on the one hand, dismissing those agitating for an expansion of 
political rights as having no influence with the masses, yet at the same time depriving 
them of their civil rights. 127 
With the deportation of Horniman and the executive action against the Chronicle in 
1919, the press portrayed both the central and local colonial states as not merely failing 
to move with the democratic and egalitarian aspirations of the times, but as retrograde 
and veering back towards `autocracy'. In the city, there were now unanimous demands 
from all shades of opinion not merely for a restoration of the civil rights abrogated by 
the Defense of India Act, but for the inauguration of a new era of press freedoms which 
initially required the repeal of the infamous Press Act. 
Both the revolutionary change in public opinion and the impending introduction of 
the constitutional reforms now led the India Office to pressurize the Government of 
India to send out conciliatory signals over the ultimate fate of the Press Act. 128 The 
end of the war also brought the lifting of military censorship of telegrams and 
newspapers. When the general textile strike erupted in the city in January 1919, the 
Bombay government requested the colonial state's sanction to resume inland telegraph 
censorship with a view to ascertaining `.. to what extent the movement is organised 
127The Indian Social Reformer, 23 May 1915; BNNR no. 21,1915. 
128GOB Judicial Proceedings 1919, p. 2133. 
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from the outside'. 129 The Government of India turned the request down, but the 
continuing social unrest quickly led to a change of heart. 
In September 1919, the colonial state proposed that, along with the provincial 
administrations of Bengal and Madras, the Bombay government should proceed to 
establish its own civilian telegraph censorship arrangements. This would confer `the 
power to control press messages from abroad that might be considered undesirable for 
publication in India'; inland telegrams received and despatched from Bombay, Poona, 
and Sind, would also be covered. This was especially necessary, it pointed out, because 
although Reuters' could still be relied upon to exercise `responsible' self-censorship, 
important newspapers like the Bombay Chronicle130 and Kesari now received non- 
Reuter telegrams direct. 131 
The Bombay government readily acquiesced. However, when the colonial state 
circulated the suggested new press policy framework devised by the India Office, ie the 
`possibility of adopting in future a policy of counter-propaganda in preference to an 
increasing use of the Press Act', the Lloyd Administration adopted an initially hawkish 
stance. It responded by asserting its conviction `.. of the necessity of maintaining the 
powers conferred by the Act' while observing that these had been generally exercised 
with `strict moderation and discrimination'. 
The action taken against the Bombay Chronicle in May 1919, for instance, had 
`effected a general improvement in the tone of the press'. It was important to 
remember, moreover, that unlike the generally factual and balanced press in England, 
the Indian press engaged in `.. publishing irresponsible, distorted, or palpably false 
129GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, pp. 19-23. 
130Even after Horniman's deportation, the Chronicle maintained its position as 
Bombay's leading civic and nationalist daily. In November 1923, the Bombay 
Provincial Congress Committee wrote to the Consuls of the US, Italy, and Norway to 
bring to their notice the Congress resolution of the boycott of goods manufactured in 
the British Empire. The letter suggested the desirability of promoting goods 
manufactured in their countries in the Indian market by means of a continuous and well 
thought out advertising campaign, `particularly through the Bombay Chronicle which is 
the most widely circulated as well as the most influential daily in India'. FR (2) Nov. 
1923. 
131 GOI Home Political ,4 Proceedings 1919,74-107. 
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versions of current events.. ' While more could certainly be done in the form of 
propaganda, this could `never in itself be an adequate remedy', and it would be `a 
dereliction of duty' to abandon or weaken the controls established by the Press Act. 132 
The local colonial state was indirectly admitting that it was losing the battle over the 
shaping of the growing public sphere of civil society, and that the only method of 
curtailing `the preponderant influence of the Press on public opinion' was to continue to 
circumscribe press freedoms by severe executive controls. The agitation against the 
Act, however, continued unabated in Bombay city: with the likelihood that it would 
always figure prominently in any resumption of civil disobedience, the Bombay 
government reluctantly came round, eight months later, to the GOI's proposition of 
repeal, accepting the view that a new climate needed to be created for the successful 
working of the reforms. 133 It strongly urged, however, that `the hands of courts' 
should be correspondingly strengthened so as to clearly fix `.. responsibility on printers, 
publishers, and editors' for the good conduct of the press. 134 
The Press Act was indeed repealed in September 1922 (together with the Defense 
of India and Rowlatt Acts), but this did not mean the restoration of journalistic 
freedom. The offense of press "sedition" remained on the statute book under section 
124-A of the Indian Penal Code, together with the colonial state's monopoly over its 
interpretation. The power to confiscate seditious newspapers, pamphlets, and books- 
including the `auxiliary power' to prevent the importation, and dissemination through 
the post, of such material-was simply transferred to the courts. While the security 
clauses were abolished, other provisions of the Act were now added to the Sea 
132Secretary, GOB Home Dept. to Sec. GOI Home, 4 Nov. 1919. GOB Judicial 
Proceedings 1919, pp. 2133-34. 1331n February 1920, the GOB cancelled all securities deposited by Bombay 
newspapers under the Press Act and returned them to the depositors. The Chronicle 
was the only paper excluded from this amnesty. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, 
p. 73. 
134Secretary, GOB Judicial Dept. to Sec. GOI Home Political Proceedings, 25 Aug. 
1920. GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, pp. 385-86. GOI Home Political 1921, 
no. 4, part 1,1-33. 
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Customs Act and the Post Offices Act. 135 Indeed, for the remaining two and a half 
decades of British rule in India, the various derivatives of the Press Act would continue 
to serve as `the basis for intervention in the circulation of printed matter'. 136 
The Chronicle observed that unless the existing law of sedition was drastically 
modified, there could be no `true liberty of the Press' in India. 137 The more moderate 
Jam-e Jamshed called for the setting up of independent committees, which would 
include elected representatives of the people, to decide what constituted `seditious 
literature'. 138 The city's nationalist press were not inclined to view repeal as a 
progressive measure, in view of their firm belief in the local colonial state's inherent 
predisposition to `smell sedition in every assertion of right'. 139 They pointed out that it 
was only the Bombay government's recalcitrance that continued to keep Horniman out 
of India, even after the repeal of the Defense of India Act. 140 
The Bombay government confidentially admitted that the dividing line between 
`sedition' and `severe criticism' was `practically illusory,. 141 In practice, however, its 
propensity to treat protest `as a form of crime'142 provided more evidence of its 
limited conception of political citizenship. The continued absence of a concept of 
oppositional rights expresses the political traditionalism of a repressive local state 
confronted by a rapidly evolving urban civil society. In this context, freedom of the 
135GOI Home Political Proceedings 1922; Indian Social Reformer, 24 July 1921; 
BNNR, no. 30,1922; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1923, p. 238. 
13613arrier, Banned.., p. 54. 
137BC, 19 and 22 Sept. 1921. 
138Jam-e-Jamshed, 22 July 1921; BNNR, no. 30,1921. 
139New Times, 16 Oct. 1923; BNNR no. 42,1923. 
140Indeed, Secretary of State Montagu himself stated in the House of Commons that 
`so long as the Government of Bombay thinks it necessary to enforce the Order of 
Exclusion', he would support it. GUI Home Po1. B Proceedings, March 1920,80. 
Three years later, the departing Lloyd cabled the India Office reaffirming his view 
`.. that Horniman, if he were to return at present to Bombay, would immediately 
become a rallying point for agitation and that he should not, for that reason, be 
permitted to do so.. ' Lloyd to Secretary of State, 25 Sept. 1923.1O, Public and Judicial 
Dept. Files : LIP&J/12. 
141 Sec. GOB Judicial Dept. to Sec. GOI Home Pol. 25 Aug. 1920. GOB Confidential 
Proceedings 1920, pp. 385-86. 
142The Indian Social Reformer, 14 April 1923; BNNR no. 15,1923. 
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press was feared precisely because it represented a fundamentally enabling civil right 
with crucial powers to define and assert new political and social claims. Moreover, the 
varied transmission routes from the written to the oral meant that bureaucratic control 
over printed forms at source remained the favoured means of preventing "subversive" 
messages from reaching the lower classes. 
Indeed, the colonial authorities were increasingly articulating the new `danger' 
emanating from urban social aspirations. In May 1920, Lloyd confessed to the Viceroy 
that his haste in wanting to get his industrial housing scheme off the ground was to pre- 
empt `.. danger not only (from) among the ranks of labour but (from) among other 
classes whose humanitarian instincts have been aroused'. 143 Bombay, the Viceroy in 
turn reported to the Secretary of State in November, constituted `the chief danger-point' 
of social unrest in India and was currently experiencing `a sort of epidemic strike 
fever'. While this was caused primarily by local economic factors--high prices, low 
wages, poor housing conditions, `certain newspapers.. notably the Chronicle', together 
with `political agitators' were openly encouraging strikes and giving workers ideas `.. by 
the frequent reports of labour trouble in England and Europe'. 144 
Once again, the combination of journalistic and political campaigning, with its 
potent blend of textual and oral messages, was perceived as particularly threatening: 
The organisation of labour in the city, the CID warned, was proceeding along the most 
`unhealthy lines' as a result of the influence of Western-educated `intellectuals' within 
its ranks. It fingered, amongst others, the recently appointed assistant-editor of the 
Chronicle, Chaman Lal, whose labour activities were even more than usually 
dangerous as he was `the most active of the representatives in India of the (socialist) 
Workers' Welfare League of London'. 145 
In this new context, it was soon clear that the local colonial state's traditional policy 
of social non-intervention in conflicts between industrial capital and labour, which 
143 GOB Development Proceedings 1920, p. 73. 
144G01 Home Pol. B Proceedings, Nov. 1920,281. 
145DC1 Reports, July 1920 and May 1921. 
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allowed full rein to the dominance of capital, was going to be severely tested. It was 
initially compelled to intervene by the sheer street pressure of the January 1919 general 
textile strike when over one hundred thousand mill hands downed tools in pursuit of a 
thirty-five percent wage increase which included a month's bonus as well as strike pay. 
As we have seen, it quickly became obvious that the Bombay millowners had lost 
control and that there were `no prospects of early settlement'. The strike was 
accompanied by riots and the looting of shops in the north of the city, and its southward 
spread to the Government Dockyard in the Fort aroused real fear in the government of 
a `general dislocation and paralysis of life in the city'. 146 
For the first time, a Bombay governor agreed to receive a delegation of mill hands 
at Bombay Castle. Acknowledging the harshness of the economic climate, Lloyd 
assured the delegates that he would use his `best influence' with their employers to 
ensure that `justice is done to you', urging in the meantime a prompt return to work and 
the restoration of social peace. 147 
The Governor summoned the city's leading millowners and made it clear that the 
immediate grant of a twenty percent increase in the war allowance was imperative. 
Industrialists had little option but to agree, and they also committed themselves to 
Ewchj Percent in. create Sit W trallowance as well as a. increasing the January wage through a bonus of between Rs. 10-20 per worker, thereby n 
bringing the strike to an end. 148 Significantly, however, Lloyd did not raise the more 
fundamental issue of a permanent rise in basic pay: resolution of the conflict was 
secured not through pressure on millowners to devise a new framework for wage 
entitlements, but as the result of a one-off paternalistic intervention. The focus remained 
on the temporary expedients of both the `war allowance' and `bonus' payments which 
were still dependent on employers' "goodwill". He also encouraged the millowners to 
146GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, pp. 32-33. The heightened colonial fear, 
evident during this era, of losing political control over the city as a result of the sheer 
numbers that mill workers' mass action might involve, was first voiced by the Bombay 
Police Commissioner following the strikes that accompanied Tilak's trial and 
conviction in 1908. Chandavarkar, Imperial Power.., pp. 153-54. 
147GOB Confidential.. , p. 24. 148GOB Confidential Proceedings 1919, pp. 21-25. 
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stand firm against conceding any strike pay so as not to confer legitimacy to strike 
action as a means of pressing industrial wage claims. 149 
The continuing spiralling of the cost of living, however, ensured that strikes were 
now here to stay particularly as neither employers nor the local colonial state were at all 
keen to confront the issue of a basic living wage. The barrister Kaka Baptista, one of the 
leading labour organisers in the city during the early 1920s, asserted that it was indeed 
the insecurity associated with the `temporary character' of allowances that constituted 
one of the root causes of the industrial unrest. 150 Another textile workers' strike in 
January 1920 saw an escalation in demands, this time for a reduction in working hours 
from twelve to nine, and for the regular payment of wages on the fifteenth of each 
month. 151 
Between 1921 and 1924, there were 406 industrial stoppages in Bombay city 
compared to just 48 in 1914-17; 152 From 1920 onwards, the escalation of strikes in 
the city was accompanied by the growth of trade unions. Labour activists organised a 
series of meetings in working-class neighbourhoods to explain the aims of trade 
unionism; the presence at these gatherings of women workers relating `pitiful stories of 
poverty' was noted by the press. Indeed, following a meeting in lower Parel, a Union 
of Women Workers was formed for the first time in India in January 1922.153 
Though small in membership and often leading a temporary existence, labour unions 
were rapidly springing up all over the city and beyond. Between 1918 and 1924, no less 
than fifteen unions of postal workers sprang into existence in the Presidency. 154 By 
1922, the number of unions in Bombay had increased from a handful to forty-eight 
with an approximate membership of eighty thousand. 155 
149ibid., pp. 24-25. 
150-Mill Wages. " Letter from J. Baptista to BC, 27 Sept. 1921. 
151 GOB Confidential Proceedings 1924, p. 23. 
152Burnett-Hurst, Labour and Housing in Bombay.., p. 146. 
153BC, 28 Jan. 1922. 
154BC, 21 Oct. 1921; RCLI, vol. 1, p. 106. 
155ibid., p. 102. 
247 
Particularly militant during this period were tramway workers employed by the 
BEST Company. Between November 1919 and February 1920, workers employed at 
the Company's Dadar Workshops called twenty-five lightning strikes in support of a 
higher pay claim which eventually resulted in the award of a monthly wage increase of 
Rs. 6-4 annas. 156 The strikes also resulted in the formation of a Tramwaymen's Union 
in January 1921, set up to protect and improve members' standard of living, with a 
membership of one thousand five hundred or about `eighty percent of employees'. 157 
When the Company refused to recognise the union, unless its officials were 
`restricted to tramway employees', the workers threatened a general strike. 158 After 
prolonged and fruitless negotiations, a strike was called in 1922. By this time, demands 
had escalated to include a radical restructuring of pay scales as well as `the provision of 
shelters with kiosks, water-pipes, and water-closets for the conveniance of employees' 
at all the main tram terminii. 159 The strike ended when managers promised that `the 
Company would pay wages equivalent to those paid by the GIP Railway for similar 
classes of work', though union recognition was still withheld. 160 
This deteriorating social climate compelled Governor Lloyd, once again, to receive a 
deputation of the newly formed, Bombay-based All-India Trades Union Congess in 
October 1920. The delegates appealed to Lloyd to reverse the local colonial state's 
traditional support for capitalist interests and to recognise the legitimacy of strikes. They 
pointed out that in a city where the vast majority of workers were `.. notoriously ill-paid, 
ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clothed, and ill-educated', strike action should be recognised as `a 
legitimate method of collective bargaining.. a "particular method of doing business" and 
not a declaration of war or a trial of strength. "161 
156GOB Judicial Proceedings Jan: April 1920, p. 378. 
157ibid. 
158BC, 19 Feb. 1921 and 17 July 1922. 
159BC, 9 Aug. and 19 Sept. 1922. 
160RCLI, pp. 538-541. 
161FR (1) Nov. 1920. 
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Lloyd rejected their attribution of `capitalistic sympathies to Government', (`an 
attribution of partiality which I cannot entertain without promptly disavowing it') 
stating that he regarded the organisation of labour `on sound economic lines' as being 
in the interests of labour, the government, and the city in general. 162 The Governor's 
candid profession of impartiality might have been taken more seriously had the local 
state not shown such a ferocious anti-labour bias in dealing with the strikes of 1920. It 
deployed three battalions of regular troops to intimidate striking workers while 
providing employers, during the Petroleum workers' strike in Sewri, with military 
drivers to convey the fuel lorries to the mills. 163 
This prompted a sharp rebuke from the Government of India which defined the use 
of the military as a `wide departure' from the principle of police responsibility for 
dealing with industrial conflicts. The Lloyd Administration had `lost sight' of the 
`principles which should govern the relative responsibilities of the police and the 
military' during civil disturbances. Delhi also sought to remind the Bombay 
government that times had changed and `.. that among the British soldiers of today there 
are many to whom military interference in trade disputes between employer and 
employed is particularly repugnant'. 164 
Lloyd's reluctance to deploy the police was probably motivated by the signs of 
restlessness which had become apparent even within the ranks of the city's relatively 
privileged police force. In early 1920, a protest by constables at the perceived delay in 
the revision of their pay led to a `small demonstration at CP Vincent's farewell parade' 
as well as `regular morning and evening meetings at Charni Road Gardens in 
contravention of police standing orders'. The Commissioner of Police reported to the 
Bombay government that drastic action against the men would `in all probability' have 
162ibid. 
163 GOB Confidential Proceedings 1922, p. 3; GOB Judicial and Home Proceedings 
Jan. -May 1922, p. 323. 164Sec. GOI Army Dept. to Chief Sec. GOB, 21 Dec. 1921. GOB Confidential 
Proceedings 1922, pp. 3-4. 
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been met `by a general strike of the constabulary'. 165 This greatly alarmed the colonial 
state and led to a tighter regulation of the police through the passing of the Police 
Disaffection Act of 1922, aimed at securing its ranks from "subversion". 166 
The spread of discontent to the police force is an indication of the near-universality 
of the urban social unrest during this era. Strikes could no longer, as in pre-war days, 
be spatially confined to individual establishments, departments, or even industries. 167 
No longer were they essentially an issue for the private sector, enabling the local 
colonial state to maintain an appearance of disinterested impartiality. In the early 1920s, 
government-run institutions were rocked by an unprecedented wave of disputes which 
effectively exposed the glaring contradiction between the local state's public service 
self-image and its real private interests. 
Local state institutions and associated quangos had been expanding since the war 
years, the official policy of `retrenchment' notwithstanding. A major employer in the 
city, the Bombay government maintained enormous wage differentials between a 
higher level of select colonial executives and a lower mass level of poorly paid Indian 
employees. These conditions prevailed within the civil administration as well as in the 
postal, press telegraph, and police departments, and the Dockyard, Mint, and Port Trust 
establishments. A `Secretary to Government', in the various departments, earned about 
Rs. 3000 per month, 168 the `Oriental Translator' took home Rs. 1200, while 
government printers were paid a mere Rs. 50; 169 in the police service, the top 
commissioner grades drew a monthly salary of around Rs. 3000 while jamadars and 
constables at the bottom earned between Rs. 30-80.170 
Although the local colonial state hastily attempted to revise the wages of its low 
paid workers in an attempt to forestall industrial action in early 1920, this often merely 
165 GOB Judicial Proceedings Sept. -Dec. 1920, pp. 1589-91. 166BC, 21 Oct. 1922. 
167Chandavarkar, The origins of industrial capitalism.., p. 5. 
168BC, 14 Nov. 1921. 
169GOB Home & Judicial Proceedings Jan. -June 1923, p. 203. 170GOB Judicial Proceedings May-August 1919, p. 1041; Jan-June 1921, pp. 385- 
390. 
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had the opposite effect: in July, printers in government presses went on strike following 
an announcement of improved pay rates which they clearly regarded as 
unsatisfactory. 171 Similarly, improved offers had to be made to the 4,175 dockers 
employed at the Royal Indian Marine Dockyard as well as the 3,500 Port Trust menials 
and halalkores before they resumed work. 172 
Indeed, a major strike in virtually any industrial concern or large public 
establishment was now likely to have far-reaching effects. The textile mill strike of 
January 1919 quickly spread to the railway workshops, Mint, dockyard, and 
engineering works; when the mill workers struck again a year later, they were once 
more followed by railway, tramway, dock, engineering, and oil workers, as well as by 
municipal employees and even by tailors and cutters. 173 The strike by postmen and 
postal packers in September 1920 also drew telegraph peons into industrial action; they 
were soon joined by tramway and gas workers thus effectively paralysing the city's 
communications and public lighting systems. 174 
The postmen's grievance was not only the low monthly wage of Rs. 34-40 which 
the vast majority of them drew; 175 a government-appointed Retrenchment Committee 
had now recommended that their wages be brought down by ten percent, to the level of 
their fellow-workers in Calcutta and Madras. Union leaders pointed out that no account 
had been taken of the uniquely high cost of living in Bombay and contrasted the Postal 
Department's profitability and status as `the biggest revenue-earning department of 
government' with its treatment of its own employees who had been turned into the 
`pariahs of government service'. 176 Moreover, they compared the wage structure in 
the postal service in India with the situation prevailing in Britain and found that the 
lowest grade of postmen in England drew a minimum monthly pay of Rs. 304, or 
171 GOI Home PoLB Proceedings Nov. 1920,281. 
172GOB Judicial Proceedings Jan. -April 1920, p. 377; GOI Home PUB Proceedings April 1920,189. 
173Burnett-Hurst, Labour and Housing.., pp. 146-47. 174BC, 9 Oct. 1920. 
175BC, 8 Oct. 1923. 
176BC, 3 Aug. 1921. 
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almost ten times the starting salary of a Bombay postman. In contrast, higher grades 
were paid less than in India. 177 
For the first time, too, a sympathy strike was called by taxi-drivers in support of the 
postmen. This was warmly appreciated by Postal Union leader N. R Kulkarni who 
described it as a `pioneer strike', different to other labour disputes `since it demands not 
higher wages but justice.. '»$ The long-drawn out postal strike, which lasted for the 
best part of a year, was said to have cost the government `.. a sum that would have 
sufficed to meet the full demand of the men for ten years.. '179 The Bombay 
Presidency Postmen's Union also became one of the first unions to put out a monthly 
bulletin, The Postman, in Marathi and English, whose initial circulation was estimated 
at around a thousand. 180 
In these circumstances, the Bombay government had a vested interest in 
endeavouring to restrain wage increases in the private sector, for fear of their impact on 
its own workforce. Thus, while it periodically indulged in an "anti-millowner" 
discourse, in practice the local colonial state stood behind management's attempts to 
maintain the traditional low-wage structure of the cotton-textile industry regardless of 
workers' higher living costs and evolving patterns of consumption. In so doing, it 
revealed itself as an integral part of the dominant class forces hostile to demands for 
social and participatory entitlements: living wages, and the rights to strike and to belong 
to labour unions. 
With wage levels determined purely by market conditions, pay increases in the 
textile industry tended to be conceded by millowners only under the severest pressure 
from workers, and then too as exceptional and temporary measures, liable to be 
overturned at the earliest opportunity. In turn, largely as a result of the escalating 
177Report on the First Bombay Provincial Postmen's Conference, October 1923; BC, 
8 Oct. 1923. 
178BC, 2 Feb. 1921. 
179BC, 18 June 1921. 
180Annual Report on Indian and Anglo-Vernacular Papers published in the Bombay 
Presidency for the year 1922; GOB Confidential Proceedings 1923, p. 344. 
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inflation caused by the war, workers no longer regarded wage settlements as final, but 
as inextricably linked to both the spiralling cost of living and to the movement of wages 
in other industries. 
In 1923, millowners found an opportunity of reversing the trend of pay concessions 
to their workers. Wage increases through bonus payments agreed upon during the 1919 
strike continued in subsequent years, but in 1923 millowners invoked a fall in profits 
and stopped the bonus. This was now regarded as a customary wage entitlement and 
once again, a general strike in the textile industry broke out in January 1924. Labour 
activists led by Baptista set up a Strike Settlement Committee, but the millowners 
persuaded the Bombay government to set up a Committee of Inquiry into the dispute. 
Legally, the employers were on favourable grounds, having taken great care to 
establish, with the support of the colonial state, that the bonus was not part of the 
normal wage packet, but dependent on `profits and goodwill'. 181 
The Committee of Inquiry was headed by Sir Norman MacLeod, Chief Justice at 
the Bombay High Court, and included the millowner Devdas Thackersey and the 
Director of the Labour Bureau, W. J Herridge, but no representative of the mill hands 
or member of a labour union. Significantly, the Committee's terms of reference 
excluded any consideration of workers' living costs. Its predictable conclusion, based 
primarily on figures presented by the Millowners Association, was that the workers 
had `not established an enforceable claim to a bonus,. 182 
The Committee failed to even investigate the claim that the bonus amounts had each 
year been deducted from the mills' gross profits as wages paid, which would, if 
proven, have legally undermined the millowners' central contention that the bonus was 
outside the sphere of the normal wage. 183 When, just over a year later, in August 
1925, one hundred thousand mill hands once again downed tools and took to the streets 
in protest against a proposed eleven and a half percent wage cut, the Bombay 
181 ibid., 1924, pp. 23-27. 
182ibid. 
183BC, 4 March 1924. 
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government refused to intervene, asserting that it was `powerless' to order an 
inquiry. 184 
The industrial unrest in Bombay was, however, being viewed with increasing alarm 
by the Government of India. The colonial state was indeed under pressure from the 
Secretary of State in London: membership of the League of Nations now made the 
protection of workers' rights of association and trade union membership obligatory on 
the British government under Article 427 of the Peace Treaty. 185 Delhi appeared 
perturbed that the Bombay government seemed too much of a participant in the city's 
social conflicts and not to be doing enough to either win over public opinion or educate 
employers `with regard to the advantages of fair treatment of labour'. 186 Accordingly, 
the provincial government was compelled to set up a Labour Bureau in 1921. Its 
objective was to collect statistics that would `.. measure the changes in the cost of living 
of industrial workers in Bombay city' by closely monitoring house rents as well as 
prices in shops patronized by workers. 187 
The colonial state was particularly concerned by the novel impact of labour strikes 
on public opinion and was concurrently seeking to introduce legislative measures for 
the arbitration of industrial disputes. It pointed out that the increase in industrial unrest 
had `led to the stimulation of public interest in labour questions'. This had come about 
largely as a result of the press's increased coverage of strikes which had `been followed 
by a steady increase in the influence exerted by public opinion on the course of those 
disputes'. 188 The function of the Labour Bureau would be to provide "objective" facts 
184BC, 27 Nov. 1925. The textile workers also usually bore the costs of any dispute 
between the colonial state and the millowners. The latter, in this instance, attempted to 
justify the proposed cut by arguing that the excise duty imposed by the state on textile 
goods had increased their costs by eleven and a half percent. The wage cut was 
withdrawn when the GOI abolished the excise duty following a three month general 
strike by the workers. Chandavarkar, The origins of industrial capitalism.., p. 419. 185GOB Judicial Proceedings Jan. -May 1922, p. 314. 186G01 Home Pol. B Proceedings Nov. 1920,281. 
187GOB Judicial Proceedings Jan. -June 1921, p. 715. 188Secretary, GOI (Industry/Labour) to all Local Governments, 30 Aug. 1924. GOB 
Home and Judicial Proceedings Jan. -June 1925, p. 161. 
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and figures on the evolution of urban wages and costs of living which would provide a 
`reliable' basis for public opinion judgements during industrial disputes. 1 89 
The GOI's concern was based on the fact that throughout the strikes of the early 
1920s, the most influential nationalist papers provided a coherent and critical 
interpretation of events, including their implications for both employers and the state. 
They warned employers that as a result of the upheavals of war, workers had come to 
realise their own power and it was now very much in capital's own interest to devise 
measures to improve the condition of labour. The press also called on the colonial state 
to enact legislation that would recognise basic social rights: a fair living wage, decent 
housing, and a reduction in working hours. 190 
Moreover, workers' appropriation of public space during the frequent wave of 
strikes in this era enabled them to have a more direct impact on public opinion. These 
strikes were evolving their own public rituals which manifested the new impulses of 
active citizenship--workers wanted something changed in their lives and they were 
prepared to take their protests to the public, often in an eye-catching manner. The social 
geography of strike processions involved marching from the industrial localities around 
Parel in the north (the mill, railway workshops, and tram depot district) through the 
Indian town to Agents' offices in the Fort, before culminating in mass meetings on the 
Esplanade maidan in the south. 
Moving from working-class to middle-class and affluent neighbourhoods in their 
journey from the north to the south, workers could appeal, both orally and through the 
wording of their banners, to the `humanitarian instincts' of gathered crowds. The 
spiralling of the cost of living for all citizens from the war years onwards meant that 
they could generally count on a sympathetic response even in the more affluent 
southern parts of the city. During the strike of tramway workers in 1922, for instance, 
strikers marched from Parel to Colaba with banners in Marathi and English 
189Secretary, GOI (Industry) to all Local Governments, May 1921. GOB Judicial 
Proceedings Jan. -June 1921, p. 726. 190GOB Confidential Proceedings 1920, p. 218. 
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proclaiming `Down with the Tramway Bosses', `United we stand Divided we fall', 
`We want Justice nothing more nothing less'. 191 These slogans were skilfully 
calculated to appeal to public opinion which already regarded the British-owned BEST 
Company (the `Tramway Bosses') as the most objectionable private utility in the city. 
This increasing prominence of labour issues in the public sphere both reflected and 
contributed to the growth of information on working-class conditions in Bombay, and 
on labour movements elsewhere. This in turn was part of an `increasing public desire 
for information' that was aimed at rendering the workings of government more 
transparent and accountable. 192 The press was of course pre-eminent in this process, 
not only through its reporting of strikes and other labour activities, and of their wider 
implications, but also by publicizing the work of official agencies such as the Labour 
Bureau and of welfare groups like the Social Service League. 193 
The claims of labour were now not only championed by the Chronicle but by the 
bilingual (English-Gujarati) Hindusthan, 194 while the new Marathi weekly Lokashahi 
was specifically devoted to articulating the interests of the labour movement. 195 
Moreover, journalists from these papers such as Chaman Lal and Venkat Ram doubled 
up as labour activists, issuing workers with a stream of leaflets, while Dange and his 
fellow socialist students combined propaganda work in the neighbourhoods of 
Girangaon with the organising of study-groups and the launch of new periodicals such 
191BC, 19 Sept. 1922. 
192Kaiser-i-Hind, 13 Aug. 1921. BNNR no. 32,192 1. 
193This did not, of course, preclude criticism. The Chronicle's labour activist Chaman 
Lal questioned the Bureau's method of compiling the statistics, which, he asserted, 
were based on `all-India average units' rather than on items actually consumed by 
Bombay workers. As a result, the Labour Bureau failed to convey a true picture of the 
real increase in workers' costs of living. The paper similarly criticized the Social 
Service League for failing to intervene in the daily `wrongs inflicted on workers', for 
being too reliant on funds from industrialists, and for not being active enough in 
promoting the growth of trade unions. BC, 26 Oct. 1921 and 29 Aug. 1924. 
194Described by the Bombay government's "Oriental Translator" as `promoting the 
dissemination of European socialistic literature'. Annual Report on Indian and Anglo- 
Vernacular Papers published in the Bombay Presidency for the year 1922; GOB 
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as the English-weekly Socialist. In the latter, Congress was denounced as `.. an 
organization of merchants and manufacturers' which only perceived trade unions as `.. a 
useful weapon to realise swaraj in terms of the bourgeoisie'. 196 Many unions 
themselves now began to shadow the Labour Bureau by collecting their own statistics 
and information that would enable them to `form a correct idea of the condition of 
workers', indispensable to both promoting and protecting their rights. 197 
Labour activists were thus able to draw on the growing availability of information 
on prices, wages, working conditions, and international movements, and invite workers 
to compare themselves to other workers in other industries; socialists were able to 
reinforce resentments and raise the level of class-consciousness by pointing to the 
disparities between profits and high salaries on the one hand, and wages on the other. 
These exchanges were conducted in the public space of the working-class 
neighbourhood: on street corners, and in tea-rooms and advocates' offices. 198 Here 
newspapers and pamphlets were read out, industrial action planned, and the wording of 
leaflets and strike banners discussed. 
The colonial state was thus faced with some new, and unheralded, threats to its 
hegemony. The explosion of industrial militancy, particularly in the public services 
directly run by government, served to highlight the unequal and unfair nature of the 
colonial wage structure; mediated by the press, it also reinforced nationalist public 
opinion by exposing another area of colonial malpractice; finally, labour militancy 
might also reach out towards the welcoming arms of the new communist ideology 
which both London and Delhi viewed as a real threat to the foundations of Empire. 
Faced with this situation, the colonial state, already under pressure from London, 
resolved upon legislative intervention. The Factory Act of 1922 established a ten-hour 
working day and a maximum sixty-hour week in the textile industry. 199 Two years 
19610, Public and Judicial Dept. Files: L/P&J/12/1923/Chaman Lal; Kooiman, 
Bombay Communists.., p. 1229. 
197Burnett-Hurst, p. 104. 198Chandavarkar, Imperial Power.., p. 104. 199RCL1, vol. 1, p. 59. 
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later, the Indian Workmen's Compensation Act made employers liable for industrial 
accidents and injuries suffered by their workers. 200 At the same time, the GOI 
proposed the introduction of legislation for the registration, and hence legalization, of 
trade unions. 
Workers' combinations `outside the civil law of the country', the GOI stated, was 
conducive neither to the long-term interests of the workers, nor to good industrial 
relations and national prosperity. The legalization of trade unions would encourage `the 
steady betterment of the condition of labour by efforts from within'. Registration would 
enable workers to exercise control over the union's officers and funds while confering 
upon it `a recognized status and position in the eyes of industrialists and the public'. 201 
The COI's consultative document was not well received in industrial and official 
circles in Bombay city which was, after all, a bastion of old-fashioned free enterprise 
culture. Particularly after the strikes of 1919-20, employers, with the active connivance 
of the local colonial state, made vigorous attempts to repress the formation of trade 
unions at the workplace and generally refused to recognise those that came into 
existence. 202 Workers who joined and participated in the new organisations soon 
found themselves blacklisted and victimized. The BEST Company steadfastly denied 
recognition to the Tramway Union and subsequently dismissed most of the workers-- 
about 1300--who had participated in the 1922 strike. 203 Similarly, the BB & Cl 
Railway Company proscribed its Employees' Association whose members were the 
first to be dismissed during the "retrenchment" of 1923 204 
Moreover, the perceived collective threat of trade unions led employers to set up a 
combination of their own. The Bombay Engineering Employers' Federation was 
200BC, 1 July 1924. 
201 Sec. GOI Home Dept. to all provincial governments, 12 Sept. 1921; GOB Home 
and Judicial Proceedings Jan. -May 1922, pp. 253-54. 202Baptista, who was heavily involved in negotiations with employers on behalf of 
workers, observed that the vast majority of them were hostile to unions. BC, 18 June 
1921. 
203Burnett-Hurst, Labour and Housing.., pp. 103-104. 
204 Voice of India, 8 Nov. 1923; BNNR no. 45,1923. 
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established in 1921 `to combat the growing industrial unrest in Bombay during the 
immediate post-war years'. Its membership, limited to European personnel, 
significantly included representatives not only of large private companies--BEST, the 
Bombay Gas Company, the Standard and Burma Oil Companies--but of state run 
utilities: the Government Dockyard, the Telegraphs, and the GIP, BB & CI, and Port 
Trust Railways. 205 The Federation thus constituted the reactionary organisational form 
of Anglo-Indian capitalism's resistance to labour modernism in the city, enabling 
employers and the local colonial state to exchange intelligence about workers and 
unions, to plan and co-ordinate their responses to strikes, and to anticipate and subvert 
industrial action before it threatened their interests. 
Opposition from capitalist interests in the city to the proposed new legislation took 
the familiar discursive form of emphasizing Indian "difference". The `problem' of the 
industrial working-class, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce asserted, could not be 
solved `by merely copying the latest legislation from England'. Indian workers, with 
their essentially `agrarian and migratory nature' had little in common with their English 
counterparts. The Millowners Association also strongly opposed the legislation which it 
viewed as `premature'. 
The Agent of the BB&CI Railway Company added that the growth of trade unions 
in England had resulted `in each individual (worker) producing less than he could have 
done if he had not been bound by trade union laws'. The impact of such laws in India 
where `for climatic and other reasons-the manual labouring class is not by nature a 
hard and steady worker' would be doubly disastrous. Colonial officials such as the 
Collector of Bombay and the Commissioner of Police were even more fervently anti- 
union, the former describing labour leaders as `unscrupulous rogues', and the latter 
observing that it was legislation to protect workers `from the machinations of 
professional agitators' that was in fact necessary. 
205Burnett-Hurst, Labour and Housing.., p. 102. 
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In contrast, the KamgarHitwardhakSabha, the Social Service League, and the All. 
India Trade Union Congress welcomed the proposed legislation, the latter stating that it 
considered the GOI Declaration as signifying `not merely protection but also promotion 
of trade unions'. This was particularly necessary, it pointed out, in the light of the 
pervasive anti-union dispositions of the city's large employers-the millowners and the 
railway and tramway companies. It also urged the colonial state to include the right of 
picketing. Peaceful picketing was an essential dimension of the right of association, 
enabling trade unions to effectively defend the interests of their members. 
Moreover, unions should also be given the right to use their funds `for any purpose 
whatsoever' including `the advancement of political propaganda if it can further the 
workmen's interest'. The Social Service League also underlined that labour issues 
necessarily involved a political dimension: `.. Politics cannot be altogether excluded 
from the labour movement as labour has to win rights and secure ameliorative 
measures through politics, and therefore it is necessary to recognise political activities 
confined to labour interests as among the legitimate objects of trade unions. ' 
The Bombay government, while not openly coming out against the proposed 
legislation, generally echoed the objections put forward by powerful class coalitions 
such as the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Engineering Employers 
Federation and reminded the GOI about the `fundamental differences' between India 
and England. Although, by 1925, the local colonial state had come to accept that 
legislation was inevitable, it insisted that the new `privilege' of trade union recognition 
by the State should not encompass any political entitlement. `The obvious danger to be 
avoided', it warned the GOI, was that union funds `which might easily reach a 
considerable figure' could be diverted to politically revolutionary purposes. `.. The 
danger is so real that it justifies a curtailment of the powers of Trade Unions which 
would be otherwise unjustifiable. ' 206 
206GOB Home and Judicial Proceedings Jan. -May 1922, pp. 279-340; also Jan. -June 
1925, pp. 105-136. 
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To official chagrin in Bombay city, the Trades Union Act of 1926 authorized 
peaceful picketing and conferred immunity on trade unions and their members from 
civil suits and criminal prosecutions. Since, under existing laws, union leaders could be, 
and indeed often were, prosecuted for exhorting workers to break their contractual 
agreements and go on strike, the new legal framework represented a decisive move 
from contract to status-the replacement of contractual free bargaining by a statutory 
declaration of rights. At the same time, however, unions had to give advance notice of 
strike action thus allowing both the state and employers ample time to counteract their 
plans. Within two years of the passing of the Trades Union Act, total union 
membership in the city had more than doubled, from around 87,500 to just under 
200,000.207 
Recognition of an albeit carefully circumscribed sphere of trade union activity 
within the workplace represented a social right extracted from a colonial state now 
subject to pressures on multiple fronts. 
However, in the urban-industrial world of 1920s Bombay, thi_s_. was. largely 
art, 
, exceptional and 
defensive measure-. Zt=' wo-; s not accompanied by a burst of 
legislation indicative of a transformed perception by the state of any new social 
obligations, even though, by 1925, labour activists such as the barrister F. J Ginwalla, 
General Secretary of the All-India Trade Union Congress, was urging the Government 
of India to take a more comprehensive view of social rights, and accompany the Trade 
Union Bill with `.. legislation on minimum wages, hours of labour, and leave 
rules.. '209 
There were now also calls for the introduction of unemployment benefit and old age 
pension schemes 210 Although the Government of India signed the draft Convention 
207RCLI, p. 104. 
209ibid., p. 194. 
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on Unemployment at the International Labour Conference held in Washington in 1919, 
it failed to give it any real effect, merely inviting provincial governments to 
communicate their views on the Convention's recommendations. 
Here, the GOI received a vexed and impatient response from the die-hard Bombay 
government couched yet again in the discourse of Indian "difference": 
The Government of Bombay realize that the Government of India attach the greatest 
importance to the necessity of ensuring that industrial organization in India should 
proceed on sound lines, but they have grave doubts whether this can be achieved by 
introducing legislation on all the most important industrial questions on Western 
lines without giving ample time to the local governments to formulate considered 
opinions and to decide whether the action that is proposed will be in every way suitable 
to Indian conditions. 211 
`Ample time'? A curious objection in the light of the following exchanges, some 
years later, between the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, J. H 
Whitley, and the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, R. W Ewbank: 
Whitley: `You say: "As regards the application of the International Conventions 
relating to unemployment, in the short time at their disposal, the Government of 
Bombay are not in a position to formulate any conclusions". When was the matter of 
unemployment first brought to the notice of the GOB? Was it not in 1919? 
Ewbank: I cannot say. 
Whitley: The Washington Convention regarding the question of labour exchanges was 
in the year 1919. Was the GOB circularized, as other local governments were, in regard 
to this matter? 
Ewbank: No doubt it was. 
Whitley- Then you have had 10 solid years from 1919 to 1929, and yet you complain 
about the shortness of time. 
211 RCL1, vol. 1, p. 146. 
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Ewbank: The Government would have naturally considered whether employment 
exchanges were necessary. Certainly during the periods of 1919,1921,1922, it was 
obvious that there was no necessity for employment exchanges. 
Whitley: But after that you had 7 solid years to consider this problem. Has any attempt 
been made by the Bombay Government to deal with the problem since the boom 
period came to an end? 
Ewbank: Government has never been satisfied that there is a problem. 
Whitley: Your position is that the Government is not satisfied that there is a problem 
because it never made an enquiry into the matter? 
Ewbank: We have made no statistical enquiry. 
itle : Therefore you are not in a position to say whether there is a problem or not? 
Ewbank: I do not think that follows at all. '212 
A somewhat more honest appraisal of the local colonial state's steadfast reluctance 
to engage with any proposed measure of social legislation can be found in the Bombay 
government's response to another GOI request: this time in relation to the draft 
Convention on compulsory sickness insurance schemes adopted by the International 
Labour Conference held in Geneva in 1927. It felt `.. constrained to point out that the 
extra expenditure which will inevitably be occasioned by any legislation which involves 
the starting of sickness insurance schemes will fall entirely on local Governments. '213 
Moreover, the potential role of unions as a democratizing force in urban society was 
seriously undermined when the Bombay government accorded them official 
representation as an `interest group' within the far from representative Municipal 
Corporation in 1928.214 Thus, while franchise restrictions continued to deny workers 
the right to choose political representatives, and unions. could not engage in `political' 
activities, registered trade union leaders were granted a fast track access to political 
influence within an unchanged authoritarian structure of local government. This 
212ibid., p. 196. 
213ibid., p. 147. 
214Jhangiani (ed. ), Bombay Municipal Corporation.., p. 20. 
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represented a classic example of colonial cooption: separated from the rank-and-file 
membership, the four nominated trade unionists were now subject to the rules of 
colonial patronage; they were encouraged to see themselves as "natural" (as opposed to 
democratically elected) leaders of another "section" of urban society, chosen to 
collaborate with the colonial regime. 
More fundamentally, the local state's authoritarianism and general unwillingness to 
support the validation of expanded citizenship rights, was a function of its own class 
location in urban society. Traditionally, it had used its unique resources of power, 
wealth, and prestige to structure the dominance of capital over civil society. Integral to 
this hegemony was a system of unscrutinized accomodations between the colonial 
regime and the dominant class factions, largely at the expense of the majority of urban 
citizens. This process had shaped a characteristically archaic and regressive capitalism, 
hostile to the development of civic rights, and thus posing a formidable obstacle to 
sustainable urban renewal. In this era, however, the escalating demands for a range of 
democratizing rights began to pose challenges that could not ultimately be resolved 
within the limitations of the colonial model of citizenship. 
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Conclusion: Urban themes 
This is primarily a thesis on urban history, a rather neglected dimension of the 
study of Indian history. It is also a social history of the colonial city. The spatial 
framework of the urban has enabled the exploration of a range of related social 
processes within the functioning totality that is Bombay city during this era. The study 
has been organised around a number of recurrent themes related to the major 
preoccupation with the impact of modernity. 
Modernity, I have suggested, was the inescapable destiny of the city of Bombay, 
potentially offering a diverse range of possibilities and experiences. In practice 
however, the material culture of modernity in Bombay was largely determined by the 
social filters of colonial political power and indigeneous class dominance. This thesis 
has attempted to draw out the dialectical interplay between the repressive modernism of 
colonial power and its contesting antitheses: the invented anti-urban traditionalism of 
the Gandhian movement and the emergence of a critical modernism articulated around 
immediate demands for expanded citizenship rights. In contrast to Gandhi's attempts at 
rejecting the materialities of the urban, this critical modernism acted as a force to 
humanise the city. It strove to expand rights of public expression, of democratic 
participation, of collective bargaining, and imagined a new city. It used words to 
dislocate and disrupt the familiar meanings of the colonial order, it promoted ideologies 
and organisations to counter and contest the individualism of colonial capitalism; and it 
gave rise to a host of appropriations of "colonial" resources and commodities. 
The dynamics of the contested colonial hegemony have also been investigated. The 
identification of the colonial mode of production of the city's spatial structure has been 
of fundamental importance. It has demonstrated how the power to command and 
produce urban space is of primary significance in understanding the overall 
development of the city. The production of space with the new possibilities of modern 
technologies for the purposes of colonial prestige on the one hand, and of unregulated 
commercial and industrial capital accumulation on the other, led to a number of 
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cumulative anti-social consequences: the creation of a hierarchy of stratified social 
spaces; the growth of commercial and industrial structures at the expense of residential 
accomodation; and the construction of extremely poor quality housing for the city's 
labouring population. 
The city's spatial structure was also intimately related to its social structure. The 
emphasis on civil property and trading rights at the expense of political rights shaped 
the process of indigeneous class formation in the city. It led to the emergence of the 
dominant and collaborationist class factions of merchants, landlords, and industrialists 
who were able to accumulate considerable property, income, and influence. Both 
economically and politically, these groups dominated the unenfranchised lower classes 
of industrial and service workers, small traders, and clerks. In between, the influential 
intelligentsia, created as a class of interpreters, but denied a voice in civic affairs until 
the mid-1920s, remained a critical and oppositional force. 
The authoritarian nature of colonial rule combined with the economics of laissez- 
faire to ensure that power and wealth determined not only the right of urban land 
acquisition but also the unregulated freedom of use of landed property. The 
individualism of both colonial and private capitalist interests precluded a conception of 
the city as an integrated social space requiring various forms of public intervention to 
ensure a sustainable and socially responsible use of land. Urban land, moreover, was a 
particularly scarce resource for wealth generation, and it increasingly tended to 
exacerbate competitive ventures within the dominant class factions; indeed, as a 
commodity, it lent itself admirably to speculative transactions. These processes ensured 
that urban development and renewal schemes, governed by the needs and preferences 
of this elite minority, remained piecemeal and incoherent. At the same time, the 
consequent rapid escalation in land values unleashed a chain reaction in terms of higher 
rents and building costs, to the great detriment of the urban poor. 
Class was thus shown to be a pervasive social cause, the blighted spatial 
environment in which the majority of citizens were compelled to live and work being 
largely the result of competing elites' attempts to realise the full market capacities of 
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their landed property. At the same time, the extreme inequality of income between the 
small minority of high-salaried executives and the large mass of employees in both 
private and public sectors, ensured the latter's poor access to basic material resources; 
inadequate wages, consistenFlyfailing to keep up with rising prices, ensured the 
persistence of high levels of social deprivation amongst the working and lower middle 
classes. Indeed, the low-wage structure of the urban economy and the social 
maldistribution of the enormous wealth accumulated by commercial and industrial 
enterprise, shaped an undynamic, "backward" capitalism which precluded any kind of 
sustainable urban development. In the absence of attempts at social redistribution 
through, for instance, state subsidies, low incomes effectively ruled out any prospect of 
mass suburbanization and the decongestioning of the city; indirectly, they also 
contributed to the gradual deterioration of the physical urban environment. 
The revolutionary impact of the First World War on the city has also emerged from 
this study and revealed, at the same time, Bombay's importance in the global network 
of Empire. The War aggravated material scarcities, widened disparities between rich 
and poor, worsened conditions of urban life, and intensified colonial repression; but 
dialectically, at the same time, the Empire's need in the crisis of war enabled the 
realisation of the full potential of the technological revolution in communications, 
bringing to the city a new discourse of civic rights that was simultaneously subverting 
the old social order within Europe. The democratic widening of the franchise, the 
importance for labour of trade union organisation, the regeneration of cities through 
planning, were some of the ideas particularly suited to a favourable reception in 
Bombay. The newspaper became the essential vehicle for the adaptation, 
vernacularization, and diffusion of the new ideas. This is why it was immediately 
perceived as a grave threat to the limited discursive domains of colonial hegemony. As 
a result, unprecedented surveillance and repression was visited upon the leading civic 
paper, the Bombay Chronicle, and its activist editor, Horninan. 
In this acceleration of the urban rhythm of communications, we have also observed 
the primary role of a critical, bilingual intelligentsia, a product of the specific colonial 
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social structure of the city. Active in a range of civic arenas which linked the worlds of 
the press, platform political oratory, social work, and labour activism, these journalists, 
barristers, and social reformers were engaged in a creative process of translating and 
vernacularizing the new ideas of citizenship. This process has also shed new light on 
the relationship between written and oral communication in the colonial city. Contrary 
to assumptions about the written and the oral inhabiting distinct and separate discursive 
domains, the rapid circulation of printed texts, in a period of acute social crisis and 
political contestation, actually led to an increase in oral transmissions of information. 
Largely disseminated by the same group of bilingual activists, these exchanges were 
viewed with considerable alarm by the authorities who vainly attempted to control the 
production and circulation of printed forms. Also underlined here is the fact that the 
value and usefulness of a language is determined less by any immanent characteristic 
(in terms of being eg `English' or `Indian') than by its perceived appropriateness and 
meaningfulness to particular social and political contexts. 
This study has also highlighted the impact of these expanded communications on 
the evolution of urban public opinion. The city's domination by an authoritarian local 
colonial state presiding over a laissez-faire economic regime was also an expression of 
the limitations and weakness of the public sphere of civil society. These hegemonies 
were now challenged by an increasingly critical public opinion shaped by the dynamic 
discourses produced by the growth of newspapers and political organisations, and by 
the emergence of trade unions and welfare associations. What mattered here was not so 
much the individual "ideology" of these new forums, but the intensified public debates 
and cumulative generation of information which their interventions provoked. It was 
the growth of this public dialogue that was now setting a new civic agenda and creating 
severe pressure on the colonial state for the expansion of civil and democratic rights as 
well as for interventionist social legislation. 
In assessing colonial practices and interventions, the importance of distinguishing 
between the central and local instances of colonial power has also emerged. The 
government of Bombay's historic power to shape the physical form of the city, its 
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financial powers and ownership of urban land, its close political involvement with the 
dominant class factions, and its responsibility for day-to-day law and order, made it a 
far more influential structure of power than the rather distant Government of India. 
Indeed, its direct class location in urban society generally inclined it towards a more 
repressive orientation vis-a-vis civil society than favoured by the central state. The local 
state's sense of its particular interests also determined the limited scope of municipal 
government, while ensuring a general policy of parsimony in public spending and 
social non-intervention in capital-labour relations. And crucially, it offered an obstinate 
resistance to demands for modern citizenship rights compared to the more manipulative 
approach of a central state now subject to global pressures. The impact of the First 
World War significantly altered the inter-colonial balance of power in favour of the 
government of India and intensified the contradictions of the local colonial regime. 
Finally, in revisiting Gandhi's strategies of public mobilization in the city, thus 
thesis has also identified the problematic anti-urbanism of Gandhian politics. Gandhian 
techniques, based essentially on an appeal to renounce the material realms of urban life, 
might have a conjunctural mobilizing effect on middle merchants, but stood little 
chance ultimately of persuading the urban commercial class to sacrifice its material 
interests for political ends. The logic of the Gandhian world-view, moreover, excluded 
the urban working classes, unlikely to respond favourably to "material renunciation", 
and increasingly attracted to the confrontational strategies and possibilities of modern 
mass agitation. The city was ultimately a far more persuasive harbinger of modernity 
than Gandhi was of tradition. In contrast to the temporary and class-specific appeal of 
the Mahatma in the Bombay of the early 1920s, the modem pleasures of cinema, 
cricket, clothes, and tea were becoming a permanent and universal feature of urban life. 
Fast-forwarding from the mid-1920s, the municipal franchise would be widened by 
the reduction of the rental qualification to five rupees in 1936, but universal adult 
franchise for all elections would have to wait until independence in 1947. Meanwhile, 
not only would social rights fail to make much headway, but the Congress Provincial 
Government, in power in Bombay between 1937 and 1939, would outdo the colonial 
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state in its repression of organised labour. Railway electrification eventually led to a 
more substantial middle-class movement towards the suburbs, but with the city 
continuing to attract a large labouring population, this would have no effect on inner city 
congestion. Moreover, the inequities of capitalist urban processes identified in this 
thesis would perpetuate themselves and continue to thwart the civic rights of housing, 
water-supply, and sanitation for the majority of the urban population. 
The perspectives of critical modernism, too, would evolve beyond this era and, 
from their urban base, achieve an influential presence in Indian society. These 
perspectives would not deny the vast reservoir of Indian tradition, nor would they 
always systematically seek to question, confront, or transform all aspects of the living 
past. But they would consistently employ new techniques of expression and modes of 
organisation to raise the possibilities of a more socially just and humane society. Local, 
grassroots forums would strive for expanded civic and human rights and for greater 
material well-being for the poorer classes; films, novels, and plays would reflect as 
much on iniquitous traditions as on repressive modernities; architecture, sculpture, 
painting, and photography would seek to re-present deep cultural structures in the light 
of modern conditions and sensibilities. 
Horniman's investigative and critical journalism would be developed and 
renovated; its ability to highlight and expose the repressive practices of both local and 
central States would become even more necessary in post-colonial India. Communist 
ideology would provide Bombay workers with new articulations of their condition, 
new possibilities of mass action, and a new vision of society; the social films of the 
1930s would address both mythological themes and modem issues; simultaneously, 
the Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA) would elaborate a new socialist 
aesthetics that would exercise considerable influence on the development of the 
performing and expressive arts; Marathi literature, increasingly devoted to fiction and 
drama would, similarly, use social realism to explore the condition of women in 
contemporary society. Decades later, long after independence, the modernist 
architecture of Charles Correa would finally address the issue of low-cost housing for 
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the urban poor, while grassroots development projects, using methods of direct 
democracy, would reveal fresh insights on poverty allievation and environmental 
regeneration. 
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Abbreviations 
BB & CI Bombay Baroda & Central India Railway 
BC Bombay Chronicle 
BEST Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company 
BG Bombay Gazette 
BITR Bombay Improvement Trust Report 
BMCR Annual Report of the Bombay Municipal Commissioner 
BNNR Bombay Native Newspaper Reports 
CI Census of India 
CWMG Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi 
DCI Weekly Reports of the Director, Criminal Investigations Department 
EPW Economic and Political Weekly 
FR Fortnightly Reports 
GIP Great Indian Peninsula Railway 
GOB Government of Bombay 
10 India Office 
MAS Modem Asian Studies 
RCLI Royal Commission on Labour in India 
TOI Times of India 
YI Young India 
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